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Abstract
This thesis addresses the problem of the challenges posed to the role and status
of the revealed Christian religion and theology in people's lives and world-views in the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It examines the problem as faced and
expressed by certain thinkers of the period in western Europe, broadly defined.
Although these challenges have been long been regarded by historians within
the general notion of 'secularisation', this was not the case for the period in question.
That religion was inescapable for the period in question is indisputable; therefore, what
did, in fact, characterise the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was a
growing uneasiness, a questioning of the role of religion, a fluidity of the boundaries
between sacred and profane and a continuous redefinition of fundamental concepts.
Religion was thus central even if challenged, as thinkers were struggling to define their
views with reference to, or as opposed to, its precepts. In view of that, in place of the
terms 'secularism' and 'secularisation' this thesis prefers to talk about the distancing
between the temporal and the divine spheres, and the redefinition of public and
private. The focus of this dissertation is on some aspects of this vast question; it aims to
address some of its implications in the moral and political realms this questioning
could have, as experienced through the struggle of Europeans to determine the role
they wanted to ascribe to religion within their life and world-views.
In order to accomplish this, this thesis brings together four thinkers who
actively engaged with the question from various angles and from different
geographical, experiential and intellectual standpoints. More specifically, it examines
four cases from four distinct areas ofwhat now constitutes western Europe. It looks at
the writings of four very influential thinkers of the period c.1580 - c.1620: Pierre
Charron, a French theologian (1541-1603); the work of Justus Lipsius, a Flemish scholar
(1547-1606); the work of Paolo Sarpi, a Venetian friar and advisor to the Venetian
Republic (1552-1623); and lastly, the work of King James VI of Scotland and I of
England (1566-1625). The four authors have been chosen mainly on the grounds of
their contribution to the discussion about the relationship between politics and
religion, and morality and religion. They represent a growing body of people who
I.
during the period that concerns us here had begun to doubt the singularity and
authority of the Christian religion in matters of politics and morals. In this respect, the
four case studies serve to illustrate the types of questions raised about the role of
religion in people's lives and world-views in the period, in the wider area of western
Europe. They thus exemplify the various areas from whence those questions arose,
while the variance in the genres of the texts and the situation of their authors operates
as an indication of the different facets of the same inescapable problem.
All four authors in question grappled in their works with the question of the
status of religion as a defining factor in the way people conceived of the Church, the
state, politics in general, truth and ethics, sacred and profane - ideas about divine and
temporal morality and their relation; the distinction between public and private;
separation of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction; the distinction between an
internalised notion of religion and an external; theory and practice; and finally the
relation and compatibility (or not) of religion with politics; religion and philosophy;
and politics and morality. What makes these contemplatives additionally interesting is
that they were regarded as ambivalent in their religious convictions. In this respect,
tills thesis is essentially an exploration in the world of ideas and shared assumptions
(mentalities), addressing questions regarding the limits of the thinkable' and the ways
in which people of the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century
understood the world aroimd them and its structures.
Alongside this main issue, the dissertation is also interested in questions
pertaining to the implantation and circulation of ideas, and appropriations of
intellectual themes, while also addressing some aspect of the complex relationship
between theory and practice. More particularly, it concentrates on the degree to which
experience informed theory or the other way rormd, as all the authors imder scrutiny
were theorists engaged with events aroimd them. Finally, this thesis highlights the
benefits of studies of intellectual history or mentalities that arc not circumscribed by
traditional national and confessional boimdaries or between political and religious
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Preface and Acknowledgements
As much as (historical) research and writing is carried out in secluded libraries
and desks, it is unrealistic to think that it is conducted in isolation from surrounding
events. The relationship of the past with the present is a complex one - for the historian,
the one informs the other. It is more than commonplace to say that the present can
sometimes be the stimulus that forces us to think about our worlci and society, while
occurrences and set circumstances in the past can serve as examples that help to see
things in different perspective and gain insight for the present. Whereas the
composition of this thesis was not inspired by contemporary events, its writing
coincided with two events with immense impact for our world. Its beginning was
marked by the dreadful occurrences of September 2001 and its closing stages by the
death of Pope John Paul II, one of the longest serving Popes in the history of the
Catholic Church. The probing of notions of 'secularisation' in early modern Europe and
the associated moral and political implications, while these two major events took place
and developed, was a striking reminder of the relevance of the study of history. Thus,
the analysis of the relationship between the religious and the political elements in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provided an intriguing parallel to events around
us. It was fascinating, for instance, to contemplate that in the September 2001 incidents
politics conceived in religious terms clashed with politics conceived in
secular/temporal. Meanwhile, among the suggested measures in Britain, remarkably,
was the implementation of an Oath of Allegiance to the Queen and the State that
subjects from all religious professions would have to take. Similarly, in Rome, the
funeral of John Paul II demonstrated the international political importance of a spiritual
leader, echoing to some extent the position and role of his sixteenth and seventeenth
century predecessors. Even more arresting, perhaps, was the fact that among the
comments made in the aftermath of the accession of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger to the
Papal throne, was an appeal to the Christian Churches to overcome their differences
and unite with Rome in a battle with the real enemy, 'secularism'.
VI.
All these were an affirmation that our world is not as secularised as some of us
might have liked. They were also a reminder that the subject matter of this study was
particularly topical, as the past few years witnessed a rigorous renegotiation of our
attitudes towards religion, and the role that it plays in our conceptions of the world, of
ethics and politics. Even if one puts the palpable anxieties raised by religious
fundamentalism to the side, one has only to think about the debates on what constitutes
offence to religious sensitivities; the discussions on the display of religious symbols;
debates about the theory of evolution; the ethics of the issue of intervention and
modification of genetic codes and cloning; abortion; suicide and euthanasia. In view of
these, this thesis proposes that a period when people went through analogous
redefinition and renegotiation of religion's role in life may provide us with useful
hindsight to contemporary tensions, uneasiness, and reconsiderations.
For the completion of this dissertation I am greatly indebted to a number of
people. First and foremost to my 'advisor', Richard Mackenney, whose breadth of
learning and perspective of European History inspired but also allowed this
undertaking - a small part of which is hopefully reflected in the scope of this thesis. To
Patricia Allerston, for her invaluable structural comments and advice, and for asking
difficult questions; to Tom Webster, for insightful discussions, for comments and advice
on James and various other aspects of the thesis; to Thomas Ahnert, for kindly
accepting to read and comment on the whole thing. I have received encouragement and
advice at different stages of the research from Michael Angold, Glenn Burgess, Owen
Dudley Edwards, Rod Lyall, Joseph Bergin, Roger Mason, David Allan, Julian Goodare,
Alan Hood, Chris Brooke, and Stephen Lloyd. The then Department - now Subject Area
- of History, at the University of Edinburgh provided me with some funds towards my
studies and some much appreciated work as a tutor for four years. I have to thank
Keith, Finn and Victoria for stimulating discussions and laughs, but mostly for keeping
one another going. Efty, Alex, Aileen, Ioannis, Tom and Helfrid deserve a note for
putting up with sharing an apartment with me, while Craig and my friends from home
for always lending a supportive ear. Words, finally, cannot express my gratitude to
Chris for all the roles he played throughout this - I'm not sure I could have made it
without you. Finally, my family (all three of them); my parents were the ones who gave
me the love of travelling in time and in space, supported me financially, and were
always there for me - even if that meant at the other end of a telephone line. This thesis
is for them.
Note on Texts and Translations
In this dissertation I have used contemporary translations of the texts analysed,
checking translations for accuracy against the originals or other contemporary
translations.
In this manner, for Charron I have used the French edition of 1607, while most of the
quotations are based on the English translation [71608] by Samson Lennard:
Peter Charron, OfWisdome (London: Edward Blount, 71608); reprinted by Da Capo
Press, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York 1971).
The original text of the quotations from the French edition can be found in Appendix
III.
A small number of remarks have been left in the original French.
For Lipsius I primarily quote from the English translation of the Constantia:
Justus Lipsius, Two Bookes ofConstancie, trans, by Sir John Stradling (London: Richard
Johnes, 1594); eds. Rudolf Kirk and Clayton Morris Hall (New Brunswick; New Jersey
Rutgers UP: 1939].
For the Politica I quote from the 1594 English translation by William Jones:
Justus Lipsius, Sixe Bookes ofPolitickes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London:
Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby, 1594); reprinted by Da Capo Press,
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York, 1970).
For Sarpi I quote from the 1629 translation of the Historia, that repeats the original
translation by Nathaniel Brent:
Paolo Sarpi, The History of the Council ofTrent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John Bill,
1629).
For James VI and I's texts, I used primarily the 1616 edition of his collected works:
James I. The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms
Verlag, 1971).
For the Treiv Laiv ofFree Monarchies and the Basilikon Doron, I have relied on the editions
by the Scottish Text Society, by James Craigie:
James Craigie (ed.), The Basilicon Doron ofKing James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh and
London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50). The edition reprints both the original edition of
1599 as well as the one of 1603; unless otherwise stated, all references are to the 1603
edition; and
James Craigie (ed.), Minor Prose Works ofKing James VI and I. (Edinburgh: Scottish Text
Society, 1982).
Throughout the text, a full reference is given the first time a source is cited in a Chapter,
and in the Bibliography; thereafter the author and a short title only is presented.
Unless stated otherwise, the italics in the text are from the original texts.
IX.
Introduction
This thesis addresses the problem of the challenges posed to the role and
status of the revealed Christian religion and theology in people's lives and
world-views in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It examines
the problem as faced and expressed by certain thinkers of the period in western
Europe, broadly defined. The period in question is often viewed as the
transitional stage between the deeply religious culture of the 'dark' middle ages
and the predominantly secular culture of modernity ('the age of reason'). The
process that brought about what Charles Trinkaus described as the
'displacement of the consciousness of God as the prime directive force in the
universe by a notion of human powers and of 'natural' forces', is generally
known as 'secularisation', first used in its modern sense in the nineteenth
century.1 Scholars, accordingly, have long been engaged with their research in
locating individuals and ideas that 'gave birth' to our modern culture, searching
for figures that promoted what they view as secular ideas.2 Evidently, of course,
1 Charles Trinkaus, 'Humanism, Religion, Society: Concepts and Motivations of Some Recent
Studies', Renaissance Quarterly 29 (1976), pp. 676-713; p. 688. Cf. also Peter Burke, 'Religion and
Secularisation', in idem (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. XIII, (Cambridge: CUP,
1979), p. 294. The New Catholic Ericyclopedia describes secularisation as the 'social and cultural
process by which non religious beliefs, practices and institutions replace religious ones in certain
spheres of life'.
2 The stance that views the Renaissance(s) and the Reformation(s) as the beginnings of
'modernity' (rationalism, political liberalism, and secularisation) permeated more perhaps older
historiographical examples; this was the thesis, for example, behind Eugene F. Rice's, The
Renaissance Idea ofWisdom. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1958) and William J. Bouwsma
Venice and the Defense ofRepublican Liberty. Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation.
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Carolina Press, 1968). It is, however, a thesis still
reflected later, among others, in David Wootton, Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and
Enlightenment. (Cambridge: CUP, 1983); Cf. Z. S. Schiffman, On the Threshold ofModernity.
Relativism in the French Renaissance. (Baltimore and London: The John Hopking UP, 1991). and J.
B. Schneewind, The Invention ofAutonomy. A History ofModern Philosophy. (Cambridge: CUP
1998).
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what this process amounts to, ultimately, is the appropriation of this material
into the various commentators' oxvn concepts of modernity.3
Yet a number of caveats ought to draw away from the interpretative
model of 'secularisation'; the first one is that the notion in question is based on a
teleological assumption and implies a linear process necessarily leading to a
secularised society. In this respect, one of the main elements that this
assumption ignores is that our modern world is not necessarily a secular one -
although perhaps some would like to consider it as such. The second and most
important one, is that, as it has long been suggested, religion was intrinsic for
the period in question, thus rendering any discussion for outright secularising
tendencies redundant.4 What did characterise the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, however, was a growing uneasiness, a questioning of the
role of religion, a fluidity of the boundaries between sacred and profane, and a
continuous redefinition of fundamental concepts, such as the relationship
between divine and temporal and public and private. Religion was thus central
even if questioned, for thinkers were struggling to define their views with
reference to, or as opposed to, its precepts. The most difficult task perhaps,
according to one view, was their attempt to 'clarify the relationship of secular
and religious values, while somehow preserving both'.5 This, however, in
accordance with Durkheim's fundamental stance, would be almost impossible,
as the realms of sacred and profane are considered in a religious society as
3 Cf. Trevor Johnson, 'Religion', in Garthine Walker, (ed.), Writing Early Modem History.
(London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), p. 140.
4 See the almost unsurpassable classical study by Lucien Febvre on how religion circumscribed
every aspect of life, from the everyday practice to vocabulary, creating a framework very
difficult to escape indeed; according to Febvre, it was nearly impossible for the people of early
modern period to think beyond religion. Lucien Febvre, The Problem ofUnbelief in the Sixteenth
Century. The Religion ofRabelais, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1982),
esp. Part IV.
5 Trinkaus, 'Humanism, Religion, Society', pp. 688-89.
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entirely separate and different, so that the two 'cannot even approach each other
and keep their own nature at the same time'.6
In view of these considerations, in place of the terms 'secularism' and
'secularisation' this thesis prefers to refer to the distancing between the temporal
and the divine spheres, interchangeable with the redefinition of the boundaries
between public and private, as in a 'secularised' society the role of religion is
entirely confined to the private sphere of human activity. In terms of the
relationship between the divine and temporal, itmay be useful to imagine the
two points of reference like two magnets, drawing and repelling one another. In
this manner, both spheres were dependent on one another, but the degree of
their dependence varied according to circumstances, and different perceptions.
With regard to the notions of public and private on the other hand, we could
think of at them as two areas where the one fuses in with the other, as the limits
between the two were constantly being negotiated and redrawn.
The starting point for what follows, therefore, is the dominance of
religion in all aspects of life and thought; theology was for a long time in
people's perception of the world the 'queen of sciences', reigning over any
moral and political considerations.7 As this world was perceived to be subject to
the divine sphere and the nextworld, morality, political organisation and
philosophy were defined by the revealed truth and ultimate metaphysical
purpose. The role of religion, however, underwent serious reconsideration
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, through the challenges for
reform, the continuing rediscovery of the classics and the civil strife that
6 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms ofReligious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1964), p. 40. The way in which this position relates to the issues
discussed here will become more intelligible when we come to discuss the relationship between
languages, particularly that of theology and that of Tacitism.
7 For a discussion of the role of theology as 'queen of sciences' and some challenges to it see
Galileo Galilei's letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany (1615); The Galileo Affair. A
Documentary History, ed. Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of
California Press, 1989), pp. 99-101.
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followed the Lutheran protest. The focus of this dissertation, thus, is on the
implications in the moral and political sphere this questioning could have, as
experienced through the struggle of Europeans to determine the role they
wanted to ascribe to religion within their life and world-views. This thesis does
not presume to answer this vast question in its entirety; it proposes instead to
address some of its main aspects in the moral and political realm and consider it
from new perspectives.
In order to accomplish this, this dissertation brings together thinkers who
actively engaged with the question from various angles and from different
geographical, experiential and intellectual standpoints. More specifically, it
examines four case studies from four distinct areas ofwhat now constitutes
western Europe. It looks at the writings of: the French theologian Pierre Charron
(1541-1603); the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius (1547-1606); the Venetian friar
and advisor to the Venetian Republic, Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623); and lastly, King
James VI of Scotland and I of England (1566-1625). Though these authors and
their texts may at first sight appear disparate and unrelated, this study will
demonstrate that they share common interests and ultimately refer to the same
fundamental questions. Rather than being a problem, their disparity in fact
serves two useful functions. On the one hand, it reveals the various strands of
thought which challenged the status of religion. On the other, the variance in the
genres of the texts and the situation of their authors ought to be taken as an
indication of the different facets of the same inescapable problem.
The four authors have been chosen mainly on the grounds of their
contribution to the discussion about the relationship between politics and
religion, and morality and religion. They represent a growing body of people
who during the period that concerns us here had begun to doubt the singularity
and authority of the Christian religion in matters of politics and morals. In this
respect, the four case studies serve to illustrate the types of questions raised
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about the role of religion in people's lives and world-views in the period, in the
wider area of western Europe. They also exemplify the various areas from
whence those questions arose. The cases of Charron and Lipsius, for instance,
reflect the effects of the spread of humanist culture, combined with the
experience of the religious wars of the sixteenth century, which sharpened the
perception of contemporaries about what kind of politics and morals were
necessary in their world.8 Sarpi and King James, on the other hand, draw
attention to the shortcomings of the Church itself, such as worldliness and
avarice, the critique raised from within by Conciliarism and evangelism, for
example. In view of these, they both argue that the lay authorities ought to take
control of ecclesiastical affairs, what was essentially the temporal facet of the
sacred element. On this question of the limits of jurisdiction between the sacred
and the profane authorities, both Sarpi and the Scottish King were involved in a
clash with the Papacy - the most powerful spiritual leader on earth.
It should not be surprising, in this regard, to observe that all four of them
operated outwith the confines ofwhat was generally accepted by the doctrine
they adhered to. Three of them, Charron, Lipsius and Sarpi, were nominally
Catholics. Two of those, Lipsius and Sarpi, were accused (in the case of Lipsius,
lawfully) of traversing confessional lines, while the third, Charron, was accused
of atheism. King James, similarly, a Calvinist by name, was also accused of
crossing religious boundaries, as his policies did not appear overtly 'Protestant'
and he was in regular communication with Catholics. Their 'heterodoxy' and
the criticisms raised against them are therefore instructive towards an
understanding of the conceived confines of the religious intellectual milieu.9
They, their premises and the networks they belonged to are indicative of a
diverse, but substantial and influential body of opinion in early modern Europe
8 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651. (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p. 33.
9 Cf. Johnson, 'Religion', Writing Early Modern History, p. 146.
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disaffected by the principles and claims of the institutionalised religion. All four
authors thus grappled in their works with the question of the status of religion
as a defining factor in the way people conceived of the Church, the state, politics
in general, truth and ethics. Importantly, their views, as articulated in their texts,
are in dialogue with one another. This does not imply that they all agreed on the
same points, but that they shared similar assumptions, and their texts dealt with
different aspects of the same problem. Comparing them allows us better to
grasp the problem as a whole, as their different concerns feed into one another.
These considerations lead us to the first related topic that this thesis
addresses, alongside the main question of the repercussions that the distancing
between temporal and divine spheres and the interrelated realignment of the
boundaries between public and private could have on a moral and political
level. Directly associated to the main theme, is the circulation of ideas. This
thesis is essentially an exploration in the world of ideas and shared assumptions
(mentalities). In this respect, it draws its inspiration from and owes a great deal
to the work begun by Bloch and Febvre earlier in the century and their
intellectual heirs, and the questions they raised regarding the 'limits of the
thinkable' and culture as a system of shared meanings, attitudes and values, and
the symbolic forms in which these are expressed or embodied.10 It is engaged,
accordingly, with mapping out a mental world, and the ways in which people of
the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century understood
the world around them and its structures. The dissertation, therefore, is
interested in questions pertaining to the implantation and circulation of ideas,
and appropriations of intellectual themes. It delves into the manner in which
elusive and abstract concepts travel, their popularity and how they are situated
10 Roger Chartier, 'Intellectual History and the History of Mentalities: A dual Re-evaluation', in
idem (ed.), Cultural History. Between Practices and Representations, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 27; Johnson, 'Religion', Writing Early Modern History, p. 146.
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according to specific environments and contexts, and their appropriation by
very diverse groups for different or similar reasons. As we will see, Charron,
Lipsius, Sarpi and King James, although from four distinct environments, share
some basic assumptions. This common awareness can simply be attributed to
similar interests; however, it can, also be explained by considerations of
intellectual exchange and a sense of unity and community.
Several links can be established between the authors in question. Charron
was aware of Lipsius's work, whom he acknowledges in his own. He had read
Lipsius through French translations that followed the publication of the Flemish
scholar's texts almost immediately. The two of them, moreover, shared an
admiration for Michel de Montaigne, with whom Charron is alleged to have met
and forged a friendship, and Lipsius corresponded. Sarpi's texts betray an
awareness of both Lipsius and Charron.11 Meanwhile, a number of common
friends from the politique and Gallican circles link Lipsius, Sarpi and James VI
and I in less immediate ways. There is evidence, for instance, that both Lipsius
and Sarpi had enjoyed the hospitality of the Neapolitan nobleman Gian
Vincenzo Pinelli (b. 1535) in Padua, where he resided from 1558.12 Sarpi
befriended Arnaud du Ferrier, an acquaintance ofMontaigne and was in
communication with the famous Francois Hotman.13 His History oftlie Interdict
was to be included in de Thou's History ofhis Own Times.14 On a different
perspective, both Sarpi and Lipsius were in communication with Cardinal
Roberto Bellarmine; the Cardinal warned and advised the Flemish scholar about
11 Besides the textual similarities and resonances, Sarpi corresponded with Peiresc, who was
involved in the transcription of Charron's letters to his editor, La Rochmaillet; see Peter N.
Miller, Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth-Century. (New Haven; London: Yale
UP, 2000), p. 6 and p. 220, note 88. See also Vittorio Frajese, 'Sarpi Interprete del De la Sagesse di
Pierre Charron: I Pensieri sulla Religione', Studi Veneziani XX (1990), pp. 59-85.
12 Paul F. Grendler, The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press, 1540-1605 (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton UP, 1977), p. 288.
13 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 9,11.
14 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 105
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'dangerous' extracts of his work, while he was involved in a passionate and
intense pamphlet exchange with the Venetian friar, whom he had once been
friends with.15 Other links between Sarpi and James include Sir Henry Wotton,
and Sir Dudley Carleton, English ambassadors to Venice, with whom the Friar
was in close connection. Sources indicate that Sarpi had received in 1612 a
pressing invitation from the king, transmitted through Sir Dudley Carleton, to
make his home in England.16 The admiration of Sarpi and the Scottish King was
mutual, although the Venetian's enthusiasm wore off as James proved less
dynamic ('active') than the Venetian had hoped for. Nonetheless, James was so
much taken by Sarpi's writings, that he sponsored the publication of his major
work, the Historia del Concilio Tridentino (London, 1619). A less evident
connection worth noting is the French translation of the History (Geneva: E.
Gamonet, 1621), made by Jean (Giovanni) Diodati; most interestingly, Diodati's
brother, Theodore, was working as a physician in the court of James I.17 Sarpi
was further admired by Hugo Grotius, an intellectual with close affiliations with
James I's circle.18 Sarpi's correspondent, finally, Jerome Groslot, had been
James's co-pupil under Buchanan; he had also travelled to England and knew
Philip Sidney, for whose death he wrote memorial verses.19 In the same way,
members of James's close surroundings such as Isaac Casaubon were of
Lipsius's correspondents.20 James was thus aware of Lipsius's work, but even
15 Wootton, p. 9.
16 Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, ed. Logan Pearsall Smith, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1907); vol. I, p. 150.
171 am particularly grateful to Prof. Rod Lyall for pointing out this fascinating connection. See
also Frances A. Yates, 'Italian Teachers in Elizabethan England', Journal of the Warburg Institute 1
(1937), p. 105, n. 2.
I am also indebted to him for the following reference, on Jerome Groslot (see below).
18 Harm-Jan Van Dam, 'Italian Friends: Grotius, de Dominis, Sarpi', Nederlands Archiefvoor
Kerkgeschiedenis, 75 (1995), pp. 200, 211.
191 am indebted to Prof. Rod Lyall for these biographical details.
20 Andriana McCrea, Constant Minds. The Lipsian Paradigtn in England, 1584-1650. (Toronto;
London: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 15-6,32, 34,236; Mark Morford, Stoics and
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though he admired it at first, he later denounced it because of the Flemish
scholar's religious inconsistency. Above all, however, all four men were
members of the 'republic of letters', the imaginary community of scholars in
sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe.21
The relationship between theory and practice is a third theme of this
thesis. The dissertation aims to examine some aspects of this complex
relationship; in particular, the degree to which experience informed theory or
the other way round. While the four figures under scrutiny were theorists, they
were not purely contemplative individuals, secluded from events around them.
Charron and Lipsius led intense lives, and were affected to a great extent by the
religious wars that plagued their countries. Sarpi and James on the other hand,
were actively involved in the 'political' affairs of their states. This difference of
the level of engagement is reflected in the ideas that the four authors put
forward - as we will see, James and Sarpi deal more with the details of
government and authority and problems of jurisdiction. Charron, however, is
more interested in the more general problem of knowledge and virtue. Both he
and Lipsius wrote from the perspective of a subject, praising the glories of
private life and advising the non-involvement of subjects in public affairs. In a
way, as itwill be shown, the writings of the two former provide the conceptual
framework within which the two latter could operate and put their ideas into
practice; in other words, the views of Sarpi and James make more sense when
considered against the intellectual background offered by Charron and Lipsius.
Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle ofLipsius. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1991), pp. 68, 84-
5; Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 87-8.
21 Peter Burke, in his paper 'Towards an Archaeology of Libraries' (unpublished), delivered in
the conference 'Material Cultures and the Creation of Knowledge' (The University of Edinburgh,
22-24 July 2005). Peter Miller's Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century.
(New Haven; London: Yale UP, 2000), is a valuable exploration in the republic of letters.
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The questioning of religion's authority in the conceptual world as well as in
everyday life, for the decades that interest us here, originated from a
combination of theoretical and experiential factors. From the theoretical point of
view, the intellectuals' preoccupation with classical studies and the classical
tradition had a formidable effect. The more widespread study of classical texts
that followed on from the engagementwith antiquity in Italy from the
beginning of the fourteenth century - the so-called Italian Renaissance - which
called for a direct access to the culture of the ancient world, and in its own
terms, independently from any mediations accumulated by time, in
combination with the preparation and printing of new editions extended the
realisation thatmorality and politics could be based on something other than
revealed truth. This, in combination with the preparation, printing and wider
circulation of new editions made it very difficult to ignore the fact that ancient
Greek and Roman intellectuals, who were unaware of Christian teachings, had
managed to excel in matters moral and political, such as Socrates, Cicero,
Aristotle or Plutarch demonstrated.
In terms of experience, conversely, the state of affairs of the Church had
caused serious criticism from various fronts, against the claims of the clergy to
be the sole authorities in morals. The perceived increased worldliness of the
Church, the Great Schism of 1378-1417, and the transformation of the Papacy
into a temporality in the course of the second half of the fifteenth and first half
of the sixteenth century had disillusioned a great number of the faithful. This
disenchantment had found expression in a number ofmovements, such as the
mystical trends of the late middle Ages (Lollards, Hussites, etc.) that were
condemned as heretical. Additionally, it had given rise to calls from within for
'reform in head and members', but also in the more juristic Conciliar movement,
that called for a greater check on the Papal authority and return to a more
collective form of Church government, rather than the Papal form of monarchy.
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The religious division of the sixteenth century, moreover, and the associated
distrust in the institution of the Church, drove some people to seek unity
through a natural religion, rather than a historically established religion. With
regard to the more immediate politico-religious experience of the second half of
the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century, the horrific conflicts that
followed the Lutheran Reformation created a widespread cynicism on both the
moral and political front. The realisation that a great number of people used
religion as a pretext in a struggle for power, be it at a local (within the politics of
a village), or a national level - such as the struggles between the rival families
and factions of the Guise and the Bourbons in France - created resentment
towards the institutionalised form of religion among many believers. Equally,
and precisely because the conflicts had religion at their root, a more politicised
approach was called for, in order to resolve the problems peacefully. By the
same token, the civil disorder caused by religious strife had led to a
reconsideration of the relations between Church and State. In the case of Italy,
meanwhile, where religious conflict did not erupt as such, the disenchantment
in the realm of politics came by the sixty year-long Italian wars (1494-1559) and
the Papacy's infamous involvement in them. All this brought about some
serious questions on whether (Christian) morality had any place in politics, and
ultimately, whether religion was compatible with politics.
Yet despite this multifaceted assault on the status, role and authority of
religion, the seventeenth century witnessed an attempt by the state to re-
appropriate religion and transfer authority to the person of the prince himself.
This is the effect of James's arguments in which he insisted that the sovereign
was God's lieutenant on earth, responsible for the welfare of the body and soul
of his subjects. This is another instance that contests the 'secularisation' model:
in the decades after the period under examination, the prevalent notion was that
of a king as the representative of God on earth. Instead of 'secularised' politics,
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thus, we are now faced with sanctified politics (see Hobbes) and a deified
monarch (see Louis XIV), or as Charles Trinkaus described it a 'tendency to
secularise the sacred while simultaneously sacralising the secular'.22 Put in the
terms of this thesis, the distance between the temporal and the divine sphere
became so great, that the king had to replace God in this world. From a different
point of view, the void that was left by the Church's inability to provide the
references that integrated social life was filled by the political authorities, who
replaced the collapsed order through political law.23
The years between C.1580-C.1620 were indeed turbulent and chaotic. In
the aftermath of the religious wars and severely traumatised by them, people
were trying to rebuild their confidence in the political and ecclesiastical
structures. The Council of Trent (1545-52,1562-3) had failed to reconcile the two
bitterly opposing religious denominations, while in the German Lands the only
viable religious settlement seemed to be the Peace of Augsburg (1555), an
essentially 'political' solution. The publication of the Tridentine canons and
decrees, furthermore, prepared the ground ideologically for the wars that began
in the 1560s, as it defined the limits of 'Catholicism' in a strict sense.24 At the
point where this thesis begins the religious and civil strife in France and the
Netherlands was at its height; the English intervention in the Low Countries
with the expedition of the Earl of Leicester (1585) ended badly, while in France
things escalated on a different level with the rebellion of the Catholic League
(1585) and the assassination of Henri III (1589). On the other hand, the Spanish,
the main Catholic players in the wars, were defeated in 1588 (Spanish Armada),
22 Trinkaus, 'Humanism, Religion, Society', p. 688.
23 Michel de Certeau, The Writing ofHistory, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia UP, 1988),
pp. 153-4.
24 Donald R. Kelley, The Beginning of Ideology/. Consciousness and Societal in the French Reformation.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1981), p. 39.
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while the French joined forces with the English and the Dutch against them in
1596.
Yet there seemed to be a relatively peaceful pause after the cessation of
strife in France and the Low Countries and with peace between England and
Spain (1604). The wars that had afflicted the kingdom of France for almost four
decades (1562-98) came to an end with the abjuration of Henri IV (1593) and the
later Edict of Nantes (1598). The illusion of stability that these major events had
given, however, was quickly shattered by the religious overtone of the
assassination of the French king (1610). In the Low Countries, the bloody
contention with Spain that had lasted for five decades (1566-1609) came to a halt
in 1609 with the Twelve-year Truce that divided the Low Countries along a
confessional line. The temporary nature of truce, however, left no delusions
about the stability of the situation. The state of affairs in Britain was far from
stable either; James VI's accession to the throne of Elizabeth (1603) may have
settled the succession problem but it created a great number of others. For
James's Catholic subjects the attempt of 1605 was their last hope of returning the
country to the bosom of Rome. In Italy, the relations between the Venetian
Republic and Rome underwent serious tension between 1606-7, the period of the
Interdict. All these unresolved and interrelated issues caused a widespread
uneasiness, and some awareness that tension was building for a later clash. The
conflict eventually began in 1618 in Bohemia, and involved the whole of western
Europe, in one way or another, for thirty years.
This intense set of circumstances forms the historical background against
which the following examination of the role of religion in people's perception of
the world ought to be located. From an intellectual point of view, it is further
crucial to acknowledge that any discussion that took place on the subject of
morals or politics did so within the framework of 'languages' or 'traditions'.
There have been extensive debates, mainly among scholars of political thought,
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as to which of the two terms is more helpful, but the two are generally used
interchangeably. The main difference between them is that the concept of
'language' entails less self-consciousness by the person who ascribes to it.25 The
theorists that concern us here, however, quite intentionally aligned themselves
with specific traditions and utilised their respective languages accordingly. The
two main languages available to the literati of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries were that of theology, and that which can generally be described as
humanistic. The latter was associated with the stiidia humanitatis that centred
around classical learning, and in particular the study of grammar, rhetoric,
history, poetry and moral philosophy.26 A third, very closely associated with the
humanistic was the juristic language of civil law. These three languages, in turn,
can be sub-divided into others: some of the branches of the theological strand
and ones thatwill be referred to in the course of this study were, for instance,
Augustinianism, scholasticism, Arminianism, and in a different form,
Conciliarism. Offshoots of the language of humanism were Scepticism, Stoicism,
Tacitism, and Ciceronianism. It is important to note that it was common for all
these languages and sub-languages to be used interchangeably or in
combination with one-another in discourse. Sceptical arguments, thus, that
emphasised the limitations of human reason and the weakness of the human
condition were particularly compatible, as we will see in due course, with
25 For discussions on languages and traditions see J.G.A. Pocock, 'The Concept of a Language
and the Metier d'Historien: Some Considerations in Practice" in A.R. Pagden (ed.), The Lcmguages
ofPolitical Theory in Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), pp. 19-38; and Andrew
Lockyer, '"Traditions" as Context in the History of Political Theory', Political Studies 117 (1979),
pp. 201-17.
26 For valuable discussions on the concept of'humanist' see Paul F. Grendler's 'Five Italian
Occurrences of Umanista, 1540-74', Renaissance Quarterly, 20 (1967), pp. 317-25; and 'The Concept
of Humanist in Cinquencento Italy' in Renaissance Studies in Honor ofHans Baron, ed. A. Molho
and J.A. Tedeschi (Florence/De Kalb, 111.: Sansori Editori & Northern Illinois UP, 1971), pp. 447-
63; reprinted in idem (ed.), Culture and Censorship in Late Renaissance Italy a?id France (London:
Variorum Reprints, 1981), ch. 6. In the latter he notes the changes the meaning of the term
underwent from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century, indicating that during the sixteenth
century the humanists were seen as scholars in disciplines unrelated to the active life.
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doctrines of Augustinianism and orthodox Calvinism that placed great stress on
the effect that original sin had on human nature. Conversely, the prominence
given to nature, human reason, and by consequence free-will, was an element
that brought together Thomist, Neo-Aristotelian, Stoic, Jesuitical, and even
Arminian stances. The employment of different modes of expression depended
on a number of variables, such as the topic one intended to tackle, the desired
effect, the training and the profession of the author. In this manner, for instance,
the humanist scholar Lipsius, as we will see in the following chapters, used a
primarily Stoic line of reasoning in the Constantia, but modified itwith
theological elements in order to make it acceptable to his audience. Similarly,
although much of James VI and I's line of reasoning depends, as we will see, on
the theological language, he also makes use of juristic argumentation as the
issues he deals with are of that nature.
The issue of languages is important inasmuch as it determined specific
approaches to moral and political questions. Discussing politics or morality,
thus, within a Christian theological framework, had a different effect than
discussing these issues in a humanist or naturalistic context, both of which
placed more emphasis on earthly values. The fundamental assumption of the
theological discourse was that temporal affairs had as an ultimate end the divine
sphere; this world, and people's conduct on earth were subject to a metaphysical
cause. In this context, politics and morality had to rely on revealed truth and
divine precepts. The naturalistic/humanist approach, however, stressed that the
basis could be found on earth; morality thus could exist autonomously, and the
end of politics was the welfare of the people (subjects) on this earth in general,
according to the examples of ancient traditions that managed to exist unaware
of the Christian God.
The difficulty in defining the limits of sacred and profane or political,
religious, and moral discourses for the period in question reflects the intense
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process of reclassification taking place around fundamental notions. The fluidity
of basic concepts upon which people of the period in question constructed their
lives with the redefinition of concepts such as 'reason', 'providence and free
will', 'superstition', 'welfare of the public', 'prudence', 'reason of state',
legitimation of 'authority' and 'resistance', corresponds to the reconfiguration of
the limits between profane and sacred and public and private and to the parallel
redrawing of the boundaries of 'academic' disciplines. Theology was to be
stripped of its position as the 'queen of disciplines' while subjects such as
(natural) philosophy, history and law emerged as autonomous disciplines in
their own right, of equal importance to theology. Indeed, what this
transformation denoted was the emergence and recognition of the possibility of
different world-views.
For the modern commentator, this difficulty in definition(s) becomes
most apparent when one discusses and defines terms that sit uncomfortably on
what modern thinking understands as the borders of these spheres and
discourses. For this reason, 'problematic' terms and modes of thought have so
far been examined as distinct entities, in isolation from one-another, ignoring
the many interconnections between them. Thus the notion of superstition, on
the border between the sacred and the profane, terms and bodies of thought that
lie in-between concepts of Church and state (or politics and religion) such as the
Conciliar movement, Gallicanism and Anglicanism, the doctrines of the
politiques, what came to be known as 'Erastianism', toleration, divine right
monarchy, and eirenicism have always been regarded as problematic, and
because they are in themselves complex, they are rarely juxtaposed. Further
than these, however, the complexity of political and religious issues is perhaps
nowhere more obvious than in the concept of 'Protestant' and 'Protestantism'
themselves, notions at the heart, namely, of the religious and political culture of
the early modern period. As Richard Mackenney has pointed out, although we
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are used to identifying the term with a set of religious beliefs, it derives from a
'refusal voiced by secular rulers in a secular assembly against their secular
superior - in the matter of religion' (Imperial Diet at Speyer, 1529).27 One of the
principal aims of this dissertation, therefore, is to re-emphasise the role of
religion in our understanding of the history of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries,28 and underline its function as a principal 'mental tool' in discussions
of politics and morality of this period, as people of the time would see it.29
This thesis proposes to study the relations and interconnections between several
concepts as they were understood by four selected thinkers at the start of the
seventeenth century, as expressions of the problem of the reconsideration of the
role of religion in their concept of the world. The four case-studies of writings
by Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and James, accordingly, provide us with evidence
regarding the construction of relations between wisdom and morality, politics
and morality, wisdom/knowledge and religion, morality and religion, politics
and religion, divine and temporal, public and private. Discussion on some of
these terms was conducted within the context of closely related theories, such as
the fourfold scheme of (the cardinal) virtues, and the theory of passions. Both
were essential for discussions on morals, as they provided a canon of principles
to be followed and of the passions to be avoided. 'Cardinal' (from cardo: a hinge,
27 Richard Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe. Expansion and Conflict (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1993), p. 170.
28 Cf. Mack P. Holt, 'Putting Religion Back in the Wars of Religion', French Historical Studies 18
(1993), pp. 524-51.
29 The phrase 'mental tool' refers to Febvre's famous analysis of the outillage mental- see Religion
ofRabelais, Part IV, ch. 10. The interconnections between politics and religion, or religion and the
state - more so, perhaps, than the interconnections betweenmorality and religion - have
attracted some more interest recently; see for example Harro Hopfl, ]esuit Political Thought. The
Society ofJesus and the State, c. 1540-1630. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) and Jotham Parsons, The
Church in the Republic. Gallicanism and Political Ideology in Renaissance France. (Washington DC:
Catholic University of America, 2004). See also the very interesting collection of essays on the
issue of superstition by Helen Parish and William G. Naphy, (eds.), Religion and Superstition in
Reformation Europe. (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 2002).
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that on which a thing turns, its principal point) were the four principal virtues
(prudence-temperance-justice-fortitude) upon which the rest of the moral
virtues revolved, in the sense that they were the common qualities of all other
moral virtues. Their origin could be traced to classical sources (Plato, Aristotle),
while they were also treated by St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, modifying Plato's
theory, situated the cardinal virtues in the faculties. He placed prudence in the
intellect, justice in the will, while he associated temperance and fortitude with
the sensitive appetites, the former to restrain pleasure, and the latter to urge on
impulses of resistance to fear which would deter a person from strenuous action
under difficulties. The theory of passions30 was intimately linked with the
virtues, since, according to Cicero the source of passion is 'intemperamentia', a
state in which the passions are not controlled by the reason. This theory was
also classical in origin, and it was particularly in vogue with the Stoics and the
Sceptics, for whom man's ideal condition was 'apatheia' (anadeia: indifference,
composure) and 'ataraxia' (arapafia: state devoid of any perturbation or
distress). The two schools, however, differed as to whether passions were to be
eradicated or moderated.31 The theory was taken later on by Augustine who
assigned the management of passions to the will rather than reason, thus
accentuating the moral implications of the handling of passions.
Conceptually, the notions of divine and temporal, public and private,
their subdivisions and the related virtues can be visualised as a quadruple
circular model (figure 1). The model assumes that the sphere of religion's
dominance can be broken down into four different aspects. First, horizontally,
between divine and temporal; this separation is most eloquently expressed in
30 See Anthony Levi, French Moralists. The Theory of the Passions 1585 to 1649. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1964), ch. 1.
31 Levi, French Moralists, pp. 11-13.
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the work of Pierre Charron, which will be examined in the first chapter. Second,
vertically, as a division between public and private, for which separation we
will be using Lipsius as our guide (Ch. 2). The two incisions create four
compartments: divine and private (faith); divine and public (piety, worship);
temporal and public (prudence, civility); and temporal and private (constancy,














The subdivisions of this scheme are helpful in discussions of jurisdiction
- modern western concepts of politics are confined to the section of temporal
and public, while religion is conceived as divine and private. In the sixteenth
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and seventeenth centuries, however, the Church claimed jurisdiction over the
areas of divine public and private, temporal and private, as well as public and
temporal. The rhetoric of separate jurisdictions or 'two kingdoms' argued for
distinction between temporal and public (civility) and divine and public
(religious practice). Ideas of toleration were based on the concept that the
temporal authorities should not have any jurisdiction upon divine and private,
as long as subjects were obedient in all the public aspects of their duties. The
four authors considered in this dissertation acknowledged the distinct existence
of these four compartments, with distinct features and - to a greater or lesser
degree - independent of one-another. Theocratic writers of the time however,
did not recognise any differentiation between these aspects; they saw them all as
part of the same whole. When Papal apologists spoke of the separation of
jurisdictions they granted control of public and temporal to lay authorities. The
authors examined here, by contrast, regarded the realm of politics as
corresponding to the human/temporal and thus morally inferior sphere - they
saw, on the other hand, private as corresponding to the divine.32 This implies
that as political affairs were inherently corrupt, there was a greater degree of
leniency, while moral integrity and communicationwith God would be limited
to the inner compartment of human affairs. This also relates to the other more
general question that this thesis is addressing, the association between theory
and practice. In this context, we can take, for instance, the divine sphere and the
private compartment to be analogous to theory, and the general principles that
only remain intactwhen they do not become tainted with the temporal realities,
politics, and ultimately, practice.
From this point of view, there is an ascending scheme in this study, as it
begins with the author least involved in affairs of the state (Charron), to the one
32 Cf. Durkheim, Elementary Forms ofReligions Life, p. 37.
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most involved (James VI and I). This is clearly reflected in the types of texts they
compose, and the arguments they put forth. Charron and Lipsius's treatments
on the separation of the divine and temporal and the public and private spheres
are thus more theoretical than the texts by Sarpi and James that placed more
emphasis on the issue of the separation of jurisdictions. As they deal more with
theory, they also provide the conceptual bases for understanding the ideas that
Sarpi and James put forth. Sarpi's proposal for the separation of jurisdictions is
directly founded on the notion of a private, internalised religion, in immediate
contact with the celestial God. It is, moreover, related to the notion that
temporal reality is not closely linked to the divine, at least not while people
wander the earth. The same pertains to James's view that religious dissent was
to be tolerated, so long as it did not find expression in the public arena. Equally,
his request for his subjects' pleading of allegiance corresponded to the notion of
the detachment of the temporal sphere from that of the divine, as it forced his
subjects to give priority to temporal affairs while on this earth, and leave the
celestial considerations for the afterlife.
All the theorists considered here understood the four notions as more or
less distinct and the quadruple division of the scheme as a given. The discussion
of their works and views will begin with an examination of Pierre Charron's De
la Sagesse, Trois Livres (1601) (Ch. l).The text, a treatise on wisdom, and a
handbook on how to attain human -as opposed to, divine - wisdom, sets the
ground for the first conceptual division, between celestial and earthly concerns.
The discussion on Charron's human wisdom will introduce the languages
associated with the classical tradition, such as Stoicism, scepticism,
Aristotelianism and neo-Platonism, which the author employed in his analysis,
occasionally blending them with some Augustinian elements. In this manner,
the chapter will refer to the relationship between certain classical traditions and
religion, and the sort of questions the use of these currents of thought raised for
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the role of religion. In the next chapter, attention turns to Justus Lipsius's two
texts, De Constantia Libri Duo (1584), a book on moral philosophy prescribing the
individual's conduct in times of public afflictions, and Politicorum Sive Civilis
Doctrinae Libri Sex (Leiden, 1589), a treatise that belongs to the genre of the
'mirror for princes'. With these two works Lipsius established two distinct codes
of conduct in private (Constantia) and public (Politico) affairs. The analysis of
these two texts leads on to discussions of Lipsius's particularly favoured
traditions, the Stoic line of reasoning, and the Tacitean style. This discussion will
show the implications the two traditions brought to questions on morality,
politics and religion.
Chapter Three takes as a case in point Paolo Sarpi's most important work,
the Historia del Concilio Tridentino (London, 1619; translated as History of the
Council ofTrent, 1620). This is a historical work that deals with the issues raised
by the Lutheran Reformation, the reaction of the Papal and Imperial side and
the failure, as Sarpi sees it, of the Catholic Church to reform itself through the
long process of the Council of Trent (1545-52,1562-3). One of the main themes
that concerned Sarpi in this work was the separation between political and
ecclesiastical jurisdictions, a position that almost naturally ensued from
Lipsius's and Charron's standpoints: the civil authorities, as inherently
temporal, had to have control over earthly affairs, in the public realm.
According to Sarpi, the Church, on the other hand, as an institution in contact
with the divine, ought to have jurisdiction over spiritual matters, and the
salvation of souls. These concerns were, moreover, confined to the private
realm, where they would cause no problems to the peace and welfare of the
state. His specific position in the History was that, at the root of the problems
that gave rise and impetus to the protest of disaffected believers, was the
Church's intrusion into temporal affairs - which had left the Church devoid of
its spiritual nature and purpose. Within these premises, the solution could only
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come from lay authorities, the only source of power equipped to deal with the
affairs of this world. The analysis of Sarpi's History leads naturally to the
discussion of Conciliar modes of thought in ecclesiastical matters, and to notions
of evangelical internalised forms of religion, both of which form an integral part
of his viewpoint and arguments in support of it.
King James's works deal with very similar problems and from a similar
perspective. The specific problems that faced James while in Scotland, having to
establish his authority in an environment in which the process of the
Reformation had produced a church financially dependent upon the state but all
the more anxious as a result to stress its autonomy, combined with the fact that
his position was undermined through Papal intervention in the aftermath of the
Gunpowder Plot, made him quite assertive in his understanding of the limits of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. His position as the sovereign of his kingdom
(kingdoms after 1603), gave him the conviction that only under lay control
would the Church flourish without problems. The concern, thus, of the fourth
chapter will be to discuss these viewpoints through the examination of several
of James's works, starting from the ones produced during his clash with the
Papacy on the issue of the Oath of Allegiance. The discussion will touch on
James's theological conception of monarchy that cut across Charron's division
between divine and temporal. Itwill also discuss his use of Conciliar arguments
against the Papacy, and his frequent references to the Byzantine example of
Church-state relations, that placed the Church within a historical - and hence,
temporal - context placing it under the Imperial ('political') control. In this
manner, the four case-studies demonstrate both the domains from whence the
attack on religion originated, as well as the implications of this attack for
matters moral and political. Yet it is essential to note, that in a world and an era
as deeply religious as the one in consideration, neither the attack nor the
implications could be as extreme and conclusive as the following examination
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may imply. What is more, the theories expounded were not always fully
developed by their advocates, neither were they without flaws. They do,
however, represent some of the more influential modes of expression and
traditions of thinking in their time.
The exposition of the texts and the main themes that they concentrate on
brings us to the last major point of this study: in addition to caution directed
against the dangers of anachronism and teleology, this dissertation raises some
questions about the usefulness of some traditional boundaries in our
conception, and consequently, our examination of early modern history. The
first categorisation refers to the somewhat simplistic distinction of history of this
period into political, religious, and cultural sectors, and the subdivision of early
modern history of the mental world into various classifications of history, from
intellectual, to literary criticism and history of political thought. It can be argued
that these categories are more a reflection of academic disciplines than it is self-
evident in contemporary texts themselves.33 The centrality of religion in the
period under examination is more influential in approaches to religious culture
and the manifestation of popular devotion and worship, than in studies of the
shared assumptions behind these.34 This is above all evident in the selection of
33 The most prominent example in reference to this study is Cardinal Bellarmine, a prolific and
ingenious author, and the main propagandist of the Papal side, whose work has not seriously
been studied by intellectual historians or historians of political thought; the only existing
monograph on him is more in the area of hagiography than history as we understand it: James
Brodrick, Robert Bellarmine. Saint and Scholar. (London: Burns & Oates, 1961). Similarly, the most
thorough study of the Council of Trent has been produced by Hubert Jedin, a Catholic priest: A
History of the Council ofTrent. 2 vols., trans. Dom Ernest Graf (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1957-61).
34 The division of the history of religion between the study of beliefs and the study of practices is
fairly traditional, although the boundaries between these fields are often elusive; Johnson,
'Religion', Writing History, p. 140. See for example the wealth of studies in popular religious
culture such as - indicatively - Keith Thomas's pioneering Religion and the Decline ofMagic.
Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England. (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1971); John Bossy, Christianity in the West, 1400-1700. (Oxford: OUP, 1985); R. W.
Scribner and Trevor Johnson (eds.), Popidar Religion and Popular Culture in Germany and Central
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texts for analysis by modern commentators. In this case, Sarpi's extended
discussions in the History of the Council of Trent on doctrinal and sacramental
questions, and James's frequent usage of a theological language, have not
attracted much attention from historians of political thought.
The second boundary not always useful in studies of the intellectual
world of the period in question, and one that will become especially apparent in
the course of this thesis, is that of nation.35 The international nature of the so-
called 'republic of letters', an 'imagined community of scholars extended in time
as well as space',36 has long been acknowledged. Its members, who felt that they
shared common interests and concerns, were in frequent communication with
one another through the exchange of letters. Even though vernacular (not yet
'national') languages started to emerge at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, all scholars were versed in Latin, and most of the intellectual exchange
took place in Latin. When assessing thinkers or ideas at the start of the
seventeenth century, hence, we ought to consider them in a wider framework
that supersedes national contexts. In the cases that concern us here, James, Sarpi,
Charron, and Lipsius moved in similar circles, had common friends, some of
them were in communication with one-another, and were certainly aware of
one-another's works. The exchanges between French and Italian, French (mostly
Fluguenots) and Dutch, Dutch and Italian, Scottish and French, and English,
Dutch and Italian intellectuals are generally acknowledged. Yet the case for
England as part of a wider European context is more contentious; English
historiography has long insisted on the peculiarity and insularity of the English
Europe 1400-1800 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars.
Traditional Religion in England c. 1400 - c. 1580 (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1992).
35 See the questions raised by the 'New' Trans-national History; cf. for example the opinion piece
by Konrad H. Jaraush, 'Reflections on Trannsnational History', in a discussion in
http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/Trans/forum trans index.htm, and C. Conrad,
'National History as Transnational Object, Representations of the Past: The Writing of National
Histories in Europe', Newsletter 1, October 2004.
36 Burke, 'Towards an Archaeology of Libraries'.
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case and experience, and has also treated the history of the British Isles as such.
And even though there are some valid reasons for this insistence, this thesis
shows that at least for the reign of the early Stuarts (James in this case) it does
not stand. This is perhaps more obvious in cases of politico-religious matters
than religious-moral issues. It was certainly linked to the fact that although one
could talk about the emergence of a small number of 'national' Churches, the
general frame of reference for the Catholics was still Rome, while Protestantism
undoubtedly also demonstrated elements of 'internationalism'.
In these respects, the present thesis is intended to supplement and
amplify existing work, more particularly - and most strikingly, in the area of
interaction across confessional boundaries. The four cases examined here serve
as an indication that occasionally people found it easier to communicate with
followers across the lines of confessional demarcation than with people who
nominally belonged to their own doctrine. Lipsius characteristically switched
confessions a number of times in his life; Sarpi although a friar was always, and
often still is, regarded as an atheist or (crypto) Protestant; and James, raised as
Calvinist, was throughout his life liable to accusations of Catholicism. This
element is only intelligible if we recognise the 'shadings' of religious doctrine;
'temperate' Catholics and Protestants were closer to one another than they were
to the extremists of the respective sides. Thus, evangelical reforming Catholics
(whose ideas later found expression through the Jansenists), who were
marginalised by Tridentine decisions, were - and indeed some of them felt -
closer to the 'Protestants' than it is generally acknowledged. From a different
perspective,'Arminian' Protestants who put great emphasis on the freedom of
will, were strikingly close to the teachings of the Jesuits.37 Equally, extreme
37 Cf. Fulgenzio Micantio's (Sarpi's close friend and biographer) letter to Marco Antonio de
Dominis: 'I remember that... not only myself, but Padre Paolo [Sarpi] had a conceit that
[Arminianism] ... is a very dangerous doctrine unto the Reformed Religion, and by going along
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Calvinism promoted theocratic views of state and society that were indeed
almost identical with the extreme Papalist doctrines of the same sort.38 It is also
reasonable to speak of similarities between the arguments put forth by the
Anglican and the Gallican Church, as both advanced their independence from
Rome and some state control over Church matters.39 Overall, the blurring of
these confessional boundaries and identities was due to the considerable
variation that existed within the doctrines, greater than either the respective
Churches or the historiographies have acknowledged. Awareness of this will
contribute to a better understanding of the complexities involved in the study
and analysis of the troubled sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With regards
to the specific texts examined here, one can say thatmost of them broadly
belong to the confines of the Catholic world, but they are unconventional texts:
most of them caused controversies, or were put on the Index of Prohibited
Books. They were, thus, directed against the organised Catholic Church - which
was the point of contactwith the writings of James, whose stance was inherently
anti-Papal.
Reservations about these boundaries also lead to questions about the
usefulness of the boundaries of periodisation; the period of c. 1580-1620 is
variously described as Tate Renaissance', as the age of the 'Counter-', 'Catholic',
or 'Tridentine' Reformation, or the age of the 'baroque'.40 Similarly, the
expression of fervent religious feeling that contributed to the horror of the
by a Pelagianism it would introduce Jesuitism..cited in Van Dam, 'Italian Friends', pp. 206-7,
n. 25.
38 Thus James in his Premonition to all Mightie Monarchs (1609) about (the Jesuit) Bellarmine: 'But
it is no wonder he takes the Puritanes part, since Iesuits are nothing but Puritan-papists', in James I.
The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971); p. 305.
39 One could perhaps venture to suggest that the modern scholars' unawareness of the shading
of religious doctrine is a reflection of the 'confessionalisation' of the Academy itself.
40 For a passionate reassessment of these terms, see John W. O'Malley, Trent and All That.
Renaming Catholicistn in the Early Modern Era. (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England:
Harvard UP, 2000). See also Jose Antonio Maravall, Culture of the Baroque, trans. Terry Cochran
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 1986).
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religious wars that plagued the continent throughout the sixteenth century,
together with the 'confessionalisation' process, makes for comparisons between
the 'secular' and 'reason-driven' Renaissance(s) with the more passionate and
devout 'baroque', thus obscuring our perception of continuities between the
findings of the earlier Renaissance thinkers and their later counterparts.41
Accordingly, thinkers such as Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi or James, who defy
classification and who acknowledge their debt to their immediate and more
remote past, become difficult to categorise.42
That difficulty itself questions the presupposition that a process of
secularisation took place, let alone that it was a predetermined development. In
this respect, the line followed in the examination of the four figures in question
and their works is not one of assumed progression and teleology; that is to say,
the thesis does not startwith the less 'secularised' and move to the more
'secularised' position. On the contrary, the whole idea of secularisation itself
comes into question if one considers the divine-right theories that we will see
James advancing they were in fact closer to medieval concepts of governance
than they were 'modern', as we understand the term. In the case that, as James
advocated, the king assumes the position of God's representative on earth, then
41 The irregularities and contradictions of such periodisation are perhaps more eloquently
illustrated in the case of England, where the 'Renaissance' post-dated the Reformation.
42 Part of the paradoxes described here and some of the inconsistencies are eloquently expressed
in the following titles: William J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense ofRepublican Liberty.
Renaissance Values in the Age of the Coimter Reformation. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
Carolina Press, 1968); idem, The Waning of the Renaissance 1550-1640. 2nd edition (New Haven:
Yale UP, 2002); David Wootton, Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and Enlightenment. (Cambridge:
CUP, 1983); Jason L. Saunders, Justus Lipsius. The Philosophy ofRenaissance Stoicism (New York:
The Liberal Arts Press, 1955); Leonard Forster, 'Lipsius and Renaissance Stoicism', Festschrift for
Ralph Parrel, ed. A. Stephens, H.L. Rogers and Brian Coghlan (Bern-Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1977),
pp. 201-220; J. H.M. Salmon, 'Gallicanism and Anglicanism in the Age of Counter-Reformation'
in idem, Renaissance and Revolt, Essays in the Intellectual and Social History ofEarly Modern France
(Cambridge: CUP, 1987), pp. 155-188; David Howarth, David, Images ofRide. Art and Politics in
the English Renaissance, 1485-1649. (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997); Rosario Villari
(ed.), Baroque Personae, trans. Lydia Cochrane (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1995).
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the notion of 'secularisation' as a linear and completed process becomes
redundant. What is more, it has to be underlined that in the terms of this
dissertation, the separation of the divine from the temporal sphere should not be
understood as being the same as the subordination of the former to the latter.
The arguments and positions that will interest us here originated within a
system that, whether it acknowledged some autonomy of the temporal sphere
or not, still operated under the condition that everything depended on the
divine to a smaller or a greater degree.43
On that account, the views thatwill be examined provide interesting
angles on what essentially constitutes one problem, the questioning of the
relationship between the temporal and the divine spheres. The most eloquent
expression of this problem will be the subject of the first chapter.
43 Trinkaus, 'Humanism, Religion, Society', p. 689.
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Chapter I
Moral Implications (1): Divine and Human







Pierre Charron's De la Sagesse, Trois Livres (1601) is a work so diverse and rich
that a key Renaissance historian was led to assert that its author, Pierre Charron
(1541-1603), might be 'one of the keys to our understanding of how the
Renaissance gave way to the seventeenth century'.1 With a somewhat
uncommon title and subject for its time, a guide for attaining human wisdom,
the Sagesse was destined to be at the centre of heated controversies for centuries
following its initial publication. The author, a French theologian, preacher and
trained lawyer who took part in the French religious wars on the side of the
Catholic League, was himself an interesting figure. The Sagesse was not his first
or only written work; he composed a few other texts, mainly Catholic
apologetics; his name, nevertheless, would not necessarily have survived, had it
not been for the Sagesse. The popularity it enjoyed is evidenced by its numerous
editions: thirty-nine from 1601 to 1672 (despite the fact that it was placed on the
Index of Prohibited Books in 1605), of which, no less than thirteen appeared
between 1618 and 1634.2
1 Paul F. Grendler, 'The Enigma of Wisdom in Charron', Romance Notes 4 (1962); p. 50.
2 In addition to these, Richard Tuck talks about eight English editions between 1608 and 1670;
Philosophy and Government 1572-1651. (Cambridge: CUP, 1993); p. 83. See Index des Livres Interdits,
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Studies on Charron have been coloured by the theologian's association
with the great Michel de Montaigne (1533-92): he was conceived to be the
latter's disciple or, less flatteringly, Montaigne's plagiariser or 'herbier', or,
according to a different interpretation, Lipsius's and Montaigne's synthesiser.3
Conversely, and equally controversially, he has been variously described as a
precursor to Hobbes;4 an advocator of an autonomous ethics,5 and his name has
been placed next to Machiavelli's,6 while his Sagesse has also been labelled as
the breviary of the Libertins.7Twenty years after its publication, moreover, the
work was at the centre of heated religious debates between Jesuits and their
adversaries, as a text that promoted atheism. Even contemporary scholars
ed. J.M. Bujanda, vol. XI: Index Librorum Prohibitomm 1600-1966 (Canada and Geneva:
Mediaspaul and Librairie Droz, 2002), p. 214.
3 The characterisation 'Montaigne's herbier' implies that Charron would collect and dry
Montaigne's 'herbs' (thoughts) and represent them. The idea that Charron was closely following
Montaigne either as a disciple or a plagiariser has a long history: it seems that it has originated
by Charles Sorel's La bibliotheque Frangoise de M.C.Sorel on le Choix et I'Examen des Livres Frangois
qui Traitent de VEloquence de la Philosophie, de la Devotion, et de la Conduite des Moeurs (Paris 1664) -
as quoted by Jean Daniel Charron, The 'Wisdom' ofPierre Charron. An Original and Orthodox Code
ofMorality. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 32. For the
persistence of the view, cf. Charles A. Saint-Beuve, Causeries du Lundi, vol. IV (Paris: Gamier
Freres, 1852-62); A. Delboulle, 'Charron Plagiaire de Montaigne', Revue d'Histoire Litteraire de
France, 7 (1900), pp. 284-296. Peter Miller characterises Charron as the synthesiser of Montaigne
and Lipsius in his Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth-Century. (New Haven;
London: Yale UP, 2000); p. 33.
4 Paul F. Grendler, 'Pierre Charron: Precursor to Hobbes', Review ofPolitics, 25 (1963), pp. 212-
224.
5 Maryanne C. Horrowitz, 'Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethics: Pierre
Charron's De la Sagesse', Studies in the Renaissance, 21 (1974), pp. 204-227.
6 Cf. the nuncio Del Bufalo's dispatch: 'Every day some scandalous book comes out off the press,
among them a recent one, similar to the impious doctrine of Machiavelli, entitled Wisdom, and
composed by a theologal and canto of the Cathedral of Condom,who had no sooner finished this
foul work filled with heresies when he suddenly died' (Del Bufalo to Aldobrandini, 10 Feb.
1604), cited in A. Soman, 'Pierre Charron: A Revaluation', Bibliotheque d'Huma?iisme et
Renaissance, XXXII (1970), p. 71. For a refutation of Charron's 'machiavellism' see Jean Dagens,
'Le Machiavelisme de Pierre Charron', Studies Aangeboden aan Gerard Brom (Utrecht & Nijmegen:
Dekker & vd Vegt, 1952), pp. 56-64.
7 Pere Frangois Garasse in his Doctrine curieuse des Beaux Esprits de ce Temps ou Pretendus tells,
Contenant Plusieurs Maxims Pernicieuseus a la Religion de I'Estat et aux Bonnes Mceurs (1624); cited
by J. B. Sabrie, De l'Humanis?ne an Rationalisme. Pierre Charron (1541-1603) L'Homme, I'CEvre,
I'lnfluence, [originally published in Paris, 1913] (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970); pp. 454-5.
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cannot really decide whether Charron was a stoic, a sceptic, a fideist, an atheist,
or whether he is worth considering at all.8 As this suggests, his legacy remains a
much-disputed point.
The ambivalence in Charron's work is partly what makes his book on
wisdom of particular interest within the scope of this project. The other aspect of
the work that renders it important for this study is that it constitutes an attack
on epistemological and religious dogmatism. As this chapter will demonstrate,
his work was a reflection of the intellectual, moral and religious crisis that
dominated the second part of the sixteenth century and the early part of the
seventeenth. In the final stages of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the
effects of which were accentuated by the experience of the religious wars, the
authority that religion and faith held as the source of truth and morality was
seriously undermined. It is within this context that Charron's attack is
intelligible. Likewise, the fact that he was the author of two distinct major texts
on two different kinds of wisdom is also fascinating. De la Sagesse was in fact his
second composition, following a theological treatise entitled Les Trois Veritez
(1593). The latter had set out to prove three fundamental truths: the existence of
God, the existence of a 'revealed' religion, and finally, that Catholicism more
specifically was the only true form of Christianity. Les Trois Veritez dealt in other
words with divine wisdom; conversely, the Sagesse, his philosophical work,
concentrates solely upon the question of human wisdom. Charron's
ambivalence, accordingly, lies in this double output: the two texts can either be
interpreted in conjunction with one another, or separately. Taken together, Les
Trois Veritez can be read as the foundation of the Sagesse, and divine wisdom as
the basis of human. Read separately, however, the two texts give us ample
reason to infer that Charron saw divine and human wisdom as divergent and
8 Soman, 'Revaluation', p. 57
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independent, with all the implications that this has on moral considerations.
Accordingly, and with regard to his attack on epistemological and religious
dogmatism in the Sagesse, the attack on the former materialises more effectively
than the attack on the latter. This can partly be explained by the scope of the text
itself. Additionally, an attack on excessive forms of piety and belief would have
been a risky and complicated task for a theologian, at a time when religious
fervour was still running high in a country that had just emerged from civil
strife, and was trying to heal its wounds, following the Edict of Nantes of 1598.9
In what follows then, we have a manifold objective. An initial brief
account of the author's life will be followed by a close textual analysis of his
chief philosophical work, the Sagesse. This textual analysis is necessary, for
previous examinations of the text have tended to adopt a thematic approach that
does not do justice to the length, complexity, and ambiguity of the work. A close
textual analysis facilitates an interpretation of Charron's position, by taking into
account the languages he used to convey his thoughts. The author was
extraordinary in this respect in that he used a combination of languages in
composing and revising his text. Itwill be shown, that the Sagesse provides a
richness ofmaterial that can either be read as a work with stoic resonances, or as
sceptic or Augustinian (theological), according to the set of arguments on which
the reader decides to give greater emphasis.10 This element builds on the
discussion about languages in the Introduction, on the one hand, while it also
9 See Mark Greengrass, France in the Age ofHenri IV. The Struggle for Stability. (London and New
York: Longman, 1984), pp. 76-9 and 83; Mack P. Holt, The French Wars ofReligion, 1562-1629.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. 162-72; Roland Mousnier, The Assassination ofHenry IV: The
Tyrannicide Problem and the Consolidation of the French Absolute Monarchy in the Early Seventeenth
Century, trans. Joan Spencer (London: Faber, 1973), pp. 143-53.
10 Bouwsma in his assessment of the 'Two Faces of Humanism', where he discusses the two
currents of thought, Stoicism and Augustinianism notes that 'citations for both sides often come
from the same figures', with Charron being one of the examples he uses. William J. Bouwsma,
'The Two faces of Humanism. Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought', in idem, A
Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990),
pp. 19-73; on p. 58.
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sheds some light on the reason why his name and this work have for so long
been the subject of debate. In this context, we can view Charron's work as an
example and an expression of the problems and consequences of accepting the
existence of a duality of spheres, the divine and the human/ temporal. Itwill
further be suggested that the centrality of the problems discussed by Charron is
witnessed by and reflected in the debate surrounding his name and his work.
What people saw in the Sagesse, and how it could fit so many viewpoints and be
claimed by so many different parties, are related issues that also need to be
addressed. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that all of the above
difficulties are resolved only when set against the peculiar circumstances of the
second half of the sixteenth century. In short, Charron and his Sagesse, were
peculiar products as well as testimonies of the effects that the humanistic
tradition could have, particularly when combined with the experience of the
religious wars.
I.
At the Heart of the Religions Wars: Charron's Life
Charron, born in 1547, was marked by the religious conflict that plagued France
for four decades (1562-98). Yet the information that we have on his life is
fragmentary and incomplete.11 It is based on two sources: the first one is the
Eloge Veritable on Sommaire Discours de la Vie de Pierre Charron Parisien Vivant
Docteur es Droits, par G.M.D.R., which was composed and published by his
11 For his life the standard account is given by Sabrie De I'Humanisme an Rationalisme, pp. 19-141;
see also Charron, The 'Wisdom' ofPierre Charron, pp. 59-84; Renee Kogel, Pierre Charron. (Geneva:
Librairie Droz, 1972), pp. 15-24. Alfred Soman has challenged these accounts on the grounds that
their main source, the Eloge is not reliable; he argues, in fact that 'during his lifetime, Charron
appears to have been little known and without connections' (p. 66); that he only managed to get
the patronage of a somewhat marginal bishop, Claude Dormy, and that ultimately, he was of
minor importance as a writer. His account, however of course does not explain the undisputed
popularity of his works. For the account that follows, I have used all three of the above in
conjunction to one another.
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friend and editor of his works after his death, Gabriel Michel de la Rochemaillet.
The second source is a collection of letters from Charron to la Rochemaillet.12
The Eloge first appeared in the 1607 edition of De In Sngesse. It does not exactly
constitute a biography of Charron: as a eulogy, its character is one of praise for
the author who had died in 1603. La Rochemaillet, furthermore, is especially
untrustworthy with dates. The letters, forty-seven of them, were sent by
Charron to his friend and later editor within a time-span of fourteen years (1589-
1603). These letters provide an interesting connection with other prominent
figures of the period: they were copied by no less a figure than Gabriel Naude
(1600-53) in 1628, on Gassendi's request, for Nicolas Peiresc (1580-1637).13 Pierre
(Petrus) Gassendi (1592-1655), scientist, priest, and professor of Mathematics,
was one of the greatest French philosophers of the first half of the seventeenth
century and a member of the Libertin Tetrnde, who we know had expressed
admiration for Charron's work.14 This detail is significant, as it lends substance
to the association of Charron and the libertins in the decades following his
death.15
Notwithstanding the survival of these letters and the eulogy matter
shortly after his death, the picture we have of Charron's life is one full of
obscurities. From the little that we know, he was born in Paris in 1541 to a
family of booksellers. According to the Eloge, sometime before 1571, he obtained
12 The letters were published by L. Auvray: 'Lettres de Pierre Charron a Gabriel Michel de la
Rochemaillet' in Revue d'Histoire Litteraire de la France, I (1894), pp. 308-329.
13 Cf. Auvray, 'Lettres di Pierre Charron', pp. 308-9
14 In a letter to Henri du Faur de Pibrac, Gassendi thanked him for sending a copy of Charron's
Discours chrestiens but explain that the Sagesse pleased him more: 'Tu fais bien de me
recommender d'emmener Charron dans ma solitude. Quel juge plus sur? Surtout si on lui donne
pour compagnons ceux dont il a lui-meme fait son profit: Montaigne, Lipse, Seneque, Plutarque,
Ciceron'; quoted in Miller, Peiresc's Europe p. 220, note 88.
15 See Richard H. Popkin, History ofScepticism. From Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley; California;
London: University of California Press, 1979) chs. 3 and 5; Sabrie, De I'Humanisme, chs. XVI and
XVII; Christian, Belin, L' CEuvre de Pierre Charron 1541-1603. Litterature et Theologie de Montaigne a
Port-Royal. (Paris: H. Chamption, 1995), ch. 8 and below.
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a doctor's degree in canon and civil law, possibly at the Universities of Orleans
and Bourges; later on, however, he turned to theology. It seems that he was
quite eloquent, and that he consequently quickly gained a reputation as a
preacher. Five years into the religious conflict, we find him in Montpellier, as
theologal and canon, where he experienced first-hand the misery of the wars
himself. As a member of the clergy, he was taken prisoner by Protestant forces
during their control of Montpellier (1567). He was captured together with other
church officials, and kept for a period of six to seven months, until his ransom
was paid. The sources are silent as to the effect this had on our author. Yet this
must have been a dramatic experience, if we judge by later aggravations, and by
the manner in which he described the horror of the civil wars in the Sagesse:
Now there is not a mischief more miserable, no more shameful, it is a sea of infelicities.
... it is not properly war, but a malady of the state, a fiery sickness, and frenzy. And to
say the truth, he that is the author thereof, should be put out from the number of men,
and banished out of the borders of human nature. ... To conclude, it is nothing but
misery.15
It seems that between 1571 and 1576, having left Montpellier, he was
working in the area of Bordeaux as a preacher and was later appointed as a
lecturer in theology. In 1576, we find him back in Bordeaux where he was
elected chanoine (canon) and soon after made ecolatre (clergyman in charge of a
school attached to a cathedral or abbey). It is during this time that critics believe
he made the acquaintance of Montaigne: due to his duties, he would have been
in frequent contact with the civil authorities and Montaigne had been elected
Mayor of Bordeaux in 1581. The extent of this relationship remains unclear; La
Rochemaillet says that
16 Pierre Charron, De la Sagesse, Trois Livres (Paris: David Douceur, 1607): Book III, 4; pp. 564-6.
Henceforth referred to as Sagesse. For the translation of the passages, I have largely relied on the
[71608] translation by Samson Lennard, with some alterations where I have considered it
appropriate. (Peter Charron, OfWisdome, London: Edward Blount; reprinted by Da Capo Press,
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Amsterdam & New York, 1971).
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il prit cognoissance et vescut fort familierement avec Messire Michel de Montaigne ... et
le sieur de Montaigne l'aimoit une affection reciproque , et avant que mourir, par son
testament, il luy permist de porter apres son decez les plaines armes de sa noble famille,
par ce qu'il ne laissoit aucuns enfans masles.17
As a token of this friendship, the essayist apparently gave Charron a copy of
Bernadino Ochino's Catechismo (Basle, 1561), a heretical work.18 Yet the
assertions for intimacy between the two men are undermined by the fact that
there is not a single reference to Montaigne in Charron's letters, or any reference
to Charron by Montaigne.19 The issue is one of importance because implicit in
the claim of their relationship is the assumption that has given rise to the
tradition of regarding Charron as a disciple of the essayist.20
Another reference from Rochemaillet, that the letters verify, states that
Charron attempted twice to join a monastic order; first, a Carthusian monastery
in 1588 without much success, and later a Celestine one with similar results.21
His attempt to adopt a monastic vocation should be taken as a serious indication
of his desire to reheat somewhere peaceful and solitary to escape events around
17 Eloge in Sagesse, n.p. [p. 5].
18 The book does indeed survive in the Bibliotheque Nationale (D2 5240 Res): it is inscribed
'Montaigne', and below that 'Charron ex dono dicti domini de Montaigne in suo castello, 2 Julij,
Anno 1586'; see Soman, 'Revaluation', p. 64
19 Cf. Soman, 'Revaluation', pp. 64-5. As further proof for a close relationship between the two
men, scholars also take the information that in his will Charron left the sum of five hundred ecus
to Montaigne's sister and made her husband Thibaud de Camain, his universal heir and
executor of his estate.
20 In this respect, according to interpretation, there exist different views on the extent of the
relationship between the two men: J.D. Charron, for instance, stresses the fact that they were
close friends but that they also both had the same material available; he even tentatively
suggests that Montaigne's scepticismmight have derived from his discussions with Charron
('The 'Wisdom' ofPierre Charron, pp. 120-1). Soman argues for no connection between the two
besides ono possible mooting that is testified by the existence of Cathechismo. Popkin, who argues
that Charron was the intellectual heir to Montaigne suggests a close friendship between the two
(see History ofScepticism, pp. 42-64, esp. pp. 56-7). Kogel, Pierre Charron, pp. 33-42, considers him
neither a plagiarist, nor a disciple. She suggests that Charron read the Essais and was impressed
by them; she acknowledges Charron's borrowings from Montaigne, but she explains them by
stressing that the two men shared similar sentiments on many issues. She finally, however,
comes to the conclusion that Charron was his own man when he wrote Sagesse.
21 See letters I-VIII (Feb.-July 1589); Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 314-6.
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him.22 Nevertheless, having left Bordeaux, Charron managed to find himself
precisely in the middle of that which he was trying to flee - political and
religious turmoil. During the opening sessions of the Etnts Generaux of Blois
(1588), he was in Angers. In the early months of 1589, after the assassination of
the Duke of Guise by Henri III (1589), the town was in considerable tension and
full of Liguers. As Mark Greengrass remarks, the language and mood of violence
in Catholic circles that dominated those early months of 1589 is difficult to
recapture. 23 In these circumstances, Charron seems to have joined the League.
Just before Easter, however, the town was taken under the control of the
supporters of Henry of Navarre. Charron was once more placed under arrest, by
the Royalists this time, and was forbidden to preach.24 His distress is evident in
a letter composed a few months later: 'Ifagitation publique m'afflige fort... J'ai
envie de me cacher en quelque coin...'.25 Charron had thus been confined twice
on the grounds of his religious convictions and actions. The first time by zealots
from across the confessional divide, the second by supporters of a political
solution to the crisis created by religious differences, who would not tolerate the
radicalism of the Catholic League.
Against this background, the publication of his first book, the Trois
Veritez, a treatise of apologetics and polemic for the Catholic faith, should not
seem surprising; it was an expression of Charron's reaction to the experience of
religious strife. The work came out anonymously in 1593 and the timing was
22 Kogel, Pierre Charron, p. 19; Charron, 'Wisdom' ofPierre Charron, pp. 71-2. Cf. Vincenzo Querini
who left Venice during time of war to become a hermit (1511-12): 'he had retreated to the
religious life, living in the woods as a poor and solitary hermit far from the perturbations of his
public career and of "miserable" Italy which was subject to the depadations of its enemies';
Stephen D. Bowd, Reform Before the Reformation (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 78.
23 Greengrass, France in the Age ofHenri IV, pp. 48-51; see also Holt, The French Wars ofReligion,
pp. 129-31.
24 '...J'ai ete inhibite de prescher et mis a arrest par la ville ... j'ai permission maintenant de
prescher et fus restitue hier en la chaire, jour de 1'Ascencion, mais 1'arrest dure encore...' Letter
from Angers, 12 May 1589; Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 315-6.
25 Letter from Angers, 1 July; Auvray, 'Lettres', p. 316.
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crucial, as Henry IV had just abjured Calvinism.26 The first two books of the
Trois Veritez, accordingly, sought to establish the existence of God, while the
third one - which bore a special separate dedication to Henry IV - was devoted
to a refutation of the Huguenot leader, Du Plessis-Mornay's (1549-1623) Traite de
I'Eglise (1578). The first edition of the Trois Veritez sold out in six months, an
indication that it enjoyed considerable popularity.
In 1594, Charron was in Cahors, working as theologal at the University (he
was later promoted to the post of Vicaire General).27 The next year he took part in
the general assembly of the clergy of France that Henry IV convened in Paris, as
a representative of the province of Bordeaux; he was also assigned as secretary
to the assembly.28 He returned to Cahors after the completion of the
proceedings. Interestingly, during this time in Cahors, namely within a few
years from the completion of his religious text, Charron seems to have
undertaken the composition of the Sagesse, the philosophical work that is of
interest to us here.29 The Sagesse was finished in mid-1599 or 1600, but its
publication was only possible after Charron had obtained royal privileges for
the printing.30 Just a year earlier, he had moved from Cahors to an even more
remote place, Condom, a small town near Bordeaux.
During this time, Charron also worked on a smaller tract, the Petit Traicte
de la Sagesse - a summary and an apologetic for the larger text, which appeared
posthumously, together with the Discours Crestiens, a collection of some of his
26 Greengrass, France in the Age ofHenri IV, pp. 58-61; Holt, The French Wars ofReligion, pp. 149-
53.
27 This position was usually the last step before elevation to the bishop's seat.
28 Joseph Bergin, The Making of the French Episcopate 1589-1661. (New Haven & London: Yale UP,
1996), p. 384. Interestingly, this assembly was one that drew a lurid picture of the state of the
French church and forcefully complained against the subversion of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction
by the secular magistrates; it demanded, moreover, the adoption of the Decrees of Trent, and the
restoration of Episcopal elections.
29 Cf. for example letters from Cahors, 8 March 1597, and 4 June 1598; Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 318-
9.
30 Letters XXVII (6 May 1600) and XXIX (12 November 1600); Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 321-2.
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sermons (1604). Charron spent the last years of his life writing and preparing a
second revised edition of the Sagesse, the text that he clearly considered as his
most important. This revision of the Sagesse was dictated both by the fact that it
had been 'wrongly perceived',31 and that Charron wanted to obtain approbation
from the Sorbonne before the publication.32 While in Paris to supervise the
publication of the second edition, however, he died of a sudden apoplexy. La
Rochemaillet was left to complete the revision, some of which was prescribed by
Jeannin (Pierre Jeannin, 1540-1622), the President of the Parlement of Paris, while
he also had to deal with the difficulties raised by the Sorbonne. De la Sagesse
'revue corrige et augmente' finally came out in 1604, but was still placed in the
Index of Prohibited Books the year after.
Overall, Charron led an intense life. A rather restless mind, like the ones
he describes in the Sagesse, his life was torn between continuous travelling and
preaching around the South and West of France where he twice became
personally involved in the conflict, and his desire to retire either to a monastery
or to his private retreat at Condom. When the civil conflict was finally over, he
managed to distill his experience into writing and articulate his religious and
philosophical views to an even greater audience. The unusual contents of his
philosophical work, his guide on wisdom, are the next topic of this chapter.
II.
Human Wisdom: De La Sagesse, Trois Livres
Charron's challenging and tumultuous life ought to be kept in mind while we
analyse his most important and famous work, De la Sagesse. A number of issues
need to be addressed in this section. Starting with an overall discussion of the
subject of the work, we will then turn to the problems in assessing Charron's
31 Cf. Letter from Condom, 10 June 1602; Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 322-3.
32 Letters XXXVII, XLI, XLII, XLIV and XLVI; Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 324-8.
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work that arise from the existence of four different editions. Next, a close textual
analysis of the work will demonstrate why the Sngesse is so important in the
context of this thesis. It will reveal it to be both an example of the moral
connotations of the separation of the divine and the temporal (human) spheres,
and an expression of the intellectual and religious crisis of the second half of the
sixteenth century. This consideration will also focus on the peculiarity of the
nature and content of the text, the naturalistic emphasis of which makes it an
especially unusual composition at a time when religion played such a
prominent role in the manner in which people lived and thought.33 The chapter
will also discuss the author's sources and languages, giving some account of his
ambiguity and varied interpretations. The discussion will thus demonstrate the
bases that have given rise to the debates surrounding the Sngesse; as itwill




Charron's work is a handbook on how to achieve human wisdom and a guide
on how to lead a wise and moral life according to the dictates of the four
cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Divided into three
parts, it purposely leads the reader through various stages to acquire the sagesse
humaine. The first book is an examination of human nature: using the Socratic
dictum nosce te ipsum (yvcbdi aeavTov, or know thyself) as a starting point, it
works as a preparatory stage and necessary disposition to wisdom. Charron
undertakes to purge man of any predispositions in order to be able to accept the
13 The classic study on the role of religion in setting an almost impossible framework from which
people had great difficulty in escaping is Lucien Febvre's The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth
Century. The Religion ofRabelais, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1982).
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teachings of wisdom. The reader is by this point cleansed and ready to move to
the heart of the subject-matter: the instructions and the principal rules of
wisdom which are contained in the second book. In this book the candidate in
search of wisdom discovers its foundations. The primary one, according to
Charron, is true and essential honesty and probity ('probite & preud'hommie').
The author then goes on to explain the offices of a wise man according to a
three-fold system: towards God, men - that is, people around him - and himself.
The double duty to God and men, interestingly, is analogous to the two tables of
the Decalogue. We should however take the reference to the duty to one's self as
an indication of the increased importance the self was acquiring in the minds of
the people of the seventeenth century.34 The second book concludes with what
Charron calls the fruit and crown of wisdom, the (Stoic) skill to maintain oneself
in true tranquillity ofmind. The third book is rather different in character;
organised on the bases of the four moral virtues, it is to a great degree
instructive and analytical, giving specific guidance on how one should lead
one's life by following their principles in order to combat the various passions.
It is essential to recognise the purposefulness of the book's structure.
Nothing better illustrates its importance and centrality, than the length of the
second book: it is the shortest of the three. After a long introduction, what Sabrie
calls a 'vast hors-d'oeuvre', the reader is introduced to the second part, the
substance of the work, which only consists of twelve chapters.35 Notably, even
the tone changes from the first to the second book; whereas the former is fairly
critical of the human race in general and more descriptive, the latter has a more
glorifying and advisory character, in a sense reflecting Charron's vocation as a
34 Cf. Nannerl O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to the Enlightenment.
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1980); pp. 183-202.
35 Sabrie, De THumanisme an Rationalisme, p. 240. Book I is comprised of fifty-eight chapters in the
first edition (1601) and sixty-two in the second (1604); for the contents of the two editions see
Appendix I.
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preacher. The last book, meanwhile, is a more systematic account of the second
one; in another forty-three chapters, the author expands upon the outline set out
in Book Two, providing specific instructions on the duties of the wise man and
the manner in which he should be leading his life. The whole work is
exhaustively analytical, and has often been described as dull and tedious,
perhaps due to its nature as a handbook. The reader can move easily through
the systematically organised material and find what he is looking for at specific
points.
Above all, however, the centralitv of the second book is underlined bv its' J" y
greater originality. In the preface of the second edition Charron explains to his
readers that it is more his own than the other two, and that he was in fact
intending to publish it on its own:
So here is in a few words the picture of human wisdom and folly, and the summary of
that which I propose to handle in this work, and especially in the second book, that
expressly contains the rules, traits and offices of wisdom, and which is more mine than
the other two, and which I once thought to have produced (publish) by itself.36
The problem of Charron's originality is a recurrent theme in the accounts of his
work. Anthony Levi's evaluation, that the whole work is Tittle more than a
systematic arrangement of opinions, phrases, sometimes whole paragraphs of
other works', encapsulates the general criticisms raised against De la Sagesse.37
There is indeed a good deal of truth in the argument, and we will examine these
borrowings in more detail throughout its analysis. It is nonetheless essential to
remind ourselves of the general trends of the age in which this work was
formulated, and assess it with some sensitivity towards them. Borrowing and
incorporating extracts from various works - and usually not acknowledged -
was commonplace among humanist scholars. Their purpose was to enhance the
text or to add more authority, while readers seemed to expect and enjoy them;
36 Sagesse, pp. 9-10.
37 Anthony Levi, French Moralists. The Theory of the Passions 1585 to 1649. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1964), p. 100.
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'mimesis', after all, was a mark of respect.38 Charron himself acknowledged in
his preface to the first edition that he made use of material from other authors
who had treated the subject of morality and politics. He specifically indicated
Seneca (4 BC/AD 1-65) and Plutarch (AD 46-120), both very popular and
influential moralists during the period of the composition of the Sagesse. He also
pointed, however, to the use of 'modern' authors concluding that he 'collected
the material during his studies, but the order and the form are his'.39
Within the text itself, Charron acknowledged by name two living
authors: the French Guillaume du Vair (1556-1621) and Justus Lipsius (1547-
1606), but did not reference authors who were no longer alive. This has made
Renee Kogel suggest that the need to acknowledge his debt to the two authors
should be taken as an indication of his fear that either du Vair or Lipsius would
challenge him in print for his use of their works, had he not mentioned them.40
This argument might also offer an explanation as to why our author does not
refer to his greatest intellectual debt, that owed to Michel de Montaigne.41
Richard Tuck suggests that Charron's synthesis was quite openly an attempt to
put the ideas of the writers from which he borrowed into a more philosophically
systematic framework and to extend them in various ways; in this way, he
38 In this manner, the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius who we will be examining in the next
chapter had composed a book on politics literally by sewing together citations from ancient
classical authors, only a few years before the Sagesse appeared in print. Justus Lipsius,
Politiconwi Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex (1st edition Antwerp, 1589). See below, chapter 2.
39 Sagesse, p. 748. Sabrie discusses his sources in detail; De I'Humanisme an Rationalisme, pp. 255-
284; see also Kogel, Pierre Charron, pp. 31-45.
40 Kogel, Pierre Charron, p. 30.
41 On this subject, in addition to sources mentioned in note 2, see Floyd Gray, 'Reflexions on
Charron's Debt to Montaigne' French review 35 (1962), pp. 377-382; Sabrie, De I'humanisme an
Rationalisme, pp. 270-282; Alan Boase, The Fortunes ofMontaigne. A History of the Essays in France,
1580-1669. (London: Methuen & Co., 1935), pp. 77-103; Popkin, History of Scepticism, pp. 55-65;
Kogel, Pierre Charron, pp. 33-42.
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would not necessarily feel apologetic in using material as liberally from other
sources.42
As mentioned above, Book Two of the Sagesse is almost entirely
Charron's composition, while Books One and Three are the ones based on
secondary material. In addition to Montaigne and du Vair, Book One features
Juan Huarte de San Juan's Examen de Ingenios (1575, French translation in 1589)
and Jean Bodin's (1529/30-96) two very important works, Theatrum Naturae
(translated in French in 1597) and Six Livres de la Republique (1576). Book Three,
on the other hand, is largely based on Justus Lipsius's Politicorum Sive Civilis
Libri Sex (1589).
ii.
Versions ofDe la Sagesse
One of the principal problems in dealing with De la Sagesse is the
existence offour separate editions.43 It seems that the appearance of the first
edition in 1601 caused some reaction, although we do not have any concrete
evidence as to the manner this was expressed and the reasons behind it. In his
letter to la Rochemaillet on 10 June, 1602 Charron recognised the fact that his
book was misunderstood, expressing at the same time his disappointment. He
undertook, thus, to revise the book:
I know that this book has been diversely understood. Some things were said a little too
strongly; this is why I have revised and corrected it, and in many parts
sweetened/moderated it.44
In October of the same year he wrote to la Rochemaillet declaring that he had
completely 'corrected and augmented it'; if there were no bad intentions, no one
42 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 84.
43 The existence of four different editions has not been noted by critics, as far as I am aware.
Scholars do remark the differences between the first and the second edition, but tend to overlook
the fact that the 1607 and 1635 editions themselves are rather dissimilar.
44 Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 322-3.
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would find anything offensive in it.45 It is not exactly clear whether the revisions
were complete at the time of his death in 1603, since La Rochemaillet had to
make some further changes. We should presumably regard these latter
modifications as the result of La Rochemaillet's attempts to get the advance
approval from the Sorbonne that Charron so much desired, before the work was
published in Paris.46
As a result of all this editorial activity, we have to deal with a number of
varying editions. The edition of 1604 differs from the first one in three respects.
First, it has a different preface. In the revised preface, Charron attempts to
explain and clarify his intentions and method, in defence of his work. Second,
the chapter sequence of the first book has been somewhat rearranged. And
lastly, several passages from Books One and Two have been omitted or
modified; these are the ones especially referring to the immortality of the soul,
human feebleness, or true piety as the first office of the wise man. These
adjustments, as mentioned, came both personally from Charron as well as from
the decrees of Parlement. Evidently, the modifications are a valuable source of
information with regard to the reception of the work. Though the first edition
had an initially pessimistic impact on the reader, it gave an overall quite
naturalistic impression. The second edition, meanwhile, had a more optimistic
opening, but went on to moderate its naturalism with references to the ultimate
dependence of man upon the grace of God. Significantly, in a separate section at
the end of the 1607 version of De In Sagesse, one can find the original preface,
together with the extracts censored by Charron himself, as well as the ones
dictated for change by Jeannin, the president of the Parlement. La Rochemaillet
clearly pointed out in the text, with separate headings, which changes came
45 Auvray, 'Lettres', p. 323.
46 See Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 324-8; and Sabrie, De I'Humanisme ail Rationalistne, pp. 108-141; Belin,
L'CEnvre de Pierre Charron, pp. 210-1, esp. note 3.
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from which source. In the table of contents, moreover, he indicated to the reader
the original order of the chapters in Book One. It is even more interesting,
however, that in 1635, the publisher of Charron's complete works decided to
follow the text of 1601, because the 'curious demanded the edition of Bordeaux';
he re-incorporated, namely, all the parts that were up until that point read
outwith the body of the work. He kept, however, the chapter arrangement of the
second and third editions, thus creating an altogether new version of the work.47
Nevertheless, it is of great significance that despite the fact that later versions
included the passages omitted from the second edition, none of them - as far as
I am aware - indicated which sections were added to the original one, in the
author's attempt to modify, clarify or enhance the meaning of the text.48
Viewing this evidence, it becomes apparent that it is almost impossible to
consider any kind of discussion of De la Sagesse without taking into account the
variety of versions available. Admittedly, Charron himself had stated that the
meaning was not much altered: '[the changes] without altering the sense and the
substance will serve well those three purposes'.49 The case, nevertheless,
47 The advertisement to the reader of the 1635 edition reads: 'Amy lecteur, Voyant que les Livres
de feu M. Charron estoient bien receuz d'un chacun, ... et sgachant que la plus-part des curieux
demandent l'impression de Bordeaux de l'an 1601, j'ay fait adjouster les articles de l'edtion de
Milange, lesquels 1'Auteur a expressement voulu estre adoucis, et specialement ceux que feu M.
le President Jannin commis par M. le Chancelier a 1'examen de ce livre, a juge devoir estre
changez, et ce qu j'en ay faict g'a este pour contenter un chacun, et laisser le liberte et le moyen
de prendre et choisir ce qui leur semblera le meilleur. Car en ceste edition on aura tout ce qui est
es precedentes impressions, tant de Bordeaux que de Paris, et ailleurs. Joinct qu'en icelle
l'Autheur y a adjouste plusieurs Chapitres, au second, et troisieme Livre. Prens done en gre si
peu de peine que j'ay prise, achete ce livre, et tu y trouveras tous les contentement que tu
sgaurois desirer. A dieu.'; Pierre Charron, CEuvres. Revues Corrigees et Augmentees (Paris: Jacques
Villery, 1635; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970, n.p.).
48 This is true even for the 'critical' edition by Barbara de Negroni (1986); she includes all the
omitted passages, but she does not specify which ones are not to be found in the 1604 edition.
Maryanne C. Horowirtz is among the only commentators who make some references to this
detail that is, however, significant, since Charron's additions modify the tone of the text. See her
'Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethics: Pierre Charron's De la Sagesse',
Studies in the Renaissance, 21 (1974), pp. 204-227.
49'.. .sans rien alterer du sens et de la substance, servent beaucoup a ces trios fins'; Auvray,
'Lettres', p. 325.
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remains; the Sagesse was ultimately a fluid text, of which each reader had
virtually his own version. In other words, it is possible to talk for each reader's
different Charron - a detail that adds to the work's and the author's
ambivalence.
Under these circumstances, one is faced with the problem of which
edition to regard as authoritative - if there can be any such thing as an
'authoritative' edition in the case of the Sagesse. It would be a somewhat natural
assumption to regard the first one as the one closest to his original beliefs, since
we know that the changes were made to adjust the text according to the
audience's reaction. The information we have of his line of reasoning and his
intentions for the tailoring of the work comes from his correspondence; Charron
wrote to his friend and later editor that the changes were necessary in order to
'silence the malicious, please the simple people', and facilitate an approbation
from the Sorbonne.50 Most scholars indeed agree that the modifications were
intended to temper the more unconventional and radical claims of the book,
such as his stress on naturalism or the insufficient references made to the grace
of God.51 Still, it was the second version and even more the third (1607) that
enjoyed more circulation.
50'...je cognois qu'il est fort expedient, pour fermer la bouche aux malitieux, contenter les
simples, faciliter une approbation des docteurs'; 13 January, 1603 (Auvray, 'Lettres', pp. 324-5).
51 Cf. Soman's comments; he argues that on the basis of Charron's letters one could make a case
that the edition of 1604 was not a clarification or advance of the first edition, but a retreat. He
points out that most of the changes tended to moderate the over-sharp distinction he had drawn
between virtue and piety, and strived to disprove criticism that he had allowed too little room
for divine grace in his system of humanistic ethics ('Methodology in the history of ideas: The
case of Pierre Charron', Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, vol. XII, 1974 pp. 495-501) citation on
pp. 497-8; also Levi, French Moralists, pp. 99-100. Belin seems to agree with this view: he regards
the modifications mainly as a way to accomplish the official acceptance of the book.
Commenting on the corrections dictated by the official censure by the President Jeaninn and the
fact that despite them, the book was still placed on the Index of 1606 he suggests that it 'must
have been the whole ('ensemble') of the work and the sentiment that were estimated dangerous
and not only individual phrases formulated in one way or another'; L'CEnvre de Pierre Charron, p.
210, n. 3.
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Taking into account all the above, the following analysis is based on the
1607 edition, for two closely associated reasons. Rather than trying to discern
what could have been Charron's cast of mind, this thesis is concerned more with
the popularity of ideas and the interaction between author and audience: that is
to say, tracing the intellectual trends developed as a reflection and consequence
of the circulation of ideas. From this perspective, the version of 1607 that both
bears the marks of the disapproval towards the cynicism and naturalism of the
first edition, as well as including the more conventional modifications, seems
the obvious one on which to concentrate. This was, moreover, the one that
enjoyed more circulation since it was reprinted more than twenty times between
1607 and 1635. Furthermore, it was within this time-span that we find the
Sagesse in the midst of intellectual debates; we should thus infer that the point of
reference at this period were the reprints of the 1607 edition.
iii.
De la Sagesse, Trois Livres: Themes, Ideas, Languages
After these introductory remarks, we can now subject the Sagesse itself to a more
thorough analysis, paying specific attention to the issues that are of relevance to
the scope of this thesis. The preface to the second edition - reprinted in the
third - is of particular interest, as it was intended as an explanation and
justification of the purpose and the method of Charron - an 'ingenious, but not
cogent line of defence', as Levi puts it.52 In this respect, it also serves as an
indication of the sort of criticism raised against Charron's text.
There are three types and degrees ofwisdom, Charron declares: divine,
human, and mundane. These correspond, in turn, to God, Nature pure and
entire, and Nature vitiated and corrupted. All three are the subjects of various
52 Levi, French Moralists, p. 100.
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writings and discussions, each one 'according to his own manner and fashion'.
The first sort of wisdom is the subject of theologians, the second of the
philosophers.53 Worldly or mundane wisdom, on the other hand, associated
with the common sort, is the lowest level of the three ('la plus basse'), and not
worth addressing, except to disparage and condemn it.54 After this classification,
Charron attempts a description and an exposition of the differences between the
two main sorts of wisdom, the Divine and the Human. Philosophy, he tells us,
according to those who practise it, is the 'knowledge of principles, first causes,
and highest power to judge of all things', even God. This wisdom according to
philosophers is inherent to the understanding. It is, moreover, the first and
highest of intellectual virtues, in such a way that does not require either
honesty, action, or any other moral virtue in order to be complete.55
Theologians, conversely, regard it as the knowledge of divine things, out
of which derives a judgement and rule of human actions. They see it as twofold:
either acquired by study, in which case itwould resemble that of the
philosophers; or infused and given by God, which could only be found in
people just and free from sin.56 It is essential to stress the radicalism of
Charron's approach: the preface effectively justified an assault on the authority
of theology as the 'queen of sciences'. By insisting that philosophy was an equal
alternative means of understanding the world, the author was undermining the
long-established worldview that all knowledge and understanding derived
from revelation and from God.
Yet Charron seems unaware of the significance of his claims; having
described the types of wisdom as distinct, he goes on to proclaim that it is not
his intention to speak of Divine wisdom because he had to some extent dealt
53 Sagesse, p. 3.
54 Sagesse, p. 3.
55 Sagesse, p. 4.
56 Sagesse, p. 4.
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with it in the first of his Trois Veritez and in his Discours Chrestiens.57 In contrast
to this exclusively practical concept, the wisdom of the philosophers and the
divines is more concerned with relating theoretical underpinnings to practical
issues. The contrast between theoretical principles and practical problems had
evidently been prevalent since the early stages of the Renaissance, as the debates
concerning the active and contemplative life denote. His inclination towards
practice could also serve as evidence of the primacy practice and 'empiricism'
had increasingly been gaining in the course of the sixteenth century.58 This can
further be associated with Charron's general attack on pedantism in the Sngesse,
the sterile theoretical knowledge that is detached from any sense of experience.
In this context, the Preface spells out that while the philosophers link
their subject to Nature and action, the theologians relate it to divine wisdom and
belief.59 Astonishingly, Charron points out that philosophy is more practical,
relevant, and deals with matters regarding families, corporations,
commonwealths, and empires, while theology is more interested in the eternal
good and salvation of the faithful. This remark evidently derives from Charron's
view of the division between theology and philosophy. What is remarkable,
however, is not only that he clearly favours the latter - at least in this work -, but
that he has additionally no reservation about declaring his preference. This is
quite extreme, particularly when one takes into account that it is coming from a
theologian at the start of the seventeenth century.60 In the manner that Charron
57 Sagesse, p. 4.
58 Cf. Peter Burke, A Social History ofKnowledge. From Gutenberg to Diderot. (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2000), pp. 16, 204-8.
59 Sagesse, p. 5.
60 Cf. Galileo's letter to Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany fifteen years later (1615), where he
delineated theology's are of influence by claiming that neither Copernicus nor himself treated
matters that pertained to the worship of God and the salvation of souls, insisting, further, that
Scripture did not teach about Nature as such; see The Galileo Affair. A Documentary History, ed.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989),
pp. 90-1, 93, 94, 99-101,109.
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presents the question, nonetheless, there is the implication that the 'true, real'
problems are, in fact, the ones people are facing here on earth, namely the
subject of philosophy, whilst divine preoccupations can be a little too
theoretical. He even goes as far as to state that.the Philosophers handle [the
subject] more sweetly and pleasantly, and the Theologians more austerely and
dryly'.61 And he goes on to make another extraordinary comment, that Nature is
more ancient than Grace and the Natural precedes the Supernatural.62
For Charron, philosophy's pre-eminence is further confirmed by the
living examples of its representatives. In this context, he explains, his discussion
of philosophers refers not only to the universally acknowledged ones such as
Solon (640-560 BC), Pythagoras (c. 582-?497 BC), Socrates (469-399 BC), Plato (c.
427-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC), but it also includes 'those great men who
have made singular and exemplary profession of virtue and wisdom, like great
politicians, kings, and generals.63 The Preface further pronounces the
astonishing intention of the author, to favour and follow the advice and sayings
of philosophers over the positions of the theologians. For although the two
concur in substance, Charron concedes, his aim was to compose a book with
instructions on civil life, for men of the world. To defend himself from the
expected criticism, he explains that had he undertaken to write for people who
live in cloisters he should have followed the advice of the theologians:
If I had undertaken to instruct the cloister, and the retired life, that is, the profession that
attends the advice/secrets of the Bible, I should have followed the counsels of the
Theologians; but our book gives guidance for the civil life, and shapes a man for the
world, that is to say, for the human zvisdom and not the divine, [my italics] 54
Having made clear at the outset his somewhat unusual approach -
particularly in the context of the religiously charged atmosphere of the start of
61 Sagesse, p. 6.
62 Sagesse, p. 6.
63 Sagesse, p. 7.
64 Sagesse, pp. 7-8.
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the seventeenth century, - the author turns now to a general description of
human wisdom as he conceives it:
this human wisdom is a kind of law, a beautiful and noble composition of the entire
man, both in his inward part and his outward, his thoughts, his words, and all his
actions. It is the excellence and perfection of man as man, that is to say, according to that
which the first fundamental and natural law ofman holds and requires.65
Charron maintains that four qualities especially distinguish wise men: first, the
knowledge of one's self; second, liberty of mind. The third component, imitation
of nature, covers a large province of wisdom, making the author assert that even
following it alone could suffice for someone to become sage. Charron designates
lastly true contentment as the ultimate fruit of wisdom; lack of any of these
qualities, he says, should be taken as an indication of an ill-advised person.66
According to the Preface, some people are born with a natural
predisposition to Charron's ideal of wisdom. Alternatively, however, it can also
be acquired, through the study of philosophy, especially moral philosophy.
Within the notion of moral philosophy, the author stresses the pre-eminence
and importance of natural philosophy; according to Charron, natural
philosophy is the light, guide and rule of our life explaining and representing in
us the law of nature.67 Charron is adamant in emphasising that his view of
wisdom is above all opposite to pedantic knowledge. He categorically contests
what he sees as professed wisdom, purely speculative, presumptuous, sterile
and based on memorised knowledge. In this respect, he refers the reader to the
frontispiece of his work, where the personification of wisdom stands
triumphant amidst the embodiments of passion, opinion, superstition and
pedantic knowledge .68 Charron thus declares his resolve to combat with
65 Sagesse, p. 8.
66 Sagesse, p. 9.
67 Sagesse, pp. 10-11.
68 Sagesse, p. 10.
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his text any form of intellectual (pedantic knowledge) or religious dogmatism
(superstition).69
Nothing better illustrates the author's purpose than the particular caution
he directs with regard to the readership of his work. Charron declares that the
Sagesse is especially addressed to sensible people, and not the vulgar sort:
This book is not for such, which if it should popularly be received and accepted of the
common sort of people, it should fail much in its first purpose and design70
The matter of the audience is an important one: the fact that his work had been
read and judged by people to whom it was not directed, had led Charron to
undertake its revision. This concern is interesting, as it demonstrates an
awareness on behalf of the author of the radical nature of many of the work's
elements.
...many things which may seem too harsh/raw and brief, too rude and difficult for the
simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser will have stomachs warm enough to put
together and digest all) I have for the love of them explained, enlightened and
sweetened, this in this second edition, reviewed and much augmented... 71
As we can see from the preface, therefore, the author introduces the
reader to all the main constituents of the three books and sets the tone for the
rest of the work. The reference to the different ways in which one can talk about
wisdom is of special significance for our purposes. In many ways the position
that Charron describes in his text, that theologians, philosophers and the
'common sort' adopt distinct approaches in order to address the question, is
equivalent to the discussion in the Introduction, about the existence of certain
distinct languages in which one could talk about politics and morals in the late
69 Sagesse, pp. 14-5; cf. also Book I, 39 esp. p. 216. For similar attacks on pedantism, cf.
Montaigne's essay Du Pedantisme (I, 24); Erasmus, The Praise ofPolly (Moriae Encomion, 1509);
Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532-4); Galileo, 'Letter toGrand Duchess Christina', Galileo
Affair, p. 101.
70 Sagesse, p. 20.
71 Sagesse, p. 21. Galileo claimed the same thing in his own defense, that his findings would
cause confusion to the minds of the common people; see 'Letter toGrand Duchess Christina',
Galileo Affair, pp. 92, 95, 98.
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sixteenth and early seventeenth century. In rough terms, one can identify the
philosophers' approach with the language of humanism, and the theologians'
with what in the Introduction we called the theological (Augustinian) tradition,
thus lending substance to the proposed model. The fascinating detail is, of
course, that the author himself having been trained both as a lawyer and a
theologian could master, as a result, both languages. What is more, in the
Sagesse, although he proposes at the outset to use the humanistic language for
the reason that he is composing a guide to civil life, he occasionally leaps into
the use of the 'theological' language (examples of which we will soon see). This
can partly be explained by the criticism raised against the book, as most of the
theological argumentation appears in modified sections, and partly by
Charron's training as a theologian. What is particularly significant in this
context, is, furthermore, the author's eagerness to stress the separate existence of
a human and a divine wisdom: the two are complementary to one another, but
they can also suffice individually. His evident preference for human wisdom
and philosophy in this work at least can to a certain extent be seen within the
framework of the crucial role he ascribes to Nature and natural law.
Philosophy's purpose is to link higher practical problems with nature, he told
us. As a final point, we should remind ourselves that the inherent duality in his
mode of thought is further testified and confirmed by Charron's composition of
separate works on the two sorts of wisdom, the divine and the human.
Book I
The First Book of De la Sagesse opens with a passionate exhortation to the reader
to study and know himself; this, according to Charron is the foundation of
wisdom and the path to what is good: 'the true science and study ofman, is man
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himself'.72 By the knowledge of himself, man reaches sooner and better the
knowledge of God; becoming truly wise cannot originate from anywhere else
but within ourselves.73 As a case in point the author mentions the oracle of
Delphi, where the axiom Know thyselfwas engraved. Socrates, we are told, was
accounted the wisest man in the world not because his knowledge was more
complete, but because his knowledge of himself was better than others.74 In this
sense, truly to know man we must look into his inward part ('en son prive'), and
examine how he behaves every day.75 Charron here alludes to a point he will
come back to later, and what was Lipsius's central point, the distinction between
a man's interior being and outer conduct, or public and private.
The author is now able to embark on his consideration of man. The first
aspect of this consideration is the natural, namely, the different elements that
man consists of and his place in the natural world.76 Man consists of three main
parts, the body, the soul and the mind; Charron is clearly in favour of the mind,
which he defines as 'the highest and most heroic part, a diminutive, a spark, an
image and dew of divinity'.77 This description is worthy of notice, as 'sparks', it
will be recalled, were an essential notion of the stoic tradition, together with the
idea that the law of nature - frequently equated with God - is imprinted in us by
birth. Similarly, in general discussion on the soul ('De l'Ame en General'),
Charron is mainly drawing on classical philosophers, while the Church Fathers
figure rather marginally.78 Indicatively, with regard to the thorny issue of the
immortality of the soul, the author opts for a rationalisation, astonishingly
72 Sagesse, p. 23.
73 Sagesse, p. 25.
74 Sagesse, pp. 26-7.
75 Sagesse, p. 29.
76 Sagesse, p. 31.
77 Sagesse, Book I, 2 (pp. 35-6). The quotation is on p. 35
78 Sagesse, Book I, 3-6 (pp. 36-49).
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explaining it by the 'hope of glory and reputation and desire for immortality of
our name'.79
In the next crucial block of chapters Charron touches upon the five
faculties of the soul. He discusses, among others, the 'sensitive' faculty and the
'Senses of Nature', while he also talks about the intellectual faculty ('et
vrayment humaine'), and more particularly the human mind ('l'esprit humain')
of this last faculty. The account of both the physiology of the body, as well as the
description of the human faculties are probably derived from Jean Bodin's book
Theatrum Naturae.80 The chapter on the soul, however, contains many elements
that can also be attributed to Juan Huarte de San Juan's Examen de Ingenios (1575,
translated into French in 1580).81
This sequence of chapters devoted to the senses, the intellectual faculty,
the human mind and their connection, forms the bases of Charron's theory of
knowledge. Some basic points have to be made at the outset; first, that his
epistemological views present a continuation of Renaissance arguments, mainly
drawn from the teachings of Neo-Platonism, combined with traditions that
became more popular later, such as Stoicism and Scepticism. His line of
reasoning is neither consistent nor entirely clear; he does not follow a specific
system of thought. His inconsistency is demonstrated time and again when he
writes a point and then refutes it within the same page (or a few pages later)
using a different set of ideas. In his exposition, Charron employs arguments
79 Sagesse, pp. 61-2. Cf. Pietro Pomponazzi's (1462-1525) treatise, On the Immortality of the Soid
('Tractatus de Immortalitate Anime, 1516), which offered philosophical, that is Aristotelian,
grounds for rejecting the idea of personal immortality.
80 Translated into French in 1597, the book was intended to be an 'encyclopaedia' of the natural
sciences in the sixteenth century, covering subjects from astronomy to human anatomy. Sabrie,
De I'Humanisme an Rationalisme, pp. 262-3; Kogel, Pierre Charron, p. 43.
81 Huarte was a Spanish physician whose work concentrated on linking mental ability to the
existence of the four temperaments or humours present in the brain: heat, cold, moisture,
dryness. Following this, for example, Charron associates the three abilities of the intellective
faculty, understanding, memory and imagination to dry, moist and hot humours respectively.
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drawn equally from ideas associated with various humanistic trends, as well as
the theological language of Augustinianism. The upshot of this unsystematic
line of argument is the rise of a number of conflicting interpretations of his work
starting from Charron's own time. Modern scholars equally struggle with a
variety of readings; most common - and perhaps the easiest one to argue - is the
approach that tries to discern which one mode of thought Charron did, in fact,
advocate. To substantiate their findings, scholars favouring this sort of
interpretation give precedence to either one set of arguments.82 More synthetic
views argue for a clearly defined and executed plan on behalf of the author; that
he intended, namely, to cleanse the reader's mind from 'accumulated learning
and traditional opinions' in order to arrive at wisdom. In the process of
achieving this goal, they argue, Charron employs sceptical arguments as a
device, but later carries on to refute them with a series of arguments that stress
his belief in the power of human intellect or reason.83 Analogous is the point of
view that the author's sceptical thought is limited by an innate belief that the
seeds of knowledge are in man from birth, allowing thus for the combination of
both arguments.84 Whatever his plan was, however, the fact still remains that his
accounts on the epistemological problem have caused certain conflicting
readings of his intentions. A close consideration is thus in order, so that we can
begin to understand the complexities involved.
Charron opens the chapter 'On the Senses of Nature' (Book 1,12) with the
traditional belief of the 'schoolmen' (scholastics) that all knowledge derives
82 As a result, Sabrie, Popkin, and J.D. Charron consider Charron a supporter of sceptic/fideist
ideas stressing the precedence of sceptic elements in his work, while E.F. Rice, P.F. Grendler
M.C. Horowitz, argue for a primarily Stoic influence in his work. For a Stoic interpretation of
Charron cf. also Leontine Zanta, La Renaissance dn Stoicisme au XVIe Siecle (Paris, 1914).
83 Kogel, Pierre Charron, p. 109. See the chapter on Charron's view of knowledge (Ch. V),
especially pp. 105-120; cf. also Levi, French Moralists, pp. 58 and 111.
84 Horowitz, 'Natural Law as the Foundation of an Autonomous Ethic', p. 208.
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from the senses; nevertheless, he sets out within the next chapters to disprove
this position.85
The common received opinion that came from Aristotle himself is, that the Mind knows
and understands by the help and service of the Senses, that it is of itself a white empty
paper, that nothing comes to the understanding, which does not first pass the senses,
Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu. But this opinion is false...86
Aristotle's traditional standpoints had been variously challenged since
antiquity; the sixteenth century, however, experienced a revived interest in
ideas originating from the Platonic Academy and Pyrrhonism.87 These
arguments, generally recognised as 'sceptical' had come down to the early
modern period through the writings of Cicero (106-43 BC), Diogenes Laertius (fl.
3rd century AD) and St. Augustine (AD 354-430). It remains true, however, that
the trend towards Pyrrhonian scepticism in the second half of the sixteenth
century was facilitated by the rediscovery of the works of Sextus Empricus (fl.
AD 200), the only Greek Pyrrhonian sceptic whose works survived.88 In France,
Montaigne was perhaps the most prominent thinker to be attracted to and
influenced by sceptical ideas; he was, moreover, according to a modern critic
'one who felt most fully the impact of the Pyrrhonian theory of complete doubt
85 Sagesse, p. 69. Interestingly enough, in the first edition the passage does not include the
underlined qualification; Charron's view, thus, in the 1601 version appear more Aristotelian
than in the 1604. (See Horowitz, 'Pierre Charron's View on the Source of Wisdom', p. 446)
86 Sagesse, p. 88.
87 Pyhrrhonism was the sceptical movement that had taken its name form the legendary figure
of Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275). Both trends are generally recognised as 'sceptical'. They advocated
somewhat different positions however: according to Academic scepticism, no knowledge is
possible; conversely, Pyrrhonian scepticism's view was that there was insufficient and
inadequate evidence to determine if any knowledge was possible - hence, one ought to suspend
judgement on all questions concerning knowledge. See the introduction of Popkin, History of
Scepticism; definitions on p. xiii.
88 For the survival and circulation of Cicero's sceptical works see the very fine study by Charles
B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in tire Renaissance. (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). Pyrrho's Hypotyposes was first printed in Latin in 1562 by Henri
Estienne. In 1569 appeared a Latin edition of all of his works by Gentian Hervet; it was
republished in 1601. The Greek text appeared eventually in 1621. See Popkin, History of
Scepticism, p. 19.
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and its relevance to the religious debates of the time'.89 The long-standing
debate on whether to classify Montaigne as a stoic or as a sceptic has partly been
resolved by the more cogent view that distinguishes two phases in the
composition of his essays, a stoic first, and a sceptic later.90 Nonetheless, the
Apologie de Raimond Sebond, one of his most famous essays, and one from which
Charron drew heavily for the composition of the section of De la Sagesse in
question, is markedly sceptic in tone. It was also during this 'crise pyrrhonienne'
that Montaigne had adopted his famous motto 'Que sais-je'?
Against this background, Charron, though he acknowledges in his text
the senses as 'first gates, and entrances to knowledge',91 also repeats the
warning of the sceptics against their weakness and incertitude: 'From the
weakness and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error and mistakes'.92
He highlights, furthermore, their susceptibility to the passions of the soul:
bitterness, love, hatred have the power to 'dull' or 'shut' the operation of the
senses. These points are a few among many in the work where Charron
emphasises the relativity of knowledge and man's inability to attain it. His line
of reasoning is that ultimately the senses need the assistance of the mind, as the
interpreting faculty. To prove his point, he refers to the inequality of human
perception; if it were up to the senses, all human beings would have equal
abilities; the fact that they do not, is evidence of the role of the mind.93 The
senses are in fact dependent upon it:
89 Popkin, History ofScepticism, p. 42.
90 Cf. M.A. Screech's comments in the introduction of the Essays: 'Montaigne was first, it seems
as we read him, a Stoic, then a Sceptic, then an Epicurean. In fact, he could hold all three
philosophies in a kind of taut harmony. .. There is certainly a shift in his thought from a
melancholic and stoic concern with dying to a full and joyful acceptance of life; a change of
emphasis away from Seneca and towards the happier eclecticism of Cicero'; in The Essays of
Michel de Montaigne, trans, and edited by M.A. Screech, (Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press,
1991), p. xviii; see also Levi, French Moralists, pp. 58-9.
91 Sagesse, p. 70.
92 Sagesse, p. 73.
93 Sagesse, p. 89.
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...but I say in defence of the honour of the mind, that it is false that it depends upon the
senses, and that we can not know anything, understand, reason, discourse without the
sense: for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can do nothing
without it.94
The centrality of reason and understanding for Charron's model becomes
apparent, then.95 Even more compellingly, Charron exhorts the reader to have
faith in the human mind on the basis that the seeds of virtue and knowledge are
to be found in man by nature:
because (as all the wisest have affirmed, and has been before touched) the seeds of all
sciences and virtues are naturally dispersed and insinuated into our minds, so that they
may be rich and merry with their own 96
The author uses, thus, in these passages arguments and ideas associated with
the Stoic tradition of thought. The image of seeds implanted by God in man at
birth was fundamental in the doctrines of the ancient Stoa. Seeds, semitia,
sperniata, or 'common notions' were generically related to spermatikos logos
(ojieppaxiKOC, Xoyoc, translated as 'seminal' reason, 'seminal principles' or 'creative
reason'), the principal force and law according to which nature works.
Implanted in man by nature, they provided him with the ability to reason and
attain knowledge, since the seeds of it were within man already.97 This 'Ratio'
was also sometimes equated with God, as the principal reason of being, and
Nature.98
Clearer references to Stoic ideas of knowledge follow in the next chapter
(Book 1,14), where Charron considers the human mind.
[Mind] let it be called the image of the living God, a taste of the immortal substance, a
stream of the Divinity, a celestial ray, whereunto God has given reason, as an animated
stern to move it by rule and measure, and that is an instrument of complete harmony;
94 Sagesse, p. 90.
95 Cf. also Sagesse, p. 87.
96 Sagesse, p. 88.
97 Cf. Galileo, 'Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina', Galileo Affair, p. 94.
98 See Horowitz, 'Natural Law as Foundation for an Autonomous Ethic', pp. 204-7 and idem,
'The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes', Journal of the History of
Ideas, 35 (1974), pp. 3-16; on pp. 3-5. Charron also makes this association a number of times in the
Second Book; see below.
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that by it there is a kind of kindred between God and man, and that he might often
remember him, he has turned the root towards the heavens, so that he should always
look towards the place of his nativity...99
Yet this confident and optimistic impression dissolves again within the same
chapter in the following pages. Charron discusses the mind's objective, that is,
the inclination towards the search for truth: 'there is no desire more natural than
to know the truth'. In the end, nonetheless, all our efforts are insufficient - we
cannot possess the truth. It is worth quoting at length the passage in which the
author discusses the futility of our endeavours, as it is one of the most
wonderful of the Sagesse:
we assay all the means we can to attain unto it [the truth], but in the end all our
endeavours come short; for truth [will not suffer] to be possessed by any human mind. It
lodges within the bosom of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knows not,
understands not anything aright, in purity and truth as he ought; appearances do always
compass him on every side, which are as well in those things that are false as true. We
are born to search the truth, but to possess it, belongs to a higher and greater power...
Errors are received into our soul, by the same way and channel as the truth is; the mind
has no means either to distinguish or choose ... The means that it uses for the discovery
of the truth are reason and experience, both of them very weak, uncertain, diverse,
wavering. The general argument of truth, is the general consent of the world.100
It is difficult to ignore the sceptical tone of the above lines: man has no way to
distinguish truth from false, reason is ultimately weak, and the only case we
have for truth is an imaginary consent by people. The impression is intensified
by the dangerousness attributed to the human mind by Charron: its unruliness
can explain why man has found good reasons to keep it
within narrow bounds, to bridle and bind it with Religions, Laws, Customs, Sciences,
Precepts, Threats, Promises mortal and immortal101
This underlines Charron's emphasis on human disorder and relativity of human
affairs.
99 Sagesse, p. 92.
100 Sagesse, pp. 97-8.
101 Sagesse, p. 101.
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The examination of the intellectual faculties concludes with a reference to
memory and imagination, from whence all confusion, disorder and passions
derive. Charron then enters another great section of the first book of De la
Sagesse, concerned with the will and its principal adversaries, passions and
affections, on which he reserves a more detailed explanation and ways to
control them for later (Book Three).102 He also finds appropriate at this point to
acknowledge his debt to the theory of passions to Guillaume du Vair.103 Du Vair
was a popular moralist of his age, having composed works of strong Stoic
character that audiences found especially suitable for the troubled times they
were living in. Book One of the Sagesse contains material drawn possibly from
La Sainte Philosophie (before 1585) and his Traite de la Constance (71590).104
Following du Vair, thus, Charron defines passion as a:
...violent motion of the soul in the sensitive part thereof, which is made cither to follow
that which the soul thinks to be good for it, or to fly that which it takes to be evil...105
After treating a series of passions,106 Charron's displays his cynicism as
regards man in his Second Consideration ofMan where he draws a comparison of
God's greatest creation with other creatures on earth. The reader is hence made
to face the blurring of the boundaries and the definitions of what constitutes
man and what makes a beast. The author of the Sagesse then goes on to discuss
what he describes as man's 'disputable advantages' over beasts; and the first
102 Sagesse, p. 111.
103 Sagesse, p. 111.
104 In contract to hie practice of analycing, cummarising and condensing of other works, Charron
seems to copy liberally from du Vair, almost transcribing whole passages. Nonetheless, the text
of the Sagesse on the theory of passions ultimately diverges significantly from that of its original
source, confirming the view that the author of the Sagesse reformulates much of the existent
material within his own work. See Sabrie, De VHumanisme an Rationalisme, p. 268 and Levi,
French Moralists, pp. 104-111.
105 Sagesse, p. 111.
106 Sagesse, Book 1,19-33 (pp. 117-150).
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point on his list, interestingly, is the ability to reason.107 In this respect, his
treatment can be read both as an ultimate challenge to human intellect, as well
as a reflection of the author's contempt for what he calls the 'base minds' that
differ considerably from the sages. Even the moral superiority is disputable:
man is a mostly unjust, unthankful, traitorous, lying and deceitful animal; his
principal quarrel is against other men.108 The chapter concludes with an
exhortation to lead a life following nature, as animals do, in order to live more
freely, securely, moderately, and contentedly.
The cynical comparison of man with the other animals of the universe is
tightly linked with the sequence of chapters that underline human vanity and
presumption, Charron's - and Montaigne's - familiar and much-loved theme.
The same tone is maintained in the Third and Fourth Consideration ofMan, where
Charron stresses the value of human life, which not many people seem fully to
acknowledge, and what he sees as 'man's declining state'. The two sections are
full of references to the frailty of human life and man's vanity, weakness,
inconstancy, misery and presumption.109 It is useful to recall that these sections
were the opening chapters that the reader was faced with in the edition of 1601,
thus determining a far less optimistic mood for the rest of the work. Transposed,
however, to a less prominent position in the second edition, the forcefulness of
the chapters is reduced, thus allowing for a more positive reading.
The section reaches its peak with the now familiar idea ofman's great desire
but ultimate weakness to reach the truth, to which neither reason nor experience
can help him:
107 Gray, 'Refelections on Charron's Debt to Montaigne', p. 379. He also concludes that 'there is a
greater distance between a man and a man and a man and a beast'; Sagesse, p. 160.
108 Sagesse, p. 164. Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, XVII: 'One can make this generalization about
men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for
profit'; The Prince, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press, 1996), p. 54; cf. also
Montaigne's essay, De la Presumption (II, 17) and Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII: 'On the Natural
Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity and Misery'.
109 Sagesse, pp. 170-1. See Book I, 36-40 (pp. 175-228).
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Now both of them are so feeble and uncertain (though experience the more weak) that
nothing certain can be drawn from them. Reason has so many forms, is so pliable, so
wavering, as has been said, and experience much more, the occurrences are always
unlike; there is nothing so universal in Nature as diversity... 110
Against this background, Charron launches his attack on the superstitious, the
formalists and the pedants (Book I, 39: 'On Misery').111 This section should be
viewed as his official attack against religious and epistemological dogmatism
that he had announced in the Preface. He portrays the first as 'injurious to God,
enemies to true religion', people that 'cover themselves with the cloak of piety,
zeal and love towards God'.112 This could well be read as a criticism of
'Christian piety, with the mysticism of the saints and the popular devotion'.113 It
is crucial to recognise that this condemnation is only intelligible in view of the
experiences of the religious strife in France. He and his contemporaries had
witnessed first-hand the effects of blind religious fervour. Similarly, attacks on
superstition were a common trend in writings of the time, reflecting the reaction
to the bloody contention originating from it; as we will see, Lipsius, Sarpi and
James all shared the same feelings.114 Charron takes also on the formalists and
the pedants in this chapter, calling the latter 'inept, impertinent, presumptuous,
obstinate' men, who 'have their memories stuffed with wisdom of other men'
and none of their own.115 The former are dangerous because of their
exaggerated attachment to forms and their little having to do with tangible
problems, in the same way that the pedants are stuck to theoretical knowledge
with no practical appliance. All three types ofmisery, however, have one thing
110 Sagesse, pp. 187-8.
111 Cf. Montaigne's essay, Du Pedantisme (I, 24).
112 Sagesse, p. 215.
113 Sabrie, De VHiimanisme an Rationalisme, p. 243.
114 Cf. Bacon, Essays, 'Of Superstition'; Justus Lipsius, Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex, I,
3; James VI, Basilikon Doron, ed. James Craigie, 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text
Society, 1944-50), pp. 47-9.
115 Sagesse, p. 216.
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in common: their dogmatism, that does not allow for adaptability according to
realities around us (or experience).
Linked to dogmatism is human presumption, another of the constant
themes of the work: we make too much of ourselves, says Charron; 'it is an
enraged folly to think to know as much as possible is to be known'.116 He then
resumes his assault against established tradition, the relativity of knowledge
and the feebleness of human understanding, unable to tell truth from false;117
the chapter culminates with the following pronouncement:
Every human proposition has as much authority as another, if reason makes not the
difference. Truth depends not upon the authority and testimony of man: there are no
principles in man if Divinity have not revealed them; all the rest is but a dream and
smoke.118
This passage is one of those that have given Richard Popkin and others ground
to argue for a more theological reading of Charron, or for a fideist
interpretation.119 According to this approach, having renounced the ability to
reason, the author acknowledges that the only source of truth is divine
revelation.
The Fifth (and last) Consideration ofMan explores social formations and
divides men to categories according to various factors. The consideration opens
with a broad chapter on the difference and inequality of men (Book I, 41), where
Charron explains that these differences are affected by the environment: the sun,
the air, the climate and the country in which each of us is born define the
116 Sagesse, p. 225.
117 Sagesse, p. 223
118 Sagesse, p. 226.
119 According to Popkin, a fideist might deny or doubt that necessary and sufficient evidence can
be offered to establish the truth of the proposition 'God exists', and yet he might say it could be
known to be true if one possessed some information through faith, or if one believed certain
things. He also adds, that the decision as to how to define the word is partly terminological and
partly doctrinal: Roman Catholicism has condemned fideism as a heresy, and has found it as a
basic fault of Protestantism, while the non-liberal Protestants have contented that fideism is a
basic element of fundamental Christianity, and an element that occurs in the teachings of St.
Paul and St. Augustine. (Histori/ ofScepticism, pp. xix-xxi). Sabrie and Kogel would agree with a
fideist interpretation - and perhaps also Boase: see The Fortunes ofMontaigne, pp. 77-89.
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diversity in soul and body.120 He also divides the minds into weak, born to obey,
serve and be led; of 'indifferent judgement' who generally rely on commonly
held opinions; and highest, the quick and clear minds, those who prefer to
doubt, and are of strong and solid judgements.121 The ideas and most of the
material that feature in this last consideration are drawn from Bodin's Six Livres
de la Republique. The theory of the climate influence, a commonplace topic for the
period, was clearly formulated in Bodin's work, where he attributed different
characteristics to people living in the North, the South, and in-between, from
whence Charron is copying a great deal.122 The author of the Sagesse has also
used Bodin's discussions on the problems relating to the organisation of a state,
the structure of the family, the paternalistic authority, the different forms of
monarchy, and the causes of rise and decline of a republic.123 Taken as a whole,
however, this last section could provide evidence for sustaining a position of
relativism, historical and geographical, that was especially common among the
French civil lawyers of the sixteenth century.124
Book II
There is a marked change of emphasis in the Second Book that deals with
the 'doctrine of wisdom itself. Having challenged man's vanity and
presumption, and demonstrated his defects and 'miserable condition', Charron
provides in this part of the work the instructions to wisdom as a remedy, in
order to live well.125 He first deals with the two dispositions to wisdom. The first
120 Book 1,42.
121 Book 1,43.
122 For contemporary comments on the influence of climate see for example A.Cunningham and
O.P. Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation
Europe. (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 207-8, 322.
123 Cf. Sabrie, De I'Humanisme au Rationalisme, pp. 263-267; Kogel, Pierre Charron, p. 44.
124 Donald R. Kcllcy, The Beginning of Ideology. Consciousness and Society in the French Preformation.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1981), p. 206.
125 Sagesse, p. 305-6.
67
one is 'liberation from a double captivity', outwardly and inwardly. The
outward is the general corruption of the world, the popular opinions and vices,
while the inward are the passions. With regard to the former, Charron
recommends shunning the company of 'illiterate' and 'ill-composed' people,
and - an advice that would prove very popular a few years later with the
libertins - to remain 'in the world, without being of the world'.126 The author's
treatment of the passions, meanwhile, and his recommendation that these ought
to be avoided advances a quality very close to what, as we will see in the next
chapter, Justus Lipsius describes as 'constancy'.
The second disposition to wisdom, according to Charron, is 'a universal
and plain liberty of mind in both judgement and will' (Book II, 2).127 This is a
particularly long and complex chapter; it is furthermore one, which, as it
touched upon such thorny issues as 'suspension of judgement' and the 'will',
underwent consequently many modifications from the first to the second
edition. Charron underlines the liberty of the mind to judge with a powerful
assertion: 'They shall govern as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not
my mind, for that, by their leave, hath another master'.128 It is on these grounds
that Charron advocates the difference between outward behaviour and inward
judgment, one of the issues for which his work was most criticised.
Now a wise man enjoying this his right to judge and examine all things, it many times
will come to pass, that the judgement and the hand, the mind and the body, contradict
one another, and that he will carry himself outwardly after one manner, and judge
inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his mind,
which he must do to preserve equity and justice in all. That general saying, vniuersus
mundus exercet historiam, should properly and truly be understood of a wise man, who is
another man within than he outwardly shows.129
126 Sagesse, p. 315.
127 Sagesse, p. 320.
128 Sagesse, p. 324.
129 Sagesse, pp.324-5. This contrast between outward behaviour and inward thinking does not
appear in the 1601 version.
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He was not the only one of course, advocating this divergence between outward
behaviour and inward thinking; in an age of intense religious strife and heated
passions, there was an increasing tendency to stress the importance of outward
conformity that could potentially co-exist with a simultaneously private
differentiation of opinion. From a somewhat different perspective, the issue was
also one of survival: fear of persecution, thus, religious heterodoxy and atheism
could make one resolve to disguising ('dissimulating') one's true
opinion/belief.130 In the same vein, as we will see in the following chapters,
Lipsius and others maintained that it was acceptable to tolerate religious dissent
so long as no disturbance found expression in public. Charron encouraged
conformity of the more 'free' minds, as he calls them, an element directly linked
to his assertion of the need of laws in order to tame the mind. Outward
compliance should especially be the case, as Charron points out, if it was for
justice and the sumum bonnm. These statements resonate to some degree with
the doctrines of the 'politiques' who during the tension of the religious wars were
promoting the possibility of religious plurality provided there was conformity
towards the monarchy and stability within the commonwealth, for the sake of
the general good.131 Later in the work, Charron will even argue that it suffices
for wise men to accommodate laws of countries that do not necessarily follow
130 Cf. Perez Zagorin's work, Ways ofLying. Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early
Modern Europe. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1990). Cf. also Paolo Sarpi's
admittance of having to hide in order to survive - whether it was for political or for religious
reasons:'... I am compelled to wear a mask. Perhaps there is nobody who can survive in Italy
without one'; letter to Gillot, 12 May 1609, cited in David Wootton, Paolo Sarpi: Between
Renaissance and Enlightenment. (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), p. 119.
The extent to which tho 'politiques' advocated religious toleration or simply religious concord
and unity is debatable. For valuable discussions on their positions see Christopher Bettison, 'The
Politiques and the Politique Party: A Reappraisal' in Keith Cameron (ed.), From Valois to Bourbon:
Dynasty, State and Society in Early Modern France. (Exeter: Exeter UP, 1989), pp. 35-49, and Mario
Turchetti, 'Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century
France', Sixteenth Century Journal 22 (1991), pp. 15-25.
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the universal law of nature, if their judgments and opinions are kept in
accordance with the latter.132
Charron returns to his argument of the relativity of knowledge, stressing
that man is incapable of telling the difference between truth and falsehood, that
there are no shared views, and that there are always two ways of looking at
things. He points out that philosophers 'have made a profession of ignorance'
emphasising that in fact, 'we are ignorant of much more than we know'.133 He
then launches another attack on Aristotle and the 'schoolmen' in general. He
condemns the dogmatists who do not see that 'there is a kind of ignorance and
doubt more learned, more certain, noble and generous than all their science and
certainty'; this was the virtue that made Socrates so renowed for his wisdom.134
To demonstrate the urgency of the matter, Charron tells his readers that he had
asked to be engraved over the gate of his house in Condom (in 1600) the motto 'I
know not', to remind him of human uncertainty.135 The association of our
author's 'Je ne sgay' with Montaigne's 'Que sais-je?' has often been noted -
Charron's phrase, however, underscores human ignorance much more
forcefully than the latter.
Charron resumes his attack on the conceited philosophers and
dogmatists, exclaiming that presumption is the source of troubles, sects,
heresies, and seditions. The reference here is clearly aimed not only at the rise
and spread of Protestantism and its various sects, butmore importantly, the
troubles this religious division and obstinacy had created for his country. He
insists that the sceptical approach to things 'does more service to piety, religion
and divine operation' because it cleanses and purifies people, making them
132 Sagesse, p. 434.
133 Sagesse, p. 330.
134 Sagesse, p. 333.
135 Sagesse, p. 333.
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'tabula rasa' to accept the miracle of God's revelation.136 The author then
embarks on another one of his pessimistic views on man that has strong
Augustinian resonances with the importance that he assigns to revelation:
That all the wisdom of the world is but vanity and lies ... That God has created man to
know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himself, nor by any humane means: And
That it is necessary that God himself, in whose bosom it resides, and who has wrought a
desire thereof in man, should reveal it as he does. But that the better to prepare himself
for this revelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beliefs,
wherewith the mind is already anticipated and besotted, and present himself plain,
naked, and ready to receive it.137
It is important to note that the above passage did not appear in the original 1601
edition; we can assume therefore, that Charron felt he had to add it in order to
moderate his insistence on nature and his apparent lack of reference to God's
might. Charron explains in the revised edition that the purpose of this extract
was to make the reader 'Academic and Pyrrhonian', both of which were entirely
compatible with the Christian teachings: 'an Academic or Pyrrhonian was never
a heretic, they are things opposite'.138
Charron brings the discussion about the liberty of the mind to judge to an
end with a note on its universality; he wants the wise man to be a 'citizen of the
world', much like Socrates was, pointing out that 'the most beautiful and
greatest minds are the more universal, as the more base and blunt are the more
particular'.139 He further argues strongly against partiality identifying it as an
'enemy to liberty'. These comments should be regarded as echoes of the
rhetorics of moderation from the French wars of religion, and the attitudes that
played down doctrinal differences, while emphasising the common universal
136 Sagesse, pp. 335-6.
137 Sagesse, p. 336.
138 Cf. Erasmus's support for the Academy: 'human affairs are so manifold and obscure that
nothing can be clearly known, as it is rightly taught by my friends the Academics the least
arrogant of the philosophers'; The Praise ofPolly, trans. C. H. Miller (New Haven, Yale UP, 1979),
p. 71. The particular passage by Charron has led Popkin to claim that for Charron 'Pyrrhonism
provides the intellectual basis for fideism'; History ofScepticism, p. 61. It should be remembered,
however, that it was only inserted after the author's revision.
139 Sagesse, pp. 337-8.
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values shared by all Christians. In order to unite people in general, and as the
only viable answer to civil turmoil, any such approach had to be devoid of
fervour of any sort.
The second part of the chapter is concerned with the issue of the freedom
ofwill; yet the author manages to avoid the matter by cautiously stating at the
beginning of the section that the will he is interested in is 'not...the free will of
man, according to the manner of Theologians'.140 Aware of the great theological
controversies regarding the freedom of will and the associated doctrine of
efficacious grace in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century (de auxiliis),
Charron steered clear of a potentially disastrous topic. An urgent and
widespread question, though decided upon in the Council of Trent, the issue of
the will still troubled many thinkers on both sides of the confessional divide
(and would do for a long time to come). As we will see below, both Lipsius and
Sarpi struggled with it, in one way or another. The chapter concludes with a
new remark about conformity; every one of us, Charron says, plays two parts in
life: the one external and thus apparent and the other one internal but more
fundamental. While maintaining his freedom ofmind and will, a wise man will
conform to everything because the laws and customs of the country he lives in
require it, and because it is in the interest of the public good.141
We have reached thus, the third chapter of the second book, one of the
most crucial to the whole text (Book II, 3). The author introduces here the
candidate to wisdom to its first and fundamental part that is, true and essential
honesty and probity (probite & preud'hommie).142 Significantly, Charron explains
that as he set out in the preface of the work, the honesty he will be dealing with
is the human one - as opposed to the Christian.
140 Sagesse, pp. 343-4.
141 Sagesse, p. 348.
142 Sagesse, p. 349.
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This honesty I will describe in this place, ... following the design of this book declared in
the Preface, I speak of human honesty and wisdom, as it is humane, whereby a man is
called an honest man and wise, and not of Christian, though in the end I may chance to
speak a word or two thereof, [my italics]143
The effect that the above passage would have caused to a reader of the early
1600s can only be a matter of speculation, as we do not have information on
specific reactions by readers or the authorities. Tire boldness and radicalism of
juxtaposing and differentiating between the human and the divine or Christian
wisdom should be quite plain. Charron attaches this (human) honesty to
Nature:
The jurisdiction of this honesty is Nature, which binds every man to be, and to make
himself such as he ought, that is to say, to conform and rule himself according to it.
Nature is together both a mistress which enjoys and commands honesty, and a law and
instruction which teaches it to us.144
There is a natural and universal obligation for every man to be 'honest'
following the intention of his creator. Charron insists that this honesty should
come to men from within by an 'inward instinct' and not from any outward
reason. He then goes on to give more details on the doctrine of Natural law in
an excellent example of Charron's usage of Stoic arguments:
Now the pattern and rule to bee honest, is this nature it self, which absolutely requires
that we be such, it is, I say, this equity and universal reason which shines in every one of
us. He who works according to it, works truly according to God, for it is God, or at least,
his first fundamental and universal law, which hath brought it into the world, and which
came first from God, for God and nature are in the world, as in a state, the king, the
author and founder, and the fundamental law which he has made for the preservation
and government of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the divinity, a stream
and dependence of the eternal law, which is God himself and his will... He works also
according to himself, for he works according to the stern, and animated instinct, which
he has within himself moving and stirring him ... for this law and light is essential and
natural in us, and therefore is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by
consequence an honest man, always and perpetually, uniformly and equally at all times
and in all places: for this law of equity, and natural reason is perpetual in us, edictum
perpetuum, inviolable, which can never be extinct nor defaced, quam nec ipsa delet
143 Sagesse, p. 352.
144 Sagesse, pp. 352-3.
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iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur, universal and constant in all things, and always the
same, that neither the time(s) or the place(s) can change or disguise ...145
The greatest part of this chapter is devoted to repeating and expanding on the
principal doctrine according to which Nature, Natural Law, Reason and God are
all inextricably linked and a number of times equated.146 Charron tells us that
the Law of Nature is so substantial that any other kind of law is a small
reflection of it.147 This law, as connected to God, is divine; yet it is at the same
time inherent in man. Man partakes in this law as it was implanted in him at
birth; the seeds of universal reason and virtues are thus within him, in his soul.
As a result, by working according to this law, man works according to himself;
by following nature, he works according to God.
Charron moderated his largely naturalistic approach in the second
edition adding some sections of a different tone:
I will here add a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of
detraction, and to stay the plaints of those, that dislike that I attribute so much to nature
(although it be God as hath been said, and this book speaks not but of the natural and
humane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required.148
In the style of the revised preface, he justifies his position returning to the claim
that his work is concerned with the human things and he attempts to rebut any
accusations of naturalism by adding a few words on Divine grace. The grace of
God, as he explains, is the only thing missing from the equation of natural
reason and human nature to make the creation 'complete and perfect':
is brought forth in his due time, and receives it last and perfect portrait, it is elevated,
christened, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after
a sort) worthy its due reward ... Now this good consists not in long discourse, precepts
and instructions, neither it is attained by our own proper act and labour, it is a free gift
from above, from whence it takes its name, Grace.149
145 Sagesse, p. 355. Cf. Montaigne, Essais, ed. Pierre Villey (Paris: Quadrige/Presses
Universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 766, 796.
145 Cf. Sagesse, pp. 356, 357 and 362.
147 Cf. Sagesse, p. 356.
148 Sagesse, p. 367.
149 Sagesse, p. 367-8.
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Honesty and grace, we are told, are not contrary; neither the latter destroys
nature, but it perfects it: grace takes the form of a crown on man. Both nature
and grace originate from God but each has its separate jurisdiction. Charron at
this point concedes ambiguously to infidels and pagans attaining virtue, but
immediately counters his claim by asserting that virtue cannot be without grace.
He does, nevertheless mention the examples of Aristides ('The Just', 530-468
BC), Phocion ("The Good', 402-318 BC), Caton (Marcus Porcius Cato, 'The
Younger', 95-46 BC), and Socrates as ethical individuals returning, thus, to his
earlier position.150 This is particularly significant, as it asserts the claim that the
pagan cultures of antiquity ought to be understood as autonomous and
independently of a Christian framework. In other words, this is also an assertion
of the independence of the temporal world from the divine.
Certainly, the above references to God's grace and its role in achieving
virtue can give substance to an Augustinian - fideist reading of Charron's text.
Yet it should be increasingly obvious that a great number of elements
emphasising man's dependence on God were added during his revision of the
work. Charron's own views, however (since he manages to mislead many of our
attempts to reach them), are less important in this consideration than the text his
readers were actually faced with. The reference to God's grace, thus, can be seen
as a reflection of Charron's contemporary intellectual conflict in the theological
circles. As a trained theologian, the author of the Sagesse would have been
acutely aware of the significance of passages referring to grace and their
connotations. All the same, his fluctuation of stance on this matter would have
made his work more vulnerable to attacks from religious writers - as indeed
was the case two decades after its publication.151
150 Sagesse, p. 370.
151 See below.
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The discussion on the foundations of wisdom is followed by a
consideration of the offices of wisdom. Charron's dictates, in this respect, are
instructive: the first office, crucially and equivocally is to 'study true piety'
(Book II, 5). The ambiguity of the chapter lies above all on the fact that Charron
lists piety as an office to wisdom, subordinating, in essence, piety to wisdom.152
Piety holds the 'first place in the rank of our duties'. Charron's discussion on
religion in general is equally astonishing: he begins by recognising the existence
of a great diversity in religions of the world, while he points to the great
concurrence between them.153 The author of course notes the pre-eminence of
Christianity among the diverse religions, describing it as the only true one, as he
had argued in detail in his Trois Veritez. The whole chapter has frequent
references to this religious work, inducing some critics to make interesting
claims about inter-textuality.154 The author of the Sagesse then presents the view
that all religions agree in that they are not based on reason, they are irrational.155
Man cannot conceive them through his intellect, and the greatest mistake of the
disbelievers is that they apply their 'natural instruments' in their attempts to
understand them. Religions, however - note the plural in the discussion - can
only reach humans by divine revelation, and by faith.156 The treatment of
religion takes a fascinating turn with Charron's remark that religion is, largely,
not a matter of personal choice:
the nation, country, place, gives the religion, and that a man professes which is in force
in that place and among those persons, where he is born, and where he lives...157
152 Cf. Horowitz, 'Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethic'; esp. pp. 223-227.
153 Sagesse, pp. 379-80.
154 Notably Belin; L'CEuvre de Pierre Charron, p. 7.
155 Sagesse, p. 383-4.
156 Cf. Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. 86-7. This would also be one of Galileo's arguments a
decade and a half later; see 'Letter to the Gran Duchess Christina', Galileo Affair, pp. 87-118.
157 Sagesse, p. 385.
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That a trained theologian and a canon of the Catholic Church claimed that
religion is subject to social conditioning is simply astounding; it is, further, a
powerful indication of the intellectual atmosphere of the time that he was both
able to present his views in print and that these had a wide appeal among his
contemporaries. Charron's examination of the issue continues with another
attack on superstition: for superstition is the feature furthest apart from true
piety, and yet nothing resembles it as much.158
The term was a commonplace one in the intellectual atmosphere of the
sixteenth century, used as an all encompassing term for the 'other'. Yet even in
the passionate polemical exchanges of the Reformation period and its aftermath,
it did not lose its association with error through ignorance.159 Charron contends,
superstition is the characteristic of the vulgar sort and barbarous natures.
However, it is usually also favoured - or at least not hindered - by men in
authority, because they 'know it is a very fit instrument to lead people'.160 His
full-scale attack on religious zealotry will follow a few pages later; as a prelude,
however, he distinguishes between piety and true honesty (preud'hommie):
Let me only give this one advice necessary for him that intends to be wise, and that is,
not to separate piety from true honesty, whereof we have spoken before, and so content
himself with one of them, much less to confound them and mingle them together. These
are two things very different, and which have diverse jurisdictions, piety and probity, religion
and honesty, devotion and conscience ... should be jointly in the wise man - the one
cannot be without the other entire and perfect... (my italics)161
True, he does point out that the preferred condition is to have piety and true
honesty combined. When, however, he examines cases where a person has one
of the two qualities instead of both, he implies, astonishingly, that the lack of
158 Sagesse, p. 388.
159 See the Introduction of Helen Parish and William G. Naphy (eds.), Religion and Superstition in
Refonnation Europe. (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 2002), pp. 1-22.
160 Sagesse, p. 390.
161 Sagesse, p. 396.
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honesty is graver than the lack of piety.162 He also talks forcefully about people
using 'piety as a cover for their impiety' or a 'cloak' for their wickedness.163 Yet
religion is 'easier to have', of greater show, and it is the trait of 'simple and
vulgar minds', whereas honesty is 'far more laborious and difficult' to practice,
of less show, and for minds 'valiant and generous'.164 The disparity of religion
and the other virtues is underlined by a note that he had made in the preface
and that he repeats here, that religion is a later virtue.165 In a similar manner, in
an omitted extract of the first edition, while maintaining that religion is
posterior to preud'hommie Charron makes the remarkable claim that true honesty
can cause and engender religion, since the former is the more ancient and
natural but the reverse is not possible.166 Religious zealots on the other hand
advance that honesty should follow religious faith:
[They] on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that
religion (which is acquired and received by an outward cause, ...) engenders honesty,
which we have showed it should proceed from nature, from that law and light which
God has put into us, from our first beginning. These men will that a man be an honest
man, because there is a paradise and hell ... I will that you be an honest man, not
because you would go to paradise, but because nature, reason, God wills it, because the
law and general policy of the world where you are part, requires it - doubtless such
honesty occasioned by the spirit of religion besides that it is not true and essential, but
accidental, it is likewise very dangerous producing many times very base and
scandalous effects under the fair and glorious pretext of piety. What execrable ivickedness
has the zeal of religion brought forth? Is there any other subject or occasion that has yield the
like? ... And he that has religion without honesty, I will not say he is more wicked, but far more
dangerous than he that has neither the one nor the other ... they believe things whatsoever, be
it treason, treachery, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not only lawful and
sufferable, being coloured with zeal and the care of religion167 (my italics)
Honesty, thus, according to Charron should originate from nature and not from
religion, because when occasioned by the spirit of religion it turns into a
dangerous feature; a person that has religion without honesty, he writes, is far
162 Sagesse, pp. 396-7.
163 See below for similar descriptions of religion as a 'cloak' (Chapter 3 and 4).
164 Sagesse, pp. 397-8.
165 Sagesse, pp. 6 and 398.
166 Extracts from the 1601 edition; Sagesse, p. 788.
167 Sagesse, pp. 398-9.
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more dangerous than a person who has neither. The conflicts of 1562-98 had
shown that people of that sort were susceptible to the seditions and discords
that condemned the French society to a period of 'malady', 'frenzy' and,
ultimately, misery.168
That his views had given rise to certain discontent and were fairly
unconventional is evidenced by president Jeannin's amendments. Most of the
points that could raise questions and doubts are removed in his version, notably
preud'hommie's precedence and primacy over piety; there is, furthermore, added
emphasis on the might of God and Divine grace.169 What is especially striking in
Charron's writings is the stress on the distinction between piety and probity and
his evident preference for the latter. His inclination can be accounted for by a
combination of theory and experience. The theory derived from the teachings of
the classical antiquity, and the experience had been the civil and religious strife
that convulsed most of Europe. The former provided evidence for a morality
that could exist outside a Christian context, while the latter demonstrated the
need for such a (human) morality, independent of religious zeal and adherence
to specific doctrines.
The remaining seven chapters of the Second Book of the Sagesse treat the
other offices of a man with the aspiration to be wise; following the duty ofman
to his creator (piety), the other offices are to himself and the people around him.
Thus, Charron exhorts him to govern his desires and pleasures and to carry
himself moderately and equally in all conditions life may bring, while also
conforming to the environment he lives in. A special reference should be made
on the duties of a man to his country. Charron elaborates on the advice that a
wise man should conform to the laws, customs and ceremonies of his realm
168 Cf. Sagesse, pp. 615-8.
169 See Sagesse, pp. 793-802.
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(Book II, 8).170 He establishes the importance of authority in this world; he talks
about the power of laws and custom.171 Much in the same way that he treated
the diversity of religions, Charron remarks on the variety of laws and customs
in the world, using a number of examples. The extracts are to a great degree
reminiscent of Montaigne's writings on the diversity of custom in the world.172
The author urges the reader to observe the laws and customs of the realm, not
because of their justice and equity of necessity, but essentially for 'public
reverence and their authority'.173 Laws are especially necessary for the common
sort: they cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without laws.174 But
there is a difference between the vulgar sort and wise men: 'By right a wise man
is above the laws, but in inward and public effect, he is their voluntary and free
obedient subject'.175 A wise man should moreover examine separately all laws
and customs, compare and judge them:
faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of the truth and universal reason
and nature, where he is first obliged ...It may fall out sometimes, that we may do that, by a
second particular and municipal obligation which is against the first and more ancient, that is to
say, universal nature and reason; but yet we satisfy nature by keeping our judgements and
opinions true and just according to it....the world has nothing to do with our thoughts, but the
outzvard man is engaged to the public course of the world and must give an account thereof176
This passage repeats the pre-eminence of the law of Nature, to which a wise
man can be loyal even when he is required to comply with human laws. This is
particularly in the case that the public good is at stake: Charron here echoes the
arguments of the politiques who in the midst of civil turmoil were calling for
some co-existence between the opposing sides, within the framework of
commonwealth (repnblique).
170 Sagesse, p. 422.
171 Sagesse, p. 423.
172 Cf. his essays, De la coustume et de ne changer aisement une loy receue.Q., 23); Des cannibals (I, 31);
Des coches (III, 6).
173 Sagesse, pp. 430-1.
174 Sagesse, p. 433.
175 Sagesse, p. 433.
176 Sagesse, p. 434.
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The ultimate fruit and crown of wisdom however, is the wise man's skill
to maintain himself in true tranquillity of mind, a reference to the need for
personal (internal) retreat from the disorder and misery surrounding the
inhabitants of the second half of the sixteenth century.177
Book III
The role of the Sngesse as a manual to wisdom is realised in the Third Book
where Charron treats the specific advices of wisdom following the four
moral/cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. As a result, the
tone of the Book is exhortatory and didactic. As on the whole, the Book does not
deal much with theoretical issues, we will be paying less attention to it. Yet the
fact that it occupies more than one third of the work is important in itself, as it
confirms the moral character and practical function of the work. This is further
evidenced by Charron's placing prudence at the highest level of tire four virtues.
Prudence for him is the 'queen, superintendent and guide' to all the other
virtues and it is the skill to handle man's perverse nature. As an empirical
quality, it stems from experience - sometimes associated with history - and
practice; prudence, consequently, also implies accommodation to
circumstances.178 Closely linked with man's reason, it amounts to dispassionate
judgement and action in accordance with it. Charron distinguishes two main
types of prudence: private, and public or political prudence. This was a
distinction made by Aristotle and has been followed by authors writing on
177 Cf. titles of books published in reaction to the religious turmoil and enjoyed wide circulation:
Justus Lipsius' De Constantia in Publicis Malis (1584); Guillaume du Vair's De la Constance et
Consolation es Calamitez Publiques (?1590).
178 Sagesse, pp. 482-3.
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politics since.179 Prudentia politica had to be different from that of private and
simple men, because a Prince was responsible for the well-being of his subjects.
Charron acknowledges his debt to Lipsius in his analysis of political prudence,
whose views we will examine in depth in the next chapter.180 Particularly
relevant to the arguments we have seen so far is the author's reference to the
piety of the prince and the role of religion within the state. Importantly,
Charron's view, following Lipsius, was that religion could be a factor of stability
within a state, promoting obedience from the subjects.181 In this manner, the
author undermines again the role of religion, subordinating it to political
expediencies. This fits well with the exposition of religion and piety within the
whole text that gives prominence to the human qualities of honesty and civility
within society. The view was not one, nonetheless, that agreed with the official
position of the Church, or with the stance of a canon of the Catholic Church; as
we will see in the next chapter, Lipsius's Politica was to be placed under the
Index of Prohibited Books, for putting forth the same position.182
Charron discusses in the rest of the book the role and attributes of
justice183 and fortitude, the second and third moral virtues respectively. The
author identifies the role of fortitude as a defence against outward evils, such as
sickness, exile, poverty and death, and inward passions. The latter are also the
most dangerous.184 Charron, thus, gives at this point specific rules on how to
deal with fear, sorrow, compassion, hatred, envy, revenge, jealousy, as he had
179 Sagesse, p. 491; Aristotle, Politics, III.iii.6: 'Ei 6s r| aoir] apsxq apxovTO<g xe ayaAoo Kai av6po<;
ayaBoo, noAvur)<; 6' eoti kcii o apyopevoc;, ouy rj aim] av sir| noAixou Kai av5po<g, xivo<; psvxoi
noAixoo' ox) yap r| aoxr| apyovxoc; Kax noAixoo...' [: And if the goodness of a good ruler is the
same as the goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also a citizen, so that the goodness
of a citizen in general will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen
will; for goodness as a ruler is not the same thing as goodness as a citizen..
180 Sagesse, p. 487.
181 Sagesse, p. 489.
182 See Index des Livres Interdits, vol. IX: Index de Rome 1590, 1593,1596, pp. 42A-21.
183 Sagesse, p. 57A-3.
184 Sagesse, pp. 676-683.
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promised in the First Book. The author's account of fortitude resembles greatly
Lipsius's concept of constancy against public adversities.185 The Flemish author,
as we will see in the next chapter, emphasised steadfastness in the face of public
(disruption in public life) and private evils, namely, passions. The work
concludes with temperance, a wise man's guide in prosperity; moderate
conduct, according to Charron is an indication of a wise life.186
In this manner, the Sngesse is brought to a closure. The richness of its
material and the radicalism of several of Charron's claims within the text, made
it susceptible to diverse criticisms and conflicting interpretations, a number of
which will be the subject of the following section.
III.
The Challenge Exposed: Reception, Interpretations and Controversy (1623-26)
Considering the extraordinary nature of the content and claims of the Sagesse, it
is, perhaps, surprising to reflect on the fact that it took almost two decades for it
to be at the centre of heated intellectual controversies.187 The specific debate is
one of particular interest, as it reveals the intellectual tensions prevalent in the
first decades of the seventeenth century. As an exchange, furthermore,
principally between theologians, on the questions of atheism, naturalism, and
the role of grace and free will, it also demonstrates the prominence of the
religious crisis of the period and the unresolved deep ecclesiological problems
185 Sagesse, p. 676. For Lipsius's notion of Constantia see below, Chapter 2.
186 Sagesse, pp. 720-2.
187 The most thorough account of the controversy in question is Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron,
chapters 9-10; see also Sabrie, De I'Humanisme an Rationalisme, chaps. XVI-XIX; Boase, Fortuties of
Montaigne, pp. 164-174; Popkin, History ofScepticism, pp. 110-115; Henri Gouhier, L'Anti-
Humanisme an XVIIe Siecle, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987), pp. 28-9; for St. Cyran's intervention see also
Nigel Abercrombie, Origins ofJanseyiism. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 173.
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that this reflected.188 For a primarily philosophical work to be at the centre of a
theological debate, moreover, is an indication of the complex interconnections
between questions of religion, philosophy and morality.
The debate in question had its startwith the publication of the Jesuit Pere
Francois Garasse's (1585-1631) Doctrine Cnrieuse des Beaux Esprits de ce Temps, ou
Pretendus tels in 1623, with which he attacked what he believed was a growing
threat: libertinism.189 In this general and vague term the Jesuit included fideists,
deists and atheists, namely, people who either challenged the prominence of
religion, or raised concerns about the uniqueness of Christian religion, or
questioned man's abilities to experience 'revealed' religion. The Jesuit had two
main objections against these 'libertins': first, he censured them for 'opening the
gate of Paradise to persons like Homer, Socrates, and Theseus...'.190 Second, and
linked to our examination of Charron, he condemned those who attributed
divine powers to Nature and advocated that man should abide by it.191
Although Charron was not the Jesuit's main target, he was included in his
denunciation as the author of the 'breviary of the libertins', as the polemicist
took pleasure in calling the Sagesse. The Doctrine Curieuse accused Charron of
ignorance in religious matters and for use of immodest language. It also classed
Charron as a very dangerous type of philosopher, because although he
continued to profess the Catholic faith, he was tearing it apart from within.
188 Cf. Michel de Certeau, The Writing ofHistory, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia UP,
1988), pp. 150-54.
189 In a dictionary published in 1611, the term was linked with 'epicureanism, sensuality,
licentiousness and dissoluteness'; cited in Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France, p. 144. It
was also used to denominate 'free-thinking'in general. Garasse in his Les Recherches des
Recherches et Autres CEuvres de M.E. Pascjuier (Paris, 1622) formulated a definition of the term that
permitted him to regroup all of his enemies under a common and practical denomination: 'par le
mot de libertin je n'entens ny un Huguenot, ny un Athee, ny un Catholique, ny un Heretique, ny
un Politique, mais un certain compose de toutes ces qualities: le fons est catholique, releve par
apres de couleurs bizzares et changeantes a proportion des humeurs, des discourse, des
compagnies, des sujects qui se presentent'; cited by Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron, p. 241.
190 Cited in Sabrie, De VHumanisme au Rationalisme, pp. 410-1.
191 Ibid. Cf also Boase, Fortunes ofMontaigne, p. 167.
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Importantly, Garasse also claimed that Charron was an author who 'favoured
libertinism by not keeping enough distance from certain philosophical
traditions, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism', emphasising what he perceived
as incompatibility between Christian teachings and pagan philosophies.192
Critics seem to agree that the Doctrine Cnriense as a whole is not of high
intellectual quality, perhaps because the author was not at ease with critical
analysis of ideas. The result however was that Garasse, an excellent
propagandist, wrote a fiercely polemical work, but did not dwell much upon
theological issues and argumentation, making his work susceptible to a
response.
This response came from Father Francois Ogier (71600-70), who within
the same year published the Jugement et Censure dn Livre de la Doctrine Curiense
(1623). His refutation of the Jesuit's work was not particularly well-founded,
however; instead, it was a loaded counter-attack, which in turn caused the
reaction of pere Garasse.193 The Jesuit answered with his Apologie the following
year: in this, Charron was brought to the forefront of the atheists and libertines,
with the accusation that he 'chokes and strangles sweetly the feelings of religion
as if with a silken cord of philosophy'.194 The criticisms were more rounded this
time; the Jesuit Father repeated the charge that the author of the Sagesse was
promoting Epicurean philosophy, but he was especially critical of his account of
the variety of religions and his effort to indicate the similarities between them,
without sufficiently exalting Christianity.195
192 Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron, pp. 242-245.
193 A remark characteristic of the tone of the work is the following: 'Garasse, my friend, that
which is above us is nothing to us. The works of Charron are a little too high tone for low and
vulgar minds like yours'; cited in Popkin, History ofScepticism, p. 111.
194 Apologie dn Pere Frangois Garassus, de la Compagnie de Jesus, pour son Livre contrc les Atheistes et
Libertines de Nostre Siecle, et Response aux Censures et Calomnies de I'Autheur Anonyme (1624). The
citation is from Popkin, History ofScepticism, pp. 112-2.
195 Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron, p. 250.
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Ogier's defense of Charron had also caused a more elaborate response
within the same year, this time by Pere Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), the later
philosopher and mathematician, friend of Galileo (1564-1642) and Descartes
(1596-1650). In his pamphlet L'Impiete des Deistes (1624), Mersenne was
especially critical of the Pyrrhonist approach, because for him this mode of
thought damaged the foundations of religion.196 The Impiete further disparaged
the libertin claim of the soul's mortality, because, as Mersenne very perceptively
argued, such a belief led man to conduct a licentious life on earth, without any
concern for the after-life.197 To put it in the terms of the present study, Mersenne
recognised that the belief in the immortality of the soul was one of the bonds
that kept the temporal sphere linked to the divine, and the kingdom of God
united with the kingdom of man. Referring to Charron more particularly, he
interestingly pointed out the diverse reception of the Sagesse and criticised its
author's choice of discussing questions of religion in such an equivocal manner
as 'inexcusable'.198 He addressed Charron's 'pragmatism' and discussed the
relation between theology and philosophy, arguing that only 'strong minds'
(following Charron's classification) do not distinguish between the two. He tried
to give a fitting definition that would join together the concept of both the
sagesse human and Christian, and condemned the libertins for not seeing the link
between wisdom and religion. Mersenne further criticised their conviction that
they could 'philosophise' without studying theology at the same time.199 By
taking the knowledge of God and revealed religion out of the equation, the
libertines were in fact establishing a new worldview, based on ancient
196 Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron, p. 406.
197 Sabrie, De I'Humanisme an Rationalisme, p. 404.
198 Cited in De I'Humanisme an Ratiojialisme, p. 456.
199 Cf. 'C'est que j'ay souvent pense touchant la Sagesse de M. Charron, mais le temps et le loisir
ne me Font encore permis, et ay tousjours attendu que quelquun l'enterprist, donnant une
sagesse qui soit aussi chrestienne qu'humaine, et politique, a ce que ca police et la religion se
conjoignent par le lien d'une veritable harmonie'; cited in Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron, p. 258.
Cf. also p. 259.
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philosophy and nature. Mersenne's work was far more sophisticated than any of
Garasse's; he based his refutation on solid theological argumentation, and
demonstrated a number of heterodoxies contained in contemporary texts,
making a special reference to the Sagesse.
Yet Garasse did not feel that the controversy had come to a successful
end; he published another work, the four-volume Somme Theologiqne des Veritez
Capitales de la Religion Chrestienne (1625), evidently following St. Thomas'
heading, with the intention to settle all the issues under dispute.200 The Somme
had a large scope indeed; it set out to give a decisive account of problems such
as the nature of religion and the double nature of the person of Christ - both of
which had immediate resonances with the matter of divine grace and its role.
The Jesuit attacked with it the views of any and all kinds of atheism: 'furious
and enraged'; 'atheism of libertinage and corruption of manners'; 'atheism of
profanation'; 'wavering or unbelieving atheism'; 'brutal, lazy, melancholy
atheism'. Charron's atheism, according to Garasse's classification, belonged to
the fourth type, the melancholy atheism. What seemed to be the source of all
evil in the Sagesse was the promoted 'indifference', and the impassiveness either
for or against God. In this respect, Garasse denounced the principle of
'conscientious ignorance' and what he thought Charron to be advocating, that
religion is a matter of convention, and not a serious question.201 More
interestingly from our perspective, he accused the canon of paganism and of
preaching the scandalous maxim of 'following nature'.202
200 In his dedication to Cardinal Richelieu, the author explained why a new Summa was
necessary; 'This title which I place at the head of my works, having been used for four or five
centuries, deserves to be revived, and since the libertine types have beclouded our times wit
new darkness, we must seek for new lights to illuminate the Truth'; quoted in Popkin, History of
Scepticism, p. 112
201 Cf. Boase, Fortunes ofMontaigne, p. 168; Popkin, History ofScepticism, p. 112.
202 Belin, L'CEvre de Pierre Charron, p. 265; Sabrie, De I'Humanisme au Rationalisme, p. 156.
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The whole debate took a most interesting turn in 1626, when Jean
Duvergier de Hauranne, abbe de St. Cyran (1581-1643), the later Jansenist leader
and sworn enemy of the Jesuits, intervened with his Somme des Fantes et
Fanssetez Capitales Contenues en la Somme Theologique du Pere Franqois Garasse.
Amidst his refutation of the work, he pointed out thirteen of Garasse's
misinterpretations of Charron and offered a reading of the latter's text in
entirely Augustinian terms. In this regard, Saint Cyran was most applauding of
the First Book of the Sagesse where Charron explains the mutability and
weakness of the 'human condition', as we have seen; from the perspective of the
Somme des Fautes, human feebleness was perfectly accounted for in Charron's
work. This weakness, moreover, was the result of original sin, from which the
Augustinians concluded that man could only hope to escape by the grace of
God. The Jesuits, on the contrary, according to the Augustinians-Jansenists, paid
little or no consideration to original sin. In this respect, and as Sabrie points out
in his analysis of the controversy, Saint Cyran was more an adversary to the
Jesuit Garasse than an apologist to Charron.203 Popkin however, recognises that
the later Jansenist's leader willingness to make common cause with the author
of the Sagesse can be attributed to the anti-rationalism that they both shared, the
one in theological matters, the other in philosophical.204 Sabrie, however,
remarks that Saint Cyran must have read the work very cursorily and
superficially, without getting at the heart of it; had 'the Doctor of grace' realised
the centrality of naturalism in the Sagesse, he would have denounced it instead
of defending it.205
203 Sabrie, De VHumanisme an Rationalisme, p. 488.
204 Popkin, History ofScepticism, pp. 113-4.
205 Sabrie, De VHumanisme an Rationalisme, p. 488.
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Conclusion
The controversy illustrates nicely the various interpretations of the Sagesse and
the challenges that this work presented to the authority of religion as source of
truth and morality. Charron had produced a very rich and diverse work,
drawing from a number of authors, and combining distinct languages. Yet he
had managed to give a distinct character to the material he incorporated,
creating an original synthesis. This richness was partly the reason behind the
variety of conflicting interpretations of the Sngesse. His critics made the
accusation that his preference of ancient philosophical texts had led the author
to a pagan way of thinking, which induced him in turn to distinguish between
theology and philosophy, and generated a greater concern for temporal things
than divine. This was further associated with the accusation of naturalism.
Charron's arguments on the link between human understanding and nature and
the law of nature as a guide to moral conduct, largely drawn from the Stoic
tradition of thought, could be used as arguments for the independent existence
of nature and man. On a different level, Garasse and Mersenne expressed a
profound distaste for Charron's emphasis on human weakness and his call for
acknowledging human ignorance; these were the Sceptic and Augustinian or
fideistic overtones of his text. They were also the exact grounds upon which
Saint Cyran had defended him.
Overall, nevertheless, Charron's discussion of preud'hommie is what
makes his work most arresting and interesting. Preud'hommie, which the author
effectively identifies with wisdom, derives from nature; it is human and not
Christian/divine - and although he does equate God and Nature a few times,
throughout the whole work it seems that Nature is closer to the human-
temporal sphere than it is to God. As the ability to act according to nature, it is
fundamentally a practical virtue; thus, wisdom for Charron does not have as
great a theoretical or theological meaning as for some of his intellectual
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predecessors or contemporaries.206 He distinguishes it, furthermore from grace;
the two have different jurisdictions. His insistence that lack of probity is in fact
worse than lack of piety and his remark that probity can engender piety but the
reverse is not possible is just startling. Hence, Charron plainly argues for a
morality that is independent from God, derived from Nature and is associated
with human things rather than divine. It is his contention of a morality
disassociated from God that makes him deem pagans such as Socrates virtuous.
Charron's own determination throughout the work, moreover, to distinguish
between divine (piety, grace) and human (preud'hommie, honesty) wisdom is
further sustained by the fact that he wrote txvo separate books on the two separate
wisdoms. What is ultimately undermined in Charron's philosophical scheme, of
course, is religion and the place of God in human affairs.207
The association ofmorality with human tilings is further related to his
attack on intellectual and religious dogmatism, even though the former features
much more prominently in his work than the latter. Yet Charron does not
hesitate fiercely to criticise superstition and dogmatism, which he sees as the
source of troubles, heresies, sects and seditions. The attack on intellectual
(moral) and religious dogmatism is additionally advanced by Charron's
emphasis on religious and legal relativism. Charron puts forward the
remarkable claim that religion is dependent upon social conditioning. This
relativity is perhaps more evident in his views about the conformity of wise
men. As a universal mind and citizen of the world, a wise man ought to
206 Cf. Eugene F. Rice's The Renaissance Idea ofWisdom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1958); the
book traces the transformation of wisdom from a purely contemplative quality to a secularised
virtue. Interestingly, in his mapping of the evolution, Rice places Charron at the final stage of
secularisation. For reviews of the book see Hans Baron, 'Secularization of Wisdom and Political
Humanism in the Renaissance' [Review of E.F. Rice's The Renaissance Idea ofWisdom], Journal of
the History of Ideas, 21(1960), pp. 131-150; and Richard Popkin, in Renaissance Neivs, vol. 12 (1959),
pp. 265-269.
207 See Horowitz, 'Natural Law as the Foundation for an Autonomous Ethics'; Kogel, Pierre
Charron, ch. 4; and Alan Boase.
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conform to the laws of his homeland, as these cannot really restrain him if he
remains faithful to the law of Nature on the inside. The author therefore
advances the disparity between inward 'freedom' (of conscience?) and outward
conformity, one that we will see Lipsius and King James ardently endorse in
their arguments about religious dissent and constancy in times of troubles. This
cannot be viewed independently of the religiously explosive environment in
which Charron and his contemporaries were living in. Relativity of laws and
religions implicitly also referred to relativity of doctrines, as Lipsius and Sarpi
would argue in their own works, and practice in real life. In the same vein,
Charron's call for universalism can be viewed as a call for ecumenism on the
same bases that James VI and I would plead for a reunion of Christendom,
The importance of the Sagesse, therefore, should not be underestimated.
The richness and ambivalence of the work ought to be taken as evidence and a
reflection of the intellectual tensions of the time, primarily expressed in
Charron's ardent attack on any kind of intellectual or religious authority and his
contempt for religious zealotry and intellectual dogmatism. These tensions were
the result of two things: first, the increasing circulation of ancient texts and the
problems that this brought with it. Were ancient philosophies to be regarded as
equivalent to Christian or were they to be dismissed? Second, if accepted, were
they to lead their adherents to paganism or was there a way of reconciling the
two? These problems, as Hans Baron pointed out, had been troubling thinkers
since the Renaissance.208 And this brings us to the second point: what was
different now was the fact that scholars had begun to realise the effects of pagan
philosophy, since it had been around for longer and made accessible to a much
greater number of readers. More important, many people of the second half of
the sixteenth century had been through a devastating experience that the
208 Baron, 'Secularisation of the Idea of Wisdom', pp. 149-50.
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inhabitants of Renaissance Europe had not: the religious wars, that showed
them that perhaps the disassociation of the temporal and the divine was
essential, if they were to survive. Nature, instead of a particular dogma, could
show the way, and the ultimate benefit would be the much longed-for
tranquillity of mind. After all, man had a divine ray of light within him that
would help him find the way on earth.
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Chapter II
Moral Implications (II): Public and Private
Justus Lipsius, De Constcintia (1584) & Politicn (1589)
Ego e Philologia Philosophiam feci
Lipsius to Woverius, 3 November 1603 (Ep. Misc. 4.84)
One religion is the author ofvnitie; and from a confused religion there alwayes groweth
dissent
Lipsius, Politica IV, 2
The impact that the spread of humanism had, when combined with the
effect of the religious wars of the second half of the sixteenth century is perhaps
more obvious in the work of the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) than
it is in Charron. This is especially the case regarding perceptions of the
relationship between the temporal and the divine spheres, the role of religion in
people's perception of the world, and the moral connotations associated with
these issues,
Several links can be ascertained between Charron and Lipsius. The two
men were almost exact contemporaries: Lipsius was born six years after
Charron, and the two of them died within three years of each other. Both lived
intense lives and were equally marked by the most turbulent and disastrous
conflicts that plagued most of Europe at that time. They shared a love of letters
and classical studies, and both had, to the distress of some of their
contemporaries, a special interest in law and philosophy in general, and in
moral considerations in particular. With regard to the subject matter of their
works, the most striking parallel is the emphasis they placed on the disjunction
between one's outward conduct and private thought. Lipsius, however, took the
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notion further than Charron, insisting on different principles of conduct for the
two domains, even at the expense of Christian ethics in the public realm, so long
as one was in close contact with God in one's private domain. Related to this,
the two of them further shared parallel views on the position of religion in
public life. The works of Charron and Lipsius both enjoyed great popularity
throughout the seventeenth century and were translated into many languages.
Lipsius was a renowned humanist, producing, during his life, outstanding
editions of Tacitus (AD c. 56-c. 117) and Seneca (4 BC/AD 1-65). He had,
furthermore, a tremendous reputation as a teacher, corresponded with most of
the great minds of his time and his services were claimed by powerful princes.
As with Charron, the Flemish humanist's legacy was controversial even
within his lifetime; his perceived ambivalence, however, was due to different
reasons from his French counterpart. The principal reproach against Lipsius was
his 'inconstancy' in religious matters: having been born a Catholic, he took up
positions first at a Lutheran and subsequently at a Calvinist University, before
finally returning to the Catholic doctrine. His views especially on the
contentious issue of the role of religion within the state caused controversy with
the polemicist Dirck (Theodore) Volckertszoon Coornhert (1522-90). Religious
ambiguity stigmatised Lipsius for centuries; it would be fair to surmise that this
partly accounts for the reluctance, particularly on the part of Protestantworld,
to recognise his value.1 This could consequently also explain the relatively small
attention that had been paid to his work until recently: in the Anglophone
intellectual community, he only started receiving the consideration he deserves
1 Cf. Mark P.O. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius. (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton UP, 1991); p. 18: 'His departure [from Leiden and the Protestant world]
saddened and perplexed his friends, students and colleagues at Leiden, and his reputation has
never been fully reinstated. In 1987 for example, in the exhibition devoted to the early history of
the University, his name appeared only in a list of distinguished scholars attracted by Dousa,
while at Amsterdam Coornhert's portrait shares the place of honour with that of William of
Orange in the exhibition in the Rijksmuseum devoted to the history of the Netherlands'.
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in the last two decades, beginning with the translation of part of Gerhard
Oestreich's work.2 Nonetheless, studies of his life and work have lately been
flourishing; a number of recent studies take Lipsius as a starting point,3 as more
students of seventeenth-century ideas have come to acknowledge his
significance through his adoption and popularisation of the principles of
Tacitism and Neo-Stoicism amongst the intellectual circles.4
This chapter will focus on Lipsius's fundamental concept of the divide
between public and private matters. This has three aspects. First is Lipsius's use
of classical sources, in which Stoicism is the principle in personal matters, and
Tacitism the example for public affairs. Second, are implications that the
fundamental notion of the disjunction between public and private had on the
role of religion in private life and within the state. The chapter will lastly also
concentrate on the way in which the emphasis on philosophy mixed with the
Christian teachings. The examination of the issues in question will depend on
Lipsius's two most widely circulated books, the Constantia and the Politica. The
former, De Constantia Libri Dno (1584), a book on moral philosophy prescribing
the individual's conduct in times of public afflictions, was printed forty-four
times in the original Latin, fifteen times in French, and was also translated into
Dutch, English, German, Spanish, Italian and Polish.5 On the other hand, the
Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex (Leiden, 1589) is a work on politics that
2 His main monograph in English is Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, edited by Br.
Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger; trans, by David McLintock (Cambridge: CUP, 1982). Cf. his
remarks on the insufficient attention that Lipsius and Neo-Stoicism had thus far attracted (p. 57).
3 The recent interest on Lipsius is primarily evidenced by the editions of collected essays, the
results of a number of conferences on the Flemish humanist; (see the relevant publications in the
bibliography). For studies on Neo-Stoicism and Lipsius's wider influence especially in literature
cf. David Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland. Neo-Stoicism, Culture and Ideology
in an Age ofCrisis, 1540-1690. (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000); the less successful Adriana
McCrea, Constant Minds. The Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650. (Toronto; London:
University of Toronto Press); Barbour Reid, English Epicures and Stoics. Ancient Legacies in Early
Stuart Culture, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998) and others.
4 Cf. Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651. (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), esp. ch. 2.
5 Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, p. 13.
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can on the whole be located within the framework of the 'mirror for princes'
literature. The Latin original went through fifteen editions within the first ten
years of its appearance (1589 to 1599), and it was soon translated into Dutch,
French, English, Polish and German, followed by Spanish and Italian editions in
1604. In fact, there was almost a new edition every year up to 1618, reaching the
total of eighty-two editions by 1752.6
Several factors contributed to this popularity of Lipsius's works. First and
foremost, was the appeal the ancient philosophical teachings presented to
people in their struggle to deal with public disruption; Lipsius demonstrated
this application in his Constantia, in a very immediate and personalised manner.
Secondly, the wars of religion increased the perception of and possibilities for
people to participate in public affairs, while they also raised serious questions
over the role religion ought to have in a state. Both these issues were dealt with
in Lipsius's Politicn. These are also the reasons that make Lipsius's work
germane in the scope of this thesis. In parallel to Charron's dualism of spheres
(divine and human wisdom, each dealt with in a separate book), the Flemish
scholar presents his audience with another type of dualism: private conduct and
morality dealt with in the Constantia, and civil conduct and the associated
morality, in the Politica.
The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to assess Lipsius's opinions on
the separation of a public and a private morality, his association with Neo-
Stoicism as a refuge from the crisis brought about by religious fervour, and his
stance on the role of religion within the state. To this purpose, an examination of
the eventful life of the author is first required, as it will provide a context for the
discussion of his two main works. A summary of the contents of the Constantia
and the Politica will then lead to the main analysis of the texts and their themes.
6 Oestreich, ibid. pp. 57-8; cf. also Jason L. Saunders, Justus Lipsius. The Philosophy ofRenaissance
Stoicism. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 27.
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Similarly to the previous chapter, we will see that we can perceive Lipsius's
positions and popularity as an instance firmly positioned within the context of
the religious and civil conflict that he, together with many other Europeans,
experienced during the second half of the sixteenth century.
I.
Lipsius's Life: Humanism in Times ofPublic Adversity
That the civil and religious strife that afflicted his country had a great effect on
Lipsius is evident throughout his work, most notably in the Constantia, which
he famously wrote from his real need for support during the calamities of the
wars.7
.. .who is of so hard and flinty a heart that he can anie longer endure these euils? wee are
tossed, as you see, these manie yeares with the tempest of ciuill warres: and like Sea¬
faring men are wee beaten with sundrie blastes of troubles and sedition. If I loue
quietnesse and rest, the Trumpets and ratling of armour interrupt me. If I take solace in
my countrey gardens and farmes, the souldiers and murtheresrs force mee into the
Towne... [Langius:] Thy countrey (I confesse) is tossed and tormoyled grieuously: What
part of Europe is at this day free? ... Hereto I [Lipsius], rashly ynough, replied: Nay
surely, I will forsake my countrey, knowing that it is lesse griefe to heare report of euils,
than to bee an eye-witnesse vnto them.. .8
This extract captures the tribulation facing the inhabitants of war-tormented
areas of Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century. Tire religious
divisions affected Lipsius's life in many ways: timid, pacifist and vain, he fled
from the troubles a number of times, seeking refuge at a safer place and a
different university. His flights, however, also necessitated changes in his
religious allegiances, which aroused serious disapproval from Catholics and
Protestants alike. His problems engaging with, or enduring the genuine distress
7 Justus Lipsius, Opera Omnia, 4 vols. (Antwerp: Balthasar Moretus, Plantin Press, 1637); vol. IV,
p. 371.
8 Two Bookes ofConstancie, trans, by Sir John Stradling (London: Richard Johnes, 1594); eds.
Rudolf Kirk and Clayton Morris Hall (New Brunswick; New Jersey Rutgers UP: 1939), pp. 72-3.1
have primarily consulted this edition, in conjunction, however, with the Latin edition of 1590,
and the revised edition in Lipsius's Opera Omnia (1637); all the citations will be from the English
edition (heretofore referred to as Constantia), unless otherwise stated.
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the intense confessionalisation of his world brought, were expressed in what can
be described as laxity in his sense of doctrine, together with the traversing of
confessional boundaries. The same problems can also be detected in the rigidity
of his views in the role of religion within a state, which brought him into conflict
with opposing standpoints on religious issues. His vanity, moreover, together
with his great reputation and his questionable outlook also meant that he
constantly felt the need to justify himself to his surroundings and to posterity.
One such attempt at self-fashioning is one of the two sources that we have for
his life: an autobiography that survives in the form of a letter to Woverius (Jan
van der Wouver, 1576-1635), one of his close pupils.9 The other source is the Vita
]usti Lipsii, composed by Aubertus Miraeus (1573-1640) and included in the
Opera Omnia (1637).10
According to these sources, Lipsius was born in 1547 in a Catholic family
in Overisjsche, between Brussels and Louvain (Brabant), and was later educated
at the Jesuit College of Cologne, where he studied classical literature and
history, alongside rhetoric and philosophy.11 He seems to have been a devourer
of books from a very early age, and showed a special interest in works of
philosophy, ethics and politics; so much so, that the Jesuit Fathers, alarmed by
his attraction, confiscated his books.12 Even though these Fathers hoped to enlist
Lipsius in their order, he left Cologne after what he claimed to be an
9 The letter is dated 1 October 1600, and it was written while Wouver was in Seville (Ep. Misc.
3.87); for a critical analysis of it and Lipsius's preoccupation with posterity see Morford, Stoics
and Neostoics, pp. 96-100. For his life see Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 3-58; Rudolf Kirk's
introduction in the Constantia, pp. 3-12; Leontine Zanta, La Renaissance du Stoicisme au XVIe siecle
(Paris, 1914) pp. 151-166; Mark Morford's Stoics and Neostoics is, however, by far the most
updated and researched. Valuable information can also be found in Jacques Kluyskens, 'Justus
Lipsius (1547-1606) and the Jesuits. With four unpublished letters', Humanistica Lovaniensia 23
(1974), pp. 244-270.
10 Miraeus based his Vita partly in Lipsius's correspondence, and partly on his works: notes on
the side of his text refer to his sources; Justus Lipsius, Opera Omnia, vol. I, pp. xlix-lxviii.
11 Vita, Opera Omnia I, p. 1.
12 Cf. Lipsius's Epistle to the Reader in Constantia, pp. 205-6.
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intervention by his parents. However, he retained close relations with the Jesuits
throughout his life.13 He then went to the University of Louvain where he
continued his classical studies, together with Law.
Lipsius's eagerness to further his studies and his career is witnessed by
the composition of a work that was published before he was twenty years old.
Variae Lectiones (Antwerp, 1569) was dedicated to Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de
Granvelle (1517-86) and attracted his favour; Lipsius accompanied him as his
Latin secretary on a journey to Rome.14 Lipsius spent two years in the 'eternal
city', where he frequented all the major libraries and became acquainted with
important scholars of the age. After his return to Louvain, in 1570, he settled on
presenting himself to the Emperor Maximillian II in Vienna; there is no
evidence, however, that this venture was successful. In the course of his journey
back to Louvain he had his first contact with the conflicts, hearing about the
troubles in the Spanish Netherlands and the cruelty of the Duke of Alva
(Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, 1508-83), who had been sent by Philip II to
enforce order and the true religion in the Low Countries. Alva's 'reign of terror'
through the 'Council of Troubles' involved looting, arrests, condemnations,
executions and excessive taxation (he imposed the infamous 'Tenth Penny'); it
managed to curtail the first wave of uprisings, but famously led to the seizure of
Brill by the Sea-Beggars.15 In the midst of this disorder Lipsius's property was
confiscated by Spanish troops. As a timid individual, Lipsius chose to keep
away from the turmoil. With the recommendation of Joachim Camerarius (1500-
13 According to Kluyskens, however, who bases his view on a letter of the rector of the College to
Jacques Laynez, Superior-General of the Order, contrary to Lipsius's assertion that his parents
made him change his mind, he had, in fact, taken the vows in the Society of Jesus. He later chose
to erase this fact, as he would not want to be associated with the Jesuits from a Protestant point
of view, and his position would be far worse towards the Catholic side having betrayed his
Order as well as his faith. (Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', pp. 245-6 and 262-4).
14 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 7-8 and Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 56.
15 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt. Revised edition (Penguin Books: London, 2002), pp. 130-
142.
99
74), the famous German scholar and friend of Melanchthon (1497-1560), the
Flemish humanist managed to secure a chair as Professor of History and
Eloquence at the University of Jena, in central Germany (1572). The University
had been founded in 1559 in the midst of the religious controversies and was
home to some of the leading Protestant scholars in Germany.16
Here Lipsius made his first of a number of switches of doctrine, as in that
environment a born Catholic was required to make a public confession of
Lutheranism in order to be able to accept this type of position. His stay in Jena
lasted eighteenth months. As it appears, however, Lipsius did not restrict
himself in just confessing Lutheranism; he delivered, while he was there,
various orations of strongly anti-Papal and anti-Spanish character. Some of
these speeches finally came to light almost thirty years after he had left Jena,
causing him problems with the Catholic Church, to which he had in the
meantime returned. Concerned about the damage that this could bring to his
reputation and the sincerity of his beliefs, Lipsius tried to disclaim them.17 After
his departure from Jena in 1574 and while at Cologne, he married the widow
Anna van der Calster. Here he switched confessions again: as his wife came
from a Catholic family, Lipsius would have had to return to Catholicism to be
able to marry her.18 Lipsius's confessional traversing is significant and in both
cases, his acceptance of the position in Jena and his marriage, can be interpreted
16 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 11; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 98-9 and 127.
17 Cf. Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 252. The 'De Duplici Concordia' was by no
means the most anti-Catholic of Lipsius's Jena orations, but as one of the two published during
his lifetime (the other was the funeral oration for the Duke of Saxe-Weimar), it attracted
attention and caused alarm to Lipsius. He wrote an open letter to the Magistrates of Frankfurt,
disclaiming authorship, while Jan Moretus (the younger) personally went to Frankfurt and
bought up as many copies of the lusti Lipsi de Duplici Concordia Oration non prius edita as he
could, in order to destroy them. The speech was placed on the Index in 1613. See Morford, Stoics
and Neostoics, pp. 126-30; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 11-12 and note 2; Kluyskens, 'Justus
Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 252; Index des Livres Interdits, ed. J.M. Bujanda, vol. XI: Index Librorum
Prohibitorum 1600-1966 (Canada and Geneva: Mediaspaul and Librairie Droz, 2002), p. 551.
18 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 14.
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in two ways, in terms of this thesis. From one perspective, it can be suggested
that Lipsius put temporal (personal) interests above divine. From a different
point of view, and as he himself would argue later in his texts, outward
appearances did not really matter as long as he kept inward constancy.
The next year (1575) Lipsius published his edition of Tacitus, on which he
must have been working since his visit to Italy. Flis interest in Tacitus,
furthermore, returned him to the study of Law; he acquired, accordingly, the
degree of Doctor of Law from the University of Louvain in 1576.19 The next year,
in the contemporary trend, he brought out a collection of letters to various
scholars and friends, the Epistolicae Quaestiones (Antwerp 1577).
The political situation at the time, nevertheless, was becoming
increasingly tense with the appearance and the victories of Don Juan of Austria
(1547-78) in Gembloux (1578).20 In the face of the coming threat, Lipsius fled
again, this time to Antwerp, where he stayed with the printer Christopher
Plantin (c. 1520-89) for a while. His association with Plantin has also given rise
to speculation about Lipsius's involvement in the 'Family of Love', as the printer
was one of the key members of the 'Family'.21 The 'House of Love' was a
mystical sect that put strong emphasis on virtue; it further advocated public
conformity to the customs of the communities in which the members of the
'House' lived, alongside private practice of Familism. The elite character of the
cult would have appealed to an intellectual like Lipsius. Its Stoic principles,
19 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 16.
20 See Parker, Dutch Revolt, pp. 186-190.
21 Lipsius's involvement in the sect was first suggested by the Netherland theologian Adriaan
Saravia (Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 131). Plantin was close friend of Hendrik Niclaes, the
founder of the sect. For the 'Family of Love' more especially see Alistair Hamilton, The Family of
Love. (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 1981). The suggestion for Lipsius's involvement has
been primarily based on the letter Saravia sent to Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury in
1608, where among other things he described a visit of Barrefelt (patriarch of the Family of Love
after Niclaes) to Lipsius's house. The letter went on to describe some of the Familist doctrines
and establish their attempt to adapt Christian doctrines to Stoicism! (Family of Love, p. 98).
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moreover, that promoted a morality without belief - or 'Christian doctrines
without Christ', as one commentator has put it - would have made it even more
attractive to an individual tormented by the crises of religious strife. Despite
these, however, we. are lacking concrete evidence that would confirm his
involvement in the 'House of Love'.22
Lipsius's flight from Louvain was just in time; for the second time during
the wars, his property was assaulted. The soldiers sacked his house and took his
manuscripts and books. Lipsius was only able to recover them through the
intervention of his Jesuit friend Martin Delrio (1551-1608).23 The next turn in
Lipsius's life came with the offer by the United Provinces of a chair as Professor
of History at the newly-founded University of Leiden (South Holland).24 This
time Lipsius found himself in a situation where to be able to hold his position he
would have to convert again, and confess allegiance to Calvinism. The easiness
with which Lipsius did this, is instructive for a period of intense
confessionalisation. His professed temporary acceptance proved to be one of
thirteen years.25 There is some indication that he might have felt like an exile
during his stay and been tormented by it, as throughout his time in Leiden he
maintained contact with friends living in Catholic countries.26 It has also been
suggested that perhaps these feelings of nostalgia made him immerse himself in
22 For Lipsius's involvement in the sect see Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, pp. 128-38; Morford, Stoics
and Neostoics, pp. 130-1; Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. 63-4, Anthony Grafton, 'Portrait of
Justus Lipsius's, The American Scholar 56 (1987), pp. 389-90; Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual
Conscience', p. 1249; Van Gelderen, Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 184; Crahay,
'Probleme du Pluralisme Confessionnel', p. 183. Most of them accept Lipsius's membership to
the House of Love, but with some reservations.
23 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 18 n. 2; and Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 93.
24 See Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 145.
25 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 18. In his autobiographical letter, he says, notably that he looked
upon it as no more than a temporary exile from his home and excuses his long stay by the
turmoil in the Spanish Netherlands (Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 99).
26 In one of his letters he descried how his conscience told him one thing, his interest another and
that he felt that he was living among strangers like a Ulysses (Ep. Misc. ii. 9); cited in Saunders,
Justus Lipsius, p. 20.
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work: De Constantia, the only text that he did not compose for fame, came out in
1584.27 The Constantia, according to his writings, were one of the two works
closest to his heart.28 During the same period - as early as 1583 - he had started
working on his Politica, the other one of the two.29
Lipsius eventually left Leiden in 1591; various reasons have been
proposed as grounds for this departure. A contemporary report suggests two
main factors: the political insecurity of the North and Lipsius's controversy with
Coornhert.30 Morford espouses the first view, asserting that the assassination of
William of Orange in July 1584 weakened Lipsius's sense of security.31 The
arrival of the Earl of Leicester (Robert Dudley, First Earl of Leicester, 1532-88)
the next year, sent to the Low Countries by Elizabeth I of England with forces to
aid the Dutch, and his ultimate recall in 1587, after the emergence of opposition
towards him, did not really bring the longed-for political stability in the area.32
Yet the controversy with Coornhert, the second alleged reason, is likely to have
had a more influential effect on Lipsius's decision.33 Coornhert's criticisms
against the Politica34 were focused on the crucial issue of toleration, one that was
debated intensely in the new Dutch republic.35 What made Lipsius's position
more vulnerable were Coornhert's challenges to his religious affiliations and the
27 Opera Omnia IV, 371.
28 Ep. misc. iv. 84 (3 November 1603, to Woverius); cf. also Vita, Opera Omnia, I, lxiii.
29 'I am preparing a work on Politics, something a little more grandiose than I have done up to
now' (Ep. Misc., i. 91); cited in Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 27.
30 Franciscus Raphelengius Ortelius, cited by Gerhard Giildner, Das Toleranz-Problem in den
Niederlanden in Ausgang des 16. Jahrhunderts (Liibeck and Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag, 1968), p.
117.
31 Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 106-7. See also Parker, Dutch Revolt, p. 207.
32 For the agreement between Elizabeth and the States-General and the arrival of Leicester see
Parker, Dutch Revolt, pp. 261-21.
33 For the controversy see below. For Coornhert (Dirk Volckertzoon Coornhert 1522-90) see
Joseph Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, trans. T.L. Westow, 2 vols. (London: Longman,
1960): vol. 2, pp. 273-286 and Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, pp. 65-80.
34 Vita, Opera Omnia, I, liv-lv. See also Morford, 106, 111, and 117 and his return to the South due
to the pressure from the Catholic intellectuals, most notably Torrentius and Delrio; Martin Van
Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590 (Cambridge: CUP, 1992).
35 See Van Gelderen, Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, esp. ch. 6.
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insinuations that he was, in fact, supporting the Spanish side with his writings.
That after he had made his decision to leave he sent different letters to his
Protestant and Catholic friends respectively, explaining his reasoning on
different grounds, however, is indicative of the insecurity of his personality and
his instinct for self-fashioning.36
In 1591, having managed to be granted six months' leave of absence,
Lipsius left Leiden for Germany (without his wife, so he would not arouse
suspicions), never to return. At Mainz, and on his way to the Spanish
Netherlands, he made peace with the Jesuits.37 The difficult tasks facing Lipsius
now, were to renounce his stay in the land of the 'heretics', convince everyone
that he had been 'compelled to stay there' and that he had remained a true
Catholic throughout his years in the North.38 The extent of Lipsius's disloyalty
becomes evident when one takes into account the fact that professors at Leiden
took an oath that they would obey the Curators and Burgomasters. This can also
explain the surprise of the Leiden authorities once they realised his decisions
were final: even close friends wrote to him reproaching him for his actions.39
Lipsius succeeded in obtaining a first pardon from Alessandro Farnese, Duke of
Parma and governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands (1545-92), and then
from Philip II (r. 1556-98) himself.
Lipsius's fame made several Catholic princes claim his services after his
return to the Catholic world.40 He refused on the grounds of ill health, yet it is
36 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 107; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 29.
37 Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 34-5.
38 Cf. the letter that he sent from Mainz in 1591 to his close friend, the Jesuit Delrio, as cited in
Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 36.
39 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 117; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 38.
40 Letters apparently arrived from Duke William of Bavaria, his brother Ernest, the Prince-
Bishop of Cologne, the Bishops of Salzburg, Wiirzburg and Breslau, Pope Clement VIII, the
Cardinal Ascanio Colonna, Gabriele Paleotti, Federico Borromeo, Francesco Sforza, Henry IV of
France, the cities of Padua and Bologna, Duke Ferdinand I (de'Medici) of Tuscany, and others.
Vita, Opera Omnia I, lv-lvi; Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 250.
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more plausible that his refusal had more to do with his desire to maintain some
form of independence. In 1592 returned to Louvain, where he accepted the chair
of History and Latin Literature at the University. His appointment may be
linked to the poor state of the university after the devastation of war: in view of
that, Laevinus Torrentius (Lieven Van der Beke, 1525-95, Bishop of Antwerp)
and the Catholic authorities were instrumental in ensuring him a chair because
they recognised that he would be influential in restoring it to its former glory.41
Within the next few years Lipsius's career was both challenged and
gratified. First, he was disillusioned to be informed that the Politica would be
placed on the Index of prohibited books, as the Curia found the chapters on
tolerating private dissent in the state offensive - the same chapters, ironically,
that Coornhert had criticised.42 In order to avoid this, Lipsius, like Charron,
would have to make modifications to his book. As we saw, however, the French
author - perhaps overall more audacious - had also added a long preface to his
own work, responding to the criticisms raised against him. This incident is very
interesting, as it illustrates the difficulties thinkers were faced with in finding a
middle way between extreme positions; Lipsius's case is informative, as he was
a figure in a sense caught between two worlds. The whole incident lasted three
years and caused him aversion together with great fear about being silenced or
punished by the Catholic Church.43
Conversely, in 1594 he acquired his greatest recognition by receiving the
rank of Historiographicus Regius by Philip II. The position, although only titular,
brought a great honour to the Flemish scholar and also provided him with some
extra resources; it also, however, effectively made Lipsius subservient to the
41 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 122-4. Torrentius was rather influential in Lipsius's decision
to leave Leiden for the South and sustained his candidacy for a chair. See also Kluyskens, 'Justus
Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 251.
42 Index des Livres Interdits, vol. IX: Index de Rome 1590, 1593, 1596, pp. 420-21.
43 Vita, Opera Omnia, I, lxiii; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 43-4; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, pp.
101-2; Kluyskens, 'Justus Lipsius and the Jesuits', pp. 256-7. See also below, pp. 53-4.
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king.44 Yet Lipsius must have felt to some extent confined in his new life and
home; his various attempts to go to Italy were brought to a halt by
circumstances, varying from the authorities' control, to his ill health. Lipsius's
loss of (intellectual) independence is also evident in his literary production.
Among other works that he composed during his years in Louvain, were a
number of Christian apologetics of no considerable quality, which Lipsius
composed in an attempt to prove the sincerity of his faith; their poor quality was
greeted with scorn and criticism from Catholics as well as Protestants.45 Perhaps
the second greatest honour was made to Lipsius by the Archduke Albert and his
wife Infanta Isabella, daughter of Philip II, who attended one of the famous
humanist's lectures in November 1599. This has been read as a gesture that
confirmed his status as the 'leading scholarly light of the University of Louvain
and strengthened the bonds tying him to the Spanish interests of the
Netherlands'.46
In the next years Lipsius undertook the last projects of his life on classical
philosophy, the great edition of Seneca's works (1604) and two volumes on Stoic
philosophy: the Manductio nd Stoicam Philosophiam and the Plulosophia Stoicorum
(both published in 1604). The former was an introduction to Stoic ethics, while
the latter dealt with Stoic physics. Both works showed a more mature approach
to Stoicism than the earlier text of Constantia; the philosophy of Stoicism, Lipsius
44 Vita, Opera Omnia, I, Ixiii-lxiv; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 47; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p.
123.
45 De Cruce Libri Tres (1593) was an examination into the historical origins of the Cross as a
Christian symbol. Another work, commemorating reported miracles that had occurred in the
shrines of the Virgin Mary at Hall and Montaigu was criticised from both sides of the religious
spectrum; Saunders, Justus Lipsius, pp. 44, 51-2. Cf. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics: 'Dousa was
right to mourn the loss of his intellectual independence...'; pp. 118-9.
46 Vita, Opera Omnia, I, lvi; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 97; see also Saunders, Justus Lipsius,
pp. 49-50.
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was convinced, was reconcilable to the Christian faith.47 Lipsius finally died in
March 1606 after a sudden deterioration in his health.48
As evident, one of the dominant features of the Flemish scholar's life
were his frequent movements from one place to another, away from the
religious troubles of the time and the changes of religious allegiance associated
with these movements. These flights and the associated confessional alignments
attracted strong criticism from various sides; the same reaction was caused by
his works, which he had to amend in order to conform to accepted principles.
These elements, while helped to form Lipsius's ambiguous legacy, are clearly
reflected in his two major works, the Constantia and the Politica.
II.
De Constantia and Politica49
Knowledge of Lipsius's life is essential in understanding his two works that
concern us, the Constantia and the Politica.50 The basic premise of this analysis is
that these two treatises advocating the subject's conduct in his private but also
in his public life, represent the separation of public from private morality.
Associated with this principle, is the issue of differentiating between a person's
outward actions and inner beliefs. Accordingly, as the state of affairs of the
public domain affects the whole of the population, and as this is furthermore
often subject to conflict, Lipsius was plainly pronouncing that whilst the virtue
47 Lipsius dedicated the edition of Seneca to Pope Paul V. He received a note of thanks which
included the advice from Rome to devote his pen to the glory and propagation of the faith;
Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 56.
48 There is a famous incident related to Lipsius's death; while lying in his deathbed, as he was
encouraged to remember the consolations of Stoicism, the humanist replied that 'those things
were vain' and pointed to the crucifix saying that 'this was true Constancy' [...ilia sunt vana ...
haec est vera patientia]; cited by Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 132-3; cf. Vita, Opera Omnia I, lx.
49 For an outline of the subject matter of the two works, see Appendix III.
50 Cf. Oestreich, Neostoicism and the early modern state, p. 17.
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according to which we shoulci lead our life in private matters (at troubled times
or not) is constancy, the virtue required in public life is prudence.
This treatment of the two works will begin with an outline of their
substance. The main part of the examination will consider the two treatises
simultaneously, as it is generally accepted that they complement each other.51
Some reference will be made to Lipsius's concern with the current of Stoic ideas
in view of the duality of the public-private domain and in conjunction with
inward-outward moralitv. The discussion examines the manner in which the
J
two sets of arguments feed into one another, and whether this dual concept is
derived from this set of philosophical ideas. Last but not least, this chapter will
focus on the question of religion. It will explore: Lipsius's views on the role of
religion in private life and within the state; the existence of any possible relation
between his adoption of Neo-Stoic views and his position on religion; the
significance of his experience of the religious strife in shaping his stance on the
matter; and finally, the extent to which his personal conduct in religious matters
can be used as a context in understanding his views. This discussion of religious
issues will also touch upon the controversy he was involved in because of the
Politica, shedding some further light on Lipsius's position and placing him in the
intellectual milieu of his time.
(i.) 'Constantia' - 'Prudentia' 52 (or Ethics and Politics)
51 Cf. for instance Giinter Abel, Stoizismus and Friihe Neuzeit, zur Entstehnngsgescliicte Modernen
Denkens im Felde von Etliik und Politik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 1978), p. 78; Giildner, Toleranz-
Problem, pp. 92-3 and others. Cf. also McCrea, Constant minds (p. 3), where she describes the
Politica as 'companion volume' to the Constantia.
52 That the two virtues were the 'pillars' of Lipsius's thought is illustrated by the design of
Lipsius's Opera Omnia title-page by Rubens (although the engraving was by Cornelis Galle),
where the two allegorical figures of virtue and prudence appear as the fundamental elements of
his political and philosophical work, the Constantia and the Politica; they correspond, moreover,
to two figures on the top of the picture, the personifications of Philosophy and Politics. See
Morford's analysis of the frontispiece in Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 139-43 and plate 17.
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The disparity and complementarity, at the same time, of Lipsius's two works, is
primarily evident from an overview of their substance. The first of the two, the
Constantia, is written in the form of a dialogue between the person of Lipsius
and Langius (Charles de Langhe, c. 1521-73). The dialogue is set in 1571-72,
during Lipsius's journey to Vienna, after which he did not return to Louvain,
but instead ended up in Lutheran Jena. The Flemish scholar had in this trip
visited Langius, in his home in Liege, where the latter was a Canon at the
Cathedral.53 Written with strong Stoic resonances and drawing mainly from the
writings of Seneca, the text is concerned primarily with the utility of the
doctrines of that ancient trend as a way of strengthening the mind in the face of
internal and external troubles.54 The discussion revolves around the miseries of
the civil conflict that plagued the Low Countries, from which, Lipsius admits to
Langius, he was running away.55 Langius soberly observes that flight is not the
solution, since there was no part of Europe at that time free of turmoil.56 In fact,
as the older man explains, misery comes from inward opinions about outward
events. The young Lipsius of the book is therefore exhorted to constancy, the
virtue that will enable him to survive and endure the public calamities.
The Politicn, conversely, is composed as a treatise in the fashion of 'mirror
for princes' literature. Most extraordinarily, it consists of a compilation of
quotations of ancient texts, a 'learned and laborious tissue' (docte et laborieux
tissue), as Montaigne described it.57 The Politicn draws a great deal from the
Roman historian Tacitus, whose works Lipsius had recently edited. The work is
composed with the hindsight he acquired from studying the Roman historian,
53 Constantia, p. 71.
54 Cf. A.A. Long, 'Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler' in Brad
Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: CUP, 2003); pp.365-392, esp. p.
381.
55 Constantia, pp. 71-2.
56 Constantia, p. 72.
57
Montaigne, Essays (I, 26), De 1'Instruction ('On Educating Children'); The Essays ofMichel de
Montaigne, trans, and edited by M.A. Screech (Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1991), p. 166.
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making the lessons from him available to the Princes of his age, to whom the
work is dedicated. Tacitus was acknowledged as a perceptive author who
recorded all the ghastly details of political life. Moreover, his use in writing
about politics, as has been suggested, also denoted a special emphasis on the
depravity of politics and the prominence of reality and experience over theory
and ideal.58 The work, therefore, dealt in realistic terms with the 'mysteries of
state', or arcana imperii; it explicated the main principles of public life, the
organisation of the state and gave advice on how princes ought to conduct
themselves in political affairs. In this manner, whereas the Constantia was
intended for subjects, the planned audience of the Politica, as set out in the
Epistle to the reader, was the Emperor, Kings and Princes.59
An examination of the two key notions of constancy and prudence
from the two works will demonstrate Lipsius's sense of distinction between
the two, while it will also elucidate some aspects of their association. In this
respect, the fact that in the same fashion that Charron composed one work on
divine wisdom (and morality) and another on human wisdom, Lipsius
produced a book on one's conduct in his inner being (Constantia) and a second
one concentrating on one's conduct in civil/public life (Politica) is significant.
This disjunction is further emphasised by the fact that he assigns two separate
guides to the two different domains: the inner existence ought to be directed
58 This is the central thesis of Viroli, From Politics to Reason ofState.
59
Epistle to the Reader (Tmperator, Reges, Principes'); Opera Omnia, IV, 5-7.1 have primarily
used the English translation of 1594, but cross-referenced it with the edition of the Opera Omnia
(1637) and the French of 1590. Significantly, the English translation is based on the original - as
the French is - while the one reprinted in Opera Omnia is the revised edition of 1586. Unless
otherwise stated, all my references are to Sixe Bookes ofPolitickes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William
Jones (London: Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby, 1594); reprinted by Da Capo
Press, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York, 1970), henceforth referred to as
Politica.
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by constancy, whilst our social activities are to be administered by prudence.60
The significance of this disjunction will become more apparent when we
consider the implications that this has on perceptions of the role of religion in
people's lives in general, and more in particular in the state.
Lipsius defines constancy as
a right and immoueable strength of the minde, neither lifted vp, nor pressed downe with externall
or casuall accidentes.] By STRENGTH, I vnderstande a steadfastnesse not from opinion,
but from iudgement and sound reason.61
Steadfastness, reason (as opposed to opinion), and finally external accidents,
are therefore the fundamental components of constancy. Significantly, the
above extract establishes the close connection between constancy and wisdom
or reason; the latter two, although not at any point equated, are sometimes
used in alternation in the Constantia.62 The two are coupled as virtues essential
to an individual in his struggle against the 'diseases of the mind'.63 Constancy,
moreover, appears in the text as 'regulated by the rule of right reason'. In the
general discussion of reason, the paired concepts of reason-constancy are
contrasted with opinion which constitutes the opposite of logic and a malice
that leads to inconstancy. 64
The strength of mind indicated in the definition is confirmed by the
allocation of patience as the mother of constancy.65 This internal strength that
works against external evils is magnificently described in what is one of the
60 Cf. Jacqueline Lagree, 'Juste Lipse: 1'Ame et la Vertu', where she specifically distinguishes
between constancy, as a private virtue and prudence as a public virtue (in Tournoy, G. et. al.
(eds.), Iustns Lipsius Europae Lumen et Columen, pp. 90-106; on p. 90).
51 Constantia (I, 4), p. 79. Cf. Montaigne's definition: 'The role played by constancy consists
chiefly in patiently bearing misfortunes for which there is no remedy'; also 'The state of the Stoic
sage is fully and elegantly seen in the following: Mens immota manct, lachrimae volvumtur inanec
[His mind remains unmoved: empty tears do flow]'; Montaigne, Essays (1,12) 'On Constancy'; in
Screech, The Essays ofMichel de Montaigne, pp. 47 and 49.
62 The notion of reason will be discussed in more detail below, pp. 39-41.
M Constantia (I, 3), p. 76: (title) 'That it is the mind which is sickc in vs, which must seek rcmcdic from
Wisedome and Constantia'.
64 Constantia (I, 4), pp. 79-80.
65 Constantia (I, 4), p. 79.
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most lyrical passages of the whole work. Lipsius is setting down a 'praise and
earnest exhortation' to constancy:
...Thou shalt be a king indeed free indeed, only subiect vnto God, enfranchized from the
seruile yoke of Fortune and affections. As some riuers are said to runne through the sea
and yet keepe their streame fresh: So shalt thou passe through the confused tumults of
this world, and not be infected with any brinish saltness of this Sea of sorrowes. Are
thou like to bee cast downe? CONSTANCY will lift thee vp. Doest thou stagger in
doubtfulnesse? She holdeth thee fast. Art thou in daunger of fire or water? She will
comfort thee, and bring thee backe from the pits brinke: onely take vnto thee a good
courage, steere thy ship into this porte, where is securitie and quietnesse, a refuge and
sanctuarie against all turmoyles and troubles: where if thou hast once more thy ship, let
thy country not onely be troubled, but euen shaken at the foundation, thou shalt remaine
vnmnoued' letshowres, thunders, lighteninges,, and tempests fall round about thee, thou
shalt crie boldlie with a loude voyce, I lie at rest amid the wanes. 66
Constancy, accordingly, represents liberation from internal and external evils;
it is the medicine for sorrows and steadfastness to outer turmoil. False goods
and false evils 'disturb' constancy. While Lipsius includes 'riches, honour,
authority, health' and 'long life', affairs that give rise to the passions of desire
and joy in the former, it is the latter that he wants to concentrate our attention.
False evils involve 'poverty, sickness, infamy' and 'death' and cause fear and
sorrow to men.67 What we have here then, is the standard theory of passions
as used in general terms by late sixteenth-century moralists, to which Charron
devoted his Third Book of the Sagesse. The role of reason, however, is in this
case taken up by constancy which is juxtaposed with the bodily and
intellectual afflictions.68
56 Constantia (I, 6), pp. 83-4.
67 Constantia (I, 7), p. 85.
68 Cf. Montaigne, Essays (1,12) 'On Constancy': 'Not even the Stoics claim that their sage can
resist visual stimuli or ideas when they first come upon him; ... So too for all other emotions,
provided that his thoughts remain sound and secure, that the seat of his reason suffer no
impediment or change of any sort, and that he in no wise give his assent to his fright or pain. ...
For in his case the impress of the emotions does not remain on the surface but penetrates
through to the seat of his reason, infecting and corrupting it: he judges by his emotions and acts
in conformity with them. The state of the Stoic sage is fully and elegantly seen in the following:
Mens immota manet, lachrimae volvumtnr inanes [His mind remains unmoved: empty tears do
flow]. The Aristotelian sage is not exempt from the emotions: he moderates them'; Screech, The
Essays ofMichel de Montaigne, p. 49.
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The third constituent element of the definition of constancy (external
accidents) refers to Lipsius's distinction between the interior being and the
outer compartment, which is of paramount importance in his 'private-public'
scheme. This distinction takes different forms in the Constantia; in one instance
it is emphasised on Langius's reproach of the young Lipsius of the book - and
potentially any readers with similar feelings - for his alleged suffering by
witnessing the calamities plaguing his country. As the old sage demonstrates,
the mourning and the distress of the people are not for their country; they are
caused, rather, by the threat this situation poses to themselves.69 Everything is
a stage-play, dissimulation: Langius criticises, thus, in the face of young
Lipsius all the people who mourn over their private misfortunes under the
pretence of grief for the common adversities, when they are in reality
lamenting over their private misfortunes.70 Put differently, the mishaps are
only affecting one insofar as one is involved. The remedy, thus, is to
disengage oneself from the disorder of the outside world and remain peaceful
in one's inner stability.
J
The inner-outer distinction appears strikingly in the contrast at the
opening scene of Book Two of the Constantia, with tire serene atmosphere of
Langius' garden. The image of internal and private tranquillity of the
surroundings offers Langius' interlocutor (together with the readers) a place
of peace and calmness - both literally as well as metaphorically - away from
the tragedy of war and the outer turmoil.
... Beholde (Lipsius) the true end and vse of gardens to wit, quietnes, with drawing from
the world, meditation, reading, writing ...here I lay vp some wholesome lessons in my
minde, as it were weapons in my armorie, which are alwayes ready with me at hand
against the force and mutability of Fortune. So soone as I put my foote within that place,
I bid all vile and seruile cares abandon me, and lifting vp my head as vpright as I may, I
condemne the delights of the prophane people, & the great vanitie of humane affaires...
Doest thou thinke when I am there that I take any care what the Frenchmen or Spaniards
69 Constantia (I, 8), pp. 88-9.
70 Cf. Constantia (I, 9), p. 91 and (I, 7), p. 87.
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are in practising? who possesse the scepter of Belgica, or who be depriued of it? ... No;
none of all these things trouble my braine. I am guarded and fenced against all externall things,
and settled within my selfe, carelesse of all cares saue one.. .71
Nothing better illustrates the disjunction between the inner peace and stability
and the outer disorder than the above extract. It is essential for an individual
in order to preserve this private harmony and steadfastness to detach himself
from the outer expressions of motion and tension.
It becomes evident then, how the essential elements of constancy come
together; immovable strength, mind, reason and wisdom are all marshalled in
opposition to external affairs. Constancy is the virtue that ought to preside
over the individual's private life and provide him with the strength to endure
any misfortunes as well as the disorder caused by the passions.
Lipsius's second favourite virtue, on the other hand, prudence, is quite
a different quality, with disparate characteristics. Its definition in the Politica is
that of
an understanding and discretion of those things which we ought either to desire or to refuse, in
publike and in privat. 72
It is the 'art of living well' and it disposes, further, 'of things present, foresee
things to come, and calls to memorie things past'.73 The author names as the
parents of prudence 'use' (experience) and 'memory' (experience and
knowledge either read in books and histories or heard by others). Yet, despite
that, Lipsius includes private affairs in his definition of prudence, he declares
at another point that the use of prudence is necessary above all in
government.74 He further repudiates his claim about the utility of prudence in
private matters elsewhere, by prescribing prudence as a guide in the actions
71 Constantia (II, 3), pp. 136-7; (my italics).
72 Politica (I, 7), p. 11.
73 Politica (I, 7), p. 12.
74 'The vse of Prudence is necessarie in all worldly affaires, but especially in gouernment'; Politica
(111,1), p. 41.
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of a Prince, and virtue as a guide in his life.75 Prudence as a quality
particularly linked to the affairs of government, as treated in the Politica, is
compared by Lipsius to the use of a compass in the navigation of a ship.
Lipsius accounts for prudence's allocation by pointing out the unruly nature
of men, much like Charron did in his work: humans are stubborn creatures
who need to be handled with great skill.76
Understanding, judgement and coming to the right decision are the three
elements that comprise prudence; these are informed by experience of the past
that furnishes the individual with foresight. Still, Lipsius further distinguishes
between the general, universal prudence and the extraordinary and far more
formidable prudence of the Prince (prudentia propria). The whole of Book Four
of the Politica is dedicated to the analysis of this 'proper' prudence, which, as
the author asserts, 'can hardly be tied to precepts': 'it extendeth very farre', and
'no certaine rules can be giuen therof'.77
...that which doth peculiarly belong to a Prince, which is indeed a spacious field, for
who can find out any certaine way or limits therof? It [proper prudence] is a verie
diffused thing, confused, and obscure. First it is diffused, for what is there that stretcheth
further then the affaires of the world? vnto which generally Prudence belongeth, yea to
euery particular action. ...but particulars are infinite, which is the cause why we cannot
comprehend them within the compasse of Art ... For Precepts ought to be limited and
certaine. And if rides cannot be determined by art, they are without the reach ofwisdome. Next it
is a confused thing, because all that we call Prudence, is indeed, vnstable and wavering.
For what other thing is Prudence, then the election of those things, which neuer remaine
after one and the same manner? ... it [prudence] is not only tied to the things
themselues, but to their dependents ... and for their least change, she changeth her selfe,
which is the reason why she is not in all places alike, no nor the same in one and the selfe
same thing.78
78 Politica (II, 7), p. 24.
76 Politica (III, 1), pp. 41-2. His exceptionally critical attitude towards common people is
expounded in Book Four (IV, 5), where he describes them as unstable and inconstant, subject to
passions, void of reason, and prone to judge many things by opinion (p. 68); all of which,
incidentally, are the exact opposites of his account of a person with wisdom and constancy. Cf.
Machiavelli, The Prince, XVII.
77 Politica (IV, 1), p. 59.
78 Politica (IV, 1), pp. 59-60.
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To the stability of constancy, hence, Lipsius juxtaposes the instability of
prudence: 'Imprint CONSTANCIE in thy mind amid this casuall and inconstant
variablenesse of all things'.79 The disjunction between the two virtues can
evidently be explained by the fact that they apply to different fields with very
different conditions; prudence as a flexible virtue can be more attuned to the
unstable outside world and the challenges of public life. And although
constancy has to face the instability of the outside world as well, it does not
need to adjust - man can escape the insecurity caused by wavering by
remaining firm and steadfast.
The adaptability of prudence is particularly explicated in the chapters
dealing with what Lipsius calls 'mixed prudence' (prudentia mixta). The views of
the Flemish scholar on this matter have gained him the reputation of a
'Machiavellian' and the label of a 'reason of state' writer, a shrewd pragmatist
who would sacrifice (Christian) morality for the sake of politics, advocate of the
theory that the end justifies the means.80 The question of 'mixed prudence' as
79 Constantia (1,17), p. 111. Cf. the account the Venetian doge Leonardo Dona gave for his
decision to allow for some room for compromise with the Roman Curia during the Interdict
crisis (winter of 1606 7): 'Let us not deem it the duty of a prudent man always to have the same
opinion, but that which the accidents and rather variable conjunctures of human affairs counsel.
And certainly, since the principles and accidents of things vary, it is essential for the
deliberations based on them also to vary. Thus he who otherwise might pretend to the title of
consistency and constancy in his opinions should rather deserve a reputation for imprudent
pertinacity and unconsidered obstinacy, since everyone, even of superficial intelligence in things
of state, knows that civil matters are variable and subject like the sea to the diversity of the
winds, to the violence and diversity of accidents. For this reason man should regulate his
opinions exactly as on a sea voyage, according to the quality of the winds. Nor is he obliged
always to have the same opinion, but rather the same end: the good and safety of the Republic';
cited by William J. Bouwsma in his Venice and the Defense ofRepublican Liberty. Renaissance Values
in the Age of the Counter Reformation. (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1968), pp. 410-11.
80 With the exception of Robert Bireley in his The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellism
or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modem Europe. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1990), who characterises him as an 'anti-Machiavellian' (ch. 4), this is the manner
in which Lipsius is generally portrayed in the literature of political theory of the late-sixteenth-
early seventeenth-centuries. For the association of 'mixed prudence' and 'reason of state'
theories see for example, Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, pp. 48-9.
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Lipsius formulates it in his own words is whether 'it be lawful ... to mingle
[prudence] lightly, and ioyne with it some dregs of deceipt? I judge it may ....'.81
It is necessary in this context to examine Lipsius's view of the realm of politics;
for him, as for Sarpi, as we shall see, politics was a sphere with extraordinary
rules, where, when the benefit of the people or state was at stake, princes had a
greater allowance in the conduct of the affairs. This is particularly the case, as
the other princes they have to treat with are 'malicious persons', who seem to be
made of 'fraud, deceit and lying':
These Princes, with whome we are to treate, are for the most part of this number: and
although they shewe themselues to be like Lyons, yet are they in their corrupt hearts,
dissembling Foxes. Let some man now come and tell me, that ive must doe nothing
treacherouslie, that we must not vse dissimulation, nor doe any thing deceiptfidlie. O pure men,
nay rather, pure children. The Philosopher doth note, that kingdomes are subuerted by
subtilitie, and guile. Doest thou say it is not lawfull to conserue them by the same meanes?
and that the Prince may not sometimes hailing to deale zvith afoxe, play the foxe, especially
if the good and publike profit, which are alwayes conioyned to the benefit, and profit of the
Prince doe require it? Surely thou art decerned: the forsaking of the common profit is not
onely against reason, but likewise against nature. ... we desire, that the Prince be of a
notable and excellent wit, and yet that he be able to intermingle that which is profitable, with
that which is honest.82
The author allows thus the intermingling of honesty with deceit, as he does not
regard the integrity of prudence damaged by this combination - so long as
honesty is still a part of the mixture. He explains this position by using a
remarkable simile:
Wine, though it be somewhat tempered with water, continueth to be wine: so doth
prudence not change her name, albeit a few drops of deceipt bee mingled therewith .. ,83
Lipsius goes on to give details about how far deceits are to be accepted; he
famously distinguishes three degrees of deceit, according to their distance from
virtue: light, middle and great deceit. The first kind, to which distrust and
81 Politica (IV, 13), p. 112.
82 Politica (IV, 13), p. 113. Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII.
83 Politica (IV, 13), p. 114. Cf. Torquato Tasso's description of the ambassador's art in II
messaggiero, as cited in Salvatore S. Nigro, 'The Secretary', in Rosario Villari (ed.), Baroque
Personae, trans. Lydia Cochrane (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.
96.
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dissimulation belong, is recommended to princes by the author. Lipsius
attributes deceit and the purchase of favour to the second kind, which he
tolerates, but he categorically condemns the third degree, to which 'treachery'
and injustice belong.84
The abstracts above, as well as the whole exposition in general, especially
with the use of the lion anci the fox metaphor, echo quite obviously
Machiavelli's text, who in the Politica is referred to as the author 'who poore
soule is layde at of all hands'.85 This open defence of the Florentine writer was
an unusual phenomenon for the late sixteenth century, despite his unspoken
popularity: any relation of a text to his writings was denied by contemporary
authors themselves, even at the time when the unprecedented conditions of the
second half of tire sixteenth century called for 'extraordinary' policies.86 Tire fact
that political theorists did, in fact, gradually accept some stretching of
conventional moral principles could be necessary in political life
notwithstanding, Machiavelli's perceived amoralism was considered
84 Politica (IV, 14), p. 115. The detailed discussion of mixed prudence and the degrees of deceit,
together with the extent to which they are accepted or not, is on pp. 115-123.
85 Politica (IV, 13), pp. 114-23, esp. pp. 114-5. Cf. also the epistle 'De consilio et Forma nostri
operis' that he added to later editions of the Politica: 'Nisi quod unius tamen Machiavelli igenium
non contemno, acre, subtile, igneum: et qui utinam Principem suum recta duxisset ad templum illud
Virtutis ct Honoris! scd nimis saepc dcflexit, & dum commodi illas senitas intente cequitur, aberravit a
regia hac via..'; (Opera Omnia, IV, 9-10). Bireley in his valuable study of early modern political
theorists on the issue of reaction to Machiavelli's views on the dichotomy between Christian
ethics and politics, classifies Lipsius as an 'anti-Machiavellian'; The Counter-Reformation Prince,
ch. 4. This position runs contrary to the widely-held view that Lipsius adhered to the
Florentine's standpoint. Although it would be difficult to argue for an identity in their views,
especially since Machiavelli was a writer who had not experienced the religious wars, even
engaging in a dialogue with the (in) famous Italian (i.e. accepting the basic premises of his
arguments) would be enough to make an author accept at least some of his views, as I believe
Lipsius does in Book Four. Cf. also the discussion of Bireley's position by Christopher Brooke in
'Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in European Philosophy and Political Thought, 1640-1795',
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Harvard University, 2003), pp. 42-5.
86 Cf. Wills H. Bowen, 'Sixteenth Century French Translations of Machiavelli', Italica, 27 (1950),
pp. 313-319.
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incompatible with any politics within a religious moral framework.87 What
distinguished, however, the authors writing half a century after the Florentine
from their predecessor, was their conscious attempts - whether successful or not
- to shape political theory within the religious milieu.88
What becomes evident in this sense is the effect experience had in the
manner in which politics were theorised. The grave effects the intermingling of
political and religious interests had in the conflicts of the second half of the
sixteenth century forced people to think hard about the relationship between
religion and politics. Furthermore, the transformation of the language of politics
into one that was more realistic and pragmatic had the parallel effect of its
'purification': the more depraved people believed that politics was, the more
they felt the need to purify it by instilling theological values into it. Lastly, the
popularisation of treatises of political nature that referred to antiquity as an
example made the distinction between Christian and pagan politics more
apparent. In this respect, the attempt to reconcile politics with Christian ethics
suggests a number of things, some of which are astounding. First, Christian
ethics and politics were not regarded as necessarily compatible. Second, and
related to the first assertion, is the fact that in the challenge to this reconciliation,
it was the Christian-divine ethics that would ultimately lose. By adulterating the
'absolute', 'revealed' ethics with human ethics, theorists were essentially
undermining the Christian principles.89 A third point relates to the discussion of
87 For discussions on the relation of Machiavelli and what are conventionally called 'reason of
state writers' see for instance P.S. Donaldson, Machiavelli andMystery ofState. (Cambridge: CUP,
1988), pp. 112-3; Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. xii-xiv and others.
88 Cf. Jesuitical discussions on prudence, reason of state and good faith in Harro Hopfl, Jesuit
Political Thought. The Society ofJesus and the State, c. 1540-1630. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), chs. 5, 7-
8.
89 Cf. Emile Durkheim's contention, that the realms of the sacred and the profane are by
definition absolutely and fundamentally different that it is impossible for the two to 'approach
each other and keep their own nature at the same time'; The Elemeiitary Forms ofReligious Life,
trans, by Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1964), p. 40.
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the two languages available to thinkers of the period to discuss politics. In their
efforts to place politics within a Christian framework, theorists were effectively
working towards an amalgamation of the two languages. Lipsius does this to
some extent, so too do Sarpi and James VI and I, to a greater degree, who will be
the subject of the following chapters.
As indicated earlier, the principle behind the above consideration of the
notions of constancy and prudence as they appear in the Constnntin and the
Politica respectively, is to demonstrate the disparity between them. As two
separate virtues, diverging to a fair extent in their characteristics and
prescriptions, were intended to guide an individual in the two areas of his life,
the public and the private, then we have to infer that the two domains are
distinct. We also have to infer from Lipsius's treatment, that he understood the
two domains as governed by disparate sets of rules, namely, that two distinct
moralities were in place.90 This becomes clearer upon a review of their relation
to virtue and deceit.
It is evident throughout the texts of the Constantia and the Politica that
Lipsius's interpretation of prudence allows for more laxity in moral conduct
than his analysis of constancy does. Particularly telling is the fact that he allows
for some degree of deception in public life, but not in private. A good example
in this direction is Lipsius's treatment of dissimulation. In the Constantia the use
of it is gravely reprimanded: in Book One (Ch. 8 and 9) Langius criticises
severely the 'vainglorious' dissimulation of men who pretend to be grieving for
the evils besetting their country, when they are in truth anxious for their own
fortune. On the contrary, in the Politica the use of dissimulation is in fact
recommended to the Prince:
90 Cf. N. Keohane's suggestion that the 'disparate character' of the two treatises [Constantia
and Politica) shows the 'dichotomy between public and private ethics that dominated French
thought after the Wars of Religion'; see Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to the
Enlightenment. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1980), p. 130.
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Dissimulation so necessarie for a Prince, that the old Emperour sayd, that he knew not wel
how to beare rule, that knew hot how to dissemble. And Tiberius being of the same mind
sayd, that as he thought, hee loued no other vertue so much as dissimidation. 91
The first of the two quotations in the above extract was commonly attributed to
the French King Louis XI (r. 1461-83), but was widely in use in late sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century discussions about public affairs.92 The second citation
was taken from Tacitus and was again a favourite in political writings of the
same period.93 Despite the fact that dissimulation as a quality was not
automatically regarded as compatible with moral precepts, its acceptance as an
essential trait in political conduct was beginning in this period to be more
widespread.94 Hence Lipsius in the following comment attempts to retain the
integrity of private life by assigning the use of dissimulation in civil life only:
This will peraduenture displease some liberall and free heart, who will say, that we must
banish from all conditions and sorts of life, disguising and dissembling. I aduouch, it ought not
to bee amongst priuat persons, but in a state I vtterly denie it.95
It is extremely intriguing, from this point of view, moreover, to look at Lipsius's
justifications for the use of deceit in politics, in spite of the possible challenge to
God's commands and Christian ethics. In a rather poorly argued section he
explains:
But what if I consider that vpright and diuine law? I do sticke very fast and sweat. It
seemeth to forbid vs these things: [...] Thou which art a Politician, what repliest thou
therevnto? ... Truly it is hard, eyther for you or me to find out any starting hole here,
were it not that the sayd holy father sayth: that there are certaine kind of lies, in which
there is no great offence, yet are they not without fault. And in this ranke we deeme that
light corruption and deceipt are only then, when a good and lawfull king vseth them
against the wicked, for the good of the common wealth. Otherwise, it is not onely an
offence, but a great sinne, howsoeuer these old courtiers laugh thereat ...96
91 Politica (IV, 14) p. 117.
92 For a valuable study on the origins and the use of the phrase see Adriana E. Bakos, 'Qui Nescit
Dissimulare, Nescit Regnare: Louis XI and Raison d' Etat During the Reign of Louis XIIT, Journal of
the History of Ideas 52 (1991), pp. 399-416.
93 The citation is from the Annates, IV. 71: 'Nullam aeque Tiberius, ut rebatur, ex virtutibus suis
quam dissimulationem diligebat'.
94 Cf. Jesuits' discussion of dissimulation; Hopfl, Jesuit Political Thought, pp. 150-55.
95 Politica (IV, 14), p. 117.
96 Politica (IV, 14), p. 120.
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Lipsius defends deceit, thus, under the preconditions of the virtue of the Prince,
if directed against depraved individuals, or if its ultimate end is the public
good. It becomes evident then, that he - as others of his time - perceived the
realm of politics as quite distinct to the private realm and subject to separate
rules, not applicable to the private domain.97
According to a commonly held view, and one that Lipsius himself
promoted, the rationale for the disjunction of his two treatises (and as a
consequence the two respective dominant virtues) lies in the fact that they are
addressed to diverse audiences. In a manner reminiscent of Charron's
sensitivity about his audience, Lipsius addressed Constantia to lawful subjects,
but the Politica to princes and people generally involved in the affairs (or
mysteries) of the state.98 Yet this interpretation, however time, is by no means
sufficient to explain the paradox of the polarisation of the morality of the Prince
and the morality of the subject (among others uttered by Aristotle in antiquity),
and the consequent separation of the principles that guide the public and the
private domain.
Further substantiating the assumption that, in contrast to the private
sphere, the realm of politics is one where virtue has a questionable role, are the
following points. 'Goodness', according to Lipsius is one of the constituents of
virtue, one of the two guides to civil life. Goodness, however, as it appears from
97 An example in the reverse is Shakespeare's Henry IV where Hal, after his transformation into
King, rejects his former friend Falstaff. This is an indication of how deeply entrenched the idea
of the different morality between princes and subjects were. It serves, furthermore, as evidence
of the communication of these notions to a broad audience from within the Globe.
98 See Lipsius's epistle De Consilio et Forma Nostri Operis presiding his Politica (Opera Omnia IV,
9): 'Quod nunc tibi danius POLITICA esse video, in quibus hoc nobis consilium, vt quemadomodum in
Constantia dues formauimus ad patiendum & parendum; ita hie eos, qui imperant, ad regendum'. Cf.
also Vita, Opera Omnia I, liv. See also Jacqueline Lagree: 'Dans le cas extremement frequent d'une
situation defavorable ou de malheurs publics, la vertu de 1'ame prendra deux formes connexes:
pour l'individu, celle de la Constance, pour le Prince, celle de la prudence'; ('Juste Lipse: L'ame
et la vertu', p. 103.); and Seneca Epist. 67,10.
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the text, has no place in civil life: it 'properly hath no place in this our ciuile
building, but belongeth to morall worke.'99 The assertion is enforced a few
paragraphs later, when Lipsius exclaims 'What would virtue be without
prudence?'100 This position is manifested also in the chapter where Lipsius
touches upon the Prince's ministers and counsellors. Lipsius advises ardently
that the courtier be patient and circumspect in court and show, above all,
constancy, as this is an environment of deceit and conspiracy. His non-
involvement in the court intrigues will secure the courtier's survival from the
enemies that are to be found in the princely entourage.101 Lipsius confirms in
this manner the idea that politics are associated with immorality and
dishonesty.
This suggestion becomes even more interesting when seen in a different
light. As proposed in the Introduction, the realm of politics can be seen as
corresponding to the 'human' or temporal - and consequently morally inferior -
sphere. On the other hand, the private sphere can be linked to the divine and
morally superior sphere- as attested to by Lipsius's contention that religious
conformity on the outside is not as important so long as one is faithful/constant
at heart. The moral purity of the interior being is preserved by immediate and
personal connection with the Deity as well as by the detachment from the outer
corrupt (human) reality. This assumption is corroborated by the difference in
the nature of prudence and constancy. Constancy, as a notion associated with
stability and immobility represents the inner peace and equanimity (the Stoic
notion of 'ataraxia'/aTcipafya) in the face of outer motion. Prudence, conversely,
as we have seen already, has a more flexible character. It is subject to change,
and as a result, prone to assimilate some of the elements of 'depravity' of
99 Politica (I, 6), p. 10.
io° Politica (I, 7), p. 11.
101 Politica (III, 11), pp. 56-8.
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temporal affairs. Both constancy and prudence accordingly are qualities that aid
the individual in order to cope with the instability of public life102 - or, to take it
a step further, and yet again invoking Machiavelli, fortune.
A sufficient number of commentators have paid attentioir to the role of
Fate, Destiny, Providence, or Fortune in the Constantia and its relation to
constancy, primarily for the reason that Lipsius himself directs the reader's
attention to this important discussion. The same critics, however, with very few
exceptions, have been unsuccessful in addressing the issue as it appears in the
Politica, through the lens of the Constantia and examining its ensuing relation to
prudence.103 Crucially, Lipsius's earlier treatise seems overwhelmingly to
undermine man's control over his life in the face of the greater scheme of things
- even though Lipsius does attempt to argue for compatibility between God's
Providence and the Christian stress on free will, his reasoning does not work
very convincingly.104 This incongruity was pointed out to Lipsius quite early on,
but did not make him alter his position.105 Yet despite this evidently
deterministic element in the Constantia, Lipsius, in a remarkable quotation,
asserts in the Politica that 'all tilings yield obedience onto Prudence, euen Fortune
itself .. Z.106 This assertion is more intelligible when considered in the light of the
etymology of the word prudence; a contraction of the Latin term providentia
102 Cf. Waszink, 'Virtuous Deception' where he suggests, among other things that Lipsius's two
treatises, the Constantia and the Politica address the question of how to deal with the reality of
conflict and disruption in public life. (p. 250).
103 Cf. Bireley for example: ' Lipsius's doctrine of providence is most important if he is to be
understood as an anti-Machiavellian'; The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 77.
104 Cf. Christopher Brooke: 'the emphasis on divine providence in De Constantia points to a much
stronger affinity to the Stoics' argument about the desirability of making a rational submission
to the existing order of things [...], for the Stoic recommendation of cultivating apatheia is
grounded in an understanding of the world as a deterministic, providentially-ordered whole:
physics and ethics are inextricably linked.'; 'Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism', p. 46.
105 Both Laevinus Torrentius and Coornhert had written to him challenging his writings as 'too
Stoic'.
106 Politica (I, 7), p. 12.
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(foresight).107 This virtue makes man able to compete with God's Providence
when it comes to human affairs.108 This could also explain Lipsius's equivocal
claim of prudence's superiority to virtue: 'For what can vertue be without
Prudence?'.109 To put the matter in simpler terms, the Flemish scholar's political
work conveys the impression of the distancing between the temporal sphere on
the one side, where man under the guidance of prudence, an entirely human
virtue, is in control of his fate, and the divine sphere on the other side. Man can
still be constant in his private life, however, through the special relation with
God that the kinship of the human and divine reason gives him. So long as all
evil and vice are expelled in the outside world, the ugly human reality of the
temporal affairs, the individual can survive within a well regulated state, safe in
his virtuous inner realm, and with an eye to the heavenly world that expects
him after he departs this one. If this system is more of a paradox than a resolved
relationship, it is a paradox inherent perhaps in the endeavour to reconcile
temporal and divine, politics and morality, political participation and
dispassionate non-involvement (or active and contemplative), otium and
negotium, Providence and free-will, or Christianity and Stoicism. It is to the last
of these pairs that we will now turn our attention.
(ii.) Lipsius and (Neo)-Stoicism (or Philosophy and Religion)
The significance of the contribution of the Flemish scholar to the revival and
reformulation of Stoicism for contemporary audiences is nowadays widely
acknowledged. Neo-Stoicism, as this philosophical trend is generally known,
enjoyed a great popularity throughout the second half of the sixteenth century
and into the seventeenth, and survived throughout the eighteenth century. Its
107 Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Latine, 2 vols., ed. A. Ernout and A. Meillet (Paris:
Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1959-60).
108 Cf. Politica (III, 2), p. 43.
109 Politica (I, 7), p. 11.
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popularity in this period is witnessed by a great upsurge in editions of ancient
Stoic writings, such as those of Epictetus (AD c. 55-c. 135), Seneca, Marcus
Aurelius (AD 121-80), and Cicero's works of a Stoic character, such as De Officiis,
and others.110 However, despite the general consent on the appeal these writings
had for a number of people of the early modern period, there is a recognised
difficulty for the students of the resurgence of Stoic ideas in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in defining 'Neo-Stoicism' as a single coherent body of
thought.111 What scholars broadly accept as a defining characteristic is the
attempt by early modern theorists to interpret a set of essentially pagan views
within the Christian framework. This trend, as it developed, tended to combine
Stoic views, particularly ethics, with Christian belief.112 The particular appeal of
Stoicism can partly be understood by the relative ease that it gave to the thinkers
of the period to discuss moral issues within the framework of the school of
thought and irrespective of particular dogmas. This was only under the
condition, however, that Stoic understanding of the physical world, which
would contradict more strongly with Christianity, ought to be left out of these
discussions.
The problems associated with definitions of'Neo-Stoicism' can be
accounted for by a number of reasons. First, and very importantly, one needs to
point out the variety of standpoints inherited by the scholars of the sixteenth
110 Cf. for example the statistical evidence provided by Henri-Jean Martin in his monumental
study Print, Power and People in Seventeenth Century France, trans, by David Gerard (The
Scarecrow Press Inc.: Metuchen, New Jersey & London, 1993), pp. 342-344.
111 Cf. Bouwsma's comments in his important account of the two faces of Renaissance
humanism: 'It is ... hardly remarkable that Renaissance humanists were often far from clear
about the precise lineaments of Stoicism, nor it is surprising that modern scholars who are not
technical historians of philosophy more often refer to than try to define Stoic philosophy';
William J. Bouwsma, 'The two Faces of Humanism - Stoicism and Augustinianism in
Renaissance Thought', in idem, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 19-73; on p. 23.
112 Cf. M.C. Horowitz, Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Pres 1998), p. 169.
126
and seventeenth centuries. As a school of thought that had survived for almost
five centuries, Stoicism was, naturally, subject to change over this period. Tire
central problems associated with the ancient tradition were two. The first
revolved around the belief in virtue and necessity. Yet if everyday life was
devoid of virtue, as it apparently was, how would one preserve one's virtue in
this immoral world? Second, and closely related, was the problem of the tension
between the belief in a greater necessity but emphasis on the power of reason
and will at the same time. Put differently, one's outward subjection to fortune,
was in dire contradiction to one's proclaimed inward liberty. But this was also a
matter of different emphasis, especially between earlier and later advocators of
Stoic doctrines (Greek and Roman respectively). As W.B. Sharpies points out, it
has become 'something of a commonplace to contrast ancient Greek
intellectualism in ethics with Latin voluntarism'.113 At the same time, some of
the core problems intrinsic in the philosophy remained unresolved by the
ancient philosophers themselves, leaving an ambivalent legacy that could be
interpreted in various ways, depending on the prominence the modern scholars
would decide to assign on some texts rather than others.114
To complicate matters even more for modern scholars, the relationship
between the ancient philosophy and Christianity is a rather peculiar one.
Stoicism's stress on strict moral behaviour always gave the sense of possible
compatibility with Christian religion and ethics.115 The congruence between the
113 R. W. Sharpies, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. (London
and New York: Routledge, 1996); p. 72
114 Cf. Reid Barbour's comments: '...In other words, there is a Stoicism that emphasises will and
the self; there is a Stoicism that emphasises fate and the whole; and there is a Stoicism that
works to bridge the gap between the extremes [...] among the Continental Neostoics, there is Du
Vair who is largely influenced by the Epictetan emphasis on the will in charge of its own
destiny, but also Lipsius who devotes a chunk of his treatise on constancy to deciphering the
exact relations between Stoic fate and Christian Providence' Barbour, English Epicures and Stoics,
pp. 15-6.
115 Cf. Bouwsma, 'Two faces of Humanism', p. 24.
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two systems, however, can also be attributed to the fact that the early Church
fathers seem to have been to a certain extent attracted to Stoic teachings and
writings.116 Both elements would work towards an explanation for the survival
of Stoicism throughout the middle Ages and the interest of the Christian
humanists such as Erasmus and Calvin in writings that underlined the
importance of nature, reason and virtue.117 In the age of religious struggle,
nonetheless, Stoicism gained an increased importance as it could be employed
as a mode to communicate about moral behaviour and training in a disorderly
world, as well as to give consolation to the distressed inhabitants of a devastated
Europe.
The influence of the Stoic system can be discerned in many aspects of the
intellectual spectrum of the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. We
can see its traces in philosophy, politics, and religion. In terms of philosophy,
the principles of the Stoic cosmic scheme, with the role of providence, fate and
destiny gave some people the ability to endure the devastation menacing them,
while its insistence on the role of the intellect and reason gave individuals a
sense of liberty in the inner world. William Bouwsma brilliantly summed up the
Stoic inspiration with regards to existential predicaments stating that it became
a strategy by which, 'through a combination of enlightenment and disciplined
accommodation, the individual could come to terms with the humanly
pessimistic implications of a cosmic optimism'.118 Its epistemological
implications were also appealing: in direct contrast to the challenges of
scepticism, the assumption that since man partakes in the divine reason, he has
116 Cf. Allan, Philosophy and Politics in later Stuart Scotland, pp. 7-8. One of the most famous
elements interwoven with this idea is the suggestion of the alleged correspondence between St.
Paul and Seneca.
117 Cf. Bouwsma, 'Two faces of Humanism', pp. 28-31. Calvin for example had written a
commentary on Seneca: Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's De Clementia, ed. F. Lewis Battles and A.
Malan Hugo (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969).
118 'Two Faces of Humanism', p. 38.
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the ability and the possibility of attaining some part of the truth would have
struck a chord of relief in a period when challenges to authorities religious and
secular caused great agitation. More generally in terms of religion, the
representation of God as fire and reason gave Him a more abstract form than
the more specific doctrinal attributes. Stoicism, thus, enabled more writers to
communicate their ideas about morality and virtue in a universal and
undisputed vocabulary.119 As a system, moreover, that advocated man's
participation in divine reason (the instrument responsible for moral conduct for
the Stoics), it facilitated the assumption that man was able to find his own way
on earth and define his own moral codes, thus reinforcing the distance between
the divine and temporal spheres. Stoicism's disjunction between private and
public, of the inner peace with the outer turmoil, gave further grounds to the
encouragement of distinct public and private expressions of religion and a
promotion of outward conformity while maintaining inner freedom of
conscience. Finally, so far as Stoicism's dictates on politics are concerned, we are
again faced with one of its paradoxes. This time the contradiction entailed on
the one side the promotion of active participation, while on the other it would
imply the advice for retreat from the 'amorality' of public affairs, together with
the retreat from impassioned civil wars.120
Lipsius's initial attraction to Stoicism, as he tells us, was precisely this
withdrawal and the need for the Stoic comforting effect in the face of the
disruption of the civil wars. Thus, the De Constnntin, his first recognisably
Stoically-inspired work, is - unsurprisingly within this context - more concerned
with the utility of the philosophical trend, rather than with any intentional
119 Cf. Christopher Brooke, 'Epictetus in Early Modern Europe', paper presented to the Roman
Stoicism Seminar, Classics Department, UC Berkeley (April 1999); available at
<http: //users.ox.ac.uk/~magdl368/research/epictetus. pdf>, pp. 2-5.
120 Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, p. 13.
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exposition of its doctrines.121 Lipsius's engagement with Stoicism, nevertheless,
continued through his work on Seneca, and the publication of the classic
author's complete works. His later Stoic works, the Manductio nd Stoicam
Philosophiam and the Philosophia Stoicorum were both a great deal more mature
and comprehensive expositions of the Stoic principles. As noted above, although
scholars at the start of the seventeenth century were by and large interested
almost exclusively in Stoic ethics, turning a blind eye to the physics of the
school, the Flemish scholar's distinctiveness was that he paid attention to its
physics as well. This has led to some suggestions that he was attracted to
Stoicism more than in a purely intellectual and moral sense. From a different
perspective, it could also be argued that Lipsius's particular version of Neo-
Stoicism was typical of the eclecticism of the time and the attempt to reconcile
Christianity with ancient philosophy.122
Some of the intrinsic contradictions of the (early) modern variant of
Stoicism that we touched upon above are evident in Lipsius's work. His work is
also typical of its inability or its unwillingness to resolve these inherent
paradoxes of the Stoic teachings. Two of these are most apparent in the
Constantia and the Politica. The first is the tension between the stress on the Stoic
Destiny-Fate on one hand, and the emphasis on free will that was briefly
mentioned in the previous section. The second example is more obvious from
the outset: the advice to disengage from the civil life in order to maintain one's
121 Cf. Seneca, De Constantia.
122 Lipsius's eclecticism is, among others, noted by Zanta, Renaissance du Stoicisme p. 165; Rudolf
Kirk, Constantia, p. 47 and Long, 'Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition', pp. 379-81. More
particular, as Long suggests, Lipsius did not know or did not use the evidence of Galen, Sextus
Empiricus, Aristotelian commentators or Marcus Aurelius - even his citations of Cicero were
few compared with what he drew from Seneca and Epictetus. Lipsius also tends to confirm or
correct the sources that he cites by additional reference to Platonism and Christian writers, thus
blurring or distorting the original Stoic doctrines. Furthermore, according to Long, he accepts
Christianity as the criterion by which to assess the meaning and propriety of Stoicism and takes
Stoic statements about human voluntas to imply 'free' will, and thus to be in line with
Christianity.
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tranquillity in the Constantia ('vita confemplativa'), is contrasted with the urge
for participation in public affairs in the Politico, ('vita activa').
With respect to the Stoic elements in the two works under scrutiny, the
Constantia is the one more concerned with Stoic teaching. It will moreover be
recalled that Charles de Lange was for Lipsius the ideal of the Stoic sage.123 It is
in him, hence, that the author attributes the instructions intended for the
distressed audience. Four themes inform the exposition of Stoicism in the work;
reason, constancy, the metaphor of the garden as a double symbol of nature and
inner peace, and last but not least, providence. To start with, reason's elevation
to a prominent position as a guide is a fundamental assumption, associated with
its role in the protection of the (isolated) self from both external evils, as well as
from the even more detrimental tribulations originating from within. Reason
has moreover a particular importance as the link between man and God; human
reason is thought to derive directly from Divine reason: the two are of the same
essence. Reason is often depicted as fire or sparks and the remnants of it are to
be found in man, illuminating him in his conduct of life.
Lipsius presents these fundamental ideas in an eloquent manner. The
relationship between human reason and God is described by Langius: man
partakes in this divine reason because some of the divine sparks are
implanted in man.124 As a result of its kinship to God, human reason is always
looking towards the divine as the flowers are continuously adjusted towards
the sun:
Reason hath her offspring from heauen, yea from God: and Seneca gaue it a singular
commendation, saying, That there was hidden in man parte of the diuine spirit. For albeit the
soule be infected and a little corrupted with the filth of the bodie and contagion of the
senses: yet it retaineth some reliks of his first offspring, and is not without certaine cleare
sparks of that pure fiery nature from whence it proceeded ...Those little coales doe
123 See for example Lipsius's description of him in the opening of the Constantia, Constantia (1,1),
p. 71. Cf. also Lipsius's obituary for Langius, as cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 65.
124 Cf. also Politica (I, 5), p. 8: 'Now conscience is a remaine, and sparkle, of right and perfect reason in
man, iudging and manifesting good or enill deeds'.
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always shine and shew forth themselues, lightening our darknesse, purging our
vncleannes, directing our doubtfulnes, guiding vs at the last to Constancy and virtue. As
the Marigold and other flowers are by nature alwayes enclined towards the sunne: so
hath Reason a respect vnto God, and to the fountaine from whence it sprang...125
As described above, reason is also the guide to virtue, since for the Stoics virtue
is identified with wisdom/knowledge. A wise person would always do what
was right and this was possible only if he only knew what was right; hence the
virtuous man must be a wise man, and virtuous because he was wise.126 The
images of sparks, coals, sun, and ultimately the struggle of light against
darkness can be found throughout the Constantia. The brightness of reason is,
however, set in opposition to the mist and clouds created by opinions
(impressions) and the internal passions, in the same way that they are
contrasted in Charron's work. The origin of grief (in the case of the Constantia
linked to the troubles afflicting the Low Countries) is, in fact, within oneself.
Lipsius is, as a consequence, carrying the angst with him wherever he goes. The
real remedy for the young Lipsius of Constantia is not forsaking his country, but
his affections.127 Man is susceptible to attacks only if reason lets her 'sceptre' fall
down:
It is the mind that is wounded, and all this external imbelicitie, dispaire & languishing,
springeth from this fountaine, that the mind is thus prostrated and cast downe. The
principall and soueraigne part hath let fal the Scepter, and is become so vile and abiect,
that it willinglie serueth his owne seruantes 128
The wise man following the dictates of reason ought to adopt an attitude of
'apatheia' (anadeia: indifference, composure) in order to become immune to
these attacks. We arrive thus at the second Stoic theme of the work, and the
125 Constantia (I, 5), pp. 80-1.
126 Sharpies, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 28; cf. also Anthony Levi, French Moralists. The
Theory of the Passions 1585 to 1649. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 71. Cf. Constantia (II, 4),
pp. 139-40.
127Constantia (1,1), p. 72
128 Constantia (I, 2), p. 75. Cf. also ibid. (I, 3), p. 77; Langius/Lipsius continues the argument
stating that all other affections have an end: a lover, to enjoy his desire; an angry man, to be
revenged - while sorrow does not.
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principal one, the virtue of constancy.129 In order to achieve the ideal of inner
peace, one has to face one's passions and be able to control them. Constancy
liberates man from the 'servile yoke of Fortune and affections'130 - even if one
cannot exert control on the outside world, one can still reach the desired state of
freedom inside. Langius points to two things likely to attack constancy: false
goods and false evils. From these two roots springs the typically Stoic set of
passions against which one has to protect oneself: desire and joy, fear and
sorrow.131 The false evils are again subdivided into public (war, pestilence,
famine, tyranny, slaughters) and private (sorrow, poverty, infamy, death)
concerns.132 Of the two, according to Lipsius, the public evils are worse; they are
the source of a number of affections: dissimulation, piety, and commiseration or
pity. Lipsius's more extensive treatment of the affections instead of the 'evils', is
evidence for the stress he put on the passions rather than the misfortunes that
cause them.133
The third theme with Stoic connotations appears in the opening of the
Second Book; the garden, as it has been suggested, works in the Constantia on
many levels. Although the garden was primarily associated with the teachings
of the Epicureans, sensuality and pleasures, Lipsius, as Mark Morford has
shown, in a magisterial manner reclaimed it and re-invented it within a Stoic
framework.134 First of all, the symbolism of the garden alludes to the Stoic
doctrine of life according to nature. Langius/Lipsius expounds wonderfully,
moreover, the specific qualities of the garden; it is a place of relaxation and a
place where men can withdraw from troubles and forget their sorrows. It is a
129 Constantia (I, 3), p. 78.
130 Constantia (I, 6), p. 84.
131 Constantia (I, 7), p. 85; cf. also ibid. (1,13), p 101. For an examination of the (Stoic) theory of
passions see Levi, French Moralists, ch. 2, esp. pp. 7-27; he refers to Lipsius's account of passions
on pp. 67-73.
132 Constantia (I, 7), p. 86.
133 Constantia (I, 8), p. 88 and (I, 9-12).
134 Morford, 'Stoic Garden'.
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space suitable for meditations, recreation and wisdom; in fact, a great part of
philosophy had originated in gardens.135 Langius outlines thus in the
Constantia the true use of gardens as the 'honest delight and recreation of the
mind'; the extract is worth quoting at length, as it is of the most lyrical of the
work:
For they [gardens] be ordained, not for the body, but for the mind: and to recreate it, not
to besot it with idleness: only as a wholsome withdrawing place from the cares and
troubles of this world. Art thou wearie of the concourse of people? here thou maist be
alone. Haue they worldly businesses tyred thee? here thou maist be refreshed again,
where the food of quietness, and gentle blowing of the pure and whol some aire, will
euen breath a new life into thee. Doest thou consider the wise men of olde time? They
had their dwelling in gardens. The studious and learned wits of our age? they delight in
gardens; and in them (for the most part) are compiled those diuine writings of theirs
which we wonder at, and which no posteritie or continuance of time shall be able to
abolish. ... [Gardens are suitable for learned meditations and writings] - For why? the
mind lifteth vp and advanceth it selfe more to these high cogitations, when it is at libertie
to beholde his owne home, heauen: Then when it is inclosed within the prisons of houses
or townes. Here you learned Poets compose yee some poems worthy of immortalitie.
Here let al the learned meditate and write: here let the Philosophers argue and dispute of
contentation, constancie, life, and death. 136
Importantly, Langius goes on to assert that in the peacefulness of the garden he
is free from all the cares of the world, and he can there concentrate on subjecting
his 'broken and distressed mind' to 'Right Reason' and God.137 The first edition
of the Constantia, nonetheless, only referred to subjection to reason, and not
God. In a similar manner to Charron's case, Lipsius added the 'Godly element'
in the revised edition, after objections were raised against the character of the
Constantia. Lipsius consciously attempted in this way to link the Stoic metaphor
of the garden with the Christian elements; undisturbed contemplation, away
from troubles and passions would lead one to wisdom and virtue, and
ultimately, God. Tire pagan-inspired elevation of human reason thus, was
135 Cf. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 66: 'it was also a place for the negotium cinimi, from which
the philosopher would return to the vita activa refreshed and inspired by the Stoic attributes of
wisdom and reason'.
136 Constantia (II, 3), pp. 135-6.
137 Constantia (II, 3), p. 137. Cf. also Morford, 'Stoic Garden', p. 163.
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tempered by the admission that this can only operate within God's province
(and providence).
The analysis of Lipsius's exposition of Stoic philosophy would be
incomplete without a reference to the school's cosmology, the last Stoic theme of
this examination: the associated concepts of Providence - Necessity - Destiny
(Fatum) and man's role within the Divine scheme of things. The importance the
matter has for Lipsius is witnessed by the fact that the discussion occupies ten
chapters of the first book (1,13-22). Lipsius introduces the subject within his
argumentation for the constancy: as public evils stem from God, men are not in
a position to complain.138 God's Providence is described as
A watchfiill and continuall care (yet without cark) whereby he beholdeth, searcheth, and
knowcth all thingcs: And knowing them, disposeth and ordcrcth the came by an immutable cource
to vs unknowne.139
In the text Lipsius joins necessity to Providence, claiming that it springs from
God, and that it is a power of Providence. It is more linked to the nature of
things; everything is naturally subject to alteration and eventually decay.140 He
gives an account of the Stoic definition of Fate and discusses part of the critique
against their views. While admitting to finding their teachings appealing,
Lipsius notes what he understands to be the two main problems ('impieties')
with their interpretation: the fact that they seem to make God subject to destiny,
on the one hand, and that they appear to deprive man of his liberty, on the
other.141 Lipsius links Destiny with the Stoic fatum, and using the root of the
word (fari: to speak) he describes it as the 'saying and commandment of God'.
By describing Destiny as the decree of God, thus, he is able to subject it to God.
What is of particular interest, however, is Lipsius's cautious effort to reinstate
138 Constantia (1,14), p. 104.
139 Constantia (1,13), p. 103.
140 Constantia (1,15), pp. 106-7.
141 Constantia (1,18) p. 115. Cf. also p. 117.
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the liberty of the will; while discussing the crucial issue of man's free will, he
remarks in a marginal note that
Whatsoeuer I speak here, let the wise be iudges of it, I will amend any thing vpon
admonition. And albeit happily I may be conuinced of folly, yet will not of frowrdness
142
Lipsius brings the discussion to a resolution with the following passage
explaining how God's Providence does not enforce man's will:
As the highest spheare with his motion swayeth about the rest, yet so as it neyther
barreth nor breaketh them of their proper motions: So God by the power of destiny
draweth al things, but taketh not away the peculiar facultie or motion of any thing. He
would that trees & corn should grow. So do they, without any force of their owne
nature. Hee would that men should vse deliberation and choyse. So do they, without
force, of their free-will. And yet, whatsoeuer they were in mind to make choyse of, God
forsaw from all eternitie: He fore-saw it (I say) not forced it: hee knewe it, but
constrayned it not: he fore-tolde it, but not prescribed it. [Drwmscemis]143
One of the most critical passages was his explanation on man's propensity to
sin; how it was exactly that man would sin out of his own free-will if
everything were part of God's Providence.144
Lipsius's case, however, did not appear convincing enough for his
contemporaries. Catholicism's strong emphasis on man's free will made his
attempt at reconciling it with his view of Providence as well as his explaining
of tricky issues such as responsibility for sin susceptible to criticism.
Coornhert, with whom Lipsius had corresponded earlier with regards to the
translation of the Constantia into Dutch, was particularly sceptical about
Lipsius's treatment of sin. For Coornhert, there could not be any compatibility
between free will and submission to Destiny.145 Lipsius, however, chose not to
142 Constantia, (I, 20), p. 121. Cf. also p. 124.
143 Constantia (I, 20), p. 122.
144 Constantia (I, 20), p. 122.
145 Cf. Rene Hoven, 'Les Reactions de Juste Lipse aux Critiques Suscitees par la Publication du
De Constantia', in Mouchel (ed.), Jnste Lipse (1547-1606) en son Temps pp. 413-422; on pp. 416-7;
Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1233; Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, pp. 84-9;
Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 113.
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respond to the questions he received from him on the specific chapter (I, 20),
and the correspondence between them ceased.
Lipsius's friend Laevinus Torrentius (Lieven Van der Beke, 1525-95),
Bishop of Antwerp, a scholar, a humanist, and a Prince of the Church, was
also among those who reacted to the views presented in Constantia. Alarmed
by his preference for Stoic views over Christian doctrine, he wrote to him
stating that it would have been much better had he taken Christ and his
followers as moral examples.146 In the same letter Torrentius urged Lipsius to
add a third book to the Constantia, written, this time, from a Christian and not
a profane point of view.147 Lipsius's published version of the reply to
Torrentius included the following:
For I had wanted to reconcile ancient philosophy to the Christian truth, and, while I was
totally absorbed in that intellectual task, some things crept in and slipped out which
perhaps have more of the flavour of the former than the latter148
He also defended his use of Epictetus and Seneca.149 In a separate published
letter, Lipsius claimed that it was his ignorance of theology that had aroused tire
slander against him:
They say that elephants love rivers but do not rashly go into the water, because they do
no know how to swim. This is the case with me and Theology; I love it, I value it, and 1
gladly dip my mind in its health-giving waters, but I do not immerse myself.150
In the same way Lipsius had insisted in his Epistle to the reader of the Constantia
on his use of philosophy, despite his awareness that his work would most likely
be censured and that he may have 'slipped' at points.151 His response to the
146 'If you compare the decrees of the Stoics or any other [school] to the doctrine of Christ, what
else are they than mere show and deceitful seeking after popularity?'; cited in Morford, Stoics
and Neostoics, p. 104.
147 Hoven, 'Les Reactions de Juste Lipse', p. 418.
148 Cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 105.
149 'There is a warmth in the writings of Seneca or Epictetus, which reaches the reader also;
and they seem not so much to discuss virtue as to plant it and impress it upon him'; cited in
Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 105.
150 Cited in Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 106.
151 Epistle to the Reader, Constantia, p. 205.
137
criticisms against the work and his orthodoxy was to defend himself in a
number of letters. Additionally, he made some minor amendments to the text,
and added some explanatory marginal notes, none of which made a significant
difference to the substance of the work. Lipsius also attached a second preface
('Ad Lectorem pro Constantia mea Praescriptio') placed at the beginning of the
work.152 In a rather sarcastic tone and perhaps with a hint of conceit Lipsius
explained in the preface that the criticisms against him were based on alleged
errors in his account of 'Right reason', which he accentuated to a great degree,
as the ancients did. In a similar manner to how Charron tried to defend himself,
Lipsius replied to this accusation that for him 'Right reason' was only directed
by God and revealed by faith. It was within this framework that he had inserted
in the second edition the name of God in the text, in the extract where Langius
was asserting that free of troubles in the garden he could subject his mind to
Right reason and God. Lipsius further defended himself in the preface by
distinguishing between theologians and not, in the same vein that Charron
distinguished between theological and human wisdom. Lipsius claimed that,
had he assumed to be a theologian, then it was fair to say that he had had erred;
and although he recognised the significance of theologians, he suggested that he
conducted himself not just as a philosopher, but a Christian philosopher.153
In any case, it is of significance that despite his repeated claims that he
would make amendments, Lipsius ultimately defied suggestions both from
Torrentius and Coornhert, demonstrating his firm belief that his views were
right. This is confirmed by a letter he sent to a friend of his, saying that the
changes he made to the Constnntin were few, and that he had only added an
152 Opera Omnia, IV, 367-8.
153 Cf. Galileo's distinction between his findings and matters pertaining to religion and faith in
his letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany (1615); The Galileo Affair. A Documentary
History, ed. Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California
Press, 1989), pp. 90-1, 93, 94, 99-101,109.
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epistle explaining his position against 'some defenders of piety', themselves
little pious and even less advised.154 This statement is important, however, as it
alludes to the greatest accusation against Lipsius and his Constantia: that of
impiety.155 It is to Lipsius's views on religion, its role in the state and
considerations of religious dissent that we will now turn our attention. As we
will see, criticisms were directed against the Politica as well, although for
apparently different reasons.156
(iii.) Lipsius and Religion (or Politics and Religion)
We arrive then at one of the most crucial matters discussed by Lipsius, and
one that sparked controversy both during his lifetime and for centuries to
follow: the role of religion within the state. The chapters of the Politica dealing
with the 'divine' part of the prudence of the Prince (IV, 2-4) were under attack
by various parties from very early on, both during his stay in Protestant
Leiden as well as during his time in Catholic Louvain. That Lipsius was aware
even before the publication of the Politica that his views were not going to be
received equally well by all is witnessed in his correspondence.157 In the
Protestant world - albeit against a Catholic - Lipsius found himself defending
his position soon after the appearance of the book, from attacks that the polity
he was proposing was too authoritarian and not tolerant enough. Conversely,
the Roman Curia deemed that the same views were too tolerant. The debates of
Lipsius with both parts - although in the case of Rome there was not much
room for a debate - occupy a notable chapter in the greater topic of toleration
154 Cited in Hoven, 'Les Reactions de Juste Lipse', p. 420.
155 'Negant fatis pie hoc argumentum a me tractatum'; 'Ad Lectorem', Opera Omnia IV, 367.
156 According to Hoven, however, at receiving the Politica both Lampsonius and Junius reacted
saying more or less that Lipsius had repeated the same mistakes he did not manage to correct in
the Constantia-, 'Les Reactions de Juste Lipse', p. 421.
157 Cf. his letter of 17 June 1588 to Lampsonius; cited by Giildner, Toleranz-Probleni, p. 94.
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and its limitations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and have been
sufficiently examined by various scholars.158
Adequate attention, however, has not been paid to some especially
interesting preliminary points on the subject of religion made by Lipsius early
in the Politicn, in his account of virtue. These points are exceptionally valuable,
as they are directly linked to the views expressed later in the book, making
them more comprehensible. While introducing the concept of virtue, Lipsius
associates it with piety and goodness.159 Piety for him is the belief in and the
worship of God, in other worcis, the theory and practice of religion. In terms
of worship, significantly, he differentiates between a double form of service,
internal and external.160 It seems reasonable in this case to recognise this
duality of internal and external worship as a parallel to Lipsius's
understanding of an inherent differentiation between the internal peace and
the outside world. In the same chapter (I, 3) Lipsius talks about the difference
between religion and superstition, an issue to which Charron also devoted
considerable attention. Like Charron, Lipsius regards superstition as an
enemy to religion, and he recognises that superstitious people are easily
manipulated by princes. His aversion to superstition can be viewed from the
lens of a Stoic: superstition is a blind passion that takes hold of one's reason
and threatens the individual's tranquillity.161 In keeping with his stress on
internal peace, the internal manifestation of piety is for Lipsius significantly
more important than the external. He suggests, however, that a wise man
158 For relevant discussions on the issue and qualifications on the differences between arguments
for toleration and religious concord see Mario Turchetti, 'Religious Concord and Political
Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France', Sixteenth Century Journal 22 (1991), pp.
15-25.
159 Politica (I, 2), p. 2.
160 Politica (I, 3), p. 4.
161 Politica (I, 3); p. 5.
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ought to conform to customs of worship for the good of the community in
which he lives.
And yet we must not altogether contemne externall things, although the most part of
them (as one will haue it) pertaine rather to custome, then to the substance of religion.
But a wise man will obserue them as enioned and commaunded by lawes (not as
acceptable of themselues to God) if they be not manifestly wicked and impious:
otherwise, we ought to yield to religion, and not stubbornly reiect the vse and custome
allowed of in the common-wealth wherein we liue. 162
He continues in a strikingly similar manner to Charron's discussion of the
distinction between preud'hommie and piety, to declare that piety is inadequate
without honesty:
J
vpright life, as well in the carriage of our selues, as in all our actions ruled by honestie.
Yet I may not ouerslip it, to the end you may know how necessarie it is, being fastened
into Pietie, or rather ioined into it. Without good demeanour, Pietie is not only vaine,
whatsoeuer shew you make in countenaunce, in word, in zeal, or deuotion, but as it
were nothing at al like the apples which grow in Indea, which are no sooner touched,
but they consume into vapour and smoke: euen such is lippe Pietie, without the vitall
iuice of deeds.163
Two things are discernible from this preliminary account: first, the separation in
Lipsius's view of the notion of piety into internal and external. The emphasis on
the importance of the former has for him as an essential consequence outward
conformity. As public observance is not as significant, it follows that as long as
people remain faithful in their private life, they do not sin in the eyes of God by
following the dictates of the state publicly. It is tempting to assume, of course,
that through these assertions Lipsius was in fact offering justification for his
own positions. The second element of importance in the above account is the
distinction between virtue (honesty) and piety; Lipsius separates, in a manner
very similar to Charron's, the divine inspiration from the more basic notion of
honesty. He claims, thus, a distinct space where men can exist without the
direction of God, and where they ought to be honest, but not necessarily pious.
162 Politica (I, 3); p. 5.
163 Politica (I, 6), p. 10.
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Having set the ground in this opening chapter Lipsius returns to the issue
of religion in the Fourth Book of the Politicn. There he ascribes the role of the
protector of religion to the Prince.164 Although Lipsius very meticulously points
out the limits of the Prince's duties, he does not delineate them precisely; he
asserts, however, that the Prince does not have a 'free hand' in religious issues.
and that prudence (I say) is vsed in matters diuine, which toucheth, ordereth and directeth
holy things, and religion, onely so farre forth as a Prince ought to haue care of them. I do iustly
and with reason tye this prudence hereunto, because the Prince hath not free power in
holy matters; God forbid he should; but a certaine insight, and that rather for their
defence, then to attribute to himselfe, as iudge to determine of them 165
Above all, religion is for Lipsius the bond that keeps society together:
Religion and the feare of God are the onely things which do conserue society amongst men: Take
away this bond, and the life ofman shall be ouercharged with folly, mischiefe and cruelty [...]
One religion is the author of vnitie; and from a confused religion there alwayes groweth
dissention 166
Having lived through the tragedy of his age and himself experienced the
disastrous results of religious strife Lipsius is resolute in this point. His despair
is evident in the following lines:
I cannot consider without tears, Good Lord, what firebrands of sedition hath religion
kindled in this fayrest part of the world? The chiefe heads of our Christian common
wealths are at strife amongst them selues, and many millions of men haue bin brought to
ruine, and do dayly perish, vnder a pretext of piety167
People were being killed in the name of piety and religion. In these
circumstances, the public good is harmed by the fanaticism that accompanies
religious plurality (or 'confusion', as Lipsius prefers to call it). Yet religion could
lead to peace and tranquillity provided that it is followed by everyone in the
state. And it is first and foremost the duty of the wise man to lead the way by
164 The title of Politica (IV, 2) reads as follows: 'The definition of that [proper or princely] Prudence
luhich properly belongeth to a Prince, into Ciuill, and Militarie. Ciuill prudence againe is deuided into
humane and diuine. That the Prince ought to haue care for the latter, and to obserue and defend
one religion'; p. 61 (my emphasis).
166 Politica (IV, 2), p. 61.
166 Politica (IV, 2), p. 62.
167 Politica, (IV, 3), p. 63.
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maintaining the laws of his ancestors; only by keeping the inherited customs in
public can society continue to exist in peace.168 This is immediately related to
Lipsius's fundamental concept of the division between public and private; when
one religion is observed in public, concord will reign over the polity.
This standpoint alludes also to his next series of arguments dealing with
the question of whether public or private dissent is to be tolerated. For Lipsius,
and in line with his prime concern for public order, public dissent is far more
damaging than private. Along the same lines that King James would later
acknowledge recusants, the Flemish author suggested that private worship is to
be tolerated, on condition that people show outward conformity: 'No Prince can
rule the mindes in like sort as he may the tongs of men. God is the king of mens
minds. ...'169He also repeats the maxim of King Theodoric (r. 494-526), that he
could 'not command religion, because no man could be enforced to beleeue against his
will',170
As already suggested, Lipsius's views brought him into contradiction
with both opposing poles on the issue of religious toleration. In the Protestant
world, Coornhert's protest was aimed against Lipsius's advocacy of the
observance of one single religion in the state and the persecution of heretics
(public dissenters). The Roman Curia, on the other hand, raised objections to his
more moderate claims of allowing private dissent. Both cases deserve some
attention as they shed further ligltl on Lipsius's stance on ihe issue of religion as
well as giving some indication of the intellectual climate of the time and of the
tensions between various standpoints.
Politica (IV, 2), p. 62.
«9 Politica (IV, 4), p. 65.
170 Politica (IV, 4), p. 66.
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In this respect, the dispute with Coornhert is instructive.171 Coornhert
was a multitalented author; he had published treatises on the theological, moral
and political issues of the day, as well as translated various classical works into
Dutch; his main preoccupation, however, was freedom of conscience, expression
and public worship.172 The debate between him and Lipsius on the occasion of
the views contained in the Politica started off initially as an exchange of letters
(the two men knew one another at least from 1582);173 Coornhert wrote to the
Leiden professor asking him to clarify his views with regards to the role of
religion in the state and the punishment of religious dissidents. After Lipsius's
dismissive reply, Coornhert made the critical decision to publish a refutation of
the three chapters of the Politica in question (IV, 2-4), dedicating his work to the
magistrates of Leiden. Tire fact that the Trial of the Killing ofHeretics and the
Constraint ofConscience (1590)174 was written in Dutch provoked Lipsius, because
it made the debate more public. Lipsius was initially determined not to respond;
he nonetheless did, a few months after the publication of the Trial, with De Una
171 For the debate between Lipsius and Coornhert see Giildner, Toleranz-Problein, pp. 99-118 ;
Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience'; Roland Crahay, 'Le Probleme du Pluralisme
Confessionnel dans les Pays-Bas a la fin du XVIe Siecle: les Embarras de Juste Lipse (1589-1596)'
in Naissance et Affirmation de I'ldee de Tolerance, XVIe-XVlIIe Siecle, 5eme Colloque Jean Boisset
(Xeme Colloque du Centre d'Histoire des Reformes et du Protestantisme) Universite de
Montpellier III (Montpellier, 1987), pp. 157-187; Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, vol. 2, pp.
281-5; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics pp. 112-118; Van Gelderen, Political Thought of the Dutch
Revolt, pp. 251-56.
172 Despite the sufficient treatment of Coornhert's religious disputes, very little reference is made
to his religion by scholars; this is rather surprising, considering the importance of such a piece of
information for the greater understanding of the religious debates. Born a Catholic, he was very
early on attracted to the works of the great reformers, Luther, Calvin and others. He never
officially embraced Protestantism, and he, significantly, disagreed in theology in many points
with all three denominations, whether Catholic, Calvinist or Lutheran; it seems, generally, that
he was more influenced by the various spiritual tendencies of the period, such as the teachings
of Sebastian Franck and Castellio. (Lecrer, Toleration and the Reformation, pp. 273-6).
173 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 113.
174 D. V. Coornhert, Proces van 't Ketter-dooden ende Dzoangh der Conscientien tusschen Iustum
Lipsium, Sclirijver vande Politien Anno 1589, daer voor ende Dirck Coornhert daer Teglien Sperkende
(1590).
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Religione Adversus Dialogistam Liber (1590).175 Regardless that the circulation of
the Trial was suppressed by the magistrates of Leiden within a year of its
publication, Lipsius's reputation was damaged by this and it seems that this
controversy was the principal reason behind his permanent departure from
Leiden in 1591.176
What is of particular importance for our consideration is the apparently
striking similarity between the views of the two men. They both argued for the
separation of the two spheres and jurisdictions - the ecclesiastical and political -
but they were doing so from entirely opposing standpoints: Lipsius's focus was
the order of the state, whilst Coornhert was more concerned with individual
conscience and the independence of religion from any interference by temporal
authorities.177 Some examples of their writings will reveal the simultaneous
divergence and correspondence of their positions. Coornhert was acutely
disturbed by the way in which he thought Lipsius had breached the separation
of the two spheres by making the ruler the defender of one religion.178 He was,
moreover, alarmed by Lipsius's refusal to state explicitly which religion this
would be, surmising that the Prince would defend whatever religion happened
to be dominant in the state. This could well have been Lipsius's case, but the
Flemish scholar was prudent enough not to push his argument to its limits. In
the same vein, he did not go all the way to explain that he was, in fact, aiming at
the complete exclusion of theologians from the political sphere. The
175 Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', pp. 1243-4.
176 Among the other factors that contributed to his departure seem to have been the displeasure
with what he considered the lukewarm rallying to his cause by certain authorities (even Prince
Maurice, who had been Lipsius's student had bought copies of the Trial), and the 'political
insecurity', i.e. the expectation that the north would lose the struggle with Spain. See Voogt,
'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1247; Guldner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 117; Morford, Stoics
and Neostoics, p. 117. Lipsius himself admits in his autobiographical letter to Woverius that it
was Religio ac Fama (religion and reputation/fame) that compelled him to leave Leiden; cited in
Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 99.
177 Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1237.
178 Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1239.
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circumstances in which he was writing did not allow such a position to become
so explicit.179
Coornhert, on the other hand, was arguing in purely theological terms;
indicative in this context is the fact that his list of sources does not include any
classical authors.180 He acknowledged, thus, the primacy of the divine matters at
the expense of politics:
I ... confess that I consider men's eternal salvation to be of more importance than their or
the state's temporary prosperity. For states exist for the sake of the people, not the
people for the sake of the state 181
Equally, he maintained that the subjects 'are not bound to obey the government
in all its commandments.' In times of conflict they should 'obey God rather than
man'.182 The two areas, the temporal and the ecclesiastical - or, politics and
religion - should be kept separate 'for they are as different as heaven and earth',
equating in the same way that has been suggested in the Introduction, politics
with the temporal sphere and religion with the divine. Coornhert also addressed
the question of human limitations: how could people trust the defence of the
church to the princes, since throughout history there had been many examples
of unwise, unjust or cruel princes: God gave to none besides Himself power in
His realm, not even the prince.183 Decisions about religious doctrines, in this
respect should be made by the Church, which is spiritually guided by God and
not the prince; conversely, the Church ought to engage only in spiritual
considerations and not in worldly ones.184
179 Guldner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 105.
180 Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1240.
181 Cited in Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', pp. 1238-9.
182 Cited in Van Gelderen, Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 252. See also Voogt, 'Primacy of
Individual Conscience', p. 1240; Guldner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 105.
183 Cf. Van Gelderen, Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, who cites Coornhert's assertion that
the government was not ordained to 'punish the errant in matters of faith and even less to
exterminate the weeds of God's field' (p. 252).
184 Guldner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 106.
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One of Coornhert's fundamental objections to Lipsius's stance concerned
his claim that people should follow the established religion as a matter of
custom. The polemicist recognised that this position had the potential to
undermine the position of the Christian religion:
...This would mean that one religion is not any better than another one, and that one can
attain salvation in any religion, no matter how false or idolatrous it might be. And this
would be complete Libertinism, and a shoe that is made to fit any foot. 185
Coornhert pointed out that Lipsius's treatment of religion was essentially one
that subordinated it to the state. He further accused Lipsius of using it as an
instrument of support for the state, in order to achieve temporal grandeur, the
most abhorrent of things.186 It is significant in the context of the discussion of
Charron's case in the previous chapter, that Coornhert challenged his
adversary's reliance on pagan, classical sources and mocked Lipsius for using
them as a fetish. Lipsius had defended himself from accusations that he ciid not
use religious sources for the composition of Constantia. Yet the fact that he did
not feel that in the case of the Politicn he had to defend his sparse use of
ecclesiastical writers, was a confirmation of his belief - and Coornhert's charge
at the same time - that theological writings did not have anything to do with
politics. This was a bold claim, very similar to Charron's insistence that theology
and philosophy were distinct domains. These, however, were also the
fundamental arguments on which assertions such as Sarpi's for the separation of
civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction could be based.
Lipsius's defence against Coornhert was principally based on the
reiteration that the prince ought to promote one religion within the state which
he had the duty to oversee; he had no rights over the church, but he had to
prevent disorder. Two issues, above all, infuriated Lipsius among Coornhert's
185 Cited in Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', pp. 1241-2.
186 Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1242; cf. Van Gelderen who states that
Coornhert regarded Lipsius as a disciple of Machiavelli, who saw religion as an instrument of
the 'body's comfort and peace'; Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 255.
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polemics. First was his opponent's questioning of his private religion and the
insinuation that he was on the Spanish side. Lipsius's irritation could partly be
explained by his own sensitivity in that the accusations were close to the truth.
He would have been unable, however, to respond to accusations about his own
faith. As Giildner accurately suggests, doing so would have damaged the
principal foundation of the Politica, which was 'politics beyond confessionalism'.
187 The other source of Lipsius's anger was the fact that Coornhert had opened
up the debate to the more general (literate) public, who ought to be excluded
from the arcana imperii; the Politica was written as a book for princes and those
who rule; common 'plebes' ought to be kept out of these matters.188
Against the views of the Dutch controversialist, then, who argued from
the one extreme of liberty of religious conscience and for some form of religious
toleration, Lipsius's position appeared too authoritarian. The Roman Church, on
the contrary, and perhaps not entirely surprisingly, viewed the same stance as
allowing for too much religious freedom. Thus, in 1590, within a year of its
publication, passages of the Politica were to appear on the Index Librorum
Prohibitorum of Pope Sixtus V (Felice Peretti, 1585-90). The chapter in question
this time was the one in whuch Lipsius explained that private dissent in religion
was to be tolerated (IV, 4).189 The sudden death of Sixtus in the same year had as
a result that his Index was never published. The same chapter of the Politica
was, however, included in the Index of Clement VIII (published in 1596).190
Lipsius was warned in 1593 by Cardinal Bellarmine about its imminent
publication; after some letter-exchanges with the Jesuit Francisco Benci (1542-
94), Cardinal Cesare Baronio (1583-1607), and Bellarmine (1542-1621), Lipsius
187 Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 103.
188 Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience', p. 1244 and Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 108.
189 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, pp. 101-2 and Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 123.
190 Index des Livres Interdits, vol. IX: Index de Rome 1590, 1593, 1596, pp. 420-21.
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finally submitted his revised version.191 The amendments, which had probably
been dictated by Bellarmine, only involved one chapter: Book Four, Chapter
Four. The significant citation by Theodoric was omitted in the new edition, and
some edge was added to the rather moderate and pacified tone of the chapter.192
As with Charron's case, the criticisms raised from both extreme positions
on the freedom of worship can give us an insight into Lipsius's position on the
issue of religion. Coornhert's disapproval originated from his view that Lipsius
only ascribed an instrumental role to religion as an 'author of unity', thus
subordinating it to the dictates of the state. By the same token, the Church of
Rome held that, by allowing private dissent provided that the subjects
conformed outwardly, Lipsius was using religion as a political tool. Both sides
were equally disturbed by Lipsius's rendering considerably more importance to
politics and temporal affairs. Indeed, if one takes into account that Coornhert
and the Papacy represented two opposite poles, Lipsius's position was
somewhere in the middle: public uniformity of religion, that would ensure
peace, allowing at the same time some liberty of conscience, so long as this was
kept private.193 Lipsius's via media,'19'1 furthermore, can account for the
contrasting interpretations of his work - the one that represents him as an
191 Giildner discusses the corrections on pp. 119-128; see also his appendix, pp. 170-4. The
alterations are also accounted in some detail in Crahay, 'Probleme du Pluralisme Confessionnel',
pp. 175-180.
192 For the amendations, see Appendix IV. Cf. Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex Qui ad
Principatum Maxime Spectant (Leiden: Plantin Press, Franciscus Raphelengius, 1590), pp. 127-129
and Opera Omnia IV, 48 for the revised edition. Significantly, the English edition of 1594 is a
translation of the original version of the chapter (as, of course, is the French of 1590). It would be
safe to assume, and rather ironic in the circumstances, that at least for the French case the
Huguenot initiative for the translation of the work was associated with what they regarded as
Lipsius's advocacy for toleration.
193 For similar interpretation see Crahay, 'Probleme du Pluralisme confessionnel', esp. p. 167.
194 Cf. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 110. Parallel, although not entirely identical is Kluyskens'
interpretation that Lipsius longed for concord and unity in the divided Christian world; it is in
this context, Kluyskens adds, that he intended to contribute to reconciliation within his own
country. Similarly, Lipsius's motto Antiquus moribus, appealing to the doctrines of the early
Church, were a way of appealing to the common and unifying elements of Christianity. ('Justus
Lipsius and the Jesuits', p. 254-62).
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authoritarian writer who would relentlessly persecute heretics, and the other
that depicts him as an advocater of too much religious freedom. His middle way
could not entirely satisfy the agents of either one of the two far opposite
positions.195
Such an interpretation of Lipsius's views, moreover, gives substance to
the suggestion that his ideas were close to those of the politiqnes.196 In this
context Giildner notes, for instance, the esteem Lipsius had for the work of
Michel de l'Hopital and the policies of Henry IV.197 Evidence indicates,
moreover, that the French King had invited the Flemish scholar to France after
his departure from Leiden.198 Giildner also places Lipsius in the same group as
Montaigne, for whom Lipsius had great respect,199 the Chancellor l'Hopital,
Charron and Du Vair, intellectuals, namely, who 'promoted one religion for the
state, without themselves being engaged in religious matters, but who viewed,
like Lipsius, moral philosophy as a necessary foundation for such an
endeavour'.200 This view of course fits well with Lipsius's interest in
(neo)Stoicism - and we already saw his firmness in its utility - as an alternative
manner to contemplate about ethics, independently of confessions, and as a way
to endure the disaster brought by religious passions.
195 Similar ambivalence continues to haunt the legacy of Lipsius in present-day scholarship; cf.
for example Ccrrit Voogt, who sees him as an advocator of authoritative policies, while Morford
or Crahay regard Lipsius's writings as rather tolerant for his time.
196 It is in the same vein, we can surmise, that Lipsius was classified together with Bodin and
Machiavelli in a sermon preached before the English Parliament of 1621 in London by
William Loe; the latter complained that too many Englishmen 'studie Bodines Commentaries,
Lipsius Politiques and Machiuells Prince...'; cited by McCrea in Constant Minds, p. 31.
197 Cf. the reference to Henry IV in his Monita et exempla politico (1605): 'Gallorum regnum potens
et florens, a Faramundo primo rege usque ad Henricum IV. qui tunc feliciter regnat...'; cited in
Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, p. 112.
198 Vita, Opera Omnia I, lvi.
199 Montaigne, Essays (II, 12) 'An Apology for Raymond Sebond'; in Screech, The Essays ofMichel
de Montaigne, p. 652.
200 Giildner, Toleranz-Problem, pp. 110-13. -
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The discussion of Lipsius's views on religion cannot be brought to a
conclusion without some reference to his notorious changes of religious
allegiances. From Catholicism to Lutheranism, then to Calvinism and finally
back to Catholicism, Lipsius has been described in history as 'inconstant'.201 He
has further been paralleled to the mythical creature of Proteus, who kept
changing his form,202 and to a chameleon.203 According to this line of reasoning,
it was a natural result of Lipsius's lax sense of religious conviction - an
assumption, admittedly, rather hard to resist - for him to suggest that religion
should have a secondary role to the state and politics.204 His views and his
religious inconstancy have also been explained with speculation about Lipsius's
involvement in the 'Family of Love'. But since there is not enough evidence for
201 James advises his son in the Basilikon Doron (Edinburgh, 1599): 'keepe trew Constancie, not
only in your kindnesse towards honest men; but also inuicti animi against all aduersities: not
with that Stoicke insensible stupiditie that proud inconstant Lipsius persuadeth in his Constantia'.
The quotation in italics was expunged from the second edition of the work (1603), and the
passage read like this: 'not with that Stoicke insensible stupiditie wherewith many in our dayes,
preassing to winne honour, in imitating that ancient sect, by their inconstant behaviour in their
owne lives, belie their profession'; James Craigie (ed.), The Basilicon Down ofKing James VI. 2
vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50), pp. 156-7. See also the comments
by J.H.M. Salmon in his 'Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England' in Linda Levy Peck (ed.), The
Mental World of the Jacobeayi Court (Cambridge: CUP, 1991) p. 186 and note 82, and McCrea,
Constant Minds, p. 175 and note 22. For different reasons behind James's dislike of Lipsius see D.
Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland. Neo-Stoicism, Culture and Ideology in an Age of
Crisis, 1540-1690. (Edinburgh: Tuckwell Press, 2000), chs. 1&2, where he argues about the
appearance of Neostoicism in Scotland in the 1590's.
202 Lipsius Proteus ex Antro Neptuni Protractus et Claro Soli Expositus (Frankfurt, 1614) was a work
published by Thomas Sagittarius, a professor at Jena that proved beyond doubt that Lipsius had
professed Lutheranism while at Jena. (Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 128).
203 Lipsius was ridiculed by the English divine Joseph Hall in his Mundus Alter idem (1605); the
latter while giving an account of the imaginary land of Fooliana the Fickle, he described some
old coins that 'were round, hauing on one side one in a gowne, seeming to bee of a middle age,
leaning his hat vpon the head of a little pettie dogge [Lipsius's love for dogs was also renowned]
, and holding in the left hand, a booke'; on the other side of the coin was a chameleon, and was
inscribed 'Const. Lips.' [From the English translation of John Healey, 71609]; cited by Rudolf Kirk
in the introduction of Constantia, p. 12.
204 It is in this sense that we have to regard the famous proverb that has survived about his life,
that he had said at some point '(For) all religion and no religion are to me one and the same'
(cited by Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. 19.); whether true or not, this statement fitted well with the
image that Lipsius had. For the sequence and parallels between a Machiavelli, Proteus, and a
chameleon, see also Richard of Gloucester in Shakespeare's Henry VI, 3 III. ii.
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us to establish the extent of Lipsius's involvement in the 'House of Love' or the
degree of his devotion, the suggestion of Familism does not provide the answer
to the puzzle Lipsius presents us with, or the popularity of his works. According
to another suggestion, we should look for the answer in Stoicism, the 'unifying
force' in his life.205
Yet both interpretations concentrate on the approaches Lipsius took to
solve his main problems: the disruption of religious wars. He turned to Stoicism
as comfort and refuge from the devastation around him, and through the
Constnntia he managed to provide solace to other people as well. Tire Politicn
was his version of what kind of politics was needed for the circumstances he
was living in, and what role religion ought to occupy within this type of politics.
This also amounted, however, to a distinct differentiation between public and
private. Within this scheme, all the ugliness and depravity of politics were
expelled and confined to the public realm, the one that corresponded to the
'temporal affairs', and ethics, belief and piety were preserved by their
internalisation, and through the direct contact with the divine. Yet his views
were not entirely accepted by his contemporaries - his attempt to combine
theology with philosophy raised similar criticisms to the ones to which Charron
was later subjected, as it led to a kind of indifference towards doctrinal matters.
His views on the role of religion within the state came under fire both for being
too lenient and for not being lenient enough - both sides, however, agreed that
Lipsius's treatment of religion effectively subordinated it to the (temporal)
interests of the state. There is a lot to be said about the use of his works in order
to justify his religious changes. Evidently, this refers to the extent to which
205 Leonard Forster, 'Lipsius and Renaissance Stoicism', Festschrift for Ralph Farrel, ed. A.
Stephens, H.L. Rogers and Brian Coghlan (Bern-Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1977), pp. 201-220; on p.
217. Cf. also Brooke, 'Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism', p. 50: 'Roughly speaking, Stoicism did for
Lipsius what Aristotle had previously done for Aquinas, providing a comprehensive
philosophical structure on which to hang theories about politics and ethics that could both
coexist with and lend philosophical support to traditional Christian claims'.
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theory justifies and influences practice and, conversely, to the degree that
experience informs theory. All the main issues in Lipsius's work, nonetheless,
become more intelligible when set against the background of the religious wars:
his fundamental separation between public and private, inward constancy
against outward strife, inward conviction and outward conformity, the paradox
of politics and ethics, and his search for an alternative source of morality - as
Charron did, at about the same time - away from the dangers of religion. And
here lie the reasons for his (un)popularity as well; in the midst of religious
warfare, a more moderate and humane approach to religious issues seemed to
provide the answer for the problems, which could only be solved on a temporal
level, and under the guidance of a prudent prince. Yet similar views, perhaps
surprisingly, would be expressed by someone who did not go through the
experience of religious strife; they were also voiced in the South of Europe, by a
friar, who followed and studied the events from a distance.
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Chapter III
Political Implications (I): Secular and Ecclesiastical
Jurisdiction
Paolo Sarpi, Historin del Concilio Tridentino (1619)
God has instituted two governments in the world,
one spiritual and the other temporal,
each of them supreme and independent from the other.
Sarpi, from a consulto of 1608
An almost inherent implication of the separation of public and private
spheres was, as Lipsius was suggesting, the expulsion of religion from the
public domain and the privatisation of it. This shifting of domains has, in turn, a
two-fold bearing on the role of religion. The extreme internalisation of spiritual
considerations can, on the one hand, render an almostmystical role to religion.
Equally, the removal of sacred elements from the public realm can have the
effect that religion, stripped of its sacred elements assumes a purely political
function.Whilst both these repercussions are, perhaps, to some extent to be
expected in the work of an individual who had been personally affected by their
experience of the religious wars, the expression of equivalent views by someone
with no direct contact with religious warfare could be regarded as less so. A few
years after the death of Lipsius, nonetheless, the notion of the separation of
ecclesiastical and political jurisdictions, the idea of an internalised religion, and
the political control of the institution of the Church, were promoted by an
extraordinary Italian figure, the Venetian friar Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623). Yet Sarpi
had been involved in a different sort of religious warfare, having to face the
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crucial task of defending, on behalf of the Venetian Republic, its temporal
jurisdiction against Papal encroachments.
An enigmatic and fascinating individual of this age, Paolo Sarpi was
widely controversial, primarily for what was perceived as a stark contrast
between his political and religious convictions. He enjoyed varied and broad
intellectual interests: much like Charron and Lipsius - whose work he would
have been aware of - he combined theological with philosophical pursuits, as
well as demonstrating a vivid interest in mathematics, natural philosophy and
anatomy.1 Sarpi was also an active member of the so-called 'republic of letters'.
Like Lipsius, he corresponded with a great number of prominent thinkers of his
time, as well as people engaged in the affairs of state and religion. The greatest
part of his legacy, however, lies with his appointment as state theologian to
Venice (28 March 1606) and his conduct during the ensuing period of the
Interdict crisis (April 1606 - April 1607). His polemical efforts made him rise to
an international status with his tracts enjoying very wide circulation indeed. The
other part of the friar's legacy rests on his most famous work, the Historia del
Concilio Tridentino (London, 1619).
Similar to Charron and Lipsius, Sarpi's name is surrounded by
contention: a friar involved in political affairs, strongly anti-papal and anti¬
clerical, excommunicated by Pope Paul V, and a competent and fierce
polemicist, he was a figure that the Curia almost certainly wanted dead.2 Like
the other two authors Sarpi was described as an atheist, both during his lifetime
1 Cf. Vittorio Frajese, 'Sarpi Interprete del De la Sagesse di Pierre Charron: I Pensieri sidla
Religione', Studi Veneziani XX (1990), pp. 59-85; and 'nota introduttiva' in Paolo Sarpi, Opere, ed.
by Gaetano and Luisa Cozzi (Milano-Napoli: R. Ricciardi, 1969), pp. 23-4,31-4; David Wootton,
Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and Enlightenment (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), pp. 24-28,70-1.
2 Sarpi was excommunicated on 5 Jan. 1607, eight months after the issuing of the Interdict of
Pope Paul V against the Republic of Venice; William J. Bouwsma Venice and the Defense of
Republican Libert]/. Retiaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation. (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 401. On the assault against Sarpi's life see
below.
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as well as in our time,3 and as a (crypto) Protestant, while he himself would
admit to often behaving like a chameleon, wearing the appropriate mask
according to the person he was dealing with.4 These are all elements that render
Sarpi of particular importance for the present study. The ambivalence of his
religious convictions and standpoint, his profound questioning of the authority
of the Church, and his strong views about the separation of ecclesiastical and
political jurisdiction make him a critical part of the argument this thesis is
constructing, on the wider moral and political connotations of the separation of
temporal and divine spheres.
The primary task of this chapter, therefore, will be to examine Sarpi's
fundamental notion of the separation of ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction
as developed in his greater polemic against the Papacy. Itwill point to links
between the friar's work and the Conciliar tradition, to which Sarpi referred,
when constructing his polemics. The analysis will also discuss extensively the
contemporary context, that is to say Venetian religious policies and the way
these were proclaimed and defended in the face of Roman challenges. Finally, it
will explore whether any associations can be discerned between Sarpi's deep
convictions about the relationship between religion and politics, and their
separate jurisdictions and his religious outlook. The examination will primarily
3 This is the central thesis of the otherwise excellent study by David Wootton, Paolo Sarpi:
Between Renaissance and Enlightenment. Wootton has based his interpretation on a reading of
Sarpi's Pensieri Filosofici, and he argues that only against this alleged atheism can anyone make
sense of the otherwise undecipherable Friar. It seems that accusations of atheism, however, were
laid against Sarpi even during his lifetime: see his early biography by his close friend and
associate Fulgenzio Micanzio, The Life of the most Learned Father Paul, of the Order of the Servie.
Councellour ofState to the most Serene Republicke of Venice and Authour of the History of the Councell
of Trent. (London: for Humphrey Moseley and Richard Martin, 1651); p. 186 (wrongly numbered
as p. 166).
4 'My character is such that, like a chameleon, I imitate the behaviour of those amongst people
who are reserved and gloomy I become, despite myself, unfriendly. I respond openly and freely
to people who are cheerful and uninhibited. I am compelled to wear a mask. Perhaps there is
nobody who can survive in Italy without one'; letter to Gillot, 12 May 1609, cited in Wootton,
Paolo Sarpi, p. 119.
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be based on the Venetian's most famous work, a work that preoccupied him
much of his life, the History of the Council ofTrent. This monumental text was
first published in London (1619) in Italian, at the initiative of Archbishop Abbot
and almost certainly James VI and I himself. It was, moreover, translated into
Latin and English within a year of its first appearance (1620), as well as into
French (Geneva, 1621).5 It enjoyed, accordingly, wide popularity, in spite of
having been placed on the Index of Prohibited Books immediately after its
appearance.6
This chapter will start by examining Sarpi's life and his involvement in
the Interdict crisis, setting thus the background for the scrutiny of his major text.
The analysis of the History will provide us with themes that reflect some of
Sarpi's views on the separate jurisdictions of the temporal and ecclesiastical
domains, as well as his more general attitudes towards religion and politics. In
this manner, itwill become obvious how the dualisms of temporal-divine and
public-private, the subjects of the two preceding chapters, translate into a
separation of authority. Itwill be argued, moreover, that the specific resurgence
of the separate jurisdictions' rhetoric can be accounted for by a double set of
circumstances. It can first be seen as a reaction towards the perceived increasing
worldly preoccupations of the Papacy and its encroachments into temporal
powers beginning from the sixteenth century and continuing, to varying
degrees, through to the seventeenth. It can also be regarded within the
5 For the history of the publication, see below. The French translation was made by Giovanni
Diodati, the prominent Protestant academic. Diodati had also come to Venice in August-
September 1608 as part of a plan to educate Venice in the reformed faith; the whole attempt,
however, fell through, and Diodati left disappointed and with a strong impression that Sarpi
was 'unduly prudent' (he was reproached for his fredda prndenza). For the attempt, see for
instance Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 99-104; Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, Logan Pearsall
Smith (ed.), 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907); vol. I, pp. 86-98; Bouwsma, Venice and the
Defence, pp. 505,528-9.
6 See Index des Livres Interdits, ed. J.M. Bujanda, vol. XI: Index Libromm Proliibitorum 1600-1966
(Canada and Geneva: Mediaspaul and Librairie Droz, 2002), p. 807.
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framework of the Lutheran revolt and the subsequent series of issues that arose
because of it, such as civil (or religious) obedience, religious tolerance and
questions of authority. In this respect, Sarpi's text is ideal as the focus of such a
consideration, since the history he was writing epitomised all of the above
issues, as they were expressed in the almost forty-five-year struggle
surrounding the summons, procedure, and conclusion of the Council of Trent.
What is more, according to the author's view, one generation later, these were




As in the cases of Lipsius and Charron, Sarpi's life is very important in
understanding the primary preoccupations of his work.7 Without doubt, the
single most significant event in the Friar's life was his appointment as state
theologian to the Venetian Republic - remarkably, only one month before the
Interdict of Pope Paul V - and his subsequent conduct during this struggle. Sarpi
himself regarded this event as a turning point in his career, and an abrupt
change from the contemplative to the active life.8 This is of particular
importance, as this position gave him the opportunity not only to make public
his views on certain issues that preoccupied him throughout his whole life, but
also vigorously to promote them. Three inter-related elements are of great
significance for a consideration of Sarpi's life. The first is his association with
Augustinian theology through his Order, the Servites, though not always
observed in studies of his work. Second, are his links with surviving reformers,
7 For his life see John L. Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix: Paolo Sarpi and some ofHis English Friends
(1606-1700). (Lawrence, Manhattan, Wichita: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 1-10;
Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 358-363; Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 8-11.
8 Micanzio, Life, pp. 85-6. Cf. also Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 362.
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some ofwhom had taken part in the Council of Trent. Third, come his profound
distrust of Rome that made him seek the company of Protestants, Gallicans,
Anglicans and eirenicists alike. An examination of the History of the Council of
Trent should be set against the context of his life-long concerns about
ecclesiastical and secular questions, issues of reform and Sarpi's rivalry - official,
as much as personal - with the Papacy.
The main source we have for his early life is the biography by Fulgenzio
Micanzio (1570-1654), one of his closest friends and associates.9 Born Pietro
(Paolo was the name he took up as he entered the monastery), Sarpi was the son
of a merchant, who died while Pietro was still a child. His education was
initially entrusted to his uncle, who taught children of noble families, and later
to the Servite Father Gian Maria Capella of Cremona (1564). Sarpi studied
philosophy and theology, mathematics and natural philosophy, and was well
versed in languages. At the young age of fourteen he entered the Augustinian
Order of the Servites (Servants of Mary), probably under the influence of his
instructor.10 At eighteen the bishop ofMantua made him a reader in canon law
and positive theology (1570). While in Mantua he formed a relationship with
Camillo Olivo, who had been secretary to one of the legates at the Tridentine
Council, Cardinal Gonzaga. This contact probably was the first source of Sarpi's
life-long interest in Trent.11 Sarpi was ordained as priest at twenty-two (1574)
and soon after moved to Milan, having been recruited by the Archbishop Carlo
Borromeo (1538-84), the reformer, to assist him in his task.12
9 Vita del Padre Paolo de VOrdine de' Servi e Teologo della Serenissima Republica di Venezia (Leiden,
1646). As the Vita is the only source we have for Sarpi's early life, it is difficult to establish its
reliability; it appears, however, to be in agreement with other sources for Sarpi's later years. All
my references are from the English edition, cited above.
10 Micanzio, Life, p. 6.
11 Micanzio, Life, pp. 10-11.
12 Micanzio, Life, p. 18.
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On a different level, Sarpi took a doctorate at Padua in 1578, while the
next year, at the age of twenty-six, he became Provincial of his Order in Venice
(1579).13 While holding this position, he was chosen as one of three Servite
scholars to revise the constitution and rule of the Order. In connection with this
task, Sarpi spent several months in Rome studying the decrees of Trent.14 This is
very important in the light of his later writings, as his research involved a
serious consideration of the Council's impact. Equally important in this respect,
is the fact that during his stay in Rome it seems that he came in contact with a
number of surviving reformers; this, evidently, also led to his reassessment of
the Church's reforming objectives vis-a-vis the Council.
In 1585 Sarpi was promoted to Procurator-General of his Order, next in
authority under the General of the whole Order, and as a result of this
promotion, he spent the next three years in Rome. This time he met Roberto
Bellarmine (1542-1621) there, with whom - ironically, since the two later became
rivals - he quickly developed a friendship. He also formed a friendship with
Cardinal Castagna, the later Pope Urban VII (1590).15 During that time Sarpi
formed an opinion concerning the extent of corruption at the Papal Court that
completed his view of the Church as a corrupt institution from which reform
could not derive.16
Back in Venice Sarpi taught philosophy and theology in the city's Servite
convent. He also frequented the house of Andrea Morosini (1558-1618), the
future historian of Venice, as well as the famous 'Golden Ship' shop in the
Merceria, both places of vigorous intellectual exchange, which hosted debates on
13 Micanzio, Life, p. 22.
14 Bouwsma, Venice and tlw Defense, pp. 359-60.
15 Micanzio, Life, p. 34. For Cardinal Castagna see the relevant article in the New Catholic
Encyclopaedia (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, McGraw-Hill, 1967);
worthy of notice is the fact that he had taken part at the second phase of the Council of Trent
(1562-3), as president of several commissions.
16 Micanzio, Life, pp. 37-8,58-9; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 361.
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a number of current issues. It was in these circles that Sarpi learned of the
situation in France during the religious wars, a topic he was very interested in,17
and met with other famous thinkers of his time. Sarpi's acquaintances were
indeed wide-ranging. Fie was a friend of Arnaud du Ferrier (c. 1508-85), twice
French ambassador to Venice, and a man with close connections in Gallican
circles. Du Ferrier, importantly, had also been the person representing the
French king during the last stages of the Council of Trent. Other friends and
correspondents included: Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), the scholar Peiresc (1580-
1637),18 the jurist-historian Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553-1617), the Protestant
Dudley Carleton (1574-1632), English ambassador to Venice (1610-5) and to
Holland, the Protestant scholar Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614) - for whom he
obtained a copy of the Koran in 1603 - prominent Gallicans such as Edmonde
Richer (1559-1631), Jacques Gillot (c. 1550-1619) and Jacques Leschassier (1550-
1625), and eirenicists such as Frangois Hotman (1524-90).19 This heterodox group
of correspondents that shared ideas about reform, challenges to Roman
authority and ecumenism aroused great suspicions in Rome, in view of which
Micanzio offers a very defensive account of Sarpi's piety and adherence to
orthodox beliefs.20 Micanzio also suggests that Sarpi had been consulted on the
major question of the efficacy of grace, the famous controversy de auxiliis. Not
surprisingly, as an Augustinian friar, his conclusions on the issue emphasised
the importance of grace in man's salvation.21 Rome, moreover, also seems twice
to have refused him a bishopric, either on the basis of personal rivalries or
17 Cf. Micanzio, Life, pp. 49-50; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 360.
18 Peter N. Miller, Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth-Century. (New Haven;
London: Yale UP, 2000), p. 6.
19 Micanzio, Life, pp. 161-2 (wrongly numbered 141-2), p. 170 (wrongly numbered 150); Wootton,
Paolo Sarpi, p. 9.
20 Micanzio, Life, p. 59.
21 Micanzio, Life, pp. 81-2.
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because of his suspect beliefs. It is possible that this rejection may have affected
his attitude to the Curia.22
It can be surmised that Sarpi's rare combination of knowledge on
theological and legal matters was the reason behind his appointment as
consnltore teologico-canonico on the eve of the Interdict crisis.23 Sarpi's view of this
event as a defining moment in his career, and a shift from the contemplative to
the active life, is consistent with the fact that there is little evidence that he had
concerned himself with political matters before the threat of the Interdict.24
During that troubled period (April 1606-April 1607), as the spokesman for the
defence of Venice against the Papacy Sarpi produced numerous pamphlets and
engaged in a series of debates, for the most part against his former friend,
Cardinal Bellarmine. His writings were primarily concerned with the limits of
ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction and the separation of the two. Although
the crisis was finally resolved early in 1607, it is safe to assume that the attempt
against his life in October 1607 can largely be accounted for by his conduct
during the struggle against Rome.25 Sarpi himself tellingly named the stiletto
(dagger) that stabbed him as Stylo Romanae Curiae, while Micanzio indicates the
involvement of Cardinal Borghese, the Pope's nephew.26
Nevertheless, it is of importance that the period of the Interdict as well as
the years following proved to be the most productive for the Servite. Besides the
pamphlets that presented the official line of the Republic, he composed the
History of the Interdict, which was intended to be included in Auguste de Thou's
History of his own times; the History of the Inquisition, requested by the Venetian
22 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 361.
23 Cf. Micanzio, Life, p. 87; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 358,362-3; Wootton, Paolo Sarpi,
p. 10. For more details on the crisis and Sarpi's involvement see below.
24 Micanzio, Life, pp. 85-6. Cf. also Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 362.
25 For the attempt against his life, and the warnings about a possible Papal-instigated assault, see
the vivid descriptions of Micanzio, Life, pp. 112-129.
26 Micanzio, Life, p. 126 and 118.
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Senate and completed in 1613; the History of Benefices, which remained
unpublished until after his death; and last but not least, the History of the Council
of Trent, completed in 1616.
The last work was one that had preoccupied him throughout his life.27
Micanzio stresses the length of time and amount of energy Sarpi devoted to
acquiring material relevant to the Tridentine Council, reiterating and
accentuating, in effect, Sarpi's similar claims at the beginning of his text.28 We
have already seen that other sources also attest to his life-long concern with the
Council: his personal contacts with surviving delegates, for instance, and his
own research of the Tridentine decrees. In like manner, his early friendship with
Camillo Olivo, and his association with du Ferrier, as well as his reforming
aspirations, all cultivated a growing fascination about that great conciliar
endeavour. Yet his interest seems to have become more topical with the
occasion of the Interdict, since, as Bouwsma noted, during the crisis the Papal
side repeatedly cited Trent against the defiant Venetians. Appropriately, there is
evidence that within a year of the issuing of the Papal censures Sarpi was
systematically collecting information about the Council,29 while a letter of the
27 Cozzi, Opere, p. 731.
28 Paolo Sarpi, The History of the Council ofTrent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John Bill, 1629);
p. 1 [henceforth referred to as History]. All the references are from the second English edition of
the text, that, interestingly incorporates some fascinatingmaterial. It refers to the alleged
supremacy of the Pope (Epistle of Pope Gregory VII to the Emperor Mauricius) and with
extracts from Guicciardini's History ofItaly touches upon the historical origins of the Papacy and
its temporal aspirations. There are also included some letters from French Ambassador to Trent;
epistle of Bishop of Five Churches to the Emperor Maximilian II about the Communion of the
Cup and marriage of priests (issues deliberated and decided in Trent); a letter explaining the
refusal of England to send representatives to the Council - material, in other words, that serves
as complimentary as well as evidence to Sarpi's text. I have compared it with the Italian edition,
although scholars seem to agree that it is a faithful translation of the Italian edition.
29 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 569-70. Similarly, there is evidence that in France, the
traditional practice of collecting official documents bearing on church-state relations gained
momentum after 1594; Jotham Parsons, The Church in the Republic. Gallicanism and Political
Ideology in Renaissance France. (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2004), p. 130.
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papal Nuncio in Venice some years later (1609) gives evidence of Sarpi's
research:
He studies much and, it is said, is writing a book about the authority of the supreme
Roman pontiff with the idea of having it printed abroad... 30
Sarpi indeed continued writing and working long after the Interdict, publishing
his works abroad, for the most part. In this context, there is further information
that may suggest his involvement in a greater behind-the-scenes anti-Papal
plan, trying to create a general alliance of states with similar disposition towards
the Curia, such as the British Isles and the Low Countries. The general plan was
that there would be an invasion of the Italian peninsula with the ultimate aim an
attack on the Papacy. In this direction, he was in communication with a number
of key Protestant figures, the most prominent of whom, and the one with the
most energetic part to play, was Sir Henry Wotton (1568-1639), three times
English Ambassador to Venice (1604-10,1616-19,1621-3).31 It was in this context
that an attempt to introduce the reformed religion into Venice came about, with
the involvement of Giovanni Diodati, the 'Protestant Pope'. The whole
endeavour did not have the desired effect, partly because of Sarpi's reluctance to
commit to something so radical.32 Against this background, however,
accusations about Sarpi's (crypto) Protestantism become much more intelligible
- of which, more in due course. Nevertheless, none of this series of intense
activities would have occurred had it not been for the Interdict. It was this
critical event that gave Sarpi a platform to present his views and gave him the
possibility of putting them into practice and bringing about a diminution of
Papal power. The close link between the friar's entry into the active political life,
30 Cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 494.
31 For Wooton's role see Pearsall-Smith in Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. I, pp. 80-92;
Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 492-4; and Gerald Curzon, Wotton and His Worlds. Spying,
Science and Venetian Intrigues. (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2003), pp. 117-44.
32 For the attempt, see for instance Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 99-104; Life and Letters ofSir Henry
Wotton, vol. I, pp. 86-98; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 505,528-9.
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and the creativity that this spurred in him, necessitates, therefore, a closer
inspection of the events of 1606-7 and the associated rhetoric from the
confronting sides.
ii. Sarpi and the Interdict
As seen above, Sarpi's most prolific period corresponded with what he
perceived as his transition from the vita contemplation to the vita activa. Even
though he was gradually marginalised after the Interdict, these were the years
during which he produced all of his significant works. The correlation, thus,
between issues and arguments raised by the Consigliere di stato during the
Veneto-Roman conflict and the views articulated in his works not immediately
associated with the Interdict, should not be surprising. This section, in
consequence, will give some details on the confrontation between Venice and
the Curia and the principal positions of the two parties. Itwill then focus on
some of Sarpi's utterances during the Interdict clash, which will serve, in turn,
as an appropriate context in which to situate or juxtapose the issues expressed in
the History of the Council ofTrent.
As David Wootton has very astutely remarked, there was nothing novel
about the causes of the Venetian Interdict: the Republic's rhetoric of sovereignty
and independence in the management of ecclesiastical affairs had long been the
object of the Papacy's discontent.33 That Venice's position appeared as an
33 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 48. The following account of the Interdict crisis is primarily based on
Bouwsma's study, as this is still the most comprehensive discussion, esp. pp. 339-416. See,
however, also Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 48-76; the articles by A.D. Wright, 'Why the Venetian
Interdict?', English Historical Review 89 (1974), pp. 534-550; idem, 'The Venetian view of Church
and State: Catholic Erastianism?', Studi Secenteschi 19 (1978), pp. 75-106; and 'Republican
Tradition and the Maintenance of 'National' Religious Traditions in Venice', Renaissance Studies
10 (1996), pp. 405-416; see also the relevant letters by Wotton in Life and Letters ofSir Henry
Wottoh, vol. I, pp. 340-392; Calendar ofState Papers: Venetian, (London, 1864-1947), vols. X-XI;
Francis Oakley's 'Complexities of Context: Gerson, Bellarmine, Sarpi, Richer, and the Venetian
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obstacle to Papal policies in the Italian peninsula, was evidenced by the fact that
censures against the Serenissima had occurred twice before in the past, first
under Sixtus IV (1482) and later by Julius II (1509). The reasons alleged,
however, at the beginning of the seventeenth century were of a somewhat
different nature. The explanation of the two Papal briefs delivered to the College
by the Nuncio on Christmas Day 1605 referred to issues of Church property
rights and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.34 The Bull of Interdict and
Excommunication of Paul V (Borghese, 1605-21) was finally issued on the 17th of
April 1606, to which the Serenissima responded with an edict pronouncing the
Bull to be null and void; the Venetian edict further instructed the clergy to
disregard the Papal Bull and continue to perform their pastoral duties, or be
expelled.35Within the ensuing months it became quite clear that the situation
had reached an impasse, as neither party would concede. The stalemate was
only resolved with the mediation of France, through Cardinal Joyeusse (1562-
1615). The Papal interdicts were removed and Venice revoked the relevant edict;
the laws, however, that had led to the Interdict in the first place, were not
withdrawn and the Republic did not publicly admit absolution from the Papal
excommunication.36
With regards to interpretations of the conflict, Bouwsma read into the
Venetian Interdict a wider importance - not unduly when seen, as has been
suggested by J.H.M. Salmon and Francis Oakley, in the context of a series of
contests between the Pope and temporal powers during the critical years of
Interdict of 1606-1607', Catholic Historical Review 82 (1996), pp. 369-396 is very good on the
ideological dimension.
34 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 339.
35 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 372-3. This edict also led to the famous expulsion of the
Jesuits from Venice; see ibid., pp. 374-75,384-87.
35 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 408,412-3.
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1605-1620.37 More particularly, Bouwsma saw in the Venetian crisis of 1606-7 a
reflection of the resurgence of the Papal claims to interference in temporal
affairs, associated with the rhetoric of 'indirect power', vigorously pronounced
in the writings of Cardinal Bellarmine.38 He particularly linked this resurgence,
moreover, to the person of Pope Paul V, a Pope who 'ominously' named himself
after Gian Petro Caraffa, the formidable - and mad - Paul IV (1555-59).39 The
Interdict crisis attracted, indeed, a European-wide attention, coinciding, as it
did, with another major controversy, over King James VI of Scotland and I of
England's attempt to establish an Oath of Allegiance (1606-7). In the aftermath
of the Gunpowder Plot, the Pope's intervention was directed towards
discouraging Catholics from taking the prescribed Oath.40 This concurrence of
circumstances substantiates the idea that the two first decades of the
seventeenth century witnessed a tension in the relations between the Papacy
and lay rulers, especially when seen in connection with the assassination of
Henry IV in France (1610) and the controversy instigated in the French Estates
General over imposing an oath parallel to the Oath of Allegiance (1614). In fact,
Venice itself addressed a European audience during its struggle with the Pope,
in an attempt to attract support, and presented its case precisely within this
37 Salmon and Oakley have put their interpretations forth in a number of penetrating essays. See
for example J.H.M. Salmon, 'James I, the Oath of Allegiance, the Venetian Interdict, and the
reappearance of French Ultramontanism' in J.H.Burns (ed.), Cambridge History ofPolitical Thought
1450-1700, (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp. 247-53; also 'Gallicanism and Anglicanism in the Age of
Counter-Reformation' in idem, Renaissance and Revolt, Essays in the Intellectual and Social history of
Early Modern France (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), pp. 155-188; Francis Oakley,'Constance, Basel, and
the two Pisas: The Conciliarist Legacy in 16th and 17th cent. England, Annuarium Historiae
Conciliarum 26 (1994), pp. 87-118 and 'Complexities of Context'. Cf. also Parsons's remark that
there was a flood of publications on the liberties of the Gallican Church - an intimately related
subject - at the turn of the century; The Church in the Republic, p. 129.
38 Cf. John C. Murray, 'St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power', Theological Studies ix (1948),
pp. 491-535. For a more recent discussion on potestas indirecta see Harro Hopfl, Jesuit Political
Thought. The Society ofJesus and the State, c. 1540-1630. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 345-65.
39 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 347-9.
40 For a more detailed account on the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance and the arguments
employed, see below, Ch. Four.
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context: as one instance in the struggle between sovereign states and princes
and Papal claims for intervention in temporal affairs.41
It is hardly surprising, then, that the twelve or so months of the crisis
generated a deluge of pamphlet and other literature on the matter of
sovereignty and jurisdiction from the two conflicting sides, Venice and the
Papacy. The war of words, significantly, started with a publication by Sarpi. The
Servite published translations of two short treatises against the abuse of the
power of excommunication, originally composed by the famous theologian and
adherent of Conciliar theory, Jean Gerson (1363-1429). Sarpi's choice was
alarming enough for the Curia. By electing to publish a text from the Conciliar
and Gallican milieu, the Venetian skilfully situated the Republic's defence in a
long, rich and influential tradition that would invite support from a range of
interested parties - first and foremost, France.42 The seriousness of the threat
was met by the employment of Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine from the Papal
camp, one of the chief advocates of the Roman positions and, ironically, one of
Sarpi's close acquaintances, a person whom he highly respected.43
More specifically, of particular importance for our purposes is the set of
arguments that Sarpi employed in his struggle against Papal rhetoric. Two
questions arise as regards the extent to which his polemic was representative of
41 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 393-94 and 370.
42 The extent of Gallican assistance in the controversy can be exaggerated; the theologians of the
Sorbonne were somewhat reluctant, but jurists such as Jacques Leschassier and Louis Servin did
indeed publish on Venice's defence. With regards to Sarpi's immediate links, it seems that
doctors of the Sorbonne like Edmund Richer sent him through Priuli, the Venetian Ambassador
to France a list of works whose republication would have the desired effect. Richer himself
republished a treatise of Gerson on excommunication (Apologia pro Ecclesiae et Consilii Auctoritate
Adversus Joannis Gerso?iii, Doctoris Christiatiissimi, Obtrectatores, 1607), the same one that Sarpi
had translated into Italian the year before; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 399; Oakley,
'Complexities of Context', pp. 386-87.
43 Oakley, 'Complexities of Context', p. 372 and Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 395. In the
aforementioned article Oakley offers an insightful and thorough analysis of the significance of
Sarpi's choice for publication, the reaction that caused on the Papal side and Bellarmine's
subsequent response.
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Venetian policy. One refers to the discussion in the Introduction of the complex
relation between theory and practice. That Sarpi's proclamations about
ecclesiastical and temporal jurisdictions cannot be considered as descriptive of
actual Church-State relations in Venice is not ofmajor significance for this
study, as it focuses more on the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice model.44
The second problem, as to the degree that Sarpi's views can be associated with
the official state positions, is not pertinent in the following account, inasmuch as
we accept that his writings served Venetian interests and were indeed used as
part of the State's defence. We will thus assume a basic identification in the
cases presented by Sarpi and Venice. Besides, when Venetian policies towards
Rome changed after the end of the crisis, it should be recalled, the Republic was
quick to disassociate itself from Sarpi's positions.
The central line of reasoning of the Consigliere di stnto during the
confrontation was the basic assumption of the existence of two separate and
autonomous spheres, the temporal and the spiritual. This fundamental duality
was for him also reflected in terms of jurisdiction: the two authorities, the lay
44 There generally is an impression that Venice was one of the States that had succeeded in
keeping the Church under tight control. Cf. for example the introduction to the Life and Letters of
Sir Henry Wotton by Pearsall-Smith, pp. 77. Although the picture has somewhat changed in
recent years, in order for more rounded views to emerge, a great deal of research is still required
in the field. For illuminative discussions on the role of the Church and its relationwith the State
in Venice see Paolo Prodi, 'The Structure and Organisation of the Church in Renaissance Venice:
Suggestions for Research', in J.R. Hale (ed.) Renaissance Venice (London: Faber, 1973), pp. 409-30;
Wright, 'The Venetian view of Church and State: Catholic Erastianism?', and idem, 'Republican
Tradition and the Maintenance of 'National' Religious Traditions in Venice'; Michael A. Mullett
has some interesting points about Catholicism and Venetian identity in his The Catholic
Reformation (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 145-8; among more general articles
the following are very useful: Roberto Bizzochi, 'Church, Religion and State in the Early Modern
Period', The Journal ofModern History 67 (Dec. 1995), pp. 152-165; Eric Cochrane, 'New Light on
Post-Tridentine Italy: A Note on Recent Counter-Reformation Scholarship', Catholic Historical
Review 56 (1970-71), pp. 291-319; William Hudon, 'Religion and Society in Early Modern Italy:
Old Questions, New Insights', American Historical Review 101 (1996), 783-804; John Jeffries
Martin, 'Religion, Renewal and Reform in the Sixteenth-Century' in John A.Marino (ed.), Early
Modern Italy, 1550-1796. (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2002).
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and the ecclesiastical could not, and ought not, to interfere in the province of the
other.45
God has instituted two governments in the world, one spiritual and one temporal, each
of them supreme and independent from the other. One of these is the ecclesiastical
ministry, the other is the political governance. He has given the spiritual to the care of
the prelates, the temporal to the princes ... Therefore where the salvation of souls is
involved all men, including princes, are subject to the ecclesiastics; but where public
tranquillity and civil life are involved all men, including ecclesiastics, are subject to the
prince.46
On the basis of this principle, the Roman attack signified for Sarpi a breach of
the spiritual limits: the legislation for which Venice was reprimanded was of a
temporal nature, and Rome's interference was an infringement upon the
Republic's sovereignty.47 From Sarpi's (and the Republic's) standpoint, the
clergy was for the sake of public benefit equally obliged to abide by laws of the
secular authority. The particular argument employed by the State that
maintained the theory of dual authority had a long tradition. Frequently utilised
in the middle Ages during the Caesaro-Papal struggles, it was alternatively put
forth by the weaker side, with the objective of establishing limitations to the
powers and area of influence of the rival party. Originally constructed in a way
as to contest the hierocratic way of thinking, it served as defence of the temporal
jurisdiction. The core of the theocratic theory was the concept of unity in earthly
and divine matters; there was not and could not be any separation between
them, since temporal things existed for a spiritual end. For the Papal advocates
the denominations of temporal and spiritual power merely described
jurisdiction granted by the Pope to laymen and clerics respectively; they did not
signify the existence of two powers, but that there is a potestas duplex 48 The
45 Cf. Sarpi's consulto of 1611, as cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 490.
46 Sarpi, from a consulto of 1608; cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 540.
47 Cf. Venice and the Defense, p. 400.
48 Ironically, of course, the Papal idea itself had developed as a response to Imperial divine-right
theories, and had only switched to the offensive during the years of Gregory VII. For very
elaborate and penetrating discussions on these issues see Michael Wilks, The Problem of
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persistence of this rhetoric up until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is
evidenced by the appearance of reformulations in writings by Vitoria (c. 1483-
1543), Suarez (1548-1617), and Bellarmine, among others.49 The latter was one of
the staunchest advocators of the theory of the Pope's indirect power; according
to his version, the Pontiff had the prerogative deriving from his spiritual
authority to intervene in temporal things on occasions, for the advancement of
spiritual good.50 More to the point, the persistence of this rhetoric is important
for us because it appears in the arguments used by the Papal side during the
Venetian Interdict.51
Two things were principally questioned from the Venetian side: the
precedence of spiritual power over temporal concerns, and the authority of the
Pope. The two points are important. That lay jurisdiction (or politics in general)
has a separate and autonomous existence from the spiritual and ecclesiastical
sphere, was one of the Republic's firmest positions. It was a stance, moreover,
that could find validation in the famous words of Christ 'Render unto Caesar
what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's' and 'My Kingdom is not of this
world'.52 The second dictum was, in fact, printed as a frontispiece in Sarpi's
response to Bellarmine,53 while both mottos appeared in the famous procession
Sovereignty in the LaterMiddle Ages. The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the
Publicists. (Cambridge: CUP, 1963), chs. 1&2; and Walter Ullmann, Principles ofGovernment and
Politics in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen & Co, 1961), parts I&II.
49 Cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundatio?is ofModern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP,
1978); vol. II, pp. 174-5.
50 Thus in the De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Rebus Temporalibus, 'the Pope as Pope directly and
immediately has no temporal power but only a spiritual power; nevertheless by reason of his
spiritual power he has at least indirectly a power in temporal things, which is a supreme power
(eamque supremam)'; cited in Murray, 'Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power', p. 496.
51 Cf. Bouwsma's insightful analysis of the 'problem of order' in Venice and the Defense, pp. 420-3.
Cf. Bovio:, Giovanni Antonio, Risposta alle considerationi del P. Maestro Paolo de Venetia (Rome,
1606); cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 424.
52 John, 18:36 and Matthew 22:21 respectively; cf. also Mark, 12:17.
53 Apologia per le Oppositioni Fatte dall' Illustrissimo, & Reuerndissimo Signor Cardinale Bellarminio
alii Trattati, et Risolvtioni di Gio. Gersone sopra la Validita delle Scommuniche (Venice, 1606); the
frontispiece is also reproduced inWootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 12.
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of the Corpus Christi of 1606 that had been converted into a powerful public
statement on behalf of Venice.54 With the assertion that God's kingdom
belonged to a different world, it followed that the holders of spiritual office did
not have any jurisdiction within this world; their function ought to be severely
limited to 'spiritual things, that is administration of the Sacraments,
indulgences, masses, divine offices and burials'.55 This world was to be
managed by lay rulers, whose end was temporal peace and public benefit. This
view amounted to a claim for an independent existence of politics, in direct
contrast to the assertion that all types of earthly government were included in
'the City of God, which is the Church Universal'. Bellarmine's inherent
conclusion was, thus, that the aims of politics were inferior to the spiritual.56 The
same case was eloquently made by Bovio (Giovanni Antonio, c. 1560-1622) in
the following useful extract:
Politics and religion cannot rule in distinct countries separated by mountains, rivers, or
other boundaries; because every community of men, like every man in himself, being
made by God and subject to him, must have within itself religion, with which it renders
to God due tribute of worship and adoration. ... Now we see which of the two must be
subordinated to the other. Politics undertakes to procure the felicity of this earthly life,
religion that of celestial life. Politics ordains the whole body of the republic under an
earthly prince, religion orders both the entire republic and its head under the supreme
Head and Lord God. Politics rules and governs earthly things, religion directs them to
the eternal. Politics is occupied for the most part with what pertains to the body and to
corporal things, religion with that which concerns the salvation of souls. Who does not
see clearly, therefore, that just as man is subject to God and the body to the soul, and just
as this life is ordained as the way to the heavenly fatherland and these earthly things as a
stairway to celestial, so politics is subject and subordinate to religion, and the prince and
temporal government to the head of religion and of the church? 57
54 In the procession, there was a series of representations which dramatised the Venetian cause
against the Pope; the congregations of the secular priests, most of the orders of the regulars and
the scuole grandi participated, the latter contributing numerous tableaux bearing scenes and
mottos that proclaimed the distinctions between sacred and secular authority. Cf. Wotton, Life
and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. I, p. 350, Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 389-90 and
Edward Muir, 'Images of Power: Art and Pageantry in Renaissance Venice', American Historical
Review 84 (1979); pp. 48-9.
55 Sarpi, from a Consulto of 1615; cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 542.
56 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 427.
57 Bovio, Lettera al R. P. M. Paolo Rocca nella quale si Discorre sopra a due Lettere del Doge e Senato di
Vinetia al Clero e Populo del suo Stato et sopra a due altre Scritture intorno alia Validitd delle Censure da
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Rome's view of government of temporal things as inferior and corrupt -
very much corresponding to Lipsius' analysis of political life - was expressed in
the accusation made against Venice as a state adherent to the base rule of ragione
di stato that disregarded the superior divine principles.58 Sarpi himself was
equally warned that he would be held to account in heaven for having
'abandoned God for the world, the cloister for the court, and religion for
politics'.59
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Venetians insisted on the idea of
two separate and autonomous spheres of equal significance, maintaining that a
distinct set of rules was applicable to politics. This is analogous to Lipsius again.
His notion of prudence as we saw it developed in the previous chapter, meant
that practicality and flexibility had to be the chief attitudes in political affairs.
Equally, in the face of Papal criticisms of corrupting politics, the Republic and
Sarpi in particular, charged Rome with quite the opposite: he accused the Curia
of debasing religion. Sarpi avowed that over the centuries the Papacy had
degenerated into an institution only concerned with mundane things, such as
temporal gains, and that the interdiction against the Serenissima was a prime
example of this attitude, since Venice could be perceived as an obstacle to the
temporal supremacy of the Pope. Instead of working towards superior spiritual
ends, the heirs of St. Peter had abused their power for profit:
Thus he [the Pope] has renounced all the offices that Christ gave to St. Peter: to preach,
to teach, to minister the sacraments, to feed the flock of Christ; and he has transformed
Papa Paolo V pubblicate contra li Signori Venitiani (Milan, 1606); cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the
Defense, pp. 427-8.
58 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 445. Cf. 'reason of state certainly depends originally on
religion, not religion on it; and therefore the principate ought to serve religion, not religion the
principate' Ventura Venturi, Delia Maiesta Pontificia Parte Prima. Nell'Occasione, del Giusto
Risentitnento, fatto dalla Santita di N. S. Paolo qninto, verso la Republica di Venetia (Siena, 1607); cited
in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 446.
59 Cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 363. Cf. also how Sarpi records Papalist
arguments in the History, pp. 27, 696-7.
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this pastoral office into a fiscality etc. as though the glory of God did not consist in the
salvation of souls and internal goodness but only in these external things. 60
It is essential to recognise the deep historical perspective that Sarpi had
developed in understanding the circumstances of his world, a sign of which are
the several titles of Histories he composed. The Venetian traced the answer to
the decline and corrosion of the Church in the past; he more specifically situated
the beginnings of it in the separation of the Western and Eastern parts of the
Empire, with the Papacy's assumption of control of the fractured Italian
peninsula over the fifth to the eighth centuries.61 Set against the background of
the early Christianity, all Papal claims for supremacy were nothing more than
usurpations that occurred at a particularly difficult time in the past. Within this
interpretation, the spiritual censure of the excommunication against princes was
one of a number of Papal abuses of power, just as interdiction had no precedent
in the primitive church.62 The distancing between clergy and laity, equally, and
the exclusion of the latter from the all-encompassing name of the Ecclesia or
congregation of the faithful were for Sarpi entirely unacceptable and
unfounded.63 Furthermore, Sarpi - as many other Catholics of his age -
contended that the question of the Pope's unrestrained and tyrannical rule of
60 Cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defence, p. 460.
61 Significantly, Prof. Ullmann gives a similar account of the development of the Western Church
- in contrast to the Eastern - in his Principles ofGovernment, pp. 110-14. He suggests that in the
East, due to a long history and tradition of politics, there existed a historical conception of
Empire, within which the Church was merely a department, and the Emperor was the head. The
Church, as a result, 'could not only not take action against its head, but was also dependent on
him.' In the West, due to absence of similar political tradition, the Church was wholly
independent of any king or emperor; theWestern respnblica Christiana was an ecclesiological
unit. In adopting a historical view that reached back to the early Christianity and the Emperor
Constantine, thus, Sarpi gave primacy to the political - as opposed to the Western/Papal point
of view that 'did not and could not rest on history, but on the a-historical consideration of the
primacy of the Pope through the medium of the Petrine commission'.
62 In his consulto of 28 Jan 1606 Sarpi supported that interdiction had no precedent in the
primitive church but was of relatively recent origin; cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defetise, p.
369.
63 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 454. Cf. History, p. 250.
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the institution of the Church, without Conciliar check, and by extension the
question of Pope's superiority over the Council were not in any way settled.64 In
this respect, the History of the Council ofTrent, our specific concern here, can be
placed within a wider perspective. For Bouwsma, it marked the transition
between an idyllic and pure past of the early Church, described by Sarpi in the
History ofBenefices, and the contemporary decay, evidenced by the Interdict and
its History.65 What is important for our analysis, is that Sarpi placed the crux of
the problem in the assumption by the Church of authorities that were properly
under the lay jurisdiction. Fie criticised, namely, the breaching of the limits
between the two domains, the profane and the sacred.
Having discussed the close association between Sarpi's entrance into the
active world of politics, the positions he advanced as the official adviser on
theological matters during the Interdict dispute and his greater historical
perspective, it is time to consider the work that furnishes our main interest, the
History of the Council ofTrent. To start with, it is important to have some
understanding of the circumstances surrounding its publication in London in
1619.
64 Cf. Oakley, 'Complexities of Context', pp. 379 and 385, 389-91; Bouwsma, Venice and the
Defense, p. 462; Jedin, however, disagrees: his view is that Conciliar theory, although not yet
vanished in the mid-16th century, was generally losing ground; he concedes, however, that the
general idea that any Church problems ought to be resolved within a Council had become
somewhat dominant: 'The struggle was not about Sacrosancta, but about Frequetis: in other
words, the great concern was not so much the question of the supremacy of the Council as the
holding of a Council there and then': Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council ofTrent, 2 vols., trans.
Dom Ernest Graf (Thomas Nelson and Sons: London, 1957-61); vol. I, ch. 2; quotation on p. 61.
65 Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, p. 580.
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II.
The History of the Council of Trent
i. Publication and Reception
The story of the publication of the work is germane within the subject
matter of this study, as it reflects the process through which ideas and concepts
travelled. It offers an indication, furthermore, of the broad and common interest
in certain specific notions, although during the process of their appropriation
these notions were modified according to the particular environment and
context in which they were received. The first publication of the History of the
Council ofTrent in London in 1619 opens a wide range of perspectives in our
understanding of the framework of the circulation of ideas, as it is a tale almost
as fascinating as the work itself.66 Publishing anonymously and abroad was a
common practice after the establishment of the Index of prohibited books, and
was carried out particularly in the case of dangerous books that would bring the
wrath of Rome.67 As we have seen, Sarpi was already Rome's target; having
been marginalised, moreover, by the Venetian state, after the end of the
Interdict, he would have felt safer to publish abroad.68
Thus the first edition of the History in Italian came from a printer to King
James VI and I and had the royal coat-of-arms on the title page. The author was
named as Pietro Soave Polano an anagram of Paolo Sarpio, Veneto and the
66 For the story of the publication see Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, pp. 39-53; and Frances A. Yates,
'Paolo Sarpi's History of the Council of Trent', Journal ofWarburg and Courtauld Institutes 7
(1944), pp. 129-31; Cozzi, Opere, pp. 721-731.
67 Although Rome had already published two Indices, one in 1557 and one in 1559, it was only
after the Council of Trent that a formal decision was taken to establish the Index Librorum
Prohibitorum (1564). See Index des Livres Interdits, vol. VIII: Index de Rome, 1557,1559,1564, pp. 25-
108.
68 Cf. for example the case of Leon Modena, a Venetian Jew (1571-1648) whose Historia de'Riti
Hebraici (written 1614-15), was published in Paris in 1637, with great anxiety by its author; Marc
R. Cohen (ed.), The Autobiograpgy of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton UP, 1988), pp. 11-12 and 29. With regard to Sarpi, note that besides the pamphlets
directly linked to the Interdict crisis, Sarpi's works were either intended for publication abroad,
or came out posthumously.
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dedication was to King James I, signed by Marco Antonio de Dominis,
Archbishop of Spalato (1560-1624).69 Tire association of the name of Sarpi with
De Dominis is particularly worthy of note, because it gives us an idea about the
reception of Sarpi's work in the British Isles. De Dominis was known for his
anti-papal convictions/0 but was mostly famous for his flight to England, in
1616, where he converted to Anglicanism. His migration, for which he quoted
his 'quest for truth' and 'distaste against the corruptions of Rome', had caused a
sensation among his contemporaries.71 He also seems to have had a keen
interest in the reconciliation of the Eastern and Western Churches, and of the
Protestant and Catholic ones. This was partly the subject of his massive, three-
volume work, De Republica Ecclesiastica (London and Edinburgh, 1617-22). It was
thought for some time that de Dominis was the person who secured the copy of
the History directly from Sarpi himself, and brought itwith him to England; this
hypothesis had been founded in the somewhat ambiguous phrasing of the
dedicatory epistle, signed by De Dominis.72 After meticulous research, however,
it has been established by the work of Frances Yates and Gaetano Cozzi that De
Dominis' involvement amounted to nothing more than the final editing of the
text. The protagonists involved in acquiring and publishing the manuscript
were, in fact, none other than King James himself and George Abbot,
69 For De Dominis, see Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. I, pp. 149-50; W.B. Patterson's
article in the H. C. G. Matthew and B. Harrison (eds.) Oxford Dictionary ofNational Biography
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004); also idem, King James VI and I and the Reunion ofChristendom
(Cambridge: CUP, 1997), pp. 220-259. Lievsay stresses the contrast between the personalities of
Sarpi and De Dominis; see Venetian Phoenix, pp. 27 and 33-4.
70 De Dominis had, in fact, taken part in the Interdict Controversy, with two (anonymous) books,
on the side of Venice. (Patterson, King James VI and I, pp.226-7). Among his other works, were
Papatvs Romanvs (1617) and The Rockes ofChristian Shipwracke (1618), both anti-papal. He also
contributed to the controversy over Arminianism, by writing to the Synod of Dort (1618-9). He
eventually returned to Rome, where he was arrested as heretic and died while in prison.
71 From his book Concilium Profectionis (or A Manifestation of the Motives); cited in Lievsay,
Venetian Phoenix, p. 30.
72 See the text in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, pp. 40-1.
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Archbishop of Canterbury.73 The Archbishop of Spalato, however, as the person
who added the epistle to the reader and also an aggressive subtitle - echoed in
the English translation - furnished the work with an overtly polemical tone not
really matching the subtlety of Sarpi's style of writing.74
Evidence for whatmay have happened in actuality is provided in the
dedicatory epistle to Archbishop Abbot in the first English edition. Nathaniel
Brent, an ecclesiastical lawyer and the scholar who translated the work, writes:
This book I have translated out of Italian into our vulgar language, presuming to
commend it to the royal protection of his sacred Majestie, for whose sake (as some
reasons induce me to beleeve) it was principally composed. And because I undertooke
this worke at your Graces command, who have beene the chiefest cause why the
originall crossed the Seas before the just nativitie of it, and saw the first light within his
Majesties dominions... 75
A similar view is found in Izaak Walton's Life ofWotton, first published in
1651,76 but the most conclusive evidence for the involvement of Archbishop
Abbot has been located in some letters of Basil Brent, Nathaniel Brent's son,
published in 1705. These show that Brent was in Venice during 1618, at the
Archbishop's request, in order to secure the text, which he smuggled back to
England with the assistance of a network of Dutch merchants, in several
instalments.77 It seems, moreover, that Brent was sent to Italy by the
Archbishop, under order from the King, for the specific purpose of securing a
transcription of Sarpi's manuscript of the History.
73 Cozzi, Opere, p. 729.
74 In which (Besides the Ordinarie Actes of the Councell) are DeclaredMany Notable Occurences, which
Happened in Christendome, During the Space ofFourtie Yeeres and More. And Particularly, the
Practises of the Court ofRome, to Hinder the Reformation of their Errors, and to Maintaine their
Greatnesse. For Sarpi's style, see below.
75 Cited in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 44. For Nathaniel Brent (1573/4-1652) see the relevant
article by A. J. Hegarty in the Oxford Dictionary ofNational Biography; apart from Archbishop
Abbot, he had close connections with Sir Dudley Carleton, with whom Lievsay suggests he was
related.
76 See Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 45.
77 See also the relevant letters Basil Brent (son of Nathaniel), and the correspondence between
Abbott and Brent, while the latter was in Venice, as cited in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 47
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James VI and I's involvement is especially notable. The King's awareness
of the composition of the work and his specific interest in its contents in terms of
his own policies, are clear from the following letter, sent to him by Sir Henry
Wotton, the English ambassador in Venice:
The book of Maestro Paolo touching the Council of Trent is newly finished. It containeth
many rare things never discovered before, and surely be of much benefit to the Christian
Church, if it may be published both in Italian and in Latin. Whereunto the author, upon
your Majesty's persuasion, doth well incline; but I have not yet received his full
resolution which he will take about his own person.78
The value of Sarpi to James's political stance is further witnessed by the earlier
invitation to the Venetian by the Stuart King in 1612, transmitted through Sir
Dudley Carleton, to make his home in England.79 This was, of course, consistent
with the widely acknowledged policy of James of offering patronage to fugitive
intellectual figures who also suited his greater plans; thinkers of the likes of
Isaac Casaubon and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), advocates of ideas of religious
reconciliation, had been entertained and found shelter at his Court.80 The
suggestion for James's crucial involvement is further confirmed by another
letter ofWotton, sent in June 1619. In the letter,Wotton reports to his King that
he has been telling the German princes:
of a discourse that was ready to come abroad, wherein should be discovered by a great
intelligent man ... all the practices of the Council of Trent, out of the original registers
and secret papers; wherein your Majesty had a hand for the benefit of the Christian
world.81
Various interpretations have also been offered on the question of who
provided the inspiration for Sarpi's undertaking of the work. In this vein,
Professor Cozzi suggested that it was Sir Dudley Carleton who convinced Sarpi
78 The letter dates from 1616; Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. II, p. 100.
79 Eugenia Levi, 'King James I. and Fra Paolo Sarpi in the Year 1612', The Athenaeum, no. 3689
(July 9,1898), pp. 66-7; also Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. I, p. 151.
80 See Patterson, James VI and I, chapter 4; M. Simon, 'Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et l'Eglise
d'Angleterre' in Aspects de VAnglicanisme: Colloque de Strasbourg 14-16 juin, 1972 (Paris, 1974), pp.
39-66.
81 Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. II, p. 178.
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to publish the work as a history, instead of his original idea of a collection of
relevant documents. Carleton, a staunch Calvinist and thus an opponent to
conciliatory positions, was accordingly keen to expose the Council of Trent in an
unfavourable manner. The trigger for Sarpi, according to Cozzi, was a book by
Carleton's cousin, Consensus Ecclesiae Catholicae Contra Tridentinos, which the
English Ambassador presented to him.82 True or not, the detail about Carleton
illustrates perfectly the employment of one work for a range of purposes: in
contrast to James's embracing of Sarpi's work for eirenicist reasons, Carleton
promoted it for the exact opposite. Despite their conflicting starting points,
however, both parties agreed about its strongly anti-papal character, which
corresponded well with the more general outlook of the whole of the British
Isles. Across the Channel, the comments by the French (Catholic) scholar
Peiresc, who was alert to the different readings to which the text could be
subjected, give an indication of the reception of the History. He complained that
the preface, signed by De Dominis, threatened to discredit a great work in the
eyes of those 'who are not of his opinion'. Similarly, the preface would prevent
the History from making its way into the hands of Roman Catholics and even
Italy; 83 indeed, the work was placed under the Index almost immediately.84
Above all, what the above reactions to the publication indicate is the richness in
substance and scope of the History; Sarpi had composed a magisterial text of
astute criticism and of unsurpassable style that offered a great deal ofmaterial
to be used for various purposes - first and foremost, however, it constituted a
challenge to the official Roman version of the Council.
82 George Carleton, Consensus Ecclesiae Catholicae contra Tridentinos (London: John Bill, 1613). Cf.
also Eric Cochrane, Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance. (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 475; Cozzi, Opere, pp. 723-4; Simon, 'Isaac Casaubon,
Fra Paolo Sarpi et I'Eglise d'Angleterre'p. 58.
83 Cited in Patterson, King James VI and I, p. 248.
84 Decreed on the 18th of November 1619; Index des Livres Interdits, ed. J.M. Bujanda, vol. XI:
Index Librorum Prohibitorum 1600-1966, p. 807.
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ii. The History of the Council of Trent: Style and Method
Sarpi was convinced that his challenge was warranted: the Acts of Trent had not
been published for everyone to see what had transpired in that Synod, and
various sides had particular reservations about the way matters were handled in
the Council.85 Sarpi, who was more than anyone else a committed opponent of
Rome, and had faced the real implications of the outcome of Trentwith the
Papal assertions of temporal supremacy, would not let the 'deceit' about the
proceedings continue for any longer. His text was thus an exposition of the 'real'
and 'definitive' version of the story of Trent. Sarpi's declaration at the beginning
of his History is plain enough in maintaining this: 'My purpose is to write the
History of the Council ofTrent'. He justified his undertaking by asserting there
had not appeared so far a study that adequately related the causes and the
events of the Council.
I wil relate the causes and managings of an Ecclesiasticall Conuocation, by some, for
diuers ends, and by diuers meanes procured and hastened, by some hindered and
deferred for the space of 22. yeeres: and for 18. yeeres more, sometimes assembled,
sometimes dissolued, alwayes celebrated with diuers intentions, and which hath gotten
a forme and conclusion contrary altogether to the deseigne of them that procured it, and
to the feare of those, that with all diligence disturbed it; a cleere instruction for vs to
referre our selues to God, and not to trust in the wisedome of man.86
Sarpi thus dissects the history of the Council for the reader. He narrates the
twofold story of what for him was the 'catastrophe' of the Council; the failure of
the reform movement at Trent was in his view directly linked with the
controversy and the conflict that dominated the whole undertaking, the
corruption and the behind-the-scenes intrigue, all of which he compellingly
exposes.
For this Council desired and procured by godly men, to reunite the Church which began
to be diuided, hath so established the Schisme, and made the parties so obstinate, that
85 Cf. History, p. 136. For an outline of the History's subjectmatter, see Appendix VI.
86 History, p. 1.
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the discords are become irreconciliable: and being managed by Princes for reformation
of Ecclesiasticall discipline, hath caused the greatest deformation that euer was since
Christianity did begin... and hoped for by the bishops .... 87
The above extracts give a clear indication of Sarpi's distinctive method and style
of writing. As both these features impress mostly upon the reader, they deserve
at least a cursory reference in this examination of the work. Assessing them will
also facilitate two other tasks. Itwill contribute, first, to our understanding of a
work as complex as the History is, and the intentions of the author. Second, an
analysis of Sarpi's approach will add substance to the idea set out in the
Introduction, that political and religious ideas during the period under
consideration were developed not only in what would be classified as religious
or political treatises, but in a variety of tracts. Equally important, in this context,
is Eric Cochrane's observation that Sarpi's History stands some halfway between
sacred and profane history.88 This is consistentwith the scope and the basic
assumptions of this thesis, as Sarpi's text represents a combination of two
languages, the theological and the humanistic. It is also a detail that is further
symptomatic of the process of the delineation of disciplines and redefinition of
basic concepts such as sacred and profane or divine and temporal and of the
resultant fluidity of such notions. This section of the chapter, therefore, intends
to consider the author's alleged sources, the particular method he used in
approaching the topic and the style in which he presented it to his audience.
That the Council of Trent was a life-long preoccupation for Sarpi has
been referred to already, yet Sarpi was also eager to publicise his early interest
in the proceedings of the Council to his readers:
For my selfe, so soone as I had vnderstanding of the affaires of the world, I became
exceeding curious to know the whole proceedings thereof [the Council]: and after I had
diligently read whatsoeuer I found written, and the publique instructions, whether
printed or diuulged by pen, I betooke my selfe, without sparing either paines or care, to
search in the remainder of the writings of the Prelates, and others who were present in
87 History, p. 2
88 Cf. Cochrane, Historians and Historiography, pp. 472, and 477-8.
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the Councel, the Records which they left behinde them, and the Suffrages or opinions
deliuered in publique, preserued by the Authors themselues, or by others, and the
Letters of aduice written from that Citie; whereby I haue had the favour to see euen a
whole register of Notes and Letters of those persons, who had a great part in those
negotiations. Hauing therefore collected so many things as may minister vnto me
sufficient matter for a narration of the progresse, I am resolued to set it downe in order.
89
In terms of actual sources, we know that Sarpi had personally met a number of
people who had taken part in the Council themselves and examined their
memoranda, notes and so forth. His acquaintance with Camillo Olivio, for
instance, the secretary to the Legate Cervini (1501-55, later Pope Marcellus II),
provided him with some valuable material from the latter. Sarpi had also met
with Cardinal Castagna in Rome, who had taken part in the second phase of the
Council as the president of various commissions. He also had at his disposal the
letters of Cardinal del Monte (Giovanni Maria del Monte, later Pope Julius III,
1550-5) one of the Papal Legates, while he was aware of the correspondence of
Arnaud du Ferrier, the French Ambassador to the Council, with whom he was
in communication.90 The reliability of his sources, however, and the way he
used them, is harder to verify. Historians are in accord that Sarpi's composition
includes some degree of his own inventiveness: in the manner of ancient
historians, he would generally fill any gaps in the information he had, and put
arguments and orations into the mouth of the assembled dignitaries.91 The
extent to which he has manipulated his material is, nonetheless, difficult to
ascertain, as not all of the notes at his disposal have survived.
Yet the most significant aspect of Sarpi's History from our point of view is
not so much its accuracy, but the fact that it is a work that divides its attention
equally between the 'political' and the religious sides of dealings relating to the
89 History, p. 1.
90 See below for Sarpi's claims on his sources within the text of the History itself.
91 Jedin, History of the Council ofTrent II, pp. 518-20.
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Council.92 Hence, even though the author's intention was to compose the history
of the Council, the analysis of the developments outside Trent - both before as
well as during the Council - was for him of equal importance. This consideration
should be taken as a reflection of his understanding of the dynamics of the
Council as largely associated with the outside political factors, while it should
serve, at the same time, as a direction in any attempt to review Sarpi's
interpretation. The originality of his method has been described as an
'incorporation of sacred history into humanist history' or as an application of
'humanist historiographical standards to sacred history'.93 This approach,
however, should be seen against the perspective of the author's position; it is no
coincidence that this work was the product of a person deeply involved in both
spheres of life and learning, the sacred and the profane. Sarpi's theological
training and his place as a member of the Servite order were combined with an
excellent humanist education and a significant involvement in 'active' political
life, all of which are aspects incorporated in his pronounced title as official
'state-theologian'. Whereas Charron and Lipsius composed distinct works on
the different domains of the sacred and profane (public and private), divine and
temporal, Sarpi managed to integrate the two into a single undertaking.
The History is a problem-centred work; it seeks to answer the question of
what the reasons were for the failure, according to the author's view, of the
Council of Trent to reconcile the divisions of Christendom and reform the
abuses of the Church. It is with this task at hand that Sarpi narrates the causes
and proceedings of the Council. It can be surmised that Sarpi's intention was to
present to the world the perspective of the side that had, in fact, lost in the
Council. Sarpi was acutely aware that the defeated side in the Council was
92 At a rough estimation Sarpi devotes four of the eight books in purely theological discussions
and the other four in the political developments surrounding the Council.
93 Cf. Cochrane, Historians and Historiography, p. 476.
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made up of a consortium of forces - the temporal princes, the bishops, the
Protestants, and ultimately, the Church, in the shape of the reforming elements
within the institution. Nonetheless, he was also conscious of the fact that these
otherwise disparate forces were strongly united by one common cause: their
anti-papal objectives. Sarpi, therefore, reveals in his work the part of the history
that was obscured by the triumph of the papal policies in the Council and
demonstrates, in this manner, that what by his time was regarded as (papal)
orthodoxy was just one version of the truth - one version of religion
(Christianity) and one form of perceiving relations between political and
ecclesiastical issues.94 It is thus important in understanding his interpretation to
underline the fact, that his recounting of political events and the circumstances
in the run-up, but also running parallel to the Council, do not form the
background of the discussions taking place in that small Italian town, but a vital
part of the author's understanding and analysis.
It is essential to stress Sarpi's competence as a narrator. Despite the
History's length and comprehensiveness, the author manages to maintain the
interest of the reader throughout the work. In order to achieve this, Sarpi has
magisterially imitated the technique of an ancient tragedy. That he treats his
subject as a drama or an epic is intimated in his description of the history of the
Council very early in the text as the 'Iliad' of his time.95 Accordingly, the story is
initially announced in the prelude, then the scene is set, and the plot is gradually
developed starting with the building up to the Council. The narrative reaches a
peak twice: the first time with the disappointment of the Protestant arrival
(Book Four), while the second time the climax is much more powerful with the
intensity of the discussions on the Communion of the Cup, residence and
94 Cf. Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain and the Papacy: Paolo Sarpi and the Renaissance Tradition' in E.
Cochrane (ed.) The Late Italian Renaissance. (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 353-376; on p. 356.
95 History, p. 2.
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episcopal jurisdiction (Books Six and Seven). The story finally reaches its closure
with Lorraine's involvement and the conclusion of the Council (Books Seven
and Eight).96 The dramatic effect, which has generally been overlooked by
scholars, is accentuated by Sarpi's intervention at every stage, preparing the
reader for what to expect, as is the announcement, for instance, of the
significance the issue of episcopal residence was going to assume at later stages
of the Council.97
Furthermore, the text's appeal lies in the fact that Sarpi emerges
throughout it as a very conscious and immediate writer. His appreciation that
he is addressing an interested audience is evident, as is his awareness that his
work will cause some reaction among the readers, and that his positions will be
put under scrutiny. As a result, although the History is on the whole a
straightforward narrative, he very animatedly diverts intermittently from the
pure sequence of events in order to speak directly to the reader. The aim and
function of these short intervals is different each time; they have the overall
effect, however, that they give the reader a greater sense of involvement in the
story. A number of times he refers to the practical problems he encountered in
the course of composing the text, and his choice ofmethod. In this context, he
occasionally excuses himself for all the details that he had to incorporate in the
text, reassuring the reader that all the particulars of his account are of some
importance:
Some that reade this relation may thinke it superfluous, because it containeth matter of
small weight: but, contrarily, the writer of the Storie hath thought it necessarie to make
knowne, from how small riuers, so great a lake, which possesseth all Europe, hath been
raised....98
96 Cf. History, p. 782. Cf. also Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 616-7.
97 Cf. the effect of 'proeconomia' (npooiKovopia) practised by ancient Greek authors, who
forewarned their audience of what was about to follow.
98 History, pp. 117-8. Some other examples are: History, pp. 90-1, 226; 583-4, and p. 633.
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Yet the most effective and important type of intervals are unquestionably
Sarpi's discussions on specific issues relevant to or debated in the Council. The
'discourses of the author' on a specific subject are explanatory passages of one to
two pages in length, usually preceding the narrative of the relevant topic. All
the crucial issues, thus, such as the role of the Councils throughout the ages and
the way in which decisions were made in them ('giving voices'), considerations
on Indulgences, monastic exemptions, residence, plurality of benefices,
episcopal jurisdiction, prohibition of books (Index), are treated by the author
under the guise of explaining to the reader the origin and development of the
problem." These discourses serve the task of identifying the topics thatmatter
most for the author and draw the readers' attention to them; they also reveal
what we can reasonably assume to be very close to - if not indeed Sarpi's own -
point of view on the specific subject.
Of additional interest is Sarpi's frequent allusion to his sources;
throughout the text he appears somewhat anxious to confirm their reliability.
Several short interludes, thus, are devoted to reassuring the reader that
everything in the text derives from material he had confidentially collected from
people personally involved in the Council.100 These confirmations add to the
general impression conveyed in the text, of the History as an impersonal,
rational and objective discourse. This impression is also advanced by Sarpi's
style ofwriting. In the History, the author moves between presenting aspects of
a fascinating subject in an engaging way, and exhaustive analyses and narration
of detail, that make at times for a dry and monotonous read. The History is a text
99 See the discourse of the author on Indulgences (History, p. 4); on the issue of 'giving voices'
(pp. 135-7); on residence (pp. 216-8); on exemptions (pp. 220-1); on benefices and their plurality
(pp. 250-1); on episcopal jurisdiction (pp. 330-3) on prohibition of books/ Index (pp. 472-3).
100 Here are also some examples: pp. 42,114. With regard to the Decree for the translation of the
Council, pp. 268,517, 706, 815.
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that demands the undisturbed attention of the reader.101 In this manner, it
presents itself as a scientific work that speaks to the reader's intellect, thus
distinguishing itself from works that sought to make an impact on emotion
through rhetoric.102 The author appears distant and wholly detached from the
proceedings, while his voice seems present only in order to recount the events.
As one is gradually immersed in the text, however, one becomes increasingly
aware of the author's personal input in the form of irony and sarcasm towards
incidents and protagonists of the story. Sarpi's expression of approval or
disapproval occurs in a very indirect manner, employing the method of an
'immensely complex Renaissance dialogue' as Bouwsma has described it.103
Thus, his voice is to be traced in a variety of arguments throughout the course of
the narrative, and more specifically, to the remarks from several groups of
people whom he suggestively names as 'men of understanding', 'godly and well
disposed men', or 'those of the wiser sort'.104 This type of commentary usually
follows statements primarily on the part of the Pope or the Emperor, the two
most powerful men upon whom the fate of the Council and reform depended.
Sarpi assesses the Tridentine decrees in a similar mode, by referring extensively
to how these were censured in Germany, the principal domain of opposition to
the manner in which the Council was conducted.105
Sarpi likewise influences the understanding of the reader, emphasising
what he regards as the most significant issues by announcing them, as it will be
101 Cf. Cochrane, Historians and Historiography, pp. 476-7, where he talks about the 'morass of
details' and the possibility that 'readers might be falling asleep' with them.
102 Cf. Bodin's description of a good historian as 'rid of all emotions': 'There are ... three kinds of
historian, I think: first, those very able by nature, and even more richly endowed by training,
who have advanced to the control of affairs ... The best writers are equipped on all three counts,
if only they could rid themselves of all emotions in writing history'; Method for the Easy
Comprehetision ofHistory, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia UP, 1945), p. 43.
103 Venice and the Defense, p. 572.
104 Cf. Cozzi, Opere, p. 735. For examples see pp. 12,17-8,41, 45-6, 63,163, 228-9, 320-1, 789-92.
105 See for example History, pp. 187,227, 343,357, 789-92, 818-20.
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recalled, before they take place in the story - as he notably does with the issues
of residence and the reformation of the Princes.106 Sarpi's style is captivating: it
is so successful in mesmerising the reader, that as one is drawn further into the
narration, one feels compelled to agree with the author. It thus becomes
apparent, that what at first is presented as a dispassionate distance on behalf of
the author is an illusion.107 His carefully allocated scorn and censure ofmen and
events, his cynicism and sarcasm generate what is, essentially, a morally
charged history; for Sarpi there is, in fact, something to blame for the situation
of Christendom and the subsequent failure of reform through the Council: the
Papacy. The Friar's stance on the Church's faults is very specific. This is further
underlined by his treatment of the 'political' figures in the work: even though
Sarpi recognises and calls attention to the mishandlings and shortcomings of the
Emperor Charles, for instance, or the French kings, he however makes
allowances for them. Sarpi's distinct attitude towards the two authorities should
remind us of Lipsius's different treatment of the public and private; for both
authors the conventions of the political or public domain are much more
accommodating - and consequently much less subject to moral principles. The
Church, on the other hand, as an institution representative of, and in direct
communion with the divine sphere, that addresses the private needs and
contemplations of the individual, is subject to an unconditional notion of
morality; in other words, the Church for Sarpi has no excuses for the vices that
had led to its current corruption.
The question of whether Sarpi's History is 'rational' and 'objective' rather
than 'unscientific' and 'partisan' has some bearing on the question of whether it
is, in essence, the work of a contemplative or of a man of action. Simply put, it
106 History, p. 617; and p. 761 Cf. also p. 218 where the author refers to the issue residence (1546).
107 Cf. Peter Burke, 'The Great Unmasker: Paolo Sarpi, 1552-1623', History Today 15 (1965), pp.
426-432; on p. 432.
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reflects the much debated question of whether it is a work of propaganda with
ulterior intentions or just an individualistic view of a remarkable thinker.
Historians have long been in disagreement on the issue. Whereas David
Wootton, for example, sees the History as the product of a Sarpi retired from and
disillusioned by political life, Bouwsma was conversely convinced that during
the composition of the work the Servite was still an active political agent, albeit
marginalised from the official Venetian line of policy.108 Although the question
is rendered partially redundant in view of the fact that any kind of history is
subject to the author's personal and particular circumstances, the problem of
intention and personal stance remains. What is more, it becomes more
complicated a propos the History of the Council ofTrent as Sarpi's approach in the
text is fundamentally negative and disapproving, offering very little indication
of any systematic views of his own.109 To surmise, thus, and reconstruct from his
negative standpoint Sarpi's 'positive' viewpoint, namely what he regarded as
the proper state of affairs in the allocation of authority and the role of morality
in the political and ecclesiastical domain, will be the object of the next section of
this chapter.110
iii. The History of the Council of Trent: Themes and Ideas
Following the discussion of the style and the method employed in the
composition of the History, we can now consider the ideas underpinning the
text. In order to define the Venetian's stance on the relationship between
108 See Wotton, Paolo Sarpi, pp. 47, 64-8,105 and 114-5; Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense, pp. 512-
3. Cf. also his remark that Sarpi's view of history was utilitarian: not a matter for idle
contemplation, but an instrument of the active life (p. 598).
109 Cf. Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 107.
110 Cf. Bouwsma: 'The polemical vigor of the Istoria del Concilio Tridentino should not be allowed
to obscure the positive convictions on which Sarpi's attack on the Council was based'; Venice and
the Defense, p. 583.
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political and ecclesiastical affairs, it is particularly important to examine some of
the central themes of the work more closely. That Sarpi's bias is eloquently
reflected in his interpretation of the Council's outcome notwithstanding, his
specific positions are more difficult to define, given that the text under
consideration is a historical work, and thus inherently a less immediate
discourse. It has already been shown, however, how Sarpi's own ideas, even
though disguised, do appear in the History: interwoven within the narrative,
and in the words of numerous persons throughout the text, they need to be
drawn out. We can thus arrive at conclusions about his positions though the
comments, remarks and discourses that he incorporates in the main body of the
narrative.
The issues arising in such an extensive and complex work as the History
are, certainly, numerous; nonetheless, Sarpi's interpretation can be reduced to
some basic concerns. As in most of his other works, the single most significant
issue that preoccupies him in the History is the limits between temporal and
ecclesiastical authority: in his reading, this is the crux of the reasons behind the
failure of the Council. As we have seen, the perceived increased preoccupation
of the Papacy with worldly matters and the Holy See's outlook as temporal
principality was, for him, directly linked to the 'abuses' and the institutional
decline of the Church that led to the Lutheran protest in the first place; it was,
furthermore, the most important reason behind the disastrous outcome of the
Council.111 Assembled with the aim to reform the Church and reunite
Christianity, its result was for Sarpi the exact opposite: the Schism was not
resolved, but confirmed. In contrastwith the temporal Princes' desire for
111 Cf. Sarpi's emphasis on the fact that Luther initially protested against Indulgences, and he
moved on to doctrinal issues later; History, pp. 7, 20, 766. Cf. also Sarpi's general/historical
assessment on p. 578. For an analysis of people's perception of the Church's shortcomings and a
contrast to the condition of the Church according to surviving evidence, see Jean Delumeau,
Catholicism Between Luther and Voltaire: A New View of the Counter-Reformation, trans. Jeremy
Moiser (London: Burns & Oates, 1977), pp. 154-61.
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reformation, the Council had, in fact, produced the greatest 'deformation' since
the beginning of Christianity. The Bishops' intention to restore Episcopal
authority was crushed by the Pope who compelled them into greater servitude
than what they suffered already. Lastly, despite Rome's dread in the face of the
possibility of a Council and the inherent threat to Papal supremacy, Trent
reinforced the authority of the Pope to an unprecedented degree.
The purpose of what follows, therefore, is to examine Sarpi's
preoccupation with the delineation of the limits between ecclesiastical and
temporal authorities as expressed in the manner he perceived the proceedings of
the Council. A closer analysis of Sarpi's interpretation will demonstrate another
aspect: that his reading is determined by two fundamental standpoints. First,
that in the initial development of the Protestant Reformation and the conduct of
the Council of Trent later, the question of doctrine was of secondary importance.
As for Sarpi, Luther's protest was brought about by the Church's shortcomings,
the reaction of the Curia to the grievances ought to have been, according to him,
a comprehensive institutional reform. This Trent failed to realise, precisely for
the reason that it was handled by most interested sides as a 'political
battlefield'.112 Second, and immediately deriving from the first principle, is
Sarpi's position that in times of trouble in particular, and in view of the
corrupted state of the Church, the managing of ecclesiastical affairs ought to be
left to the temporal rulers. Both these underlying convictions can be
distinguished in the author's approach to his subject and his treatment of almost
everything that surrounds Trent.
112 Cf. Delumeau's discussion on the expectations by the faithful, the disappointments by and
the weaknesses of the Council; Catholicism Betiveen Luther and Voltaire, pp. 4-9.
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Sarpi's broad understanding of the proceedings and outcome of the
Council is presented to the reader in the very first pages of the work, effectively
pre-empting, as Hubert Jedin has remarked, what is going to follow.113
For this Councell desired and procured by godly men, to reunite the Church, which
began to bee diuided, hath so established the Schisme, and made the parties so obstinate,
that the discords are become irreconciliable: and being managed by Princes for
reformation of Ecclesiasticall discipline, hath caused the greatest deformation that euer
was since Christianity did begin: and hoped for by the Bishops to regaine the Episcopall
authority, vsurped for the most part by the Pope, hath made them loose it altogether,
bringing them into greater seruitude: on the contrary, feared and auoided by the See of
Rome, as a potent meanes, to moderate the exorbidant power, mounted from small
beginnings by diuers degrees vnto an unlimited excesse, it hath so established and
confirmed the same, ouer that part which remaineth subiect vnto it, that it was neuer so
great nor so soundly rooted.114
In this fashion Sarpi eloquently encapsulates in just one extract all the main
themes that will concern him throughout the whole work. The overriding
ambitions of the Papacy in worldly affairs are exposed in the History in two
respects: in the shape of an ongoing conflict with the sovereign rulers on one
hand, and on the other in the Popes' treatment of the Council. An overview of
the two sets of antagonisms is, thus, in order, for our analysis of the limits of the
temporal and the divine. It should be noted at the outset, however, that it is
often difficultwithin the text to disentangle one struggle from the other,
inasmuch, as the Conciliar protest, for example, could seem as if it was largely a
French national movement. Similarly, the antagonism between Popes and
sovereign states is often expressed in debates about the convening of the
Council, its nature and its aims throughout its duration. The confusion and
intertwining of these matters serves as a perfect illustration of the utter
intermingling of religion and politics in general for the period on which this
thesis concentrates.
113 Jedin, History of the Council ofTrent II, p. 7.
114 History, p. 2.
The Pope's contest with the Council can only be understood against the
twofold background of the Conciliar threat, and the proposed reforms. Both
these factors are directly associated with Papal authority - with either the
acknowledgement of the doctrine of the supremacy of the Council or with the
realisation of the proposed reforms of the abuses, Papal power would be
diminished. This is the thrust of Sarpi's argument: the power of Rome had
increased at the expense of the temporal authority by breaching the prescribed
limits between the spiritual and temporal jurisdiction. The argument that Rome
had been transformed into a Princely court was put forward by a number of
critics, not least of all Machiavelli and Luther.115 Sarpi ascribes the following
extract to the latter:
... that it was a great fault of the Romanists, to establish the Church with gouernements
taken from humane reasons, as if it were a temporall State. That this is that kind of
wisedome, which S. Paul saith, is accounted foolishnesse with God, as not to esteeme
those politique reasons, by which Rome doeth govern, but to trust in Gods promises, and
to referre to his Maiestie the managing of the Church affaires, is that humane folly,
which is wisdome with God.116
The process of a Council itself as a remedy to problems and abuses had
originally been the responsibility of temporal princes, which the Papacy
arbitrarily assumed at some point in time. The very essence of Trent was thus
for Sarpi flawed from the beginning, as the Papal claim of authority in
convening and directing a Council was, in fact, a usurpation. Sarpi expands on
this view in his discourse on the issue of 'giving voices':
But after that it pleased God to giue peace to the Christians, and that the Romane
Emperours receiued the holy faith, there happening more difficulties in doctrine and
discipline, which ... troubled the publike quiet, another sort of Episcopal assemblies had
beginning, congregated by Princes or their Lieutenants, to remedie the troubles. In these
the action was guided by those Princes or Magistrates which did call them together, who
also were personally present, proposing and gouerning the treatie, and decreeing
interlocutorily, the occurring differences, but leauing the decision of the principall point,
115 Machiavelli's treatment of the Papacy as a temporality is striking and striking similar to
Sarpi's; see Machiavelli's Discourses, 1,12 and The Prince, XI.
116 History, p. 76.
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for which the Councell was congregated, to the common opinion of the assemblie. This
forme appeareth in the Councils , whose actes doe remaine. ...
After the Easterne and the Westerne Empires were separated, there remained still in the
West some marke of the ancient Councels ... At last, Princes being absolutely debarred
to intermeddle in Ecclesiastical matters, that kind of Councel grew in disuse, and that
alone remained which was called by the Ecclesiastikes themselues; the conuocation of
which ... was almostwholly assumed by the Pope ... And after a certaine time hee tooke
that power to himselfe which the Romane Emperours vsed, to conuocate a Councell of
the whole Empire. ...
[plurality of the voices of the Nations] So it was obserued in the Councels of Constance,
and Basil: which vse as it was good where the gouernment was free, as it was when the
world had no Pope, so it ill befitted Trent, where they desired a Councell subiect vnto
him.117
Here the reader becomes acutely aware of the author's fundamental objections
to the Council of Trent as it was conducted; the references, moreover, to Basle
and Constance as free and true disclose Sarpi's Conciliar inclinations.118 The
author presents the case that in contrast to the persistent demands on the part of
the Germans - primarily Lutherans, but Catholics as well - for a 'free, Christian
general Council in the German lands',119 Rome generated a Council entirely
subjected to the Pope.
Sarpi skilfully draws the picture of the Papal control of the Council. He
first gives a detailed account of the twenty-eight year delay of the summoning
of Trent, for which he holds the Papacy wholly responsible. Because of their
intrinsic aversion to Councils, the Popes did everything in their power to
present the Christian world with copious obstacles, preconditions and false
promises procrastinating for as long as was possible the convening of an
117 History, pp. 135-7.
118 There is a number of Conciliar references throughout the text, particularly regarding the
Council's superiority over the Pope; they do, however become more frequent during the second
phase of the Council, where these are attributed to French assertions: cf. for example pp. 566,
658-61,718-9, 729-30,802-3,819.
119 Cf. for example History, pp. 27, 33,54, 59, 62, 65, 77,80-1, 97,115,125-6,141,149,165,183, 273,
306,309,355, 359-60,363,367. Cf. also Jedin, History of the Council ofTrent I, p. 211.
See also Sarpi's dramatic description of the arrival and reception of the Ambassadors of the
Duke ofWittemberg and the Elector of Saxony, pp. 355-72, esp. p. 359 and 367-8.
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assembly to deliberate on the German protests and issues of reform.120 From all
the Popes in the run-up to the Council, Clement VII is singled out by Sarpi as
the most detrimental to the Conciliar endeavour. Due to his contested election
and descent, he had a specific abhorrence to Councils; he was, moreover, a Pope
far too profoundly concerned with politics and territorial contests to give any
attention to issues of Church reforms. Clement VII personifies thus for Sarpi the
type of Pope that bore the blame for the current situation of the Church and the
urgency of reform.121
Papal manipulation was for Sarpi even more obvious in the actual
proceedings of the Council. The Legates, as the Pope's direct representatives,
exercised tight control on the agenda of the sessions. Sarpi stresses, moreover,
the frequent correspondence between the Legates and Rome, in which they gave
accounts of the proceedings of the sessions and received instructions on how to
continue.122 That the control of the Council was intolerable by any advocate of a
free council is evidenced by the Legates' anxiety to conceal this communication
from the other prelates in Trent. Sarpi speaks of one case where the
correspondence was indeed exposed, testifying that the disclosure gave rise to
the circulation of a famous proverb:
...so that a blasphemous Prouerbe was generally vsed, that the Synod of Trent was guided
by the holy Ghost, sent thither, from time to time, in a cloake-bagge from Rome ...123
120 Cf. for example History, pp. 19,32, 34, 36-8,49-50, 60, 73, 85-6,100,109, 259,302-3,399-400,
403. Perhaps the most striking extract in that direction is, however, the following:'... but that, to
make some thing arise which might hinder the Councell, which not proceeding from him, might
be ascribed to another, hee [Pope Julius III] desired a warre betweene the [French] King and the
Emperour'; p. 315.
121 Cf. History, pp. 36-7,42,45-6, 67; also Jedin, Council ofTrent I, pp. 219-21; Mullett, Catholic
Reformation, p. 32.
122 Cf. History, pp. 114,133-4,142-3,146,148-9,164,168,170, 238, 249,253, 256,327-8,337,355-6,
359,470,482,497,501,504,511,514,543,594, 600 and many more.
123 History, p. 497. Evidently, the source of this proverb might well have been Sarpi himself - it is
indicative, in any case, of the spirit of the opposition to the Council and the extent of Papal
control.
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Much more drastic confirmation of the Council's servitude was, for Sarpi,
Rome's success in finally transferring the Synod in 1551 to Bologna, which was
nearer and easier to control.124 The friar was convinced that the decision for a
translation had been made from the opening of the Council, but was
implemented at the first instance of problems, with a ludicrous excuse.125
In Rome the Court was glad they were deliuered from danger...
But none was so simple as not to beleeue that all was done by his [the Pope's]
commandment, it being certaine that nothing, how little soeuer, was handled in the
Councel, without order first had from Rome ... But that which could not be concealed,
and which did scandalize euery one, was, that, by that Bull it appeared that the Councel
was in seruitude. For if the two Legats could command all the Prelates, at once to part
from Trent, and compell them by punishments, and censures, let any man say that can,
what liberty they had?126
In the same way, the reader is not really surprised when Sarpi exposes the final
dissolution of the Council in 1552, after four years ofminor activities, under the
pretext of war.127 The author had conditioned his audience to expect the worse
from the Papacy - as Rome did notwant the Council in the first place, it would
do anything to discontinue it. The Papal deceit became apparent when the
intended two-year suspension turned into a ten-year one.
Even the resumption of the Council in 1562, Sarpi reveals, was dictated
by an outside threat - and against the wishes of Rome. The outburst of religious
wars in France had created the possibility of a National Synod there that
presented Rome with a twofold danger: the undermining of its authority in
resolving religious problems on an international level, as well the risk of a
124 History, pp. 266-8.
125 Jedin, importantly agrees with Sarpi's position; he suggests that there are 'no sure grounds
for assuming the existence of a large-scale epidemic, one that would disrupt the continuation of
the Sessions'; he concedes, moreover, that there were other reasons behind the translation
(History of the Council ofTrent II, pp. 416-21). Although in contrast to Sarpi, he views the decision
not as the work of the Pope, but largely of the Papal Legate Cardinal Cervini (Ibid., pp. 437-43),
Jedin, nonetheless, reaches to the remarkable conclusion that the translation was a great blow to
the final outcome of the Council and the reformation in Germany! (Ibid, p. 443) For a thorough
discussion see ibid., ch. 11.
126 History, p. 268.
127 History, p. 376.
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possible break of France from Rome, a Schism.128 The last sessions (1562-3) were
the most dramatic for Sarpi; it was there that the full sway of the Curia
manifested itself. He portrays the particularly severe strain as the debates
focused on the critical issue of residence and the Legates' reaction by
continuously postponing the congregations. He highlights, finally, the dramatic
climax of the whole undertaking, the triumph of the ultimate Papal
manipulation in enlisting the Cardinal of Lorraine - the chief of the opposition -
to push the proceedings and persuade the prelates to conclude the
convention.129 Still, the crucial claim that Trent was not a free Council is not only
made indirectly through the way Sarpi presents the succession of events; he
makes the assertion explicit repeatedly throughout the text. He often attributes
it to German comments during negotiations of the possibility of Lutherans
attending sessions, reiterating their call for a 'free, General Council', 'such as
Trent was not'.130
That the fears that led the Papacy to exert such tight control on the
Council were justified is evidenced by all the key issues that were raised during
the sessions. Most important, after the arrival of the French, the question of the
Council's superiority to the Pope was posed frequently.131 On a smaller scale,
Sarpi was in no doubt that the correction of all the main abuses would have as
an immediate result the diminution of Papal claims to supremacy that had led to
the decline of the Church, in the first place - and this is why he supported it. A
right and proper reformation would reverse this process: it would make the
bishops return to their dioceses instead of serving as courtiers (the issue of
residence), diminish papal superiority over the rest of the bishops (the issue of
128 Cf. History, pp. 423,476,478, 796. This course of action was hinted at various occasions by the
French side; see Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 157.
129 Cf. History, pp. 759, 766-7,778-9,779-80, 795-6, 813.
130 Cf. History, pp. 115,149, 309; similar objections are raised by other parties, as well, such as
Henri II of France and the Parlement of Paris at the end of the Council; cf. pp. 319,412, 641.
131 History, pp. 658-61,718-9,729-30, 802-3,819.
198
episcopal jurisdiction) and reduce the income of ecclesiastics to levels within
acceptable limits (the issue of plurality of benefices). Sarpi himself
acknowledged the centrality of these matters in the reformation process; in the
History he lays particular emphasis on them by devoting a 'discourse', on each
one of these issues, exposing, as referred to above, his personal viewpoint.
Sarpi's discourses, moreover, are very informative with regards to his
understanding of things: the fact that they all address institutional problems of
the Church excluding any consideration of doctrinal questions, such as the most
contested issues of original sin, justification by faith, or free will, furnishes the
argument that for him the institutional reforms were considerably more
important than the doctrinal ones. This, together with the little attention to
doctrinal differences between Lutherans and Catholics in the History - in fact,
these are deliberately played down throughout the text132 - is also consistent
with the more general Venetian attitude conveniently to ignore doctrinal issues
concerning the Protestant Reformation.133
This element corresponds to Sarpi's conviction (or awareness) of a
distinction between external and internal expression of religion, such as Lipsius
endorsed. When it came to the Church and its jurisdiction, as the institution
strictly responsible for the salvation of souls, its authority on external (worldly)
issues should be limited to the strictly necessary aspects. The corruption of the
Church, besides, originated in its involvement with temporal things. This,
combined with the belief that man's involvement with the Divine word only led
to contention and disputes on a factional level, brought the conclusion that man
could only address and correct the deformations that he had caused himself. In
132 Cf. Cozzi, Opere, p. 735.
133 Cf. Bouwsma, pp. 479-80; cf. also Wotton's comment while on a visit to Venice in 1603, that
the Venetians had almost 'slipped into a neutrality of religion'; Life and Letters ofSir Henry
Wottoti, vol. I, p. 318. Micanzio, Life, p. 136.
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other words, the Council of Trent could only deliberate on reformation issues
and not on doctrinal ones.
This stress on matters of jurisdiction rather than doctrine, nicely leads the
discussion to what was for Sarpi the Papacy's second front in its claims for
supremacy: the contest with the temporal rulers. The text vividly reflects the
author's in-depth awareness of the historical precedents of the Caesaro-Papal
struggle, a contest with its roots in the early centuries of Christianity. Examples
of famous episodes, however, such as the Investiture contest of the eleventh
century or the 'Babylonian' exile of the Papacy in the fourteenth century (1309-
77) and the subsequent Great Schism (1378-1417), all characteristic of the
swinging balance between the two sides, endured long into the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, at least in the collective memory of scholars. It is within
this intellectual tradition that we have to place Sarpi's understanding of the
antagonism between the Pope and the representatives of temporal sovereignty.
Charles V, Francis I, Henri II, Ferdinand, Philip II, and to a lesser extent Henry
VIII and Elizabeth I figure as the main opponents of the Holy See in the History.
Sarpi distinguishes in his work the tensions between the Papacy and the
Emperor from those between the Pope and national rulers, such as the King of
France. The distinction is important; the Emperor and the Pope represented two
contrasting views of universal control, inevitably at odds with one another, as
both sovereigns asserted their right to rule over the same body of people, the
conceived notion of Societns Christiana,134 This monumental clash was above all
apparent in the case of Charles V, as the Habsburg Emperor had emerged in a
position of power and territorial control somewhat reminiscent of the position
of the greatmedieval Emperors. Indeed, Charles V had a 'strong dynastic
consciousness and a medieval conception of Imperial dignity'.135 Charles's
134 Cf. History, p. 107.
135 jedin, History of the Council ofTrent I, p. 226.
200
status is to a certain extent reflected in his coronation (1530) - the last Emperor
to receive a Papal validation of authority.136 The clash with smaller national
rulers, conversely, was on different grounds: their claim to control their
'national Churches' threatened to shatter the unity of Christianity and agitated
Rome.137
It is against the background for universal control that the two rival
authorities clash in Sarpi's text on the crucial matter of handling the outbreak of
the religious problems. The question was all the more complicated, given that
problems originally deriving from the Church found expression in civil strife.
Sarpi introduces a number of closely associated matters arising as a result of the
Emperor's and the Pope's different stances on jurisdiction: first, of who ought to
deal with the dissidents, and related to this, of whether it was appropriate for
the two authorities, the temporal and the sacerdotal, to deal with the problems
separately, as prescribed in the theory of dual authority.138 In the case of
Germany, in other words, this was a matter of whether the strife was to be dealt
with by the Emperor and the reformation by the Church.139 The friar,
nonetheless, favours another alternative: that both the reformation and the
Lutheran insurgence ought to be handled by one and the same authority. In
Sarpi's view, the Emperor was the most reliable power to deal with the religious
issues. As a Christian Prince, aware of what was best for his dominion, Charles
would manage matters according to the public benefit; the clergy, conversely, as
only interested in its private profit and greatness, was unsuitable to manage the
fate of the faithful. The Curia, even worse, was too far away to have any
136 See History, pp. 49-52.
137 Cf. pp. 33, 52, 56, 88, 93,423. Cf. also Jedin, p. 215: 'to permit the meeting of ... an assembly
would amount to allowing one nation to hold another faith than that of the universal Church
and thus to conjure up a Schism. ... The demand for a national Council was emphatically
rejected by the papal legate because it involved the danger of the apostasy of a whole nation'.
138 Cf. History, pp. 15,36-7,107,289,292.
139 Cf. the terms of the Peace between the Pope and the Emperor in 1529, History, pp. 46-7.
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awareness of all the specific circumstances in the German lands. Sarpi's own
view is unmistakably presented in the following passage, thinly disguised in his
usual manner of anonymous comments; the remarks refer to the Peace of
Nuremberg (1532):
At Ro7iie the Emperor was reprehended, for putting his sickle (as they sayd) into another
mans harvest, euery Prince being obliged, by the strictest bonds of censures, to the
extripation of those that are condemned by the Pope ... But others commended the
pietie and wisedome of the Emperour ... That the Maxime, so renowned in Rome, that it
is more meete to persecute heretikes, than Infidels, was wel fitted to the Popes dominion,
but not to the benefit of Christendome. ... That it was the duetie of euery Christian
Prince, to indeuour equally, that his Subiects maintaine the true faith, as also that they
obserue all the Commandements of God... But when a vice cannot bee rooted out,
without the ruine of the State, it is acceptable to the Maiestie of God to permit it... None
knoweth how to gouerne a territorie, but the Prince himselfe, who alone knoweth all the
necessities of it. Hee will ouerthrow his State, whosoeuer will gouerne with respect vnto
the interests of others, and it would bee to as much purpose to gouern Gemianie as the
Romanes desire, as to gouern Rome as the Dutch-men please. ... For the case was,
whether euery Christian Countrey ought to bee gouerned, according to its own
necessitie and profit, or was a slaue of one onely Citie, to maintaine the commodities
whereof, all others should spend themselues and become desolate. The times following
haue taught, and will teach perpetually, that the Emperours resolution was conformable
to the lawes of God and man.140
Sarpi supports the same position, that it was the Crown's role to resolve
problems of religious dissent in the case of France.141 The French situation,
however, differed from the Imperial as to the level of the struggle: the clash
between Pope and Crown was one of a universal view antagonising a national
view. Nonetheless, the terms in which, according to Sarpi, the French King and
the Emperor articulated their positions share some significant common ground,
as can be seen in extracts of an oration ascribed to Michel de l'Hopital (St.
Germain, 1562):
the Chancellor declared in the Kings name, that they were called to consult how to
remedie the stirres raised in the Kingdome. Hee made a recapitulation of all the things
that hapned, adding that the differences of Religion should be referred to the Prelates,
but when the Peace of the Kingdome, and keeping of the Subiects in obedience to the
King is in question, that this could not belong to the Ecclesiastiques, but to those whom
the King would appoint to consult of it. ... That lawes were to be fitted to the time and
wo History, pp. 63-4.
141 Cf. History, p. 422.
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persons, as the shooe to the foote. ... wherein they were not to dispute which Religion
was the better, because they tooke not in hand to frame a Religion, but to put in order a
Republique; and that it was not absurd to say, that many might be good Citizens, and
not good Christians, and that those who were of diuers Religions might liue in peace.142
It is indeed very difficult not to imagine Sarpi behind these lines explaining the
fundamental differences between ecclesiastical and political jurisdictions and
defining their limits.
The struggle on authority that the two contrasting positions of the Papacy
and the sovereign princes generated is manifested in numerous instances in the
History, either outside or within the Council itself. The problem of jurisdiction,
first, with regard to the Council translates in the text into debates about whose
responsibility it was to call the General Council, the Pope's or the Emperor's.143
Similarly, Sarpi elaborates on the Papacy's fierce efforts to prevent any
possibility of national Councils first in the German Lands and later in France.
The reaction, accordingly, in Rome at the news of religious settlements was one
of astonishment as the author records (or fabricates). The Interim of Augsburg
(1548), for example, which prescribed 'what to believe until all was established
by a general Council', was not received very well:
When the copie came to Rome, euery one was amazed; first in generall, that a temporall
Prince, in a secular assembly, should meddle with Religion, and not in one Article onely,
but in all.144
As Sarpi shows the Papacy's great effort to avert a Council at all costs, he also
makes a point of highlighting Charles's continuous endeavours to secure a
General Council that would deal with the problems of his subjects.145 He
142 History, pp. 470-1.
143 See for example Charles V's letter to the College of Cardinals: History, p. 41; also pp. 57 and
281. Cf. also Jedin, History oftlie Council ofTrent I, pp. 237-8.
144 History, p. 289.
145 Cf. History, pp. 35,40-1, 61, 274-5, 279-81,300-1,311, 729-30. This position agrees with Jedin's
assessment that the more the Papacy was delaying the matter, the more Charles proved to be the
driving power in the convening of the Council; Jedin, History of the Council of Trent I, p. 224. Cf.
also Charles' own autobiography, as cited by Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, p. 186.
Charles' endeavours were continued by Ferdinand: cf. History, pp. 412, 683.
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presents the Emperor's demands for a relatively free Council, preferably within
the confines of the Empire, where the complaints of the Protestants would
receive an appropriate consideration and response, underlining Charles's
firmness in his efforts to ensure the presence of Protestants in the Council.
Although the political motives of Charles do not fool Sarpi, his determination
that the appearance of Lutherans would have contributed to a better Council
makes him present extensively all the attempts in that direction.146 He is also
persistent in depicting the views and arguments of the Imperial prelates during
the sessions, as their attitude was very close to his stance. The request that issues
of doctrine, for instance, ought to be discussed in the presence of Lutherans, or
the serious disconcertedness at the Council's transfer to Bologna - contrary to
any fagade of complying with Protestant demands for a Council within the
confines of the Empire - were all positions on which Sarpi was in agreement
with the Imperial party.147 Correspondingly, in the second phase of the Council
Sarpi supports the French stance; the French had taken over in acting as the
opposition to the Papacy. They were the driving force for a new General
Council, not to be held in Trent, and not to be recognised as a continuation of
the earlier sessions, so that would be entirely disassociated from the previous
decrees, preserving, thus, some hopes for a compromise.148
The Venetian's view on the struggle between the Papacy and the
sovereign Princes is much more obvious in his account of the discussion within
the Synod of the issue of the reformation of the Princes. Sarpi's strong reaction
to the notion that an ecclesiastical body could even deliberate on such a matter
is noticeable even through his detached writing. According to his reading, the
reformation of the Princes was used as a threat by Pius IV, and as a means to
146 See for example History, p. 481, after the decree on safe conduct for the Lutherans.
147 Cf. History, pp. 129,142-5,166,338,364,510, 533,570 and many more.
148 Cf. History, p. 428. See also pp. 433-5,441-3,468,506-7,508.
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appease assaults against the Papacy during the second phase of the Council. He
resorted to this in the face of the continuous debates about residence and
episcopal authority together with the dreadful prospect of the French
delegation's arrival.149 The whole issue brought to the surface fundamental
problems with regard to separation of jurisdiction between the two
representatives of authority. Indicative in this respect of Sarpi's position is the
letter he attributes to the French King, sent to the Council when the King was
informed about the proposed reforms:
hee signified, that hee had receiued the Articles, imparted to them by the Legates, and
did see that matters were farre from the hope hee conceiued, because to establish these
was to pare the Kings nayles, and to make those of the Ecclesiastiques longer. ... That he
saw how lightly they passed ouer the reformation of the Clergy, who onely haue giuen
the scandals to those that haue separated themselues fro the Romish Church, and how
they assume authoritie to take away the rights and prerogatiues of Kings, to break their
Consitutions and Customes, prescribed by time out of minde, to anathematize and
excommunicate Kings and Princes, all tending to sowe disobedience, sedition, and
rebellion of subiects against their Soueraigns; whereas it is manifest to the whole world,
that the power of the Fathers, and of the Councel, extendeth onely to the reformation of
the Clergie, without touching matters of State, or of Secular power and iurisdiction,
which is wholly distinct from the Ecclesiasticall ,..150
Whether this letter was indeed written by the French King or invented by Sarpi
makes little difference; both men would certainly concur with this resentment of
the infringements on temporal power. On a greater scale, however, and much
more overtly, the author portrays the contrasting viewpoints of the Papacy and
the sovereign rulers in defining religious and political issues with regards to the
war against the Schmalkaldic League. He juxtaposes first the two sets of rhetoric
put forward by the Pope and the Emperor to instigate war. Sarpi portrays
Charles advocating that the premises of his attack were 'matters of state' and
that he was combating disobedient subjects. The plausibility of this position is
149 See the first threat by Pius IV (History, p. 505); cf. also p. 617. For the articles of the proposed
reformation as recorded by Sarpi see below, Appendix VII for the relevant chapter from the
Decree of General Reform that was eventually voted.
150 History, p. 765 Cf. the Gallican Pierre Pithou's comments on the inadequacy of the clergy to
discuss matters of state, as cited in Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 91.
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facilitated by the fact that some of his Protestant subjects remained on his side,
because they did not regard the Emperor as a threat to their religious
demands.151 The author contrasts this, however, with the proclamation by the
Papacy that the war had instead been undertaken for matters of religion, and
that the real objective was to extirpate heresy.152 Evidently, this was also the
way in which a good number of contemporaries perceived the war, as
evidenced again by Protestant reactions.153 Nonetheless, the point of interest for
us here is that the author reveals his own view by exposing (or assigning)
concealed motives on both sides. In Sarpi's reading Paul III had, in fact,
encouraged the war in Germany in order to divert Charles's attention from Italy.
Such a campaign would also have the added benefit of offering a distraction
from any attempts for a Council and a reformation.154 This interpretation
corresponds to Sarpi's broader viewpoint, underlining the History, of the Papacy
as a temporal power with worldly aspirations that would do anything possible
to shun the impending reformation and the celebration of a Council - both
major threats to its established authority.155 But at the same time, the mere
profanity of the Papacy's motives deprived it of any reliability to have a say in
the managing of the affairs of Christendom.
As mentioned already, Sarpi was shrewd enough to recognise that
Charles's motives were not that innocent - or religious, for that matter -
attributing the Emperor's conduct to personal ambition, the desire to subdue
Germany under his yoke and make the Empire hereditary, using religion merely
151 Cf. History, p. 189.
152 History, pp. 200-1.
153 Cf. History, p. 190.
154 Cf. History, p 78; see also p. 222, where Pope Paul III recalled his forces after seeing the
Emperor's successes; his reaction to the news of Charles' victory at Muhlberg (pp. 270-1), and in
the case of France, p. 628.
155 Cf. History, pp. 109,115,144, 202, 315,403.
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as a means to his ends.156 Still, Sarpi's censure of the Emperor is not hard in
comparison to that directed against the Popes; this distinction can be explained
by his deep-seated belief of their different respective duties and moral
responsibilities. The contrast between these two types of monarchs is evident
throughout the text. Although he does not offer a characterisation of Charles -
or other temporal monarchs - the author presents the reader with individual
portraits for almost every Pope. Sarpi's Popes are normally described as less
than pious, liberal in spending and promoting their kindred in high positions of
power, avaricious, rigid, cruel, prone to indulge in pleasure rather than
business, inclined to follow their private affections and live extravagantly. They
are usually of an angry nature, and Sarpi often depicts them as having fallen
into excessive rage and perturbation of mind - most imprudent and inconstant
passions as both Charron and Lipsius would concur.157 The strongest antithesis
between Pope and Emperor is perhaps articulated in the following passage that
juxtaposes Charles with Paul IV:
It gaue much matter of discourse, that, this yeer [1556], Charles the Emperor parted from
Flanders, and passed into Spaine, to betake himself to a priuate life in a solitary place; so
that they made a comparison betweene a Prince, trained vp from his infancy, in the
negotiations and affaires of the World, who at the age of little more than fifty yeers, had
resolued to quit the World, and onely to serue God, changed from a mighty Prince to a
meane religious person; and one, who had formerly abandoned the Episcopal charge, to
retire into a Monastery, and now, being at the age of 80. yeers, and made Pope, did
wholly addict himself to pomp and pride, and endeauoured to set all Europe on fire with
War. 158
156 Cf. History, p. 311. Charles' ulterior motives are a frequent theme for Sarpi; see also pp. 78,
129, 202,268, 360,372.
157 For portrayal of Papal personalities see for example History, pp. 3,4, 71,298-9, 300-1,391.
Sarpi even ascribes the death of Paul III to 'perturbation of mind' (p. 298). The only two Popes
receiving a better treatment from Sarpi's pen are Adrian VI and Marcellus II; it is clear, however
from Sarpi's account that he regards them as (unfortunate) exceptions who did not manage to
make much of a difference during their office - Adrian because he was unaccustomed to the
Curial practices, and Marcellus because he died very soon after his creation. For their Papacies
see pp. 19-30 and 389-91 respectively. Cf. also Jedin's assessment of the Papacy of Adrian VI in
History of the Council ofTrent I, pp. 205-10.
158 History, p. 404.
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The Popes of the History then, emerge as purely worldly princes - in many ways
more princely than the temporal princes themselves - subject to human
passions, hungry for power, even tyrannical. Evidently, the profane nature of
the Papacy was first and foremost witnessed by the long drawn-out territorial
struggles that Rome was involved in, ofwhich Sarpi does not fail to give
elaborate and detailed accounts. The infamous implication of the Pontiffs in the
long Italian wars between the Habsburgs and the Valois (1494-1559) together
with the dynastic interests and conflicts over towns such Naples, Milan, Parma
and Piacenza, feature prominently in the History substantiating the notion of the
Pope as an Italian prince. This notion was entirely in opposition to Sarpi's
conception of the Church as a purely sacred institution and the Pope as a
spiritual ruler; the Holy See's worldliness was for him an infringement of the
spiritual limits of its authority.159
Itmight appear as an inconsistency then that, against the background of
dual authority, as already indicated, Sarpi in fact promoted in his polemics the
assumption of the managing of ecclesiastical affairs by the lay rulers. Yet, as has
been observed, this was an intrinsic problem in theories of jurisdiction: the
border between the secular and the ecclesiastical jurisdictions ran through the
person of the king.160 From Sarpi's perspective, the explanation for this seeming
contradiction lies in two fundamental elements of his thought, the first one of
which is his deep historical understanding. Accordingly, although the
prescribed separation of profane and sacred had been in place in the early
Church, some particular circumstances resulted in its breach on the part of the
Church. This infringement gradually led to a degeneration of the principles that
governed the early Church and corruption, to which the religious protests of the
sixteenth century was a reaction. Sarpi's historical understanding is particularly
159 Cf. Micanzio, Life, p. 183 (wrongly numbered as p. 163).
16° Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 182.
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apparent in his discourses, all of which, strikingly, follow the same pattern: the
descriptions start with the appeal to the idealised past of the primitive Church,
locate the beginning of the decline with the separation of the western and
eastern Empires and the consequent assumption of additional influence by the
clerics, and culminate with the landmark Papacy of Gregory VII (1073-85).161
The most characteristic and comprehensible of all discourses, and certainly the
longest one, is Sarpi's discussion on episcopal jurisdiction, a passage indeed
worth quoting at length, since it represents a lucid reflection of the author's
perception:
The iudgement of the Church (as is necessary in euery multitude) was fit that it should
be conducted by one ... This care, due to the most principall, and worthy person, was
alwayes committed to the Bishop. ... This forme was still on foote in the yeere two
hundred and fiftie ... But the principall cause of the change was the ceasing of
Persecutions. ... Afterwards some Bishops, beginning to abuse the authoritie giuen them
by the law of Coristantine, ... an ordination made, that they should iudge causes of
religion, and not ciuill, ... Which law being not much obserued in Rome, in regard of the
great power of the Bishop ... Iustitiian did establish vnto them a Court, and audience,
and assigned to them the causes of Religion, the Ecclesiasticall faults of the Clergie, and
diuers voluntary iurisdictions also ouer the Laitie. By these degrees the charitable
correction, instituted by CHRIST, did degenerate into domination, and made Christians
loose their ancient reuerence and obedience. It is denyed in words, that Ecclesiasticall
iurisdiction is dominion, as is the secular, yet one knoweth not how to put a difference
betweene them. But St. Paul did put it ... that a Bishop should not be greedy of gaine,
nor a striker. Now on the contrary, they make men pay for processes, and imprison the
parties, as is done in the secular Court.
But the Westerne Countries being separated, and an Empire made ... the Bishops, for the
most part, were made Councellors of the Prince, which, by the mixture of spirituall and
temporall charges, caused their iurisdiction to encrease exceedingly. Before 200. yeeres
were past, they pretended absolutely all iudicature, criminal and ciuill, ouer the
Cleargie, and, in some things, ouer the Laitie also, pretending that the cause was
Ecclesiasticall. ... they appropriated all vnto themselues; ...[they made up a rule for
every case that did not fall into the accepted categories] that euery cause is deuolved to
the Ecclesiasticall Court, if the Magistrate will not, or neglect to doe iustice. But if the
pretensions of the Cleargie were contained within these bounds, the state of Christian
Common wealthes were tolerable. ... For after the yeere 1050. all the causes of the
Cleargy being appropriated to the Bishops, and very many of the Laitie, vnder title of
spiritualitie, and almost all the rest vnder the name of a mixt iudicature, and placing
themselues above secular Magistrates, vpon pretence of iustice denied, they came to say,
that the Bishop had that power to iudge, not by the grant or conniuency of Princes, or by
161 Cf. contemporary Gallican arguments that ecclesiastical power came about through the
absence of political; Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 160.
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the will of the People, or by custome, but that it was essentiall to the Episcopall dignitie,
and giuen to it by CHRIST. ... And not staying heere they adde, that neither the
Magistrate, nor the Prince himself, can meddle in any of those causes which the Clergie
hath appropriated, because they are spirituall, and of spirituall things the Laiques are
vncapeable...162
The second fundamental element in Sarpi's understanding is the moral
responsibility; due to its nature, the sacred authority cannot err; as a body
claiming to represent the divine sphere, it, by necessity, ought not to be
involved in the mundane affairs of this world. As the Church allowed worldly
interests to corrupt its sacred character, it deprived itself, Sarpi believed, from
the right to control its affairs, at least in the institutional domain, its temporal
facet.163 This deformation, moreover, generated the current state of affairs, the
division of the faithful. The managing of ecclesiastical matters should pass on to
the lay monarchs whose responsibility entails, in any case, the administrating of
the affairs of this world, and they are skilled in the managing of them. Their
duty does not necessarily involve moral flawlessness, as the affairs of this world
(politics) are devious and corrupt, anyway. This reasoning can account for the
apparent inconsistency between Sarpi's call for separate jurisdictions and his
claim on greater control of ecclesiastical matters by lay rulers. The Venetian's
argument, nonetheless, was flexible enough to accommodate objections:
... that he neuer said that the King had free power ouer Ecclesiasticall goods, but that all
did belong to the Prince, in time of instant and vrgent publike necessitie, and he that
knew the force of those words, did vnderstand well, that, in such a time, neither request,
nor authoritie of the Pope could take place...164
Here Sarpi made the French Ambassador du Ferrier skilfully to retract some
fairly radical points that he had made in the Council. By the same token, one can
imagine Sarpi modifying his position according to his audience.
162 History, pp. 330-3. Cf. also the discussion on p. 578.
163 Cf. the distinction made by Micanzio in Life, p. 183 (wrongly numbered as p. 163).
154 History, p. 776. See his oration on pp. 771-3.
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Thus, Sarpi's understanding combined thoroughly Lipsius' notion of
corrupted politics and the separation of divine and temporal spheres as we saw
expounded by Charron. His approach represented the immediate implications
that the theories of his two Northern counterparts had on the world of action: as
a statesman, Sarpi was able to articulate and adapt his positions according to
circumstances. His views, however, were also deeply infused with his religious
and ecclesiastical training, the other half of his personality; to these we will now
turn our attention.
Some Final Considerations: Politics through Religion
To acknowledge the significance of Sarpi's religious thought in order to present
an analysis of his stance on ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction, is entirely in
keeping with the principle suggested in the Introduction, namely that any
consideration of political issues for the period under examination ought to be
seen in the light of the religious aspect. An enquiry into Sarpi's views, therefore,
would be incomplete without a parallel consideration of his religious outlook. In
this respect, the latter is important inasmuch as it can account for, or is parallel
to his political views.
Like Charron and Lipsius, Sarpi's religious beliefs were seriously
questioned during his life-time, and are still the subject of speculation and
debate among critics. As already noted, Sarpi's fierce anti-Papalism, as
expressed in his plans and his contacts with Huguenots, Anglicans and French
Gallicans, raised questions about his religious orthodoxy; what is more, it made
his enemies at the Curia accuse him of Protestantism, and even downright
atheism. Of course, as Bouwsma has observed, the question of Sarpi's
Catholicism can be rendered obsolete, in view of the various shades of
Catholicism that existed long before Trent defined the Roman Catholic
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orthodoxy.165 Since, however, political and religious elements in his stance are in
many cases too closely intertwined to be distinguished, it is valuable to find
indications about Sarpi's particular position within the greater body of religious
doctrines that referred to the Apostolic See as their head.166
Defining Sarpi's religious attitudes, nonetheless, is in itself a challenge,
owing to a number of reasons. The first difficulty in that direction is that he did
not clearly articulate his religious views. An explanation for this could lie in his
awareness that these did not belong within the accepted frame of beliefs and
their concealment through outward conformity or dissimulation served as a
means of protection from religious persecution. The second point that is open to
discussion is, whether it was the case that his religious beliefs determined his
political beliefs, or the other way round: whether, namely, due to his official
position and his greater political interests, he deliberately avoided asserting his
views explicitly.167 Finally, as it has been observed, it is not entirely certain that
his religious convictions remained unchanged throughout his life.168
Nonetheless, even though we are in the dark about much of what he
believed on a religious level, there seems to be an agreement about the fact that
Sarpi placed a great emphasis on the importance of grace. Support for that
comes from two main sources: first, the conclusions he reached when he was
assigned to assess the de auxiliis debate between the Dominicans and Jesuits, the
165 Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain, and the Papacy', p. 356: 'Whether Sarpi was truly a Catholic, seems
to me equally anachronistic - for several generations before the appearance of Martin Luther a
rich doctrinal ferment, both various and free, had permeated Western Christendom; and this
variety persisted among men who continued to think of themselves as Catholics long after the
last session of the Council of Trent. What true Catholicism was, what the authority of the
Council was and what its decrees meant, were still open questions for many thoughtful
Catholics in Sarpi's time'.
166 Simon, 'Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et 1'Eglise d'Angleterre'; p. 56.
167 Cf. Simon's comment: 'II est toutefois difficile de deceler si ses opinions touchant la grace
precedent uniquement de son opposition irreductible aux Jesuites, ou si elles respondent a des
motivations plus profondes et plus reflechies'; 'Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et 1'Eglise
d'Angleterre', p. 59.
168 Simon, 'Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et 1'Eglise d'Angleterre'; p. 55.
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same controversy of which versions were meant to plague Catholic
Christendom until well into the seventeenth century.169 The other indication that
we have for the importance Sarpi placed on divine grace is his approval of the
outcome of the Synod of Dort, as expressed in a letter to Hensius, the secretary
of the Synod.170 Evidence of Sarpi's Augustinian conviction of man's ultimate
weakness and the feebleness of human reason can be found scattered in the
History, but the most prominent appears in the very first page of the text:
I will relate the causes and managings of an Ecclesiastical Convocation, by some, for
divers ends ... hindered and deferred... sometimes assembled, sometimes dissolved,
always celebrated with divers intentions, and which hath gotten a form and conclusion
contrary altogether to the design of them that procured it, and to the fear of those, that
with all diligence disturbed it; a clear instruction for ns to refer our selves to God, and not to
trust in the wisedom ofman.171
Sarpi's Pensieri, moreover, provide enoughmaterial to substantiate a great
degree of scepticism in his thought, and profound distrust towards human
reason.172 This scepticism, as we already saw in the discussion of Charron's
thought, ties in very well with a fundamental reliance on revelation. A further
consequence of the incapacity of human reason is the realisation that man is
unable to reflect on religious issues. Accordingly, to apply the subtle definitions
and distinctions of human reason to the content of the faith was for Sarpi a
shocking contamination of heavenly with earthly things.173 In return, this can
also account for Sarpi's relative indifference towards doctrine and doctrinal
diversity: doctrinal differences were a human invention or product, and hence
169 Micanzio, Life, pp. 81-2.
170 Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, p. 108; Jaska Kainulainen, 'Paolo Sarpi and the Colloquium Heptaplomeres
of Jean Bodin', Storia di Venezia (2003); available at
<http://venus.unive.it/riccdst/sdv/saggi/saggi.html#kainulainen>, p. 14; Simon, 'Isaac
Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et 1'Eglise d'Angleterre', pp. 61-2.
171 History, p. 1.
172 The best interpretation of Sarpi's sceptical elements is provided by Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, ch. 1.
173 Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain, and the Papacy', p. 370
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trivial.174 If human understanding is fundamentally based on divine revelation,
any dispute on doctrine was entirely unfounded and out of place.175 It is along
these lines that Sarpi viewed the Council of Trent and the debates that took
place in its sessions; the positions expressed were but human and factional.
Similarly, the triumph of the Papalist side, which he explicitly presented as the
result of intrigue and manipulation was merely the triumph of one version of
the received Truth.176
Sarpi's convictions, in this respect suggest an affinity with the evangelical
currents that characterised Venetian spirituality since the early sixteenth
century; his evangelism, however, was an expression of personal piety.177
Locating Sarpi's religious attitude within the spectrum of the more mystical,
divinely-revealed Christianity that requires the assistance of grace unlike
Tridentine Roman Catholicism, and denies the importance of free-will has two
facets. It explains, on the one hand, the Venetian's opposition to the decisions of
the Council of Trent from a doctrinal point of view: the views that Sarpi seems
174 His overall understanding is strikingly similar to Marsilius of Padua who argued that the
existence of God is not susceptible to rational proof and that God has no contact with human
life. His theory cut right across the Christian tradition of a unitary theory of knowledge,
regarding philosophy and theology as completely separate disciplines. Marsilius emphasised,
moreover, the absolute autonomy of the spheres of revelation and reason, claiming that Nature
and supernature were two completely separate realms. See Wilks, Problem ofSovereignty in the
LaterMiddle Ages, pp. 96-7.
175 Cf. Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain, and the Papacy', p. 371; Cf. also Sarpi: 'Men cannot talk about
God without stammering'; cited by Kainulainen, 'Paolo Sarpi and the Colloquium Heptaplomeres
of Jean Bodin'; p. 12.
176 That Sarpi's position in questioning the outcome of the Council of Trent was not that unusual
is evidenced by similar oppositions in Italy in the late sixteenth century: see Martin, 'Religion,
Renewal and Reform in the Sixteenth-Century' in Marino (ed.), Early Modern Italy, 1550-1796. Cf.
also Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain, and the Papacy', p. 356; Cf. also Oakley, 'Complexities of
Context' who with regards to the Bull Exercabilis that forbid the reference to future Councils
suggests that this 'was viewed less as an authoritative pronouncement than as a statement of the
views of one particular faction': p. 379; cf. also pp. 385,389-91.
177 John J. Martin. Venice's Hidden Enemies. Italian Heretics in a Renaissance City. (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993); p. 225. See Martin's discussion on the
spread of evangelism in Venice (pp. 71-96), and its eradication by the last quarter of the
sixteenth century (pp. 199-233).
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to have endorsed were the ones that were condemned in Trent.178 Their
exclusion from Catholic orthodoxy, moreover, pushed them and their adherents
dangerously towards the margins and very close to what was now defined as
'heretical' or 'Protestant'.179 Sarpi's association, hence, with Protestants, which -
besides the common 'political' interest - was also due to a certain affiliation on
theological issues (such as the importance of grace) rendered him a Protestant in
the eyes of his contemporaries, as well as some of his modern students.180
Sarpi's conviction that men could not deliberate on doctrinal issues can
also be seen as an aspiration to a sort of 'super-confessionalism'.181 This had a
strong political flavour and brought him very close to ideas promoted by the
politiques during the Wars of Religion in France, some of Sarpi's most intimate
friends. The politique stance was absolutely denounced by the Papal side.182 For
Sarpi, nonetheless, as experience had showed, a 'political' accommodation was
sometimes necessary for the sake of the public good and salvation of the human
community.183 In these cases, it was the theologians with their insistence on
trivial detail who presented the obstacle for the pacification of the people.184 The
political authority ought to take matters in hand, then, and provide for the
general benefit.
178 Mullet, Catholic Reformation, p. 45.
179 Sarpi is very explicit in depicting the arguments of the Prelates in Trent during the theological
debates as deliberately fashioning their view in opposition to Lutheran doctrines. Cf. for example
History, p. 156: 'to agree to this would bee to yield to the Lutheran claims...'
180 Simon, 'Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et l'Eglise d'Angleterre', p. 61.
181 Simon, 'Isaac Casaubon, Fra Paolo Sarpi et l'Eglise d'Angleterre', p. 61. Wotton, visiting
Venice in 1603 had remarked that the Venetians had almost, 'slipped into a neutrality of
religion'; Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. I, p. 318.
182 Cf. History, p. 27, 693; see also the reactions of the Prelates at Trent at the same news: (pp. 696-
7): 'This was blamed by the greater part of the Fathers in Councell, who said it was to prefer the
things of the world, before the things of God, yea to ruine both the one and the other. For the
foundation of a State, which is religion, being remooued, it is necessary that the temporall
should come to desolation; whereof the Edict before was an example, which did not cause peace
and tranquillitie, as was hoped, but a greaterWar than before'.
183 Cf. History, p. 388.
184 Cf. Sarpi's account of the Diet of Ratisbon (History, p. 183).
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The primacy to politics that this view endorsed is consistentwith both
the atheistic and anti-clerical tendencies that Sarpi was accused of, but is also
compatible with an internalised and spiritual notion of religion and the Church,
such as Lipsius advocated. This notion is one that is evident throughout Sarpi's
work. As Diodati put it,
Sarpi is rooted in that most dangerous maxim that God cares nothing for externals,
provided the mind and heart are in pure and direct relation with Himself. And so
fortified is he is he in this opinion by reason and examples, that it is vain to combat with
him.185
An internalised and entirely spiritual or mystical conception of religion justifies
Sarpi's fierce criticism and attack on the Pope and the Roman Curia. The
Church's external jurisdiction, from this point of view, ought to be limited to the
strictly necessary aspects of worship. Similar points are expressed in the
following extract from the History of the Council ofTrent, from Sarpi's discourse
on episcopal jurisdiction:
Yet the light of trueth was not so put out, but that learned and godly men, in those first
times, did oppose that doctrin, shewing that both the Premisses of that discourse were
false, and that the Maior, that is, that the Laiques are vncapeable of spiritual things, was
absurd and impious. For they are adopted by the heauenly Father, called the sonnes of
God, brothers of CHRIST, partakers of the Kingdome of heauen, made worthy of Diuine
Grace, of Baptisme, and of the Communion of the flesh of Christ. What other spirituall
things are there beside these?186
Very fittingly, Sarpi was to die having refused, as his friends claimed, to
say confession or to receive extreme unction.187 Whether this is true or not, is not
necessarily important: as an anecdote, it corresponds to the life and convictions
of a strongly anti-papal friar, who spent the last part of his life serving the state.
Sarpi's positions, thus, are intimately related to the ideas explored in the
two previous chapters: his views were the next natural step. Although he had
185 Cited by Pearsall-Smith in Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, p. 88.
186 History, p. 333.
187 Wootton, Paolo Saiyi, p. 65.
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not himself been through the experience of religious strife, his conclusions had
come from observing the same occurrences through time and from a distance.
He had, moreover, been involved in a different sort of religious warfare,
defending during the Interdict the Venetian Republic in the face of Papal
encroachments of its temporal authority. Yet for him, it was all part of the same
picture: Sarpi's deep historical - hence temporal - understanding of the Church
had convinced him that the corruption that plagued the institution had
originated in its assumption of temporal jurisdiction after the separation of the
Western from the Eastern Church. It was then that the (Constantinian) ideal of
imperial control over Church affairs had first been undermined, and Rome was
allowed to corrupt religion with its political aspirations. The greatConciliar
tradition had for some time struggled to contain this effect, but to no avail.
The other great landmark was for Sarpi the Council of Trent, his life-long
preoccupation. For him the Council symbolised the ultimate assertion of Roman
supremacy, along with the devastation of any hopes for religious reconciliation
between Catholics and Protestants. Its proceedings had also had the effect of
redefining Catholicism in a very narrow manner, excluding any real impetus for
reform that would purify the corrupted institution of the Church and restore its
sacred nature from the worldliness of its leaders. The dealings at Trent had
further demonstrated that the Church on the whole had deprived itself of the
right to control its affairs, as not only had the religious troubles originated from
its temporal facet in the first place, but they had also led to confrontations that
endangered the peace and welfare of the Christian states. His stance was
therefore very close to Gallican and Anglican attitudes, on the one hand, that
defended the right of the state to control Church matters.
His fierce anti-papalism, on the other hand, and his theological
understanding brought him very close to 'Protestant' ('Reformed') positions.
His Augustinian conception of grace induced him greatly to distrust human
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nature, and assert that man could have no say in doctrinal matters. For him, the
human and the divine - irrespective of whether the one was dependent upon
the other - were not only separated from one another, but they were also very
distant. Consequently, man had to survive on his own in this world, through his
internal connection with the Creator. The Church's role was to assist this
relationship, but as worship ought to be internalised, its role is restricted to
providing for the salvation of the souls. Religion and the Church ought not to
meddle with more corrupt and feeble human affairs, because doing so only
blemished them. Sarpi, nonetheless, was only a legal and theological adviser to
his Republic, and hence did not have the means to put into practice any of his
views. He could only advise - unlike James VI and I, who, as the actual head of




Political Implications (II): The King as Divine:
From Secular and Ecclesiastical to Lav Supremacy
James VI and I, Workes (1616)
God gives not Kings the stile ofGods in vaine:
For on his throne his Scepter doe they swey:
And as their subiects ought them to obey,
So Kings shouldfeare and serue their God againe
James VI and I, Basilikon Doron, The Argument - The Sonet
Giue vnto Caesar what is Caesars, and to God what is Gods. Regnum meum non est huius mundi...
If these examples, sentences, titles, and prereogatiues, and innumerable other in the Olde and
New Testament doe not warrant Christian Kings, within their owne dominions, to gouerne their
Church, as well as the rest of their people, in being Custodes vtriusque Tabulae, not by making new
Articles of Faith, (which is the Popes office as I said before) but by commanding obedience to be
giuen to the word of God, by reforming the religion according to his prescribed will, by assisting
the spirituall power with the temporal sword, by reforming of corruptions, by procuring due
obedience to the Church, by iudging, and cutting off all friuolous questions and schisms,
as Constantine did...
James VI and I, Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologiefor the Oath ofAllegiance (1607)
Sarpi's conclusion that the management of ecclesiastical affairs had to be
assumed by the secular authorities was, in fact, the principle followed by King
James VI of Scotland and I of England (1566-1625) for most of his 'diverse and
interesting' reign.1 It has been observed that Sarpi had reached this position
through a twofold experience: first, through his observation of the decay of the
Church, and the ensuing division and the bloody contention that this caused,
and secondly, through the encounter with the Papacy as a threat to the temporal
1 Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier, "'Enregistrate Speech": Stratagems of Monarchic Writing in
the Work of James VI and T in Fishling and Fortier, (eds.), Royal Subjects. Essays on the Writings of
James VI and I. (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 2002); p. 37.
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sovereignty of the Venetian Republic. Remarkably, King James VI reached
similar conclusions in the distant kingdom of Scotland, located at the other end
of the notional area of Europe. Although, like Sarpi, he did not directly
experience religious warfare himself, James had been through the aftershocks of
the aggression of the Reformation in Scotland. He lived through the tension
between the advocates of further and 'complete' reform and the remaining
Catholics, the latter always a potentially subversive element in the kingdom, as
they were in continuous communication with Spanish forces. Similarly, as the
successor to Elizabeth I, he had also come face to face with one of the last waves
of Catholic resistance to the Reformation in England, almost losing his life, and
again like Sarpi, he had to defend himself against Papal claims of temporal
supremacy. Unlike the Venetian, however, who could only act as an advisor to
the Republic, the Stuart King was in a position to enforce, to a considerable
extent, the principles that the two men shared.
In the vein of Charron, Lipsius and Sarpi, James was a contemplative; by
the nature of his office, however, he was a 'contemplative in action'- although
perhaps not as dynamic as Sarpi and others would wish.2 He was exceptionally
widely read, and had a number of intellectual interests, as evidenced by the
diversity of his writings. He was aware of the work of both Lipsius and Sarpi.
Although in the end he lost his esteem for the former, he was an ardent admirer
of the latter, whose work he sponsored to be published in London. James had
received an excellent humanistic education, having had the fortune (as well as
the misfortune) to be taught by one of the best indigenous humanists of his time,
George Buchanan. At the same time, he had also received very good theological
training by his other, less famous, tutor, Peter Young, a former student of
2 The phrase is borrowed from Stephen D. Bowd's imaginative title 'The Contemplatives in
Action : Vincenzo Querini, Gasparo Contarini, and the Shaping of Politics in Renaissance Italy',
Ph.D. Thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1997).
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Theodore Beza at Geneva.3 The King grew up, accordingly, to be very
competent in theological debate while he showed his inclination towards the art
of writing at a very early stage, producing several texts in poetry, prose,
scriptural exegesis, politics and more. We can thus trace what Kevin Sharpe has
called James's 'sense of the centrality of writing to his exercise of rule', to his
thorough education under these two great intellectuals, as well as the more
general outlook of a scholarly king, also somewhat disparagingly known as 'the
wisest fool in Christendom'.4
As with the previous three figures examined in this dissertation, James's
religious outlook was called into question a number of times throughout his life.
Born of a Catholic mother, but raised under strict Calvinist supervision, he was
criticised in Scotland for the lenience he showed towards his Catholic subjects,
as well as his unwillingness to accept that his kingship was to be subjected to
the spiritual control of the Kirk. Similarly, as the King of England, he came
under fire for his stance towards Catholicism and Catholic powers and his
decidedly ambiguous policies with regard to Protestant interests. A great
number of his subjects felt that he did not live up to the role of the leader of
Protestant Europe, especially when compared to his predecessor, Elizabeth.
From the Catholics' point of view, this was a king who did not grant them the
much-anticipated toleration, but became embroiled, instead, in a decade-long
controversy with their spiritual leader and his publicists.
The politico-religious framework of James's life and reign, his deep
preoccupation with issues of ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, together with
3 David H. Willson, James VI and I (Oxford: Alden Press, 1962), pp. 19-25; Roger A. Mason,
'George Buchanan, James VI and the Presbyterians' in idem (ed.), Kingship and the Commonweal.
Political Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998), pp.
187-214; esp. pp. 189-91.
4 Kevin Sharpe: 'Reading James Writing: The Subjects of Royal Writings in Jacobean Britain'; in
Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier (eds.), Royal Subjects. Essays on the Writings ofJames VI and I.
(Detroit: Wayne State UP, 2002), pp. 15-36; on p. 18. The description of James as the 'wisest fool
of Christendom' is attributed to Henry IV of France and his minister Sully.
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the fact that the practice of his kingship was based on conceptual foundations
that he himself put to paper, make him an ideal case in point for this study. His
case will also draw this survey to a conclusion, as the theory and practice of the
Scottish King bring together in interesting ways most of the elements and
concepts analysed so far. The object of this chapter, hence, will be to examine
James VI and I's views on jurisdiction, as expressed in several of his writings, in
conjunction with the manner in which he sought to put them into practice. As
James was a prolific writer, the examination will necessarily be based on a
selection of tracts mostly written in response to critical occurrences of his reign.
It will point to the strong theological resonances in the King's writings that
constitute a reflection of his wider perception of his kingly role as a 'divine', that
is, a mediator between his subjects and God, and, as an extension, an
administrator of the affairs of the Church.
This chapter, it should be noted, does not aspire to give a complete re-
evaluation of James's reign and writings. It aims at assessing James's views
against the background of notions already examined, on the relationship
between the temporal and the divine spheres, public and private domains, and
views on the two forms of jurisdiction, lay and ecclesiastical. These notions
acquired prominence on the Continent through the experience of politico-
religious tensions in the late part of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth
centuries. They were also intrinsically connected to the variety of issues that
were in the aftermath of - in the English case 'incomplete' - Reformation,
relating to questions of obedience, toleration, and foundation of authority. Yet
although the intellectual response to these questions for the authors examined
so far was, as we have seen, the promotion of conceptual dualisms, James dealt
with the same issues in a slightly different manner. As we shall see, while still
operating within the same theoretical framework and accepting the distinctions
as his starting point, the King took the theory a step further, redefining the lines
222
of demarcation. This was above all evident in the case of the jurisdictional
divide, where James promoted a sort of lay supremacy.
In view of the above, the analysis in this chapter is based on the
assumption that during his reign as the sovereign of the 'Three Kingdoms'
James did indeed aspire to partake in wider European affairs and developments,
although perhaps in the world of rhetoric more than actually in practice. This
will give us the occasion to associate the intellectual milieu of the Stuart King
with that of the Continent, as so many of his views and policies were formed it
relation and in reaction to wider European developments. This interpretation
runs somewhat counter to the traditional historiographical views, to some of
which we will now turn.
I.
Background: Imagining James VI and I
The imagining of James VI and I presents a number of problems to students of
his reign and thought. While it is commonplace to say that his reputation has
suffered over time, it is also slowly but steadily becoming a commonplace to
assert that his reputation has, for a while now, been under review and is
undergoing a restoration. Counter to the traditional view of James as a
stammering, slobbering, timid and sexually deplorable figure, who spent his
free time in futile literary exercises, during the last twenty-five years the Scottish
King of Britain has emerged as a serious, intelligent, moderate, ambitious and
fairly successful king.5
5 The literature on James and his reign is daunting. Historiography, however, still lacks a
definitive biography of the Scottish king; the most reliable is still the rather unfavourably
disposed by David H. Willson, James VI and I; both JennyWormald and Glenn Burgess are in the
process of composing biographies of the king, that would incorporate new research and the
revisions of James's political achievements. Two recent books by Roger Lockyer and Pauline
Croft represent attempts to integrate new findings and reappraisals of James into a narrative:
Roger Lockyer, James VI and I. (London and New York: Longman, 1998); Pauline Croft, King
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If this aspect of James VI and I's persona and reign is starting to be
resolved, the contextual problems arising from his accession to the English
throne and his move from Edinburgh to London (in April 1603) are less so. The
shift of focus in government that naturally resulted from the King's translation
south of the border is reflected in the way historical research has since taken
place. The problem is perhaps most eloquently expressed in the title of Jenny
Wormald's famous article 'King James VI and I: Two Kings or One?', where she
locates the basis of the duality of a long historiographical tradition in the
attitude of James's northern and southern subjects respectively to regard him as
their king.6 What is more, it seems that the two separate dominant
historiographies - English-centred and Scottish-centred - are not in dialogue
with one another, thereby perpetuating various respective misconceptions and
eluding any real sense of continuities or discontinuities before and after 1603.
An additional and significant difficulty that faces the historiography of
the Stuart king from our point of view is his positioning. He was cramped in-
between a queen with a strong Protestant image and policy, and a king
James. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), not always with success, however.
A number of more specific studies has also appeared, particularly on the area of the religious
settlement/establishment under James, while the four-hundred year anniversary of his
accession to the English throne two years ago, gave occasion for the organising of two
conferences (Sheffield and Reading), the participating papers of which are in the course of being
published. Last year also marked the four-hundred year anniversary of the Anglo-Spanish peace
treaty, and was celebrated_with a significant conference at the Somerset House that will also give
rise to a publication of the proceedings.
6 JennyWormald, 'James VI and I: Two Kings or One?', History 68 (1983), pp. 187-209. Wormald,
however, is posing the question from a slightly different angle; she is more concerned in
establishing how it is that James the VI is generally regarded as a successful king of Scotland,
whereas James I has the fame of a weak, easily fooled, and overall unsuccessful king. Despite the
studies that have appeared since the renewal of interest in the early Stuarts, the problem of
perspective is still insufficiently treated, since it is inextricably entangled with the problem of
'British' history as a whole, for some insightful perspectives cf. the collection of essays by Roger
A. Mason, (ed.) Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603. (Cambridge:
CUP, 1994); and Glenn Burgess's critique of the problem of a 'British' historiography, in his
review article 'Scottish or British? Politics and Political Thought in Scotland, c. 1500-1707',
Historical Journal 41 (1998), pp. 579-90.
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generally perceived as (crypto) Catholic, who allowed for Catholic masses to
take place in his Court and accepted that his Archbishop impose liturgical
reforms that, his subjects thought, brought the Anglican worship dangerously
close to the 'Popish'. Any consideration of James's religious and ecclesiastical
outlook thus suffers from a comparison to his predecessor and successor, and by
the looming spectre of the wars that plagued the Three Kingdoms in the 1640's.
All these aspects are, of course, interrelated, and as we will see, when viewed as
a whole are much more intelligible. Historians famously disagree on his political
beliefs, as well as his religious and 'foreign' policy - all elements that caused
tension during his forty-year reign, and will be touched upon below. James's
foreign policy as the king of 'Great Britain' has been the subject of criticism from
the very years of his reign. The question of England's involvement in the Thirty
Years' War, James's attitude toward the Papacy, his inadequacy to assume the
role of the Protestant warrior, and his policy of rapprochement with Catholic
powers such as Spain, France and Venice, were all issues that gave anxiety to his
subjects and caused widespread opposition. From a contextual point of view,
Scottish policy towards the Continental powers had traditionally been different
from that of the English; this is particularly plain, for instance, in the case of the
special relationship between Scotland and France. The other major factor that
has increasingly been gaining ground in assessments of James's foreign policy
and will be discussed in this chapter, is his renowned pacifism, together with his
much-pronounced plans for a general Christian reunion.
In fact, controversy regarding his religious policy dates from quite early
on, during his early years in Scotland, long before he succeeded Elizabeth on the
English throne. Historians debate his relationship with the Scottish Kirk and the
Anglican Church, and are divided as to how successful his 'middle' way was.
They disagree as to how tolerant of religious dissent and non-conformity he
tried to be, discussing extensively his treatment of religious extremists, Roman
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Catholics and Protestant purists. From this perspective, some stress the sense of
'consensus' and the relative calm in place during his reign, while others place
more emphasis on the widespread dissatisfaction among James's subjects. The
latter underline the hardening of the confessional lines, especially in the last
years of his reign, partly due to his growing favour towards Arminian elements
and the ever-widening of the definition of Puritan tendencies.7
James's 'political' beliefs will only concern us here inasmuch as these
relate to his theological understanding of kingship and his view that kings were
God's lieutenants on earth. The long-lasting tension among scholars of
(primarily English) political thought as to whether James was an advocator of
divine-right monarchy and 'absolutist' ideas can be explained to a great degree
by some scholars' emphasis on comparisons with Continental 'absolutist' ideas
and by some others on James's conformity to the language and precepts of the
Ancient constitution and the common law.8 According to the more recent
compromise, some of these problems can be resolved by giving some more
attention to the Scottish context - something that scholars had failed to
sufficiently do so far. According to this interpretation, some of James's views
were articulated in the face of opposition from advocates of the liberties of the
Presbyterian Kirk. The same views, however, when translated and reedited in
7 Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake, for example, seem to stress more the success of James's
attempt to follow a middle way, although they refer to the relative failure of the settlement by
the end of his reign; see Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I', Journal of
British Studies 24 (1985), pp. 169-207; and "The Ecclesiastical Policies of James I and Charles I', in
Kenneth Fincham (ed.), The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642. (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 23-49.
On the other hand, a good example of the stress on the dissatisfied and alienated subjects of
James I is the work by Lori Anne Ferell, Government by Polemic. James I, the King's Preachers, and
the Rhetorics ofConformity, 1603-1625. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998). John Morrill's article, 'A
British Patriarchy? Ecclesiastical Imperialism Under the Early Stuarts', in Anthony Fletcher and
Peter Roberts (eds.), Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain. Essays in Honour of
Patrick Collinson. (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 209-37, is much more subtle in pointing out the
areas in which Jacobean religious policies were successful and the areas that were not.
8 The two contrasting views are represented by Johann P. Sommerville and Glenn Burgess; for
the relevant works, see the bibliography.
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England for the benefit of the King's new subjects were misunderstood and
misinterpreted by his English subjects.9 In other words, the stronger and more
'unconditional' language of James was caused and called for by the
unfavourable environment in which he had to establish himself as a young king,
but was later tempered and modified according to the new setting in which he
found himself.
It is worth looking at some of the above issues from a different
perspective. To paraphrase Wormald, James may, in fact, be three personae in
one - what all the above viewpoints do not take adequately into account is
James's conscious positioning against a wider 'European' background, that is,
his 'European' face. One of the objects of this chapter, thus, will be to situate the
Stuart king in a European context both in terms of wider European
developments and considerations, as well as intellectually. Several facets
corroborate this assessment - first and foremost, the attitude of James himself.
The fact that a substantial number of his texts were written with a continental
audience in mind, and that he specifically addressed some of them to European
monarchs shows that he was 'extremely sensitive about his continental
reputation'.10 This was true as much for his intellectual reputation as for his
views on kingship. James's purposefulness in presenting himself as an emerging
major European player after 1603 has already been observed.11 From an
intellectual point of view, it is quite important to note that the significance he
9 Jenny Wormald, 'James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trew Law ofFree Monarchies: the
Scottish Context and the English Translation', in L.L. Peck (ed.), The Mental World of the Jacobean
Court (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp. 36-54; Roger A. Mason, 'George Buchanan, James VI and the
Presbyterians'; and 'James VI, George Buchanan and the True Lawe of Free Monarchies'; both in
idem (ed.), Kingship and the Commonweal. Political Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland
(East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998), pp. 187-214, and 215-41 respectively.
10 Sommerville, 'James I and the Divine Right of Kings' in Peck, Mental World, p. 59.
11 For an interesting account of the 'marketing' of James's ideas in continental Europe with the
Low Countries as a starting point see Roderick J. Lyall, 'The Marketing of James VI and I:
Scotland, England and the Continental Book Trade', Quxrendo 32 (2002), pp. 204-217, where he
argues about the expediency of the publications of James's works.
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placed on religious exchanges made him automatically more cosmopolitan than
several of his compatriots, as the language of theology was inherently
international (ecumenical) in the Christian world. After all, all confessions based
their doctrines on shared scriptures and they had all been part of the greater
Societas Christiana before the divisions.
James's cosmopolitan outlook was expressed in many ways, from his
humanistic pursuits to the policy of offering a refuge and acting as a patron to a
number of international thinkers of his time, most notably Isaac Casaubon, and
Pierre du Moulin among others.12 Although James's interest and appreciation of
Continental art cannot be compared to that of his heir, he was certainly
responsible for opening up England to Europe.13 This newly-found interest in
continental art and painting was above all illustrated in the career and role of
two very important diplomats, Elenry Wotton and Dudley Carleton. The consuls
of the two diplomats operated as sojourns for Britons on the nascent trend of the
'grand tour'. They were also responsible for developing cultural relations of all
kinds, collecting art and acquiring important books and manuscripts for
publication in London.14 It is within this context that the offer of shelter to Sarpi
that we saw in the previous chapter was made.
At the same time, the King's frequent interventions in continental
politics, whether in the form of intervening in the Dutch Estates-General on the
issue of the appointment of Vorstius, intellectual relations with the Greek
Orthodox Church, or a resolution of the explosive situation in the Palatinate
through a Spanish match, constitute an aspect that cannot be ignored by any
12 See William B. Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom. (Cambridge: CUP,
1997); ch. 4, 'Foreign Visitors'.
13 David Howarth, Images ofRule. Art and Politics in the English Renaissance, 1485-1649.
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 235.
14 Howarth, Images ofRide, pp. 235-40; Gerald Curzon, Wotton and His Worlds. Spying, Science and
Venetian Intrigues. (Xlibris, 2003). pp. 105-116 and 145-66.
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student of his political theory and practice.15 Most important, however, one
ought to take into serious account James's European considerations because it
was these that ultimately mattered. As various scholars have suggested, his
(domestic) religious policy, without doubt the most important facet of his
kingship, was essentially determined by the dictates of James's 'foreign'
(religious) policy. This can only be intelligible when one considers the centrality
of religion in James's 'thinking and self-fashioning'.16 For James, there was no
perceptible divide between a 'religious' and 'foreign' policy: both were part of
the same whole. But since, as Patterson has shown, the King's ecumenical vision
could encompass the religious situation of his kingdoms, his priorities would
have naturally lied with the overall picture that 'Britain' would be a constituent
of.
Seen against such a background, James's political and religious theory
and practice are intelligible in different ways. Such a perspective can, for
instance, supersede the problem of a dual Scottish and English context, for from
1603 onwards James considered himself as the ruler of 'Britain'. It can also
explain many of the intrinsic ambiguities of the King's outlook that have largely
been regarded as mere paradoxes of his policies. Yet James was always ready to
offer to the public an explanation and justification of these, no matter how
explicit, in his numerous texts.
15 The best consideration of James's 'foreign' policy has been the seminal study by Patterson,
King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom. For interesting aspects of James's intervention
with regards to the Vorstius affair see for example Frederick Shriver, 'Orthodoxy and
Diplomacy: James I and the Vorstius Affair', English Historical Review 85 (1970), pp. 449-474. For
references on relations with the East see Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity. A Study
of the Patriarchate ofConstantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of
Independence. (Cambridge: CUP, 1968), pp. 266-296; idem, 'The Church of England and the
Orthodox Churches in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in Anglican Initiatives in
Christian Unity (London, 1967); Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Church of England and the Greek
Church in the Time of Charles I', in Derek Baker (ed.), Religious Motivation: Biographical and
Sociological Problems for the Church Historian (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), pp. 213-40.
16 Cf. Fischlin and Fortier, "'Enregistrate Speech'" in Fischlin and Fortier, Royal Subjects, p. 53.
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ii. Conceptualising James's Writings: Context, Authorship, Nature, Audience
A number of problems face the student embarking on an examination of James's
views on the relationship between politics and religion and political and
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, based on his texts. The biggest difficulty arises from
the number and diversity of the texts bearing the King's signature. James was a
writer of voluminous output, composing texts throughout his life and in
response to several different circumstances. He was moreover, an author who,
like many humanist scholars, enjoyed writing in various genres. He created
poetry; wrote scriptural exegesis and meditations; composed tracts more readily
recognised by modern scholars as 'political treatises'; wrote theological and
ecclesiastical disputations, while furthermore discussing the subject of
demonology, and the evils of tobacco.
Modern scholarship's difficulties in coming to terms with James's
production are reflected in the texts selected for editions of his work published
in the last century. These difficulties echo some of the problems discussed in the
Introduction, namely the use of inadequate and somewhat anachronistic
definitions of terms like politics, religion, and the associated problems posed by
divisions between academic disciplines when studying the past. The standard
selections of texts in editions of James's works exclude - with one exception -
texts with theological resonances.17 Editions of his political works, furthermore,
do not include any of James's poetic exercises, for instance, or the king's work
on demonology.18 Yet as scholars have acknowledged for some time now,
17 See Charles H. Mcllwain (ed.), The Political Works ofJames I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP,
1918); Johann P. Sommerville (ed.) King James VI and I. Political Writings, (Cambridge: CUP,
1994).
18 See for example James Craigie (ed.), The Basilicon Doron ofKing James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh
and London: Scottish Text Society, 1944-50). The edition reprints both the original edition of
1599 as well as the one of 1603; unless otherwise stated, all references are to the 1603 edition,
henceforth referred to as Basilikon Doron. See also James Craigie (ed.), Minor Prose Works of King
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'political' elements are to be found first and foremost in his theological
disputations, as well as in his poetic works, the most notable example being the
epic Lepanto which was frequently reprinted by James; his poetry, however, has
largely remained unexplored.19
In terms of the larger subject addressed in this thesis the variety of the
nature of James's texts supports the contention of the interchangeable nature of
religious and political elements. A notable example in this case from the king's
work is the early paraphrase on the Revelation. In this tract the Pope was
identified with the Antichrist and was juxtaposed to James and Protestantism.
James appropriated the language of the Apocalypse to promote his views on the
balance of powers in confessional Europe. To a similar argument the King
would return in his later Premonition to all Mightie Monarchs (1609), a tract more
universally accepted as 'political'.
Yet on a more general level, it can be argued that as a political and public
person, all the texts that James authored ought to be regarded as 'political'
actions and part of the King's exercise of authority.20 In this respect, historians
and literary critics are in agreement about the Stuart king's fundamental
conception of the authority of the printed word and the fact that James was
quite conscious in exercising his royal supremacy through writing. As two of his
critics put it, he 'recognised textual representation as crucial to the construction
of both the political subject and the sovereign, whose power depended on
James VI and I. (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982); idem, The Poems ofJames VI. of Scotland. 2
vols., (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1955-58).
19 For the Lepanto see Peter C. Herman, "'Best of Poets, Best of Kings": King James VI and I and
the Scene of Monarchic Verse', in Fischlin and Fortier, Royal Subjects, esp. pp. 77-103. The same
volume contains some interesting essays on part of James's poetry. The same volume marks a
great turn in the study of James's works, as it examines a variety of his less studied texts.
Interestingly, the fact that most of the contributors are literary critics is an indication of the
present situation; this may also however mean that historians will not give it its due attention.
20 Cf. Basilikon Doron, p. 12.
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creating such a subject'.21 Furthermore, as the kingdoms' sovereign it was self-
evident that he would rule in all areas of life, as he avowed in his Basilikon
Doron:' ...I bid you knowe all craftes: For except ye knowe euerie one, how can
ye controlle euery one, whiche is your proper office?'.22 Hence the royal exercise
in a variety of genres and topics. In James's case, however, scholars are quite
fortunate in assessing the King's view of royal authority through his own
written word, as we have the official collected edition of his works from 1616.
This collection of works includes various types of tracts and should be
considered as the official expression of what James wanted the people to
associate with his name and reign.23 In this chapter, however, for reasons mainly
of priority and scope, it is necessary to be highly selective.
Before we move on to the main area of examination, nonetheless, some
further points have to be made. At the outset, the question of James's authorship
is one that has critically been raised by his biographer, David H. Willson. In an
early article, unfavourable, though insightful, Willson showed that the King's
literary activity was much more complex than assumed. Essentially with the
aim of undermining James's achievement, Willson demonstrated that the texts
that appeared under James's name throughout his reign were the product of a
collaborative effort. In this respect, the article pointed out the pleasure the King
took in discussions during meals, his enjoyment of having books read to him
during his repast, and his discourses during hunting.24 As for the actual process
of the composition, the article paid attention to the role of James's divines in
collecting material for him, commenting on his writing and even co-authoring
tracts. James Montagu, thus, for instance, was partly responsible for the
21 Fischlin and Fortier, "'Enregistrate Speech'" in Fischlin and Fortier, Royal Subjects, p. 41.
22 Basilikon Doron, p. 143.
23 For a list of the works included, as well as the contents of the Mcllwain and Sommerville
editions, see Appendix IX.
24 David H. Willson, 'James I and his Literary Assistants', Himtington Library Quarterly 8 (1944-5);
p. 36.
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composition of the Apology; Lancelot Andrewes had assisted the writing of the
Premonition, while the Remonstrance can largely be credited to Pierre du Moulin.
What is important, however, for our purposes isWillson's final admission that
although James was not the one who had written them, 'the thoughts were
his'.25 Whether he was the one putting every word of his tracts on paper is of
less consequence than the fact that he actually signed them, thus, effectively
endorsing them. Moreover, the fact that the views expressed in these texts were
not only representative of the King, but also of an influential and wide-ranging
intellectual circle around him, adds to the case that preoccupation on several of
the issues discussed in the course of the present dissertation was wide-spread
throughout European intellectual circles.
In terms of the body of the texts, various arrangements imposed on them
can make the surveying of James's work easier. Besides the question of genre,
one can separate the King's writings in terms of context, into the ones he
composed while in Scotland, like the Daemonology (1597), the True Lawe ofFree
Monarchies (1598), the BAZIAIKON AQPON (Basilikon Doron, 1599), and so forth,
and his writings while in London, such as the Apologiefor the Oath ofAllegiance
(1607), the Premonition to all Mightie Monarchs (1609) and many more, that were
penned after his accession to the English throne.26 Secondly, and more
importantly, the texts can be arranged according to the alleged intended
audience - whether James was writing to himself, his subjects (Scottish, English
or both) or a wider European audience. This is a much vaguer distinction as
even texts that were initially intended for a limited audience, like the True Lawe
ofFree Monarchies or the Basilikon Doron were later officially endorsed and
25 Willson, James VI and I, p. 230.
26 Cf. Wormald, 'Two Kings or One?'.
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published with the King's name on them.27 These types of texts, however, seem
much more fascinating as they give the illusion that they are much more
personalised. James himself, for instance, would describe the former as a
'discharge of conscience' and the latter as his 'Testament and latter will'. 28 On a
similar tone, a much later text, the Meditation upon the 27th, 28th, and 29th Verses of
the 27th Chapter ofSaint Matthew (1619), was composed at a point when the King
thought he was dying.29
In what follows we will concentrate on an indicative sample of James's
writings. These are, in chronological order (although not the order in which they
will be examined here), the pair of the Scottish treatises on government, the True
Lawe (1598) and the Basilikon Doron (1599); the King's Speech at the opening of
the Parliament in 1604; the texts associated with the controversy over the Oath
of Allegiance; and lastly, the two later meditations, on the Lord's Prayer, and on
the 27th Chapter of Matthew (both 1619). Our concern is, therefore, with texts
that have quite dissimilar outlook, in terms of purpose, audience, and content.
All tracts, moreover, are the King's responses to specific sets of circumstances,
and contingent, thus, upon their particular context. As royal articulations,
furthermore, reflecting the image of an accommodating sovereign who aspired
27 For the idea that these texts were at least at the time of their conception not intended for wide
circulation see Wormald, 'James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trezv Law of Free Monarchies-.
the Scottish Context and the English Translation', in Peck, Mental World, pp. 50-1. Cf. Basilikon
Doron, p. 13. This is also linked to the existence of two different intellectual circles around James:
one, while in Edinburgh during the 1580s and 1590s, and the other one in London, after 1603.
28 True Lawe of Free Monarchies (spelling of the 1598 original edition) in Craigie, Minor Prose
Works, p. 60; heretofore referred to as True Lawe. Cf. Advertisement to the reader, A Meditation vpon
the 27.28.29. Verses of the XXVII Chapter of Saint Matthew or a Patternefor a Kings Inauguration, in
James I. The Workes (1616), facsimile edition (Elildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971);
p. 606; heretofore referred to as Workes. The confessional/personal character of the work is
witnessed by James' discussion of the crown of thorns as an allegory to the burdens of kingship:
see ibid., p. 613.
29 Kenneth Fincham, Prelate as Pastor. The Episcopate ofJames I. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.
35. For a discussion on the confessional element of the king's works see Kevin Sharpe, 'Private
Conscience and Public Duty in the Writings of James VI and I' in JohnMorrill, Paul Slack, and
Daniel Woolf (eds.), Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England. Essays
presented to G.E. Aylmer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 77-100.
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to policies of religious unity both domestically as well as internationally, they
had to be as flexible as possible, thereby leaving room for a wide spectrum of
opinions. Accordingly, modifications of James's attitude over the years and
throughout his writings are subtle and almost indiscernible. Yet, despite all the
constraints, the remarkable sense of unity they exhibit ought to be perceived as
evidence of the sincerity and consistency of the King's fundamental beliefs.30
This unity allows us to look at the texts as a continuum that mirrors the
circumstances in which James reigned; it can also operate as a backdrop against
which we can set the writings of the three other authors, as all four of them dealt
with and had to respond to essentially similar conditions, tensions and unease.
The universality of these issues was manifested above all during the reign of
James VI and I in the years of the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance, a
dispute that aroused international attention and was taken as an indication of
the same fundamental problems. It is to the heated years of this international
debate and James's texts associated with it that we shall now turn our attention.
II. Texts and Themes
i. Controversy Over the Oath ofAllegiance and the International Milieu
At the core of this controversy was the decision to impose an Oath of Allegiance
in 1606, the year after the attempt on James's life with the Gunpowder Plot.31
30 Cf. Kevin Sharpe, 'Reading James Writing: The Subjects of Royal Writings in Jacobean Britain',
in Fischlin and Fortier, Royal Subjects, pp. 15-36; p. 24.
31 For accounts of the imposition of the Oath and the subsequent controversy see the
Introduction in Mcllwain, Political Works; Johann P. Sommerville, 'Jacobean Political Thought
and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge, 1981);
chs. 1&2; Patterson, King James VI and I, ch. 3; Willson, King James VI and I, pp. 223-42; James
Brodrick, Robert Bellarmine. Saint and Scholar (London: Burns & Oates, 1961), pp. 264-296; Harro
Hopfl, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society ofJesus and the State, c. 1540-1630. (Cambridge: CUP,
2004), ch. 13. Beginning from the early seventeenth-century, and still having some supporters,
there is the theory that the Gunpowder Plot (Powder-Treason) had, in fact, been an orchestration
from above, that would unify James's Protestant subjects - as it did; for a modern advocate see
Ferell, Government by Polemic, esp. pp. 62-7; cf. also Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 75-6.
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Interpretations for the objectives behind the decision for this Oath have been
abundant. The more favourable ones run along the lines that the Oath would
simply distinguish the potentially subversive extreme Catholics from
moderates, who would pledge allegiance to their monarch. James is perceived to
be granting covert toleration or simply trying to conciliate his moderate Catholic
subjects. Less favourable interpretations, on the other hand, argue for a Jacobean
policy of persecution, which the imposition of the Oath would put into force.32
James's assertion that he wanted to set 'a marke of distinction betweene good
Subiects, and bad', if taken at face value, supports the first point of view.33 In
terms of evidence, particular attention to a clause that obliged soldiers fighting
abroad to take the Oath seems to add to the argument that its purpose was the
security of the polity.34
By taking the Oath the subjects denied that the Pope had any authority to
depose the King, or to dispose of any of his kingdoms or dominions. It also
meant that the Pope could not authorise any foreign Prince to invade the
country, or to discharge any of the subjects from their oath of allegiance and
obedience to his king. The oath further bound the subjects to admit that they
could not be incited by the Pope to rise against their king, state or government;
similarly, they also swore to regard as heretical the position that allowed the
deposition and assassination of kings who had been excommunicated by the
Pope.35 The contents of the Oath, accordingly, went against some of the basic
32 Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake seem to agree with the view that it was planned as a means
to distinguish between the radical and the moderate Catholics; see their article "The
Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I'; on pp. 185-6; also Patterson, King James VI and I, p. 78.
33 Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologie for the Oath ofAllegiance; Workes, p. 274. Cf. also
Premonition to All Most Mightie Monarches, Kings, free Princes and States ofChristendome; Workes, p.
292.
34 Sommerville, in his discussion on the reasons for the establishment of the Oath in 'Jacobean
Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance', pp. 25-7. According to him,
soldiers who did not take the Oath, it was feared, would rally under the Archduke and then turn
their swords not against the Dutch, but against England.
35 Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
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principles of the Papacy, as expressed in their extreme form by the Dictatus
Papae of Gregory VII (Hildebrand, 1073-85).36
Pope Paul V's involvement in the form of a letter to the Archpriest
George Blackwell, the head of the Catholic community in England since 1598,
instructing him not to take the Oath (September 1606), struck a chord with
James. The Pope had based his orders on the grounds that the taking of this oath
would be damaging to the Catholics' faith and salvation of their souls, for it
contained many points that were contrary to faith and salvation.37 James
considered this 'thunder' as an outright interference in his jurisdiction,
provoking his subjects to refuse 'to professe their naturall obedience' to their
sovereign.38 As Blackwell had refrained from circulating the first Papal letter, a
second one arrived less than a year later (August 1607), to confirm the
authenticity of the first one, repeating the order to the followers of the Catholic
faith to avoid taking the oath.39 An interesting development in the events came
with a more personal letter sent by Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine to Blackwell
(September 1607). That letter aimed, nevertheless, at the same point, to hinder
the English Catholics from swearing the Oath. The Cardinal was much more
instructive in his letter, claiming that the real objective behind this measure was
to deny the authority of the Apostolic See and to transfer this authority to the
successor of Henry VIII.40
The timing of this correspondence could not have been more remarkable.
The first Papal letter had been dispatched right in the middle of the crisis of the
Venetian Interdict (April 1606-April 1607), a crisis that James himself had
followed very closely. It was extremely difficult, therefore, not to perceive the
36 See the Dictatus Papae in Sources for the History ofMedieval Europe, ed. Brian S. Pullan (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1966), pp. 135-37.
37 Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
38 Apologie-, Workes, pp. 248-9.
39 Apologie-, Workes, p. 258.
40 Apologie; Workes, pp. 260-2.
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situation as an orchestrated assault by the Papacy against temporal
sovereignties - Bellarmine, after all, had also been at the forefront of the dispute
with Venice.41 At the height of the international pamphlet war that was already
in full swing, James chose to give a response to both the Pope and the Cardinal.
Besides, the King's fondness for theological disputation, especially when this
was paired with a challenge to his own authority, made the choice of putting
pen to paper almost irresistible to him.42 The question of whether there was in
practice actual danger of the Pope excommunicating and deposing James, or of
a Catholic coup, is a matter for speculation. James, however, lived in real dread
of being either excommunicated or assassinated.43 Whether it was for the
practical implications, or whether it was just that the theoretical principles of the
assault ought not to have been left unrequited, James resolved to respond with
his Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologiefor the Oath ofAllegiance.
The tract came out anonymously in early 1607, giving another dimension
to the issue of the controversy. It was quickly translated into French, Latin and
German and had a wide circulation 44 The European interest aroused, the Papal
side had to respond; Bellarmine was thus persuaded by the Pope to provide a
41 Sommerville, 'Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy Over the Oath of Allegiance',
pp. 34 and 51-2.
42 Patterson's argument, that James was deeply moved by a conviction that his motives had been
misunderstood in Rome, is a little more difficult to prove, especially if we consider that his later
writings are of a more polemical nature; King James VI and I, p. 84.
43 Sommerville argues that although the Papal deposing power was accepted by almost
everyone in Catholic circles, it was generally perceived that there was little point in putting it
into practice against James, as the Peace of 1604 with Spain had effectively squashed all
prospects of the restoration of Catholicism by force and there was low probability that a Catholic
uprising would have succeeded. The threat of deposition, on the other hand, could be used to
encourage James to tolerate Catholicism; Sommerville, 'Jacobean Political Thought and the
Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance', pp. 39-41.
44 See Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 84-90; Willson, James VI and I p. 234; Cf. also Lyall, 'The
Marketing of James VI and I': James's defence of his policy appeared in at least nineteen separate
editions, in five languages, and printed in at least eight different countries. The English
ambassador to Venice, Sir Henry Wotton records that the Apologie was being read in Venice
before the end of March; Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton, ed. Logan Pearsall-Smith, 2 vols.
(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1907); vol. I, p. 416.
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reply. Nevertheless, Bellarmine's tract, which had come out under disguised
authorship, contained a bombshell for James: the Cardinal brought to light
information that the King had been in communication with Clement VIII while
still in Scotland, making serious insinuations about James's inclinations to
Catholicism.45 The King's religious identity was a critical factor in his ability to
maintain unity within his domains: when in later years James chose to follow a
pro-Spanish ('pro-Catholic') direction, his policy brought about widespread
opposition and the resurgence of Puritan feeling. Any sense of doubt, thus, as to
the King's allegiance, posed a threat to the general religious consensus. The
severity of the blow is reflected in James's reaction; in order to clear his name,
he first brought publicly to justice James Elphinstone, his former secretary in
Scotland, who had allegedly made him sign a letter that James had not read.46
James then set about refuting the Cardinal quite determinedly. He re-
edited the Apology under his name with an added Premonition to All Most Mightie
Monarches, Kings, Free Princes and States of Christendome (1609), personally
addressing the Emperor Rudolph II and all the 'temporal powers' generally.47
The double tract was almost immediately translated in Latin and French, while a
Dutch edition followed soon afterwards. Patterson shows the Curia's marked
concern; as he notes, 'almost every papal concern in Europe - Gallicanism in
France, heterodoxy at the Emperor's court, the anti-Papal stance of Venice, the
growth of Calvinism in the Rhineland, and the loyalty of Roman Catholics in
Britain seemed likely to be affected in some way by the British king's
45 Bellarmine brought his text out under the name of his chaplain Matteo Torti. The full title of
the work was Matthei Torti, Presbyteri & Theologi Papiensis, Responsio ad Librvm Inscriptvm, Triplici
nodo, Triplex Cuneus, Sive Apologia pro luramento Fidelitatis (1608).
46 Cf. Handbook ofBritish Chronology, 3rd edn. (London, 1986), p. 194.
47 Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 288.
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manifesto'.48 According to James's plan, copies were presented individually to
all the princes and principalities. Papal nuncios throughout the continent,
nevertheless, had been entrusted to prevent the acceptance and circulation of
the Premonition, admittedly, with considerable success.49 In the text James
responded to both Bellarmine and Robert Parsons, the English Jesuit who had
also written against the King, demonstrating that the problem of Papal claims to
temporal authority was not specific-related but that it had strong roots in
history and that it ought to be of shared concern to all the sovereigns.50 That
James's rhetoric in the Premonition, underlined by the specific address to the
European monarchs, did have an effect is witnessed by the subsequent
international involvement in the discussion. Some of the most notable
contributions to the Papal stance, besides Bellarmine's Apologia (1610), were
tracts by two Jesuit theologians in Germany, Martin Becanus and Jacobus
Gretser; a highly erudite response by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez, the
Defensio Fidei Catholicae (1613); in France, a reply by the Jesuit Andreas
Eudaemon-Johannes as well as by the Dominican Nicolas Coiffeteau; a tract by
the Flemish Jesuit Leonard Lessius and the Dutch theologian Adolf Schulken.
Conversely, the positions professed by the King were supported among others,
by William Barclay, a Catholic Scot who taught at Lorraine; the famous classical
scholar Isaac Casaubon; the Calvinist pastor Pierre du Moulin; the Catholic-
inclined poet John Donne; and the divine George Carleton, cousin of the
48 Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 97-8. For the reactions and the anxiety in Rome see also
Robert Peters, 'Some Catholic Opinions of King James VI and Y, Journal ofRecusant History 10
(1969), pp. 292-303; esp. pp. 299-303.
49 Cf. Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 97-9; William J. Bouwsma in Venice and the Defense of
Republican Liberty. Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1968); p. 510.
50 Parsons's work was The lodgment ofa Catholicke English-man, Living in Banishmentfor His
Religion, Written to His Priuate Friend in England, Conserning a Late Booke Set Forth, and Entituled,
Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus or an Apologiefor the Oath ofAllegiance (1608). Cf. Premonition-, Workes,
p. 333.
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diplomat. This sort of input is indisputable evidence of the universality of issues
at stake and the degree to which thinkers from various parts of the Continent
could relate to them.
To focus more specifically on the Premontion, it has been argued that its
publication was a somewhat imprudent move: in addition to arguments
associated with the core of the dispute, the text included a section on James's
profession of faith, and, what is more, a twenty-page demonstration that the
Pope was in fact the Antichrist. In this manner, it revealed James's vulnerability
in matters of his personal faith. The King's compelling words, furthermore, were
a poor contrast with his actions: to the disappointment of Sarpi and others the
King of Britain was not a man of great action, as Sarpi, for one, noted.51
Still, within the more general context of the discourse, the language and
line of reasoning of the Scottish King is remarkably similar to that of the
Venetian friar. The most significant element of this shared stance was their
profound hatred of the Papacy. Evidently, there is a good deal of truth in the
argument that the King's aversion has to be seen on confessional grounds. That
said, however, it is important to recognise that, as will become apparent from
the following analysis, the confessional element is not sufficient in explaining
James's standpoint. This is first and foremost evident in James's assumption that
all rulers, Catholic as well as Protestant, were on the same side of the conflict;
they all shared the same interest and were all under the same threat of Papal
intervention in the domain of their jurisdiction.52 As referred to above, James
51 Mark Sarpi's disillusionment and disappointment: 'If the King of England were not a doctor,'
he wrote in 1612, 'we might hope for some good', but, he noted, instead of arms and money
James contributed nothing to the cause of political liberty but books and words; - also: 'It is one
thing to be a clever theologian, quite another to be a valorous king'; cited by Bouwsma in Venice
and the Defense ofRepublican Liberty, p. 526.
52 Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 289; Richard Mackenney, "'A Plot Discover'd?" Myth, Legend, and
the "Spanish" Conspiracy against Venice in 1618', in J. Martin and D. Romano (eds.), Venice
Reconsidered. The History and Civilization ofan Italian City-State, 1297-1797. (Baltimore and
London: The John Hopkins UP, 2000), p. 199.
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tried to promote this point by enlisting a number of Catholic supporters to write
in defence of his standpoint. For both the Calvinist James and the Catholic Sarpi,
the most abominable feature of the Papacy was its claim to temporal power,
which they saw as encroachments upon the temporal authority of sovereigns
and sovereign powers. The premise informing James's defence of the Oath of
Allegiance was therefore the same one that formed the core of the Venetian
rhetoric during the Interdict crisis.
In this respect, the King's line of reasoning has as a starting point the
familiar Biblical proverb Give to Caesar what was Caesar's and to God what was
God's, in conjunction with the declaration that Christ made: Regnum meum non
est huius mundi. Both these mottos are repeated frequently in the first two texts
under consideration, the Apology and the Premonition.53 We have already seen
the extensive use of the same dicta on behalf of the Venetian Republic,
appearing both as banners in public processions - an event that Henry Wotton
himself had recorded - as well as featuring prominently in Sarpi's work.54 We
have also observed, in the course of the discussion of Sarpi's positions, their
integral association with the rhetoric of the separation of ecclesiastical and
temporal jurisdictions. According to this, as God's kingdom belonged to a
different world, it followed that the holders of spiritual office do not have any
jurisdiction within this world. Temporal matters were to be administered by
sovereign rulers, who, in turn, were only answerable to God. The Pope and the
clergy's responsibilities and jurisdiction were centred on sacerdotal matters,
entirely separate from secular issues.
King James's principal argument throughout the controversy over the
Oath of Allegiance, thus, that the Oath in question did 'onely meddle with the
53 See for example Apologie; Workes, pp. 256 and 284; Remonstrance for the Rights ofKings; Workes,
p. 417
54 Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton, vol. I, p. 350.
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ciuill and temporall Obedience, due by Subiects to their naturall Soueraignes',
can be firmly located within this shared discourse.55 According to the text of the
Oath, James's subjects would avow that the Pope had no authority to depose
their king, or to dispose of any of his kingdoms or dominions; that he could not
authorise any foreign Prince to invade the country; most important, that the
Pope had no authority to discharge any of the subjects from their allegiance to
the king, or to allow any of them to rise against the person of the king or the
government of the state.56 Conversely, in his first letter to the English Catholics
the Pope had insisted that the text contained elements quite contrary to their
Catholic beliefs; as a result, the taking of the Oath would amount to the
damaging of their Catholic faith and the salvation of their souls.57 For James, on
the other hand, there was a clear and obvious divide between earthly and
celestial affairs, just as Charron had expressed them in the Sagesse. Temporal
matters were of a different nature to the divine. Consequently, for James it was
incomprehensible how the profession of the 'naturall Allegiance of Subiects to
their [temporal] Prince' could be opposite to the faith and salvation of his
subjects' souls.58
James's conviction of the separation of spheres of jurisdiction as a
corollary of the earthly-celestial divide is plain in his concern that the Oath
would only contain the profession of 'naturall Allegiance, and ciuill and
temporall obedience'. As he explains in his Premonition to the Princes,
The trueth is, that the Lower house of Parliament at the first framing of this Oath, made
it to containe, That the Pope hath no power to excommunicate me; which I caused them
to reforme, onely making it to conclude, That no excommunication of the Popes, can
warrant my Subiects to practice against my Person or State; denying the deposition of
Kings to be in the Popes lawfull power; as indeed I take any such temporall violence, to
be farre without the limits of such a Spirituall censure as Excommunication is.59
55 Premonition; Workes, p. 295.
56 Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
57 Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
58 Apologie; Workes, p. 254. Cf. also p. 256.
59 Premonition; Workes, p. 292.
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The divergence between this position and that of Cardinal Bellarmine, the prime
representative of the Papal camp is, however, patent when considering that the
latter advocated that to deny the Pope the power to depose Kings was to deny
his power of excommunication.60 To this categorical position, James put forward
a much more accommodating one, where he would make a distinction between
'good subjects' and 'bad' - or 'sheep' and 'goats', as he graphically put it,
possibly alluding to the religious metaphor of the damned and the saved. The
subtlety of James's stance is particularly well illustrated in a juxtaposition of the
Oath of Allegiance with the Oath of Supremacy, first devised by Henry VIII. To
the accusation of the Cardinal that the Oath that James wanted to impose was
merely a reiteration of the earlier one, the King responded with a comparison
between the two.61 He explained that
in that Oath [of Supremacy] onely is contained the Kings absolute power, to be Iudge
ouer all persons, aswell Ciuill as Ecclesiastical, excluding all forraigne powers and
Potentates to be Iudges within his dominions; whereas this last made Oath containeth no
such matter, onely meddling with the ciuill obedience of Subiects to their Soueraigne, in
mere temporall causes...62
To substantiate this and make the contrast more evident, James cites the Oath
commanded by his predecessor; the text of the Oath of Supremacy began like
this:
I A.B. doe vtterly testifie and declare in my conscience, that the Kings Highnesse is the
only Supreame Governour of this Realme, and all other his Highnesse Dominions and
Countries, aswell in all Spirituall or Ecclesiasticall things or causes, as Temporalll....63
The Oath confirmed the English King's complete control and supreme
jurisdiction over spiritual affairs. The Scottish King further explains that the
objective behind the Oath of Supremacy had been to distinguish between
followers of the Catholic faith and followers of 'our own Profession'. James's
60 Premonition-, Workes, p. 295.
61 Apologie-, Workes, p. 260.
52 Apologie-, Workes, pp. 263-4.
63 Apologie-, Workes, p. 264.
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intent, conversely, was entirely different: he wanted to differentiate between
'ciuilly obedient Papists' and the 'peruerse disciples of the Powder-Treason'.64
The distinction he makes can be found in a number of his texts; it can,
furthermore, also be seen as one between moderate Catholics and zealots;
James, besides, blamed the excessive zeal for religion for the attempt against his
life.65 This zeal, moreover, was, in the King's way of thinking, associated with a
degree of superstition,66 a feature often cited by both Charron and Lipsius who
regarded it as enemy to religion and piety. James's line of reasoning and his
classification of subjects into zealots and moderates rather than Protestants and
Catholics lend substance to the view that his position was not determined by
confessional divides. His attitude can be described more as one of lenience: his
subjects' religious affiliation was not particularly important, so long as they
professed their loyalty to him. This attitude is of course strongly reminiscent of
politique doctrines, to which we saw that both Charron and Lipsius adhered. For
James, as for the advocates of politique doctrines, lawful subjects ought to
acknowledge the supreme authority of the monarch in temporal matters and
render their submission to him, while also submitting to the spiritual authority
of their Church.
In contrast to this concept of two parallel authorities, Rome maintained
(through Bellarmine's pen) that the clergy was above temporal sovereigns; they
were, consequently, 'exempted from the power of the earthly Kings'.67 The
priests' superiority to Princes, according to the Cardinal, was reflected in the
coronation ceremonial: 'The anoynting which is powred vpon the head of the
64 Apologie; Workes, p. 263. That the King was in effect partially granting toleration is generally
suggested by Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James Y; Sommerville,
'Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance'; Patterson, King
James VI and I; John J. LaRocca, in "'Who Can't Pray with Me, Can't Love Me": Toleration and
the Early Jacobean Recusancy Policy', Journal of British Studies 23 (1984), pp. 22-36.
65 Cf. for example Apologie-, Workes, pp. 248, 274; Premonition; Workes, p. 291.
66 Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 47-9.
67 Premonition; Workes, p. 296.
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King by the Priest, doeth declare that hee is inferiour to the Priest.' Bellarmine
additionally claimed that all secular power derived from men, as opposed to the
power of the Pope that derived immediately from God. Accordingly, the Holy
See had the right to depose kings from their status of authority once they were
'in fault against Christian religion'. Furthermore, it had the right to exercise its
indirect power in temporal affairs when a 'concern of faith', 'the salvation of
souls, the welfare of religion, the preservation of the Church' were at stake, or
more in general, a 'necessity of the Church' required so.68 In order to remove
any sacerdotal connotations from kingship, the Cardinal argued, moreover, that
kings were created by the people who transferred the authority to the king. The
people, however, retained their habitual power in their hands and could
withdraw it from the kings.69
In this respect, although Bellarmine seems to have recognised boundaries
between spiritual and temporal power, he nevertheless promoted the position
that some breaching was occasionally necessary, as he viewed the spiritual to
have priority over the temporal. Seen from this angle, the clerical order, as the
representative of all things divine, ought to have more influence than the lay
order. It is in this light that Bellarmine's request to Blackwell, therefore, ought to
be viewed: the Cardinal urged in his letter to the Archbishop not to prefer a
liberty in this world at the expense of a liberty in the world of God.70
For James, a different order was in place. The devout King would not
contest that celestial concerns take precedence over temporal ones - still, his
stance was plain on the fact that in this world the secular leader ought to
administer all earthly affairs. The sacerdotal element would still be under the
jurisdiction of the clergy, insofar as it involved issues of belief and spiritual
68 Cited in Murray, 'St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect power', p. 497; see also pp. 498-9. Cf.
also Apologie; Workes, p. 282.
69 Premonition; Workes, p. 331.
70 Apologie, Workes, p. 262.
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guidance. James rebutted the suggestion that anyone had the authority or the
right to interfere in civil government that was under the direct jurisdiction of the
sovereign monarch. From this perspective, and as Sarpi maintained, the Papal
claims were nothing but a usurpation of the Popes upon the temporal power of
kings, a usurpation that ran altogether counter to the writings of the Scriptures,
of the Church Fathers and ancient Councils. The conceptual framework of this
view was the fundamental notion of the separation of the divine and temporal
spheres, the same basis that Charron uses as a starting point in his twofold
examination of the divine and human wisdom. James gives it full expression in
his Premonition:
...I vtterly deny that there is an earthly Monarch thereof [of the Church], whose word
must be a Law, and who cannot erre in his Sentence, by an infallibilitie of Spirit.
Because earthly Kingdomes must haue earthly Monarches; it doeth not follow, that the
Church must haue a visible Monarch too: for the world hath not One earthly temporall
Monarch. Christ is his Churches Monarch, and the holy Ghost his Deputie: Reges gentium
dominantur eorum, vos autem non sic.71
Here we have a definite articulation of the double separation, temporal-divine
and secular-ecclesiastical; temporal bodies ought to have an earthly head; this,
however does not apply to the body of the Church, which is directly guided by
Christ. In the same model, and refuting the Papal arguments, James insisted
that, according to the Scriptures, Princes were invested with their authority by
God. Obedience was thus rendered necessary in the Christians' duties towards
God, for the sake of peace and order, even in the case of an apostate king.72
Two further parameters associated with these arguments deserve
attention so as to obtain a more rounded understanding of James's position. The
first consideration is the King's contention that Papal usurpation of power
stemmed from the Pontifical preoccupation with worldly gains at the expense of
the Papacy's pastoral duties, and which eventually led to the arrogance and
71 Premonition; Workes, p. 306
72 Cf. the example of Julian in Apologie; Workes, p. 255.
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ambition expressed in the claims for temporal supremacy - a contention,
namely, identical to Sarpi's understanding of things. The second issue involves
James's assertion that, in fact, according to Bible precepts, not only was the role
of the temporal and secular authorities entirely different and separate, but that
certain control over ecclesiastical affairs ought to be under the lay jurisdiction.
Regarding the first parameter, James founded his position, that assertions
of Papal rights in temporal things constituted infringement of their religious
duties, firmly on Sarpi's use of ecclesiastical history and the Bible. The King
emphatically declared that this late 'vsurpation of Popes ouer the temporall
power of Princes, is against the rule of all Scriptures, auncient Councels and
Fathers'.73 To substantiate this assertion to the Princes he was addressing
himself, he offered a number of examples as evidence explaining that the
primacy of the Apostolic Sea had 'slender grounds on the word of God': 'For in
all the Scripture, especially in the New Testament, I neuer read of Pontifex
Maximns',74 James did not hesitate to address the theological foundation of the
Papal claims, devoting a concise discussion on the dictum 'Pasce oves meas' and
the status of Peter among the rest of the Apostles.75 The King was particularly
sensitive to what he saw as distorted readings of Christ's instruction. Above all,
he was infuriated by the Catholic interpretation that Christ had instructed Peter
to oversee the whole world. In order to refute it, James addressed the issue from
a historical point of view, referring particularly to the lives of the Apostles, the
early years of the Church, and the Church history after the establishment of
Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire. He pointed, thus, to
many incidences from this period in time that demonstrated that in actual fact
the primacy of the Papal See was not always recognised; he uses, thus, the
73 Premonition; Workes, p. 295; cf. also ibid., p. 292.
74 Apologie; Workes, pp. 281 and 286 respectively.
75 See pp. Premonition; Workes, pp. 306-7. Cf. also ibid., p. 296.
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example of Pope Leo I (440-61) who was in contention with the Patriarch of
Constantinople as regards the primacy, pointing out that the Council of
Chalcedon (the 4th, 451 A.D.) did not recognise any privilege to the Papal See -
the Council, on the contrary, had decreed that New Rome was of the same
status as Old Rome.76
The claim for Papal supremacy in spiritual causes was regarded by
James, as by other Christians of his time - Protestant as well as Catholic - as a
novelty, a new article of faith that had not been irrefutably concluded upon:
nor yet were euer concluded, and defined by any complete generall Councell to belong
to the Popes authoritie; and their owne schoole Doctors are at irreconciliable oddes and
iarres about them77
This was especially part of the thesis of the advocates of Conciliar theory who
challenged the doctrine of Papal supremacy by insisting on conciliar check upon
potentially corrupted, ambitious, heretical or authoritarian Popes. We saw how
eloquent Sarpi had been, working within the same discourse, in revealing the
repeated evocation of this question in Trent as one that had not been settled. He
exposed the disagreements between different factions and prelates at the
Council on this issue, and he emphasised the strong voices heard throughout its
duration supporting the declaration of the Council's superiority over the Pontiff.
Needless to say, an almost natural alliance existed between the doctrines
prompted by the scandal of the Great Schism and anti-papal claims of temporal
rulers. James's criticism falls squarely within this tradition as he develops the
same body of ideas; more specifics on the subject, however, will be discussed
shortly.
In his exposition, James refutes, first the title of the universal bishop to
the Bishop of Rome, referring to Gregory the Great (Pope Gregory I, 590-640)
76 Apologie; Workes, p. 280. Cf. Walter Ulmann, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages.
(London: Methuen & Co, 1972). pp. 20, 25-6.
77 Apologie; Workes, p. 265. An interesting contradiction is apparent between Bellarmine's
positions and Cardinal Du Perron; see Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 422-3,448.
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who had refused it when it was offered to him.78 Using evidence from history,
again, James shows how Emperors and monarchs had long suffered Papal
encroachments on their authority. Among the first examples that he cites is the
humiliation of the Emperor Efenry IV by Gregory VII (1076), as an indication of
the long attempt of Popes to deprive monarchs of their estates and their habit of
using excommunication as a means for advancement in their struggle for
temporal authority. As a conclusion to this historical account James mentions
another instance, particularly close to him and therefore more intimidating:
Elizabeth's excommunication, together with the subsequent threats to her life
and the general undermining of her power as a result of this.79
James was aware of course, that the course of Caesaro-papal contests was
to a great degree dependent on the power of the two contestant parties.80 After
his list of Papal acts of aggression, he emphasises how far the emperors had
been at times from acknowledging the supremacy of the Pope. Citing several
instances to confirm his argument, he claims that it was the emperors who, in
fact, held sway over the Church, creating, controlling and deposing Popes.81 A
similar attitude was adopted by the kings, who had long denied the temporal
superiority of Rome. James paid particular attention to France, in this regard,
referring to the Pragmatic Sanction between Pius II and Louis IX (1463); he
praised the immunity of the Gallican Church, and pointed out the great
likelihood of France declaring its independence from Rome, renouncing its
obedience to the Pope and electing a Patriarch of its own.82 This possibility, it
will be recalled, and the threats by the French Crown that it would actually
78 Apologie; Workes, p. 279. See also the article on Pope Gregory I in the New Catholic Encyclopaedia
by A.C. Rush and K. Hester.
79 Apologie; Workes, pp. 272-3. For French discussions of the king's 'inexcommunicability' see
Jotham Parsons, The Church in the Republic. Gallicanism and Political Ideology in Renaissance France.
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2004), pp. 172-78.
80 Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 402-3.
81 Premonition; Workes,pp. 297-8. Also Premonition; Workes, p. 297.
82 Premonition; Workes, pp. 298-9. Cf. also Parsons, The Church in the Republic, p. 157.
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enforce it, are mentioned by Sarpi himself in the History of the Council of Trent.83
We should also be reminded of the Venetian's own fondness and frequent
references to the Gallican Church in his polemics, as well as his correspondence
with prominent Gallicans of his time. Importantly, moreover, for our purposes,
the references by Sarpi and James to the French case, as an example of defence
of the liberties of a 'National' Church against Roman claims of control, lend
substance to the argument about the supra-confessional character of the
opposition to the Papacy. As discussed in the previous chapter, such an instance
denoted a blow to Papal claims for superintending the universal Church, which,
in turn, ought to coincide with the Societas Christiana.
We should return to the point on Conciliar doctrines, however. As
referred to above, Papal claims to supremacy had been under attack for
centuries from within the Church as well. Conciliar references in James's
Premonition should not come as a surprise, then. He links them with his account
of the French Gallicanism, using the figure of Jean Gerson, and his work. The
King indicates the long subjection of the Popes to General Councils, but
mentions, most importantly, the Council of Constance - dreadful for Rome -
that had deposed three Popes.84 As we will see below, James uses many more
Conciliar references in his Remonstrancefor the Right ofKings. Despite the
constitutional resonances, thus, inherent in the Conciliar tradition, James made
the most of arguments associated with it in his rhetoric against the Papal
positions.85
Yet an association of King James - or for that matter other early
seventeenth-century authors in Britain - with Conciliar theories has not always
83 Paolo Sarpi, The History of the Council of Trent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John Bill, 1629),
pp. 423,476, 478, 796.
84 Premonition-, Workes, p. 307.
85 Cf. the eloquent title of Francis Oakley's study on Conciliarism: The Conciliarist Tradition.
Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church 1300-1870. (Oxford: OUP, 2003). Patterson reaches similar
conclusions; see King James VI and I, pp. 57-60 and 67-9.
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been obvious.86 The neglect of this aspect in studies of James's 'political' thought
must partly be explained by the problems that Conciliar theories posed to
princely authority. This does not fully justify, even so, the absence of
comprehensive studies on the Conciliar tradition in its variant in England, a
fairly important subject that is connected to a number of other issues. This
brings us to a second point, linked with this lacuna in historiography, that not
many students of political thought consider Conciliar theories necessarily
relevant to their object of study. This, in turn, refers back to the observations
made in the Introduction about the historians' preconceived notions of what
constitutes 'politics' and 'political' tracts, or theory, in our time, and whether
these are useful in studies dealing with notions and concepts almost five
centuries removed. Additionally, and perhaps not surprisingly, Conciliarism
and its links with James VI and I, has received some more attention by scholars
of Scottish 'political' thought, notably by James H. Burns and Roger Mason. The
former has demonstrated the survival and development of the Conciliar
movement in Scotland through its strong links with the University of Paris. John
Major (Maior, Mair), who taught Scottish students in Paris as well as in
Scotland, is significant in this light. Burns further indicates that it is possible to
establish a connection betweenMajor and Buchanan, the later tutor of James,
leaving room to suggest that at least some of these ideas were communicated to
the future King of England by his tutor.87
86 Some notable exceptions, however, include Charles Mcllwain, Francis Oakley, J.H.M. Salmon,
Roger Mason, William Paterson and Johann Sommerville.
87 James H. Burns, 'The Conciliarist Tradition in Scotland', Scottish Historical Review 42 (1963), pp.
89-104; on p. 102. James himself points more explicitly to a number of writers from this tradition
in his Remonstrance and invokes their arguments: 'Iohannes Maior, doctor of Paris', 'Almaines,
doctor of the Sorbonnic Schoole', 'Occams', and Gerson, who 'otherwise was a deuoute
Catholike'; Remonstrance-, Workes, pp. 418-22 The reference to Gerson is in the Premonition;
Workes, pp. 298-9. Francis Oakley suggests that he acquainted himself with the writings of these
authors through Richer's edition of 1606; in Oakley, 'Constance, Basel, and the two Pisas: The
Conciliarist Legacy in 16th- and 17th- century England', Annuarium Historiae Conciliarum 26
(1994), pp. 87-118; on p. 109. For fascinating links between Gerson, Sarpi, Richer and Bellarmine
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Hence the fact that this current of thought has attracted the attention of
historians who have either dealt with an aspect of James's reign that placed him
within a wider European context, or scholars of Scottish history - Scotland had
anotable degree of intellectual exchange with the Continent - signifies that
arguments about the English insularism or the exceptionalism of the English
case have prevented historians of English 'political' thought from exploring this
wider and wide-ranging direction.
With reference to James's arguments, in the Premonition he forthrightly
condemned the disuse of the institution of General Councils, and remarked
bitterly on the replacement of the custom by the College of the Cardinals.88 He
further scorned at the 'recent invention' of the Cardinals, citing that their
creation was associated with the Papacy of Gregory I in the seventh century.89 It
is essential to repeat that James's particular set of arguments - its Conciliar
references, the discontent with the current state of the Church, its centralisation
in the person of the Pope and the ensuing abandonment of General Councils, as
a check to papal ambitions - was identical to the one informing Sarpi's polemic.
An additional integral part of both authors' position was, evidently, the
charge that the Apostolic See itself had long been corrupted. This corruption,
they were in agreement, stemmed from the Papacy's ever-increasing hunger for
power. It was, thus, partly the result of and partly reflected in the Church's
worldliness. Although James pays due reference to the degeneration of the
Papal office, he was, clearly, not the only man of his age to think that about the
Church of Rome. This had been the rhetoric that almost a century earlier Luther
employed in his vociferous calls for Reform against the degeneration of the state
see his "'Anxieties of influence": Skinner, Figgis, Conciliarism and Early Mondern
Constitutionalism', Past and Present 151 (1996), pp. 60-110 and 'Complexities of Context: Gerson,
Bellarmine, Sarpi, Richer, and the Venetian Interdict of 1606-1607', Catholic Historical Review 82
(1996), pp. 369-396.
88 Premonition; Workes, p. 329.
89 Premonition-, Workes, p. 329.
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of the Church, and cries for reform 'in head and members' from within had
increased throughout the course of the sixteenth century.90 What is important
for our consideration, however, is the fact that for both James and Sarpi, and
contrary to what a substantial part of Roman Catholics believed, the Council
which had finally summoned in Trent had failed in its purpose.91 We have
examined in depth Sarpi's thesis that this long-awaited Council did not bring
about the necessary reforms of the abuses, but had, instead, made the conditions
of the Church worse, by asserting the Papal supremacy. By the same token,
James was adamant, in repeating the assertion that there had not been a proper
Council to deliberate on the questions raised by the Reformers.92
To focus on the argument as it is developed, the King emphasised in his
tracts the novelty of the Papacy's claims. Far from being similes Petro the Popes
had lapsed into an unprecedented vanity and arrogance that made them equate
themselves with Gods upon earth:
But how they are now come to be Christs Vicars, nay Gods on earth, triple-crowned,
Kings of heauen, earth and hell, Iudges of all the world, and none to iudge them; Heads
of the faith, Absolute deciders of all Controuersies by the infallibility of their spirit,
hauing all power both Spirituall and Temporall in their hands; the high Bishops,
Monarches of the whole earth, Superiours to all Emperours and Kings; yea, Supreme
Vice-gods, who whether they will or not cannot erre: how they are now come (I say) to
the toppe of greatnesse, I know not: but sure I am, Wee that are KINGS haue greatest
neede to looke vnto it. As for me, Paul and Peter I know, but these men I know not: And
yet to doubt of this, is to denie the Catholique faith.. ,93
90 Cf. Michael A. Mullett, The Catholic Reformation (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); ch.
1.
91 See John Jeffries Martin, 'Religion, Renewal and Reform in the Sixteenth-Century' in John A.
Marino (ed.), Early Modern Italy, 1550-1796. (Oxford and New York: OUP, 2002). Cf. also William
Bouwsma, 'Venice, Spain and the Papacy: Paolo Sarpi and the Renaissance Tradition' in E.
Cochrane (ed.) The Late Italian Renaissance (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 353-376; on p. 356; Cf.
also Oakley, 'Complexities of Context' who with regards to the Bull Exercabilis that forbade
reference to future Councils suggests that this 'was viewed less as an authoritative
pronouncement than as a statement of the views of one particular faction': p. 379; cf. also pp.
385,389-91.
92 Cf. for example Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 423, 448.
93 Premonition; Workes, p. 307; the reference to similes Petro is in Apologie; Workes, p. 270.
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This form of corruption and the worldliness that went alongside it were for
James unmistakeably manifested, first and foremost in the dishonest manner
that the Popes were elected.94
It is useful to recall, that these were some of the elements that led Sarpi to
the claim above and beyond his fundamental principle of separate jurisdictions,
that the institution of the Church ought to be overseen by temporal monarchs.
Yet James's views on this point are much stronger than that of the consigliere di
stato. Whereas Sarpi's suggestions in that direction appear rather tentative and
are contingent on his audience, James was much firmer in declaring that the
secular authorities should control the Church. This apparent divergence in
opinions, however slight it may be, can be accounted for by a number of factors.
James's troubled background in Scotland had undoubtedly contributed a great
deal in the formation of a much more resolute attitude regarding the position
and the role of the clergy within a polity. In addition to their dissimilar
backgrounds, and from a different perspective, an important factor in the way
the two figures expressed themselves was the difference in rank. James was
writing from a greater position of power - and whatever his fears might have
been in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot for a possible excommunication,
he was still the sovereign of three Kingdoms, and resided considerably further
away from Rome than Sarpi. Advocating, thus, a position as drastic as the
subjection of the Church to temporal authorities was potentially more
dangerous for the Friar, who was a subject and subordinate to the Venetian
Senate, in whose defence he was employed to write. Venice was furthermore, in
a more vulnerable position and was in urgent need of the international support,
as there were already rumours circulating with regard to Spanish preparations
94 Cf. Premonition-, Workes, p. 332.
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for attack.95 James's potential danger on the other hand came primarily from his
subjects, whom he would not necessarily convince through his writings; rather,
his texts formed part of his 'foreign policy'.
These differences are manifested in their respective texts. While Sarpi
used the motto 'Give to Caesar what amounts to Caesar and to God what
amounts to God' as a justification and support for the separation of ecclesiastical
and political jurisdiction, James's use took the connotations of the same motto a
step further. The King employed the two proverbs in order to assert the rule of
the Kings over the Church, as was, after all, inscribed in the Bible:
In the old Testament Kings were directly Governors over the Church within their
Dominions, purged their corruptions; reformed their abuses [...] And as to the New
Testament ... Gine vnto Caesar what is Caesars, and to God what is Gods. Regnum meum non
est huius mundi... If these examples, sentences, titles, and prerogatiues, and innumerable
other in the Olde and New Testament doe not warrant Christian Kings, within their
owne dominions, to gouerne their Church, as well as the rest of their people, in being
Custodes vtriusque Tebulae, not by making new Articles of Faith, (which is the Popes
office as I said before) but by commanding obedience to be giuen to the word of God, by
reforming the religion according to his prescribed will, by assisting the spirituall power
with the temporal sword, by reforming of corruptions, by procuring due obedience to
the Church, by iudging, and cutting off all friuolous questions and schisms, as
Constantine did.. .[my italics]96
This passage is crucial as it encapsulates all of James's main views as to the type
of involvement he envisaged the King to have in ecclesiastical matters. The
extract points to the Prince's role as protector of both tables of the Decalogue,
that is, guardian of the people's duties towards God and towards one another.
According to James, it was not in the kings' jurisdiction to have a say in
doctrinal matters, but it was their responsibility to command obedience,
implement reformation of abuses, and eliminate heresies and schisms; to assist,
in other words, the 'spiritual power with the temporal sword'.
95 This was particularly the case after the signing of the truce in the Low Countries in 1609, that
freed Spain for action in Italy; see Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 116-7; Bouwsma, Venice and
the Defense, p. 502.
96 Apology; Workes, p. 284.
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The extract alludes, moreover, to the historical aspect of the problem, of
which James was very conscious. By using the Emperor Constantine as a case in
point, James, like Sarpi, referred to an ideal past where the Emperor had
granted Christianity its role as the official religion of the state, while retaining at
the same time the imperial authority and control over the Church. Constantine
had notably demonstrated his role as protector of the Church by summoning the
first Ecumenical (General) Council in Nicaea under his auspices, to deliberate on
the heresy of Arius (325 A.D.). James was therefore keen to emphasise the
subjection of Councils to the Emperor throughout the early years of Christianity
as the official religion of the Roman Empire, pointing to the first four General
Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople (381 A.D.), Ephesus (431 A.D.), Chalcedon
(451 A.D.), and repeating his claim that kings were God's Lieutenants on earth.97
James's most decisive argument, however, against the Papal positions was a
reference to the circumstances of the primitive Church:
Neither was it euer doubted by any Christian in the Primitiue Church, that the Apostles,
or any other degree of Christians, were subiect to the Emperour.98
This was a crucial point. Christianity, ultimately, had been born and
flourished within an organised polity, the Empire. Of particular importance in
this regard was the practice in the primitive Church of adapting to the political
structure of the Empire, thus essentially recognising its subjection to it.99 As this
97 Apologie; Workes, p. 280. For James's association with Constantine in literature and
iconography see James Doelman, King James I and the Religious Culture ofEngland (Cambridge:
CUP, 2000), pp. 73, 79-83,100.
98 Premonition; Workes, p. 331.
99 Similar arguments were raised by Gallican theorists, since after all in France the physical
divisions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction followed exactly that late-antique administrative
geography to which the Roman law referred: 'The Christian law having come into the world
under the Roman Empire [and] while the dominion of that people was widely distributed in
diverse regions and provinces', its hierarchy followed the divisions of the empire; cited in
Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 156.
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was a widely known and accepted fact, why did the relationship between
Christianity and Empire have to be renegotiated in any way?100
Clearly, the implementation of such a view with all its connotations
would substantiate Bellarmine's assertion that James's intention was to transfer
the authority of the Church of England from the Pope to the King himself.101 Yet
the King was careful enough to underplay the full extent of the implications of
his views and to qualify it by differentiating between the role of the 'guardian'
of the Church and the role of 'leader' of the Church, although he did emphasise
that the authority of the Church rested on the head of the King.102 This subtle
variation on the same theme raises, of course, a number of issues pertaining to
the relationship between theory and practice, as discussed in the Introduction.
Regardless of how attractive the notion of a Church subject to the head of the
State might have seemed to James, this did not necessarily mean that it was an
easy task to realise. Furthermore, as mentioned above, his rhetoric was tailored
according to the audience. Hence, when James wrote more directly for the
consideration of his subjects, it will be seen shortly, he felt he could be much
more assertive and authoritative. This shift of emphasis will become more
apparent when we examine some of his writings while in Scotland and at the
first summoning of the Parliament after his accession to the English throne.
Our next stop before that, however, is the tract that the Stuart King
authored in response to debates in France concerning the imposition of an oath
similar to his Oath of Allegiance. The Remonstrance for the Right ofKings and the
Independance of their Crownes (1615/16), published under the King's name, was
another tract concerned with problems in the international arena. It was written
in defence of a proposal of the Third Estate during the Estates General of 1614,
i°o Walter Ullmann, Principles ofGovernment and Politics in the Middle Ages. (London: Methuen &
Co, 1961), pp. 110-14, and idem, Short History of the Papacy, ch. 1.
101 Apologie; Workes, p. 260.
102 Apologie; Workes, p. 279.
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and in the aftermath of Henry IV's assassination to impose an oath that would
confirm the subject's loyalty to the Crown.103 Moreover, the tract that was
published first in French (1615) and in English the year after, was a response to
the oration of Cardinal du Perron, the person who had been responsible for
dissuading the Estates from approving the measure.104
Although its greater part was authored by the Calvinist pastor Pierre du
Moulin,105 the Remonstrance followed lines of reasoning similar to James's
arguments in the two texts immediately associated with the Oath of Allegiance
Controversy. Using arguments drawn from conciliar theory, and a considerable
degree of historical evidence, the text presented a number of contentions: it
maintained the limits between temporal and spiritual jurisdiction; the novelty of
the Papal claims to supremacy in temporal matters and the common interest of
the secular authorities in their struggle against the Papacy. In advancing the last,
the Remonstrance repeatedly cited the Gallican liberties, and made frequent
allusions to the parallels between the French case, the English case and the
Venetian interdiction. The tract also called attention to the corruption of the
Apostolic See and the role of the Councils as a check to Papal power; it touched
upon the decline of the role of the General Councils, and raised the standard
criticism that Protestant grievances had not been addressed adequately in a
Council so far. A further point that the Remonstrance highlighted was the
apparent widespread disagreement of the Papal side as to the extent of the
Papal deposing power and the grounds required for a deposition, pointing out
103 See J.M. Hayden, France and the Estates General of 1614. (Cambridge: CUP, 1974), ch. 8; the text
of the proposed article is on pp. 131-2.
104 See Patterson, James VI and I, p. 183. See also Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 389-90.
105 Willson, 'James I and his Literary Assistants', p. 50.
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the difference of opinion between Bellarmine and Cardinal du Perron on this
issue.106
More specifically, some attention is due to a few of the more interesting
and pertinent themes of the text. In this tract James appears distinctly concerned
with the problem of obedience to the monarch and he diligently aims at
discrediting resistance theories which were flourishing.107 Directing his criticism
towards the second estate, he underlined the fact that the clergy had been the
root of recent uprisings, both in France as well as in England:
Now, haue not all the calamities, which the third Estate haue sought prouidently to
preuent; have they not all sprang from the Clergie, as from their proper and naturall
fountaine? From whence did the last ciuill warres, wherein a world of blood was not
more profusely then prodigiously and vnnaturally spilt, .... From whence did these
bloodie warres proceed, but from the deposing of the said king [Henry III] by the Head
of the Church? Were they not Prelates, Curats and Confessours; were they not
Ecclesiastics, who partly by seditious preachments, and partly and partly by secret
confessions, powred many a iarre of oyle vpon this flame? Was not he that killed the
forenamed King, was not he one of the Clergie? Was not Guignard a Iesuite? Was not
Iohn Chastel brought vp in the same schoole? Did not Rauaillac that monster of men, ...
did not he referre his examiners to the Sermons made the Lent next before ... Are not
Bellarmine, Eudaemonoiohannes, Suarez, Becanus, Mariana, with such other monsters, who
teach the doctrine of patricides ... are they not all Clerics? ... What were the heads, the
chiefe promoters, the complices of the powder-conspiracie in my Kingdome? were they
not Ecclesiastics? ... Is it not also the general belief of that order, that clerics are exempted
from the condition of subjects to the king? 108
This feature was indicative of the King's fundamental belief that the clergy
ought to obey the civil authorities of the state in which they resided, since they
were subjects of an earthly kingdom. As he often stressed, the offenders during
the Gunpowder Plot had been tried as traitors and punished by civil authorities,
and not on the basis of their religious allegiance. He established, furthermore,
106 Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 422-3,448. It is also worth remembering that Bellarmine's work
was not accepted by the Pope as granting very limited authority and was placed under the
Index; cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations ofModern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP,
1978); vol. II, p. 180.
107 See Skinner, Foundations ofModern Political Thought, vol. II, Part Three, pp. 189-348. (Chs. 7-9).
108 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 393.
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that it was possible to obey the clergy while at the same time remaining loyal to
the monarch, and the other way round.109
James once more accused Rome of crossing the boundaries of the
spiritual domain, on the grounds that Popes in the past had, in fact,
excommunicated and deprived Princes of their Estates for purely civil reasons,
such as the control of monastic privileges and revenues, or the granting of
Benefices, as well as adultery and matrimonial matters (cf. Sarpi).110 This went
contrary even to the claims of the Papal publicists who professed that the Pope's
deposing power was applicable in cases of heresy, apostasy or infidelity, cases
that James seemed to concede to their jurisdiction.
James traced the origin of these abuses, like Sarpi, to the transformation
of the heir of St. Peter's Seat into a temporal monarchy:
For by such deceitfull, craftie, and cunning practises, the nature of the Pontificall See,
merely spirituall, is changed into the Kings-bench-Court, merely temporall: the Bishops
chaire is changed into a Monarchs Throne. And not onely so; but besides, the sinners
repentance is changed into a snare of pitfall of cousening deceit; and St. Peters net is
changed into a casting-net or a flew, to fish for all the wealth of most flourishing
Kingdomes.111
The transformation had absolutely no foundation in Scripture, according to
James; on the contrary, it was the result of a long struggle between Rome and a
series of secular monarchs. It was only, moreover, fully brought about with the
Papacy's impinging on temporal affairs at a period when princes were suffering
temporary setbacks. James commented a great deal, in this respect, on the role of
Pope Gregory VII, who famously excommunicated the Emperor Henry IV and
forced him to appear in the guise of penitent.112 He also drew attention to the
corruption that had been plaguing the Curia for the last three to five centuries,
109 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 433.
110 Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, p. 389; see also pp. 396-7. For the same themes, see Sarpi, History,
pp. 220-21,250-51, 664-68, 697-701, 736-37.
111 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 477.
112 Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp.402-3. For the episode, see Ulmann, Short History of the Papacy,
pp. 154-60.
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mockingly commenting that if one were to judge the legitimacy of the elected
person's position based on whether simony, canvasses or bribery had been
used, there would 'hardly be found two lawfull Popes in the three last ages'.113
The issue of the conciliar check upon Papal power features more
prominently in this tract than the other two considered earlier. It is reasonable to
suppose that the French origin of the primary author should account for this
preference; one should also keep in mind, in this respect, that as the text was
initially addressed to a French audience, Conciliar references would increase its
appeal. The Remonstrance names in this vein a long tradition of Conciliar authors
and cites some of the central themes in their writings.114 It also makes frequent
references to the Councils of Constance and Pisa, the former considered as
highly problematic by the Papal side, and the latter condemned as heretical
('Conciliabulum').115 The text above all reprimands the decline of the role,
function and purpose of the General Councils, especially in light of the
appropriation by the Pontiff of the prerogative of their summoning.116 The
author is explicit that Councils ought to be summoned by the secular rulers, as it
was the custom in the early years of the Church. The Emperors then made good
use of Councils by moderating the Synods, by assessing whether the prelates
had come to decisions that would endanger the order of the Empire, by judging
whether the final decrees were in accordance with decrees of earlier Synods and
ultimately, by executing the Decrees.117
Crucially, James referred finally to the view that Trent had not been a fair
Council, since it did not provide a forum where the Protestant grievances would
be heard and seriously addressed.
113 Remonstrance-, Workes, p. 413.
114 Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 417, 418-22.
115 Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 414,424.
116 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 423.
117 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 427.
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[Arian's doctrines] powerfully convicted by Gods word, and lawfully condemned by the
ancient general councils, where they were permitted and admitted to plead their own
cause in person. But as for the trewth professed by me, and those of the reformed
Religion, it was neuer yet hissed out of the Schooles, nor cast out of any Council, ...
where both sides haue bene heard with like indifferencie.
Yea, what Council soeuer hath bene offered vnto vs in these latter times, it hath bene
proposed with certaine presuppositions: as, That his Holinesse (beeing a partie in the
cause, and consequently to come vnder iudgement as it were to the barre vpon his triall)
shall be the Iudge of Assize with Commission of Oyer and Determiner: it shall be
celebrated in a citie of no safe accesse, without safe conduct or conuoy to come or goe at
pleasure, and without danger: it shall be assembled of such persons with free suffrage
and voice, as vphold this rule 118
That much in this extract reminds us of the view conveyed in Sarpi's
monumental work on the eponymous Council should not surprise us, given the
affinity that we have indicated between the positions of the two figures. James
seems further to share Sarpi's view that all that was accomplished in Trent was
a reaffirmation and continuation of authoritarian Papal policies, and absurd
claims. He also very interestingly identified with Sarpi's exasperation on the
issue of the Reformation of the Princes, a decree that both saw as effectively
validating Papal claims for temporal interference.119 Last but not least, the
Remonstrance draws attention to the common cause of all the temporal powers,
frequently praising the liberties of the Gallican Church, while also expressing
admiration for the Venetian position during the Republic's recent confrontation
with the Papacy.120
Overall, however, the most striking feature that a parallel examination of
Sarpi's History and the above tracts reveal, is the extent to which these two
ostensibly distant authors - in fact more, if one includes James Monatgu,
Lancelot Andrewes, Pierre du Moulin and others - drew from the same body of
thought, that was a collection of distinct elements of Conciliar notions, marked
arguments on the separation of jurisdictions, and an abundance of historical
118 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 448.
119 Remonstrance; Workes, p. 449. See also Appendix VII for the Reformation of the Princes.
120 See for example Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 382,393, 394,414,416, 417,418-22,424,452,482.
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evidence from the imperial and ecclesiastical history.121 One could perhaps
argue that in the specific historical conjuncture of the almost contemporaneous
Gunpowder Plot and the subsequent controversy over the Oath of Allegiance,
the aftermath of the Venetian Interdict, the assassination of Henry IV, and the
attempt to implement an equivalent of the Oath of Allegiance, the authors
involved read and composed their tracts in a similar language. This is in
keeping, for instance, with the overflow of re-edition of Conciliar tracts during
this period that Francis Oakley and others have argued for. The case of James is
instructive, in this respect, however, because a consideration of his earlier work
illustrates that he did not arrive at these conclusions after his assumption of the
English throne in 1603 and his subsequent exchanges with the Papal side.
Remarkably - and this is a point which scholars of the King's 'political' thought
do not usually take into account - he had expressed the bases (if not all) of his
views in his earlier writings, some of which we will now briefly turn our
attention to.
ii. Intellectual and Experiential Background: Two Treatises on Government
James's two first most celebrated treatises of government, the True Lawe ofFree
Monarchies (1598) and the Basilikon Doron (1599) are works of consideration. To
understand them properly, it is necessary first to give some details about the
historical circumstances surrounding their composition.122
121 Cf. Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 168.
122 For thoughtful examinations of the treatises in question and their historical context see Roger
A. Mason, 'George Buchanan, James VI and the Presbyterians' and 'James VI, George Buchanan
and the True Lawe ofFree Monarchies', both in idem, (ed.), Kingship and the Commonweal. Political
Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998); see also his
earlier 'Rex Stoicus: George Buchanan, James VI and the Scottish Polity' in John Dwyer et. al.
(eds.) New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture ofEarly Modern Scotland (Edinburgh 1982), pp. 9-
33; Wormald, 'James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trew Law ofFree Monarchies: the Scottish
Context and the English Translation' in Peck (ed.), Mental World; Alan R. MacDonald, The
Jacobean Kirk, 1567-1625. Sovereignty, Polity and Liturgy. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 87-9.
264
Both texts have been treated as royal assertions of a king eager to
establish his emerging position as the ruler of a heretofore unstable kingdom;
and they certainly were.123 They expressed James's attempt to refute flourishing
resistance theories. In so doing, the two texts described the opposition that the
Stuart King had experienced from mutinous nobles and the ecclesiastical
establishment. The latter had been very effective in promoting 'parity' in
principles of polity, in accordance with the religious reformation that had taken
place largely in defiance of the crown in Scotland. The texts thus constituted, to
a great degree, responses to Presbyterian elements in Scotland, which had
endorsed principles put forward by George Buchanan. They were also,
however, the articulation of James's perception of his role as a king, and were
written, at the point when he felt most confident about his ability to direct the
affairs of his kingdom, having successfully dealt with factional and ecclesiastical
opposition. This had not been an easy task; despite having been crowned at the
young age of thirteen months, it was not before the age of eighteen that James
managed to take hold of his regime (November 1585). It took almost another
decade before he began to contend with the challenges he felt the Kirk posed to
his rule. The politics of religion had played an important role throughout
James's reign. To begin with, he had himself been the object of predominantly
factional struggles almost from his birth - his captivity was, after all, the result
of fears that his Catholic mother and her husband would reverse the
Reformation in Scotland. The rest of his minority saw feuds about who would
have control over the young king, as a result of which he was trusted to a
number of successive regents. Rival factions in Scotland, however, to a greater
or lesser extent, also meant rival religious orientation.
123 Cf. Roger Mason: 'There are not many kings who have felt the need to go into print to explain
to their subjects why it is that they ought to be obeyed'; in 'George Buchanan, James VI and the
Presbyterians', p. 195. Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 75-89.
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Problems with regard to religion did not end there, however. Regardless
of how revolutionary it had been, the Reformation in Scotland had left a number
of issues unresolved. Although, for instance, the authority of the Pope had been
abolished in 1560 by the Parliament, it had not been declared who or what
would be the new head of the Church.124 On the one hand Mary had regarded
the Reformation as illegal, although in practice she was forced to tolerate it, and
on the other, the succession of regents during James's minority had not resolved
the question of headship in a definite way.125 The result was that, by James's
time, Scotland had a Calvinist Kirk largely grown outside the crown's control
and alongside the structure of the old church; an act of uniformity was not
imposed on pre-Reformation clergy until 1573.126 In real terms, this amounted to
two problems. First, there were fundamental questions about the polity of the
Church, centring on whether a system of oversight would be exercised through
a form of episcopacy or by a system which involved ministerial control through
presbyteries, first introduced in 1581. Closely associated with this question was
the issue pf royal prerogative, first firmly set out in James VI's reign in the
'Black Acts' parliament of 1584. Secondly, on the question of the fate of the
remaining adherents to Catholicism, the Kirk was adamant that measures ought
to be taken against potentially subversive Catholic Scottish magnates - they
either had to be expelled, excommunicated or coerced to denounce their
allegiance to Rome. James, nonetheless, particularly on the last issue felt that the
Kirk's demands purported to interference with affairs of the state, since for
124 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland. (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 192;
MacDonald, The Jacobean Kirk, pp. 6-7.
125 The Concordat of Leith in 1572, for instance, was a settlement that was intended to operate as
an interim; MacDonald, Jacobean Kirk, p. 11.
126 Patterson, King James VI and I, p. 7; Mason, 'George Buchanan, James VI and the
Presbyterians', p. 197.
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political reasons he deemed it necessary to tolerate the powerful Catholic
families of Scotland.127
The standard interpretation of the reign of James VI tells the story of the
strong opposition he had to face in his effort to subdue the presbyteries, impose
episcopacies and control the Kirk according to the principle of divine rule. The
same story tells of the opposition his policies met with, on the grounds of the
theory of the Two kingdoms', namely the separation of sacerdotal and civil
jurisdictions. A number of concerns, nevertheless, have been recently raised
against this common view of James's reign, and new emphasis has been placed
on the impact James's policy of toleration towards the Catholic earls (the Earl of
Huntly in particular) had in uniting the Kirk against the King.128 From this point
of view, Alan R. MacDonald has argued, the doctrine of the 'two kingdoms' was
not part of everyday language. It was only raised as a part of a crisis that had
eventually reached a head over James's leniency towards the Catholic magnates.
In this sense, the greater 'question of where ultimately authority lay', became
'entangled' with the specific confrontation.129 Be that as it may, it is important
from our perspective to stress two aspects: first, that in cases of urgency this sort
of argument was indeed employed, second, regardless of whether the Kirk and
advocators of the 'two kingdoms' theories represented a real threat or not,
127 James had a number of reasons for tolerating the Catholic magnates: first, at least before 1603
he did not have the power to effectively control them. Secondly, such demonstrations of good
will towards Catholics were important in the crucial period of the last two decades of the
sixteenth century, when Spanish power at its height and when there was so much Spanish
activity in the Low Countries. Lastly, the Kirk was especially agitated about James's favourite,
the earl of Huntly - but of course, James would not give up his favourite because the Kirk told
him to do so.
128 See Alan R. MacDonald, who has shown that that the supporters of the liberties of the Kirk
had gradually been won over by the King; Jacobean Kirk, p. 82.
129 In Scotland, 'thair is twa Kings and twa Kingdomes ... Thair is Chryst Jesus the King, and his
Kingdome the Kirk, whase subject King James the Saxt is, and of whase kingdome nocht a king,
nor a lord, nor a heid, bot a member'; from Andrew Melville's diary, cited in MacDonald,
Jacobean Kirk, p. 64; cf. also p. 71.
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James conducted his policies and composed his texts, with the assumption of
their existence.130
The Trew Law ofFree Monarchies and the Basilikon Doron were composed
after James had resolved to assert a greater control over the Church in the
aftermath of the disturbing riot in Edinburgh (1596).131 This spirit, as a result,
permeates both tracts, as James stressed in them a great deal more the kingly
duties of overseeing the conduct of the Church, than in the tracts already
examined. Yet the basic premises behind these two texts are similar to the ones
underpinning the tracts associated with the controversy over the Oath of
Allegiance. The author still touched upon the limits between the spiritual and
civil jurisdiction, but here he was keen primarily to underline the limitations of
the jurisdiction of the clergy, justifying a certain degree of royal control of the
Church on the grounds of the special relationship that he believed existed
between kings and God. From a slightly different perspective, thus, the Basilikon
Doron insists that spiritual officers ought not to interfere with affairs of the state:
And when any of the spirituall office-bearers in the Church, speaketh vnto you any thing
that is well warranted by the word, reuerence and obey them as the heraulds of the most
high God: but, if passing that bounds, they vrge you to embrace any of their fantasies in
the place of Gods word, or would colour their particulars with a pretended zeale,
acknowledge them for no other then vaine men, exceeding the bounds of their calling;
and according to your office, grauely & with authority redact them in ordour againe.132
The above passage is indicative not only for its firmness in proclaiming the
boundaries within which the Church ought to operate, but also for the
widespread resentment it echoes. The latter is, of course, related to the bitter
experiences that James had from his early years, as is evident from another
extract from the same treatise. There James speaks of the animosity he had to
deal with during his rule, not because of his person but because of extremist
130 MacDonald, Jacobean Kirk, pp. 64-7; 72-3; Mason, 'George Buchanan, James VI and the
Presbyterians', pp. 195-202, 212-14.
131 MacDonald, Jacobean Kirk, pp. 67-74.
132 Basilikon Doron, pp. 49-51.
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religious teachings, according to which 'all Kings and Princes were naturally
enemies to the libertie of the Churche'.133 Throughout both the Trew Law and the
Basilikon Doron James appears at once acutely aware of and concerned by the
threat posed to the order of the state by people who feel directly subject to God
without the mediation of God's lieutenants on earth, the kings. As James writes,
religious 'purists' of this sort held the civil magistrates in contempt; from their
point of view, their own personal relationship with God was the criterion
dictating everything else with regards to their conduct on earth.134 The rhetoric
of the two separate spheres in this sense was useful to a King trying to reassert
his authority over people who only recognised a voluntary and nominal
subjection to their earthly monarch. In other words, religious zealots of this kind
did not recognise any division between the divine and the temporal spheres, or
if they did, they dismissed the temporal as insignificant, 'temporary', and
entirely dependent on the celestial.
All the same, it is essential to recognise the significance of James's
modifications to the standard rhetoric in terms of his political attitude, as a
skilful policy-maker who was able to manipulate his way through established
principles while maintaining balance and moderation. By using the same
language, he was able to shift the boundaries of the lay and spiritual domain so
that he would incorporate into his area of influence some jurisdiction over the
institution of the Church as well. His texts, accordingly, are more concerned
with indicating the limitations of spiritual jurisdiction rather than delineating
the boundaries between the two sorts of authorities. This finds further
expression in the fact that the King sees God as the sole judge of princely
actions. Commenting on the reigns of Nebuchadnezzar and Nero, for instance,
James points out that even in these two extreme cases God still ordained His
133 Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9; cf. also pp. 145-7.
134 Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9; cf. also pp. 16,47-9.
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people to subject themselves to the respective kings, following the dictum 'Give
to Caesar what amounts to Caesar and to God what amounts to God'.135
This fits perfectly with James's world-view, according to which kings are
not ordinary people: their office requires them to be in-between the two realms,
the temporal and the divine. This standpoint and the King's stress on his strong
bond with the Creator is particularly apparent from the structure of James's
mirror for Princes, where he discusses the king's duties first in relation to God,
and then to his subjects. This is also the meaning of the image James uses, of the
king as the custodian of both tables, the first one being man's duties towards
God and the second one referring to our duties towards our neighbours.136 The
king is appointed by God with the responsibility to procure for the welfare of
his subjects' souls and bodies; his vocation is established by the oath he takes in
his coronation, according to which he ought to maintain religion.137 James has a
very clear notion of the kingly office; for him, the king upholds two professions:
as he often reiterates, the King has two callings.138 Similarly, and equally
graphically, he advises his son Henry to wear his clothes in a 'middle forme,
inter Togatos & Paludatos':
...wearing your cloathes in a carelesse, yet comelie forme: keeping in them a middle
forme, inter Togatos & Paludatos; betwixt the grauitie of the one, and lightenesse of the
other. Thereby to signifie, that by your calling ye are mixed of both the professions;
Togatus [:citizen], as a judge making and pronouncing the lawe; paludatus [:soldier], by
the power of the sword: as your office is likewise mixed, betwixt the Ecclesiasticall and
ciuill estate. For a King is not mere laicus, as both the Papistes and Anabaptistes would
haue him, to whiche error also the Puritanes incline ouer- farre.139
135 True Lawe, p. 69.
136 Basilikon Doron, pp. 145-7. James uses the same simile in the Apologie; see Workes, p. 284.
137 True Lawe, pp. 61-2. Cf. the Sonnet in Basilikon Doron, p. 5.
138 Basilikon Doron, p. 53. In this respect, cf. also the influential study by Ernst H. Kantorowicz,
The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
UP, 1957).
139 Basilikon Doron, p. 173.
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Along the same lines, James insists that one of the most important elements of
good kingship is for the Prince to be a 'louing nourish-father to the Churche'.140
It is against this background that we need to place the Scottish king's policy in
the model of that of the Emperor Constantine, to summon, preside and regulate
the agenda of the General Assembly of the Kirk.141 With regard to the image and
example of Constantine, a further point needs to be made. Although identifying
'influences' in James's Basilikon Doron is a complicated task, it has been
suggested with very interesting connotations, that some of its sources are
Byzantine.142 This possibility is especially worthy of note, as it fits very well with
the idea of James consciously fashioning himself according to the example of the
early Christian Roman Emperors. First established by Constantine, the
perpetuation of this model was to be found not in Rome any more, but in the
Byzantine Empire.143 There the Emperor was responsible for maintaining the
welfare of the Church, and convening and presiding over General Councils.
This was the same system that James had pursued in Scotland, and it was in
accordance with both his Scottish experience, as well as the Imperial tradition,
that James proposed the responsibility of the temporal rulers in presiding over a
General Council convened with the purpose of discussing the divisions of the
Universal Church.
140 Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3.
141 See Alan R. Macdonald, 'James VI and the General Assembly, 1586-1618', in Julian Goodare
and Michael Lynch (eds.), The Reign ofJames VI. (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), pp. 170-185,
and idem, Jacobean Kirk, esp. chs. 2 and 3. Cf. Basilikon Doron, 145-7.
142 See Ihor Sevcenco, 'Agapetus East and West: The Fate of a Byzantine "Mirror of Princes",
Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeenes XVI (Bucharest, 1978), pp. 3-44 reprinted in idem (ed.),
Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982), ch. 3; on p.
19. Sevcenco, moreover, refers to comments by Jean Hotman, the French translator of the work,
who had also suggested that in writing the Basilikon Doron James had been inspired by three
'mirrors for Princes' of Byzantine origin (ibid, note 54). I am particularly grateful to Professor
Michael Angold for this reference.
143 The literature on the subject is vast; see indicahvely, however, the seminal study by Gilbert
Dagron, Emperor and Priest. The Imperial Office in Byzantium. Trans, by Jean Birrell (Cambridge:
Past and Present Publications, CUP 2003); Walter Ulmann also offers concise and insightful
points in Principles ofGovernment, pp. 110-14 and in Short History of the Papacy, ch. 1.
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Additionally, James's perception of the potential threat posed by
religious extremists was associated with his conviction that religious reform was
also among the duties and responsibilities of kingship. We can relate this in turn
to the King's view of the Church being prone to 'Pride, Ambition and Auarice',
an issue that drew strong views from Sarpi as we have seen.144 The Basilikon
Doron contains, thus, an extraordinary exposition and criticism of the way in
which the Reformation came about in Scotland, from the bottom up rather than
the Crown's initiative, namely the way it ought to have happened, according to
James.
But the reformation of Religion in Scotland, being extraordinarily wrought by God,
wherein many things were inordinately done by a populare tumult & rebellion, of suche
as blindly were doing the work of God, but clogged with their owne passions &
particular respects, as well appeared by the destruction of our policie; and not
proceeding from the Princes ordour, as it did in our neighbour country of England, as
likewise in Denmarke, and sundry parts of Germanie; some fierie spirited men in the
ministerie gote such a guyding of the people at the time of confusion, as finding the
guste of gouernment sweete, they begouth to fantasie to themselues a Democratick
forme of gouernment: and hauing (by the inquity of time) bene ouer-well baited vpon
the wracke, first of my Grandmother, and next of my owne mother, and after vsurping
the liberty of the time in my long minority, settled themselues so faste vpon that
imagined Democracie, as they fed themselues with the hope to become Tribuni plebes:
and so in a populare gouernment by leading the people by the nose, to beare the sway of
all the rule.145
This extract shows in a very clear and unambiguous way the intermingling of
political with religious elements and how a religious reformation from below
would also imply a political revolution and the establishment of a 'Democratic'
form of government, the most abhorrent of polities for the period under
scrutiny. Such an intermingling, moreover, was a threat to the social order of the
state; the destructive traits of such an intermingling, as the bloody contentions
of that period bore witness to, confirmed the urgent cry for a strong
authoritative government that would control the public face of religion, the
exclusion of religion from the affairs of the state, and the separation of religion
144 Basilikon Doron, pp. 73-5.
145 Basilikon Doron, p. 75.
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and politics. The work of both Pierre Charron and Justus Lipsius attested to the
shifting religious, social and intellectual attitudes and the altering intellectual
atmosphere with regard to the notions of public and private, political and
religious.
The universality of these issues and the widespread concern about the
intertwining of politics and religion is above all evident, in this case, in James's
references to the troubles afflicting France at the time. James's understanding of
this situation and the problems the French Crown faced from extreme preachers
'of whatsoeuer religion' was indicative of his appreciation of the affinities of the
situation there, and problems that he had to face in the early years of his reign.
Fie was thus categorical in condemning the French uprisings as pure rebellion
disguised under the 'cloak of religion' and was extremely disconcerted with the
Catholic League's opposition to the lawful king's inheriting the throne.146 His
attitude towards Catholic zealots, the Liguers, was of course a reflection of his
own feelings towards the Puritans and the opposition that he himself had met in
Scotland. Consequently, James's fundamental principle of rule throughout his
reign was the pursuit of a middle way between the two extreme sides of the
religious spectrum that he viewed as equivalent.147 The King's moderation is an
important aspect in this examination, in that it leads us to the next point that
will concern us here, that of his policies as an attempt to conciliate subjects from
both ends of the religious spectrum.
iii. Parallel Writings - Religions Unity and Division
Throughout his reign, spanning over three kingdoms and over forty years,
James did his utmost to maintain a policy of balance between the two extremes
of the adherents to Rome, and the advocates of 'pure' and complete reform. He
146 Cf. True Lawe, pp. 80-1, and p. 68.
147 Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3.
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made a more comprehensive exposition of this specific stance and a delineation
of his religious policy in his first address to Parliament, to which we will now
briefly turn our attention. In his speech of 19 March 1604 James clearly divided
his subjects into three categories, according to their religious outlook: the one
professing the 'trew religion', namely the one that he himself professed; the
Catholics; and lastly what he called 'not really a religion', but rather a 'sect', the
Puritans. He categorically pronounced his intention of not persecuting his
Catholic subjects, as he did not mean to interfere in matters of conscience, as he
put it. Regarding the latter, in particular, James was surprisingly forthright in
declaring in his oration that he had to
put a difference betwixt mine owne priuate profession of mine owne saluation, and my
politike gouernment of the Realme for the weale and quietness thereof.148
This is an exact implementation of Lipsius's understanding of the separation
between public and private. According to it, the King had to draw a distinction
between his own private profession and public practice. Thus for political
reasons, the welfare of his subjects and the interests of his state, he had publicly
to acknowledge subjects of a different profession, so long as they remained
steady in number and otherwise loyal to him.149 In this context, James split the
Catholics first into clergy and laity, and then further subdivided the laity into
two categories: the quiet Catholics on the one hand, and on the other the
'factious stirrers of sedition, perturbers of the Commonwealth'. The King, then,
used the same classification, that within the next two years he felt he needed to
put into effect after the disastrous Gunpowder Plot, between people who were
willing to pledge their loyalty to him, regardless of their religious allegiance and
people who would not. The problem that James identified at this early stage of
148 A Speech, As it was Delivered in the Vpper Hovse of the Parliament to the Lords Spiritvall and
Temporall, and to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses there Assembled, on Monday the XIX. Day of
March 1603; Workes, p. 490.
149 Speech; Workes, p. 492.
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his rule as the sovereign of the three Kingdoms was the dangerous threat posed
to him by the 'seditious' point of doctrine maintained by supporters of the
Catholic faith, namely, the Papal supremacy. According to this, the Pope
claimed
to haue an Imperiall ciuill power ouer all Kings and Emperors, dethroning and
decrowning Princes with his foot as pleaseth him, and dispensing and disposing of all
Kingdomes and Empires at his apetite.150
The second point of doctrine, and an extension of the first, was the principle that
these subjects were (or felt) free of their obligation to loyalty once their monarch
had been excommunicated ('cursed') by the Roman See. They were, thus,
potentially subversive, as they were effectively sanctioned either to revolt or to
assassinate their king. Yet, importantly, James acknowledged that similar
challenges were posed to him by the Puritan 'sect', who were
euer discontented with the present gouernment, & impatient to suffer any superiority,
which maketh their sect vnable to be suffred in any wel gouerned Common wealth 151
In this manner James famously placed the 'Papists', the extreme Catholics and
Jesuits, in the same class as Puritans; the one represented for him an external
and the other an internal peril. The latter, he admitted, did not differ much in
doctrinal matters from the followers of 'true religion'. James stressed, however,
the profound disagreement that set them apart in points of policy, much like the
way in which he thought about the Roman Catholics - both sides were staunch
advocates of the doctrine Lhat his secular jurisdiction ought to be subject to the
spiritual authorities.152 It is reasonable to assume that one aspect of James's
positioning in the middle of the two extreme religious standpoints was his
relative aversion to excessive expressions of sacred sentiment; as he avowed in
the same speech, he was 'neuer violent or unreasonable' in his profession.153
150 Speech; Workes, p. 492.
151 Speech; Workes, p. 490.
152 Speech; Workes, p. 490.
153 Speech; Workes, p. 491.
275
Moderation of violent passions was certainly part of his duty as the leader of his
state.154 His specific stance, however, was also determined by his view of his
role as the supreme governor of the Church, as eloquently expressed in his
description of his relationship with his state and subjects: 'I am the shepherd
and it is my flocke'.155 This understanding of his position can provide an insight
into a later contention of the same text. James claimed that for as long as his
subjects were going to differ from him in terms of religion, they would be 'half
subjects'. The King, nevertheless, desired the better half, their souls:
as long as they are disconformable in Religion from vs, they cannot bee but halfe my
Subiects, bee able to doe but halfe seruice, and I to want the best halfe of them, which is
their soules.156
This declaration was quite radical, in effect, as it not only refers to the
assumption of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the King, that we have already seen,
but in this case also to a breakdown of the Lipsian divisions between public and
private. The King expresses that he, in fact, wished to control not only the public
persona of his subjects, but also their private sentiments, their 'souls'. As clearly,
that would have been impossible in practice, so the King had to settle for an
outward subjection on behalf of the religious dissidents.
The special significance of this speech for us lies in the fact that it
operates as a bridge between the views James had expressed in his earlier
writings in Scotland, and the new realities he had to face in his new role as the
King of a unified Britain, while it points to the issues he would raise within the
next five years. Meanwhile, it continues the rhetoric of the separation of
jurisdictions, punctuating it with, however, an enhanced degree of royal control
of ecclesiastical affairs, in accordance with his assertions in Scotland and with
his new role as the supreme governor of the Anglican Church. James's oration
154 Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 137-9.
155 Speech; Workes, p. 488.
156 Speech; Workes, p. 493.
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prefigures, lastly, the separation between loyal Catholics and Papists that he
would attempt to make with the Oath of Allegiance, the measure that was
meant to provoke the ire of Rome. The Speech, however, has to be seen also as
part of the official proclamation of the greater eirenic policies that James
intended to pursue from the greater stage he had stepped on to. In this sense,
the union of the English and Scottish crowns was a prelude to his greater vision
of reunification of divided Christendom.157
The importance of eirenicism as a facet in assessing James's views on
kingship and the role of the king as protector of the Church has for the most
part been acknowledged by historians. Its full impact, however, on our
understanding of James's domestic policies, has not yet fully been realised,
apart from the formidable case put forward by William Patterson.158 Although it
is not the intention of this chapter to assess James's domestic (religious) policies,
some suggestions will be made to relate some of the greater implications of his
world-view with more specific decisions and alignments that he had to make as
the sovereign of religiously diverse kingdoms.
According to this announcement of James's plans, the reunification of the
Churches could be achieved if the two sides could meet half-way, 'so that all
nouelties might be renounced on either side':
.. .1 could wish from my heart, that it would please God to make me one of the members
of such a generall Christian vnion in Religion, as laying wilfulnesse aside on both hands,
wee might meete in the middest, which is the Center and perfection of all things. For if
they would leave, and be ashamed of such new and grosse Corruptions of theirs, as
themselues cannot maintaine, nor denie to bee worthy of reformation, I would for mine
owne part be contente to meete them in the mid-way, so that all nouelties might be
renounced on either side. For as my Faith is the Trew, Ancient, Catholike and Apostolike
157 Cf. Morrill, 'A British Patriarchy?', p. 216.
158 Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion ofChristendom. Unfortunately, it seems that no
one has seriously engaged in a dialogue with this significant work. Part of the problem is, of
course, the concentration on domestic issues that plagues English (less so Scottish)
historiography, with the effect of almost ignoring the impact of James's foreign policy.
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faith, grounded vpon the Scriptures and expresse word of God: so will I euer yield all
reuerence to antiquitie in the points of Ecclesiastical policy159
It is vital to recognise that the call for a Christian unity, as is apparent from this
extract, was essentially founded on James's moderate approach to religious
issues. This was paired with the underlying notion that Christianity comprised a
number of fundamental and indispensable doctrines, and a number of issues 'on
which debate and disagreement were acceptable among Christian brethern'.160
Or, to use James's contemporary vocabulary, between 'points of saluation' and
things indifferent.161 Thus the exposition of James's concept of doctrine in the
Premonition:
I am no Apostate, nor yet a deborder from that Religion ...Neither can my Baptisme in
the rites of their Religion make me an Apostate, or Heretike in respect of my present
profession, since we all agree in the substance thereof, being all Baptized In the Name of
the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost: vpon which there is no variance amongst vs... I
am such a CATHOLIKE CHRISTIAN, as beleeueth the three Creeds; that of the Apostles,
that of the Counsell of Nice, and that of Athanasius; the two latter being Paraphrases to
the former: And I beleeue them in that sense, as the ancient Fathers and Councels that
made them did vnderstand them...I reuerence and admit the foure first generall
Counsels as Catholique and Orthodox...162
James's ecumenism was a conscious and purposeful policy. Moreover, as
Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake have shown, it corresponded with his
domestic policies. As they have argued, his aim to encourage understanding
and respect between Christian Churches throughout Europe was mirrored in his
policies of incorporating a wide spectrum of (moderate) theological opinion and
practice while systematically excluding radicals of either side. Crucially,
however, as Fincham and Lake point out, these categories were mutable, for
they were contingent on political circumstances.163 Such a theoretical
159 Speech; Workes, p. 492.
160 Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James V, p. 182.
161 Cf. Basilikon Doron, p. 49. See also David C. Hard, 'Doctrinal Adiaphora in the Debate
Between Erasmus and Luther and its Impact on the Early English Reformation'; available at
<http://www.ournet.md/~theology/adiaphora.htm>
162 Premonition; Workes, pp. 301-2.
163 Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I', p. 171.
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framework, thus, left James with considerable room for manoeuvre. This in
practice meant that he could move from a reconciliatory position that appealed
to his Catholic subjects - also giving them (false) hopes about the King's
intentions to convert - to a strong anti-Papal rhetoric after Rome's unwillingness
to cooperate in such a project, and especially after the events of November 1605
and Rome's reaction to the Oath of Allegiance. This move permitted James to
incorporate strong Protestant elements in his following as these rallied to his
support against the Papacy.164 On the other hand, his more eirenic policies, such
as the refusal to take sides at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, and his
attempts to resolve part of the problem through an approach with Spain that
would include a Spanish match for Charles, was appealing not only to his
Catholic subjects, but also to 'anti-Calvinist' or 'Arminian' elements of his court.
Rome's refusal to co-operate is very interesting, for it has strong
resonances with issues examined in the previous chapter. James's plea for the
convening of an ecumenical Council raised concerns in Rome. According to the
Apostolic See, there was no need for a new Council, as most of the issues that
James insisted should be included in its agenda had already been discussed in
Trent. A new Council, moreover, would raise questions of who would call it,
who would preside, as well as the problem of how voting would take place. All
those issues, of course, both James and Sarpi agreed, had not sufficiently been
resolved in Trent, hence the need for a new Council.
Rome's discouraging stance had the effect of making James modify his
approach. Thus, in his call for an ecumenical Council in the Premonition, Rome is
taken out of the equation and James has reverted to practices established during
his reign in Scotland, where he had assumed the responsibility of convening and
164 Lori Anne Ferell has even suggested that the issue was in a sense too convenient for James in
his endeavours to appease/subdue Puritan resistance, insinuating that it was probably a
governmental invention; see Government by Polemic, esp. pp. 62-7.
279
presiding over the General Assembly of the Kirk. According to the Premonition,
the grounds upon the proposed reunion ought to be an alliance between
temporal monarchs, the rightful superintendents of General Councils and
religious matters in this world:
But the speciall harme they [the College of Cardinals] do vs, is by their defrauding vs of
our common & Christian interest in General Councels; they hauing (as I said) vtterly
abolished the same, by rolling it vp, & making as it were a Monopoly thereof, in their
Conclaue with the Pope. Whereas, if euer there were a possibilitie to be expected of
reducing all Christians to an vniformitie of Religion, it must come by the means of a
Generall Councel: the place of their meeting being chosen so indifferent, as all Christian
Princes, either in their owne Persons, or their Deputie Commissioners, and all Church¬
men of Christian profession that beleeue and professe all the ancient grounds of the
trew, ancient, Catholike, and Apostolike Faith, might haue tutum accession thereunto; All
the incendiaries and Nouelist fore-brands on either side being debarred from the same,
as well Iesuites as Pnritanes.165
In this extract James also returns to the rhetoric of religious moderation with the
parallel exclusion of extremism that was represented equally by Jesuits and
Puritans. Religious moderation, nonetheless, in an age of religious wars was
under the danger of being perceived as inherently ambiguous - and there is
ample evidence to show that James had problems proving his spiritual identity.
Accusations of religious ambiguity, for instance, were apparently one of the
primary reasons behind the re-edition of the Basilikon Doron; thus in the preface
of the revised edition:
...some sentences therein should seeme to furnishe grounds to men, to doubt of my
sinceritie in that Religion, whiche I have euer constantly professed...
The first calumriie (most greeuous in-deede) is grounded vpon the sharp & bitter
wordes, that therin are vsed in the description of the humours of Puritans, and rashe-
headie preachers, that thinke it their honour to contend with Kings, & perturbe whole
kingdomes.
For my booke, suppose very small, being deuyded in three seuerall parts; the first part
thereof onely treates of a Kings duetie towards God in Religion: wherein I haue so
clearlie made profession of my Religion, calling it the Religion wherein I was brought
up, and euer made profession of, and wishing him euer to continue in the same, as the
onely true forme of Gods worship.166
165 Premonition; Workes, pp. 329-30.
166 Basilikon Doron, p. 14.
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The attack referred to in this passage was associated with his aim of
reintroducing the system of episcopacies, a system unmistakably 'Popish' for
the Scottish reformers. Conversely, James had also been continuously criticised,
it will be recalled, for his policy of favouritism towards Catholic earls.167 His via
media made James susceptible to blows from various directions. His dealings
with the Papacy, on the eve of his succession to the English throne and his
continued communication after 1603, raised suspicions that he would follow
Anne of Denmark in her conversion to Catholicism. As a result, James was
extremely disconcerted when Bellarmine touched upon the Scottish king's
correspondence with the Papacy, alluding that he had negotiated better
treatment for his Catholic subjects in exchange for Papal support to his claim to
the throne, and adding that there was a general impression that James did not
'abhor the Catholic faith'.168 That this accusation was credible, and as a result
could prove severely damaging to his position, is verified by James's urgent
reaction by imprisoning his former secretary in Scotland, James Elphinstone.
Bellarmine's charge was also the reason behind the exposition of James's
doctrine of faith in the Premonition, where he had laboured to prove in five folio
pages that he considered himself to be no apostate or a Puritan.169 Yet the
ambivalence of the Stuart King's position as reflected in his writings is above all
evident in the flexibility of his assertion that the Pope was the Antichrist. After
having spent twenty pages proving this claim, James added the startling offer
that he was willing to refute the accusation should the Pontiff withdraw his
claims to temporal supremacy.170
Evidently, the greatest problems arose for James with the outbreak of the
Thirty Years' War, especially when combined with his attempts to secure a
167 Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 16-7.
168 Patterson, King James VI and I, pp. 86-7.
169 Premonition-, Workes, pp. 301-7.
170Premonition-, Workes, pp. 328-9.
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Spanish match for his son as a means of bringing the two sides together. James
strongly refused to take a confessional view on the issue of the Palatinate,
writing to the Pope as 'his holy father' to request his cooperation in the
restoration of European peace. His stance was not received well by his subjects
and when opposition started to appear James issued instructions that in their
sermons the clergy were not to represent the conflict 'as one of religion, which
would stir up all Europe'.171 In spite of James's measures, though, 1618 marked
the resurgence of radical Puritanism. It is remarkable to consider that in an age
that viewed most things through a confessional lens, James had managed to
obtain his subjects' allegiance on the grounds of jurisdiction and anti-papal
interests.
James's attempt to maintain a via media and a balance between his foreign
and domestic policies, thus, created problems, as in the process he alienated
Protestant elements that had been supportive of him until then. In this manner,
in the face of opposition and having to deal with a situation where affairs of the
state were discussed from the pulpit, the King's fears of extreme Protestantism
resurfaced.172 To support his position in European affairs James had to turn to
divines whose theology was more receptive to a non-militant Protestant stance
and a rapprochement with Catholic powers. The so-called rise of Arminianism
in the Stuart court, therefore, with the parallel hardening of attitude towards
Puritans must be viewed within this context. This complex combination of
domestic and foreign policies is also the background against which we can read
the final two small tracts in our consideration, the Meditation upon the Lords
Prayer (1619), and the Meditation vpon the 27.28.29. Verses of the XVII Chapter of St.
Matthew or a Paternefor a Kings Inauguration (1619).
171 Cited in Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of James I', p. 198.
172 Fincham and Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of James I', p. 200.
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The Meditation upon the Verses ofSt. Matthew returns to the familiar
fundamental principle of the separation of jurisdictions and the role of the King
as superintendent of the Church. This tract, as he tells us in the advertisement to
the reader, he intended as an outline for another treatise on kingship, but in the
meantime, he offered the Meditation to his son Charles, as a forewarning and
preparation for his succession.173 This fairly small tract is valuable, in that it
verifies the assumption that James's main principles of Kingship as well as the
main issues preoccupying him did not change much throughout his life and
reign. In the text we find reiterations of the idea that Christ did not exercise any
temporal jurisdiction during his time on earth, in direct contrast with the
usurping claims of the Papacy:
He had no vse of a sword then, nay, he found fault with Saint Peters vsing it, telling him,
Hee that striketh with the sword shall perish by the sword; leauing it belike to those that call
themselues Peters successors, who come in the spirit of Elias with fire, adding gun¬
powder and the sword vnto it. But our Sauiour knew not how to set both croune and
mitre vpon one head: nor yet was he acquainted with that distinction, that a Church¬
man may vse the temporall sword, to procure bonum spirituale.174
In the same tract James alluded to the special relationship between God and
Kings, and pointed out especially the association of the Roman Emperors with
the person of Christ. This challenged the traditional association of the Pope with
St. Peter, since the notion of the Emperor as the heir to Christ implied that the
Emperor was, in fact, superior to the Pope. This was, as we have already seen, a
concept prevalent in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire and one endorsed by
Constantine. James also referred to the role of the King as a mixed person, in-
between a cleric and a lay person, stressing that the duties of a king included the
responsibility to oversee and compel the Church to do her office, to purge all
abuses, and to procure her due reverence and obedience of all his temporal
173 Meditation vpon the 27.28.29. Verses of the XVII Chapter of St. Matthew or a Paternefor a Kings
Inavgvration; Workes, p. 606.
174 Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew, Workes, p. 619.
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subjects with his sword.175 Importantly, the text also made a plea to Christian
unity in this age of war, using the metaphor of Christ's coat:
...onely his coate, without any seame in it, was to fulfill the prophecie of Dauid, that they
should cast lots for it; and did also signifie the indiuisible vnitie of the Church, which I
pray God the true Church of Christ would now well remember176
In a rather different tone, the Meditation upon the Lords Prayer set out to
discuss the meaning and significance of this prayer as an integral part of a
Christian's service of God. The interest of this text lies in the fact that through an
analysis of the Lord's Prayer James pointed out theological and ecclesiastical
errors of both the Papists and the Puritans, signalling, in this way, his own
moderate and 'middle' approach. Nevertheless, the balance of the criticism
placed within the Meditation, a tract intended for the 'benefit' of all of James's
subjects as is indicated in the title, leans more towards the Puritans, as James
accuses them for their emphasis on preaching instead of praying:
the Puritanes will haue vs hunt for hearing of Sermons without ceasing, but as little
prayer as yee will, turning the commandment of the Apostle from Pray continuallie to
preach continually177
The King chastises the Puritans' aversion towards ceremonies, their opposition
to the polity of Bishops and their over-familiarity, to the degree of lack of
respect, towards God. Equally, the text's publication coincided with the
deliberations of the Synod of Dort in the Low Countries and so it was intended
to comment on the proceedings. James, therefore, finds the opportunity to touch
upon some Arminian positions in it, by discussing the situation in the Low
Countries and the teachings of Vorstius. In terms of theology, the text
reproaches the doctrines of free-will advocated by the Dutch Arminians,178
175 Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew; Workes, p. 611.
176 Meditation upon the Verses of St. Matthew; Workes, p. 611.
177 Meditation vpon the Lords Prayer; Workes, p. 575. For expressions of the different forms of
churchmanship between Puritans and Arminians, namely the emphasis on preaching or praying
respectively, see Fincham, Prelate as Pastor, pp. 5, 300-4, and esp. 248-293.
178 Meditation vpon the Lords Prayer; Workes, pp. 581,594.
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while in terms of Church organisation it reprimands the development of
numerous small sects who called themselves Churches.179 This sort of critique,
finally, would not be complete without some reference to the errors of
Catholicism; James thus reprimands the adherents of the Roman faith for their
view of Purgatory and the associated sale of pardons on behalf of the Pope. He
criticises their use in the liturgy of a language that no-one comprehended as
well as their invention of numerous mediators between Christians and their
God. The text also repeats the plea for Christian unity:
Wee are then to pray, that his reuealed will may bee obeyed in earth by his Militant
Church, as it is by his Triumphing Church in heauen: then would this Militant Church
vpon earth obserue better the two Tables of the Law, then now they doe, and then would
the Church bee free of Schismes, Heresies, and all new opinions 180
The text thus, operates on many levels: as a theological treatise identifying
mistakes in doctrinal and ecclesiological doctrines, as well as a call for unity
based on the fundamental elements common in all Christian varieties like the
Lord's Prayer. At the same time, however, it represents the royal prerogative of
protecting the Church, of commanding obedience to the word of God, but most
importantly, of resolving differences and seeing to the removal of heresies.
Therefore, its particular emphasis on the errors of the Puritans renders this a
polemical tract. Although the Puritans, as has been shown, appear next to Papist
Catholics as the villains in the King's writings throughout his reign, by 1619
they had almost become the sole enemy. The fact that James allowed in a sense
his stance on Ecumenical matters to take precedence over the domestic interests
of his state suggests that his position in the greater Europeanmilieu was
ultimately more important for him. The religious settlement that he had so
strenuously managed to establish was seriously undermined by his lenience
towards Catholic matters and his refusal to see the Thirty Years' War as a
179 Meditation vpon the Lords Prayer, Workes, p. 576.
180 Meditation vpon the Lords Prayer-, Workes, p. 581.
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confessional strife. Yet although France having experienced a few decades of
religious warfare was able to accept the Crown's (or the Cardinal's!) more
political stance on the issue of the war, James's kingdoms would not endure the
same.
Conclusion
Having taken the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance as a starting
point, we have thus come full circle in this analysis of James VI and I's views as
articulated in texts issued in his name. The richness of the material has given us
the opportunity to bring together most of the issues explored in this thesis. As a
King, James was able to articulate his theories of government - in reality,
nonetheless, we have seen the extent to which these were the product of his
experience in the practice of government. By expressing them on paper in turn,
James was conscious of the fact that he was exercising his royal authority by
defining the limits within which his subjects could dwell. This was above all
evident in his understanding of his role as the overseer of the Church in his
domain. His views on this matter were closely associated with the perception of
himself as a subject of God, who, in turn, served his Lord by procuring for the
welfare of the bodies and souls of his subjects. His theological understanding of
kingship,181 based both on the scripture as well as on the temporal history of the
development of the early Christian Church within the confines of the Roman
Empire, both cut across as well as renegotiated the conceptual divisions
advocated by Charron and Lipsius. As God's lieutenant upon earth, the King
was a mediator in-between the divine and the temporal sphere. As a sovereign
ruler, however, and a public person, he was mostly content to control his
181 Cf. Francis Oakley, 'Jacobean Political Theology: the Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the
King', Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1968), pp. 323-346 and idem, 'The "Hidden" and
"Revealed" Wills of James I: More Political Theology', Studia Gratiana xli (1972), pp. 365-75.
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subjects' public personae. In terms of the ecclesiastical establishment, although
James claimed control only over issues of public religious practice, in reality, by
perceiving and articulating himself as a divine, he also claimed authority over
doctrine - he was, after all, the King who published the authorised version of
the Bible. He was, therefore, a godly person who served God through worldly
means.
Taken to the extreme, however, his position could imply complete
subversion of the divine by the temporal - both in terms of whose interests the
King would serve, the state's or God's, as well as in terms of jurisdiction. James
was thus adamant in defending his authority in the face of assaults from the
spiritual sphere, both from the Papacy and the extreme Protestants.
Furthermore, in an age when the full consequences of religious dissent were
being felt, a king as a divine could offer impartial and dispassionate resolution
to the divisions that plagued Christendom. Untainted by passion and
superstition, God's lieutenant upon earth would be able to distinguish between
extremities, important and non-important things and thus lead to reconciliation,
in his kingdom, and, indeed, in the whole of Christendom. That he failed to do
so at home was an indication of the mutual misapprehension between him and
his subjects. Not only was James more of a 'European' than most of them, but
either because of his superior position or his conceived special relation with
God, he was also above 'temporal trivialities' such as doctrinal differences. The
latter applied also to his ecumenical plans: it is perhaps ironic that advocates of
such eirenic visions were perceived as natural allies to 'political' (politique)
doctrines, whereas the staunchest religious devotees, entrenched in 'temporal'
passions, failed to overcome their deep hatred of one another.
287
Conclusions
To start with Pierre Charron and the French religious wars and finish
with James VI and I and his three kingdoms, may have seemed unusual.
However, this investigation of the mental worlds of Europeans in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries has been revealing on several levels.
Most markedly, in the course of this journey we have encountered a number of
crucial similar preoccupations, in apparently disparate texts, of ostensibly
incompatible figures. From philosophical treatises on the attainment of wisdom,
to works on the consolation of the individual in the face of civil wars, mirrors
for princes, histories of ecclesiastical councils and works defending the royal
supremacy in the face of spiritual assaults, we have seen the manner in which
the questions and problems with which their authors grappled merged and
were closely inter-related. In fact, the great difference between the authors, their
texts and the genres of those texts, makes the parallels between them all the
more striking. This in turn substantiates the case made by this thesis, that the
range of questions to which the four authors were responding, were variant
facets of what was essentially one problem: the struggle Europeans went
through at the start of the seventeenth century, in determining the role they
wanted to ascribe to religion within their life.
The challenge to religion's supremacy in people's lives and world-views
has been interpreted by scholars as part of a longer process, that of the
'secularisation' of European society and thought. By describing, however, what
has here been called the distancing between the divine and the temporal
spheres, as a process, scholars have imposed an almost deterministic reading on
what was essentially a long, and definitely non-linear development - and
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ultimately, one that has still not been brought to a close. The widespread view
that sees the early modern period as the turning point, after which the largely
religious Europeans of the middle Ages turned into the 'secularised beings' of
the Enlightenment and more modern times, has been under attack for some
time. Within this context, this thesis has advanced a more general model, along
the lines of a continuously changing and adjusting relationship or a negotiation
between the two spheres - the divine and the temporal. This approach is at once
much more appropriate and nuanced, as it allows for the general intellectual
uneasiness and politico-religious tensions that we saw characterised the period
between c 1580 and 1620. More specifically, the four case-studies examined in
this study exemplify the anxieties of the decades between the end of the
religious wars and the outbreak of the Thirty Years' war, which forced the
thinkers of the time repeatedly to (re)negotiate and reconfigure the principles
and values of their world.
And this is the second important element that emerges from a close
consideration of the period in question and the main issues that preoccupied the
four authors we studied. The problems that all these authors faced and tried to
resolve were time-specific, or at least had acquired a specific sense of urgency at
that particular time. It was only a few generations after the first stages of the
rediscovery of classical tradition that came to be known as the 'Renaissance',
and even fewer after the Protestant Reformation that the full impact these two
great challenges posed to established truths, institutions and social structures
started to be realised. The development of printing had had the effect of
spreading ideas at an unprecedented scale and rate. If during the initial stages of
the Renaissance the philosophy of the classics was rediscovered by a small,
primarily Italian, cultured elite, the sixteenth century significantly increased the
availability of all the texts. The circulation of these and contemporary
translations made by the humanists of the Quatrocento reached a greater part of
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the literate, this time, albeit still a small part of the whole.1 Similarly, the
criticism Luther had raised against the established Church had been the first
movement fully to make use of the new discovery - even for the illiterate.2
Furthermore, the religious wars that plagued most of Europe in the second half
of the sixteenth century, and of which, arguably the Thirty Years' War and the
civil wars in the Three Kingdoms of the British Isles can be seen as extensions,
accentuated the effect of the Protestant Reformation on a moral, political and
religious level of unparalleled degree, while consolidating the
'confessionalisation' of the continent and hardening the attitude between
opposing sides.
Apart from the specific historical conjuncture, however, theorists of the
time, as has been shown, were themselves also aware of their place in a long
intellectual tradition.3 We saw how Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James
based their arguments on classical and scriptural sources, using these as
examples to justify their own positions. More specifically, reference was made to
the relationship of Charron's De la Sagesse with the Aristotelian, Stoic and
Pyrrhonist tradition, while exploring Lipsius's conscious revival and usage of
Tacitean and Stoic patterns of thought. Sarpi, on the other hand, was deeply
immersed in an historical understanding of the Christian Church as it
developed in relation to the Roman Empire, and he was particularly fond of the
Conciliar tradition. King James worked in a similar framework, discussing the
history of the Church from the point of view of its relations with temporal
princes, in the Western as well as the Eastern Church, and making extensive use
1 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge: CUP, 1983).
2 Robert W. Scribner, For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popidar Propaganda for the German Reformation.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1981).
3 Cf. Quentin Skinner: '1 regard it as ... essential to consider the intellectual context in which the
major texts were conceived ... context of earlier writings and inherent assumptions about
political society, and ofmore ephemeral contemporary contributions to social and political
thought'; The Foundations ofModern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 1978); vol. 1,
Preface, p. xi.
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of the scriptures. While aware of the long intellectual traditions and in spite of
their identification to some degree with one or more of them, authors of the time
are characteristic in their attempt to address contemporary issues. Their choice
and usage of strands of thought thus, although partly an indication of their
views, should also be considered as a mode of deliberating on and
communicating matters contemporaneous. Worthy of notice in this respect is
the manipulation and handling of their original sources, a remark that applies to
all four of the contemplatives examined.
Such a critical usage of sources liberated the men of letters on the one
hand from notions of 'authority', while it opened up new ways in which to cope
with issues and redefine their perceptions. The contemporary break-down of
older sources of authority and the redefinition of social, political and religious
structures and bonds, together with the new horizons available to the theorists
of the time, is plainly reflected in the agitation and tensions within their works.
More specifically, of the four cases we examined, Charron struggles with the
question of the foundation of wisdom and what its relationship with morality
was. He contrasted the wisdom deriving from nature with revealed wisdom; he
contemplated which one came first and which of the two was more important;
he considered, finally, whether natural wisdom could exist independently of
revealed wisdom and the other way round. He was particularly exercised by the
fact that if one accepted that wisdom and consequently morality only derived
from God, then classical figures such as Socrates could not be regarded either as
wise or ethical.
Raising comparable questions, Lipsius, Sarpi, James VI and I, and their
critics speculated upon the origins of authority and upon the issue of where
sovereignty lies. If authority derived solely from God, then society and the state
ought to be organised in a theocratic manner. If, on the other hand it derived
from nature in the vein that classical authors such as Aristotle suggested, then
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the formation of the state ought to be purely secular. By the same token, even if
authority derived solely from God, did He then remit it to spiritual or temporal
officers? These questions, of course, led to the much-debated and complex issue
of jurisdiction and its limitations, and the problem of the 'one or two kingdoms',
which was discussed extensively in the course of the thesis with particular
reference to Sarpi and James, and to a lesser extent Lipsius. The three of them
agreed that there were boundaries between the civil and ecclesiastical domains
of jurisdiction, but they granted a degree of control of spiritual matters to the lay
authorities, to varying extents. All four theorists in question also struggled to
define the relationship between politics and religion, and to establish a claim for
some form of independent existence of the former from the latter. This ran
opposite to arguments promoted by theocratic writers exemplified here by
Coornhert and Bellarmine, according to whom politics ought to be subject to
religion in all respects. The latter authors based their position on the writings of
the Bible that underscored the temporary nature of this world, pointing out that
the ultimate end was the next world. Adherence to divine principles, thus, was
to be preferred, in the same way that eternal salvation was to be preferred to
this life. Our writers provided different responses to this stance. Influenced by
Stoic doctrines of free-will and man's participation in divine reason, Charron
and Lipsius argued that God had provided man with everything he needs to
survive on this earth. As a result, not only did politics exist independently, but it
had, in fact, a priority over religion in this world; religion's sphere of influence
was in the afterlife, while in this life it was restricted to internal and privatised
expressions of piety. Sarpi, likewise, although he had considerably less faith in
the abilities of man, echoing Charron, firmly believed that the divine sphere was
at a great distance from the temporal, so men had themselves to mend the
disorder caused by human feebleness.
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This line of reasoning reflected the more general question of the role of
morality in politics that particularly exercised Lipsius and Sarpi. Simply put, if
one accepted that this world is morally corrupt due to its dependence on human
feebleness then, by definition, the administration of it would also be corrupt.
Seen from a different perspective, this situation was only to be dealt with by an
equal moral laxity in the realm of politics, represented by a notion as subtle and
adaptable as only prudence could be, provided that the primary aim of the prince
was the welfare of the people in general. But then if politics was inherently
corrupt and immoral, perhaps the road to salvation lay in people detaching
themselves from the outside world and public life, secure and constant in their
inner compartment. Charron and Lipsius thus talked about the disjunction
between private and public conduct, and argued that as long as one adhered to
societal and state precepts in public, one could then maintain and practice one's
personal convictions in private.
This was particularly relevant to the main question of the role of religion
within the state, which again related to the general welfare of the subjects. This
was especially pertinent in the cases of religious differences - a personalised and
internalised form of religion, such as Charron, Lipsius and Sarpi advocated,
would ensure peace and unity in a state, as it would prevent religious
differences to being expressed by public confrontations. It was along these lines
that King James pronounced he could accept his recusant subjects, provided that
they kept quiet and did not create problems within the state. The devastation of
the religious wars had brought about discussions on notions of toleration that
can be traced in the writings of all four authors examined here. We saw,
however, how Bellarmine, a pronounced critic of this position, asserted that
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notions of tolerance and concealment of true religious allegiance amounted to
the prioritisation of temporal interests at the expense of eternal salvation.4
Similar preoccupations centred on expressions of piety and the point at
which piety turned into superstition; Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James, all
considered religious zealotry to be a menace to reasonable thinking, moral
conduct, and the peace of the state. Their works are characteristic in their
attempt to play down doctrinal differences and to communicate on a supra-
confessional level. This was certainly a reflection of the tumultuous
circumstances in which they lived; it was a way of dealing with the conflict
religious hatred brought and a way of surviving. It is reminiscent, moreover, of
the rhetoric of 'things indifferent' of the early Reformation; if all Christians
agreed on a basic level they could co-exist peacefully.5 All four authors, in this
respect, were critical of religious extremists and of the hardening of the
confessional lines, such as, according to Sarpi, was the effect of the Council of
Trent. James's active promotion of policies that aspired to a reunion of the
divided Christendom both affected and was inspired by his view of the
common fundamental elements shared by all Christians. Significantly, the laxity
Lipsius, Sarpi and James demonstrated towards doctrinal differences gained
them the reputation of religious ambivalence: all three were criticised as heretics
and accused of traversing confessional boundaries. Equally, Charron's
naturalism and use of philosophy made him susceptible to accusations of
atheism, despite the fact that he had also published a book on Christian (and
more specifically Catholic) apologetics.
4 Cf. Calvin's loathing of and fight against Nicodemitism; Donald R. Kelley, The Beginning of
Ideology. Consciousness and Society in the French Reformation. (Cambridge: CUP, 1981); p. 69.
5 Cf. David C. Hard, 'Doctrinal Adiaphora in the Debate Between Erasmus and Luther and its
Impact on the Early English Reformation'; available at
chttp://www.ournet.md/~theology/adiaphora.htm>.
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It should be plain from the above account that these preoccupations are
all closely interlinked. The interconnection of these elements has been analysed
in detail in the course of the thesis. What this blending, however, leads to, is the
conclusion that we are - as much as the thinkers of the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries were - essentially faced with a single problem that
presented itself in various facets: the role that religion ought to hold in people's
understanding of the world around them, in their life, and political and social
organisation. The challenge to religion's authority and the formation of world-
views and structures independent of - or less dependent on - it ('secularisation')
was expressed as we have seen, in many ways. The most characteristic
expression, however, is perhaps the fluidity of fundamental notions upon which
people of the period in question constructed their lives. Debates on the
definition of 'reason' for example, and the different connotations it had
according to a theological - whether it be Jesuitical or Augustinian - or
philosophical - Stoic or Sceptical - line of argument; on the concept of
'providence and free will' among Calvinists, Arminians, Jesuits, Augustinians
and Dominicans; over the definition of 'superstition' between Protestants who
denounced Catholic ritualism, religious authorities faced with unorthodox
practices and beliefs of the population at large and on a different level the term
being used against religious zealots by more moderate believers (or not); the
delineating the 'welfare of the public', or 'prudence' shifting from a notion truly
originating from wise behaviour to a notion accommodating to practicality and
thus more morally ambiguous, 'reason of state' as representing the will of God
on earth as opposed to 'reason of state' as a priority (since life on earth precedes
life after death), legitimation of 'authority' and 'resistance', again, according to
the dictates of God or man, stemming from 'political' or divine purpose; these
forceful debates correspond to the reconfiguration of the limits between profane
and sacred and to the parallel redrawing of the boundaries of 'academic'
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disciplines. Theology was to be stripped of its position as the 'queen of
disciplines' while subjects such as (natural) philosophy, history and law
emerged as autonomous disciplines in their own right, of equal importance to
theology. Indeed, what this transformation denoted was the emergence and
recognition of the possibility of different world-views.
It is important to recognise the relation between the development of
alternative possible perspectives and the issue of languages, first put forth in the
Introduction and frequently referred to throughout the thesis. Through their
education in and adoption of a specific idiom in which to discuss politics,
philosophy, religion and morality, the thinkers of the early modern period in
general, and at the start of the seventeenth century more specifically, subscribed
effectively to a particular way of seeing and understanding the affairs of the
world. This circumscribed to a considerable degree the mode in which they
thought.6 Adopting a humanist language, for instance, gave one the ability to
discuss politics and morality, based on Plato, Aristotle, Stoic or Sceptical
writings. It also, however, drew one's attention to questions about the
compatibility or not (or the independent existence) of philosophy, politics and
morality with the same areas as defined by divine revelation, since the classical
tradition had developed and existed before the Christian vision of the world
was known. By the same token, it enabled its users to discuss politics within a
historical political tradition, confined, however, to the principles and practices
that were in place when the treatises of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and the rest were
written.
From a different point of view, the assumption of a theological language
of discourse limited the argumentation to an un-historical perception of state,
6 J.G.A. Pocock, 'The Concept of a Language and the Metier d'Historien: Some Considerations in
Practice" in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages ofPolitical Theory in Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge:
CUP, 1987), pp. 19-38; and Andrew Lockyer, '"Traditions" as Context in the History of Political
Theory', Political Studies 27 (1979), pp. 201-17.
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Church and Empire. It followed the precepts as set forth in the Old and New
Testament referring to the main principles and structures of politics within a
Christian framework, pointing to notions of the moral duty to obey, the king's
and subjects' responsibility towards God, and the hierarchical structure of
society according to patriarchical concepts of authority and so forth, but was
less able to discuss the details of government. As one historian of political
thought has remarked, 'theology provided the purpose';7 the means were
provided by the humanistic idiom and that of civil law. The latter was more
suitable to discussions of the details of public administration and the
manoeuvrings associated with the affairs of the state. In several ways this could
conflict with the language of theology: first, the allegiance of civil law to the
Romanist tradition made it inherently dangerous to the Christian tradition.
Second, the increasing role jurisprudence was acquiring throughout the
sixteenth century made some jurists talk about a 'civil science' that would touch
upon and regulate all aspects of human relations.8 Third, the group's
preoccupationwith the law was somewhat linked to forms of relativism. This
was due to the jurists' perceptions of law as a notion that had to be
accommodated to the needs of each individual society; after all, 'jurisprudence'
denoted the application of prudence - namely accommodation to circumstances
- on law.9
Of course, these general and distinct forms of language could again be
subdivided into more branches. Scepticism, for example, was not the same as
Stoicism, nor did the Ciceronian style have the same effect as the Tacitean; more
importantly, perhaps, the Augustinian (later Jansenist, but also evangelical)
7 Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution. An Introduction to English Political Thought,
1603-1642. (London: Macmillan, 1992); p. 138.
8 Kelley, Beginning of Ideology, p. 185.
9 Cf. Jotham Parsons, The Church in the Republic. Gallicanism and Political Ideology in Renaissance
France. (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2004), p. 80.
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emphasis on grace, was diametrically opposed to scholastic (and later Jesuitic)
stress on free will. What is even more interesting, is the crossover between
philosophical and ecclesiological traditions. Charron's sceptical elements, and
the emphasis on human feebleness, as we saw, were thus attractive to
Augustinians, so much so that St. Cyran defended Charron's text against the
Jesuit Garasse. In the same way, Lipsius's close relations with the Jesuits could
also be viewed from the point of view of the stress on free-will, which for
Lipsius was based on Stoic elements of thought.
It has also been demonstrated, that this web of strands of thought
contributed to scholars normally using a mixture of languages in their writing.
Languages and traditions were usually combined, either on purpose or
unconsciously, according to the person (their education, preference), the subject
treated, and so forth. Thus Charron combined the humanistic idiom with the
theological - especially in the revised version of De la Sagesse, in order to temper
the naturalistic elements of the first edition. Significantly, he also incorporated
some parts with a juristic essence, notably in his discussion of social formations,
organisation of a state, and political prudence - the parts, namely, for which he
relied on Bodin and Lipsius. Lipsius used primarily a humanistic language in
the Constantia, while also adding elements of Christian theology.10 The needs of
a subject such as the Politica tackles, on the other hand, required the use of the
humanistic reasoning, tightly interwoven with juristic argumentation; the
religious elements of the work are limited to the discussion of the duties of the
prince towards God and to a lesser extent the role of religion within the state.
Sarpi's approach is a magnificent amalgamation of the theological and the
humanistic standpoint. The former is especially evident in his accounts of the
doctrinal and sacramental deliberations in the Council, while the latter
10 It should be recalled that when accused of impiety he defended himself by asserting that he
was a philosopher, albeit a 'Christian philosopher'; see Ch. 2, above.
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dominates his sense of ecclesiastical history (the Popes are treated in the same
manner as the princes), and his account of the events surrounding the Council.
Ultimately, however, his theological language is a mere methodological tool: his
approach reflects his fundamental belief that history belonged entirely to the
temporal realm, with no metaphysical ultimate purpose.11 James, meanwhile,
wrote in a much more overtly religious idiom and his texts are permeated by the
sense of the ultimate divine purpose; everything that happened here was
directed towards the divine sphere. His role as a king, however, and the
experience derived from it, also gave his writing a more pragmatic outlook; the
True Law ofFree Monarchies, thus, by definition uses many juristic (and
humanistic) examples, and Basilikon Doron, a manual on royal government, is
full of practical advice.
The above is by no means an exhaustive account of either the available
languages and their combinations, or how they are used in the texts considered
here. This rough summary, however, can offer us a better understanding of the
functions of languages and the possibilities that these offered to the scholars
who used them. To return to the earlier point, an appreciation of these different
viewpoints and their uses can give us insights with regard to the intellectual
premises from which the assault on the status and role of religion stemmed. As
described, on the moral and political level, the preoccupation with classical texts
persuaded intellectuals that it was possible to base morality and politics on
nature or the principles of the ancient civilisations. Furthermore, the religious
wars made scholars turn to other modes of expression (classical) in order to
resolve and communicate about current problems, as was the case for instance
with Lipsius and Charron. The victory of the 'politique' party - in the sense that
11 Cf. William J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense ofRepublican Liberty. Renaissance Values in the
Age of the Counter Reformation. (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968);
p. 595.
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territorial and political concerns dictated the final peace treaties - in the German
lands, France and the Low Countries, moreover, demonstrated the suitability
and adaptability of the language of civil jurisprudence in resolving and
negotiating issues between opposing parties, at the expense of the theological
approach.12 This theoretical and conceptual background, however, could not
have brought about notions of secularisation, had it not been mixed with
experience: the contemporary conjuncture of the disillusionment originating
from the religious wars, had the effect of disenchanting thinkers such as
Charron and Lipsius with the moral and political conventions that failed to deal
with the disruption brought about by religious warfare. In many cases, after all,
religion itself, they realised, had been used as a pretext in the struggle for
power. Therefore, religious extremism had to be dispensed with, particularly in
situations like these where one party could emerge triumphant without
annihilating the other, and bringing about the destruction of the state in the
process. The success of the via media or the 'political way', however, also
signalled the break-down of the notional societas Christiana (for the second time,
after the schism with the Eastern Church) and the triumph of national churches
over the Papacy: a political and temporal concept of the Church over an all-
encompassing and transcendent.
Yet the Papacy had partly caused this itself. In the case of Italy, Sarpi's
cynicism on the subject of the role of religion in politics had its roots in the
Papacy's transformation into a temporal power and in the collective memory of
the experience of the dreadful events of the Italian wars.13 Thus, the theoretical
framework of Italian (civic) humanism combined with the historical
circumstances produced, throughout the sixteenth century, explicitly political
12 Cf. Nicolai Rubinstein, The History of the Word Politicus in Early Modern Europe'; in Pagden,
Languages ofPolitical Theory in Early Modern Europe, pp. 41-56, and Anthony Levi, French
Moralists. The Theory of the Passions 1585 to 1649. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 55-6.
13 Cf. Kelley, Beginning of Ideology, p. 34.
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treatments of the affairs of this world, from Machiavelli's Prince (1513, published
in 1531/2) to Botero's Delia Ragion di Stato (1589) - despite the fact that the latter
presented itself as an attempt to reconcile political expediency with Christianity.
According to the new trend of Tacitean history and politics, political conduct
could only be justified according to reasons of state, and morality did not
necessarily have any place in politics.14 All of these elements are apparent in the
way that Sarpi had composed his history and in his understanding of political
and ecclesiastical affairs.
Lastly, the assault on the place of religion in people's lives was intimately
associated with the corruption and deformation that was perceived as having
penetrated the Church. Based on a perhaps idealised notion of the early Church,
calls for reform had been voiced long before Luther's protestation. Within this
context King James insisted that the Anglican Church, having detached itself
from the corruption of Rome, was the heir to the true faith, and it was its role to
protect and restore it in a regenerated, unified Christendom. On a different
level, advocates of Conciliar doctrines had insisted on a less authoritative form
of Church administration, as denoted in the literal meaning of the word Church
itself (congregation of the faithful). Similarly, evangelical ideas that had been
spreading long before either Luther or Calvin arrived in the picture promoted a
kind ofmystical view of piety. This, joined with a growing type of
anticlericalism of the sort to which Sarpi adhered, also contributed to concepts
of exclusion of religion and the Church from the public domain.
Furthermore, the experience of religious extremism, its politicisation
through the rhetoric of resistance to the monarchy, and the threat that this posed
to the welfare of the state, led theorists such as Lipsius and James to advocate
14 Cf. Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: CUP, 1993); chs. 2 and 3
and the study byMaurizio Viroli on the transformation of politics; From Politics to Reason of State.
The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language ofPolitics, 1250-1600. (Cambridge: CUP, 1992).
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that religion ought to be controlled by the political authorities. Such erastian
notions of state-controlled Churches, however, as mentioned above,
fundamentally undermined the higher status that religion possessed until then,
as they reduced it to a mere instrument of the state.
In a sense, this study has been an examination of many layers of
overlapping circles - yet the breadth of the adopted perspective has been
instructive on a number of fronts. It has demonstrated the degree to which,
although to a certain extent conditioned by the distinct milieux in which they
lived and wrote, Charron, Lipsius, Sarpi and King James shared a number of
fundamental assumptions and preoccupations. This highlights the benefits of
studies of intellectual history or mentalities that are not circumscribed by
traditional national boundaries.15 This makes sense particularly when we take
into account the international character of the 'republic of letters'. Its members
felt that they belonged to a community that shared common interests and
concerns; they were, moreover, in frequent communication with one another
through the exchange of letters. It should be recalled that both Lipsius and Sarpi
maintained a wide network of correspondents throughout Europe, and that
most of the authors examined were familiar with one another's work. The same
applies to assumptions of confessional boundaries; in this respect, the thesis has
illustrated that viewing doctrinal differences in terms of shades16 is much more
appropriate than the oversimplified view that contrasts 'Catholics' and
'Protestants'. A classic example here is the degree to which Sarpi's version of
'Catholicism' was closer to evangelical beliefs than it was to Roman orthodoxy;
15 Cf. Peter Burke, A Social History ofKnowledge. From Gutenberg to Diderot. (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2000); ch. 2 and William J. Bouwsma, The Waning of the Renaissance. 1550-1640. 2nd edition
(New Haven: Yale UP, 2002); pp. 1,7-8.
16 Cf. the imaginative subtitle of Richard Mackenney's book on the Renaissance(s): Chiaroscuro:
The Management of Shadows; idem, Renaissances. The Cultures of Italy, c.1300 - c.1600. (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2005); p. 4.
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similarly, James's version of 'Protestantism' was considerably close to Papal
convictions. By the same token, the passionate controversy over the role of the
efficacy of grace ('de auxiliis') was paralleled with the division on the subject of
free will between Arminians and orthodox Calvinists.17 In terms of how
religious convictions translated into polities, moreover, Papal theocracy
resembled Calvinist doctrines of theocracy. Meanwhile, moderates from either
side found it easier to communicate with one another; in France, their coming
together generated the pursuit of religious concord in a political framework that
is associated with the so-called 'politique' party.
Further to these, a more general and comparative approach has the
added benefit of drawing attention to differences between varying intellectual
and geographical milieus. Through the consideration of the circulation and
communication of ideas, this study has also indicated some of the differences in
the manner in which some of the ideas were adapted in various environments. It
has been pointed out, accordingly, how the Conciliar tradition was more
prominent in Scotland than it was in England, because of the close links the
former maintained with France. Correspondingly, it seems that considerations
with regard to the role ofmorality in politics seem to have been much more
crucial to Italians, the French, and thinkers from the Low Countries, in areas,
namely, where the preoccupation with the Tacitean tradition was much more
widespread.18
The breaking down of national and confessional boundaries should also
be accompanied by a waiving of the boundaries of approach between academic
disciplines. Throughout this examination it has been established that modern-
17 Bouwsma, The Waning ofRenaissance, pp. 100-1.
18 See J.H.M. Salmon, 'Stoicism and Roman Example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England',
Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989), pp. 207-221; and idem, 'Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean
England', in L.L. Peck (ed.), The Mental World of the Jacobean Court (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp.
169-188.
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day classifications of genres and disciplines are not applicable to the late-
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The most obvious example germane
to discussions in the present study is the arbitrary division between 'religious'
and 'political' matters that modern scholars impose on their material. In this
context, preconceived notions of what differentiates a 'political' text from that
incorporating 'religious', 'moral', 'philosophical' or 'historical' considerations
can inhibit a more comprehensive understanding of the shared assumptions of
the people of the period. This examination has therefore shown that what can
seem as incongruent texts and genres, share similar underlying assumptions
and concerns.
Finally, the present analysis has sought to contribute to discussions about
the relations between theory and practice, and the extent to which theory is
informed by practice, and vice versa. The relation between theory and practice
has permeated many of the themes considered here. In many ways the first two
chapters provide the theoretical framework in which Sarpi's and James's views
can be understood. It is important, in this respect, to remember that out of the
four figures under scrutiny, Charron and Lipsius were the least active, while the
other two were most clearly engaged in the affairs of the state, Sarpi as an
advisor to the Venetian Republic and James as sovereign of his kingdoms. From
this perspective, by establishing the separation between the temporal and the
divine spheres, and between public and private domains, Charron and Lipsius
offer the conceptual bases on which Sarpi and James could apply their positions
about jurisdiction.
Seen from a different angle, we could equate theory with the divine
sphere or higher principles, and practice with the temporal and more 'corrupt'.
The relation between the two spheres during the extraordinary circumstances of
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries underwent great adjustments:
it swayed from tension - as political practice and everyday life contradicted
304
higher principles - to a disassociation of the temporal from the divine. The
period in question, nonetheless, witnessed practice assuming prominence over
theory, as evidenced for instance by the importance that prudence, the practical
aspect of wisdom, assumed in political affairs.19 The significance that the
temporal realm had started to take in the minds of a number of people of the
period can be observed in the case of prudence, a quality that primarily drew
from practice. Similarly, the emergence and recognition of politics and civil
jurisdiction as an independent and superior art in controlling the affairs of this
world was an indication that the role of religion was in the process undergoing
serious re-evaluation.
19 Cf. the importance of the notion even in treatises composed by Jesuits; Harro Hopfl, Jesuit
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Appendix I
Pierre Charron's De la Saaesse. Trois Livres:






8. Seconde consideration de I'homme, qui est par comparaison de luy auec tous les autres
animaux
9. Distinction premiere, et generate de 1'homme
10. Des proprietez singulieres du corps humain
11. Des biens du corps, Sante, Beaute, et autres
12. Des sens de Nature
13. Du veoir, ouyr et parler
14. Des vestements du corps
15. De l'Ame en general
?16. De l'Esprit humain, ses parties, fonctions, qualitez, raison, inuention, verite
17. De la Memoire
18. De l'imagination & opinion
19. De la Volonte
Des passions et affections, aduertissement
20. Des passions en general
Des passions en particulier, aduertissement
21. De 1'Amour en general
22. De 1'Ambition
23. Dc l'auarice & sa contrepassion
24. De l'Amour charnel
25. Desirs, cupitidez
26. Espoir, Desespoir










?35. De la proffession militaire
36. Estimation briefuete, description de la vie humaine, & ses parties
Cincjuieme et derniere consideration de I'homme, -par les varietez et differences grandes qui sot
en luy, et leurs comparaisons
37. De la difference et inegalite des hommes en general
38. Premiere distinction & difference des hommes naturelle & essentielle, tiree de la
diuerse assiette du monde
39. Seconde distinction & difference plus subtile des esprits, & suffisances des hommes
40. Troisieme distinction et difference des hommes accidentale, de leurs degrez, estats,
et charges
Des estats et degrez des hommes en particulier, aduertissement
41. Du commander et obeir
42. Du mariage
43. Des parens et enfans
44. Des Seigneurs et esclaues, maistres, et seruiteurs
45. De l'Estat, Souuerainete, Souuerains
46. Des Magistrats
47. Des Legislateurs, Docteurs et instructeurs
48. Du people ou vulgaire
Quatriesme distinction et difference des homines tiree de leurs diuerses professions, et conditions
de vie
49. Distinction et comparaison des trios sortes de degrez de vie
50. Comparaison de la vie ciuile ou sociale auec la solitaire
51. Comparaison de le vie menee en commun, et menee en propriete
52. Comparaison de la vie rustique et des villes
Cinquiesme et derniere distinction et difference des hommes tiree desfaueurs et defaueurs de la
Nature et de la fortune
54. De la liberte et du seruage
55. De la Noblesse
56. De l'honneur
57. De la Science
58. Des Richesses et pourete
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Contents of the second edition (1604) - and all subsequent
LIVRE PREMIER, qui est de la cognoissance de soy et de l'humaine condition.
Exhortation a s'estudier et cognoistre
Preface du premier liure
Premiere consideration de I'homme, qui est naturelle par toutes les pieces dont il est compose
1. De la formation de l'homme
2. Distinction premiere, et generale de l'homme
3. Du corps, et premierement de toutes ses parties, et assiette d'icelles.
4. Des proprietez singulieres du corps humain
5. Des biens du corps, Sante, Beaute, et autres
6. Des vestements du corps
7. De l'Ame en general
8. De l'Ame en particulier, et premierement de la faculte Vegetatiue
9. De la faculte sensitiue
10. Des sens de Nature
11. Du veoir, ouyr et parler
12. Des autres facultez, imaginatiue, Memoratiue, Appetitiue
13. De la faculte intellective & vrayment humaine
14. De l'Esprit humain, ses parties, fonctions, qualitez, raison, inuention, verite
15. De la Memoire
16. De l'imagination & opinion
17. De la Volonte
Des passions et affections, aduertissement.
18. Des passions en general
Des passions en particulier, aduertissement.
19. De l'Amour en general
20. De l'Ambition
21. De l'auarice & sa contrepassion
22. De l'Amour charnel
23. Desirs, cupitidez
24. Espoir, Desespoir










34. Seconde consideration de I'homme, qui est par comparaison de luy auec tons les autres
animaux
Troisieme consideration de I'homme, qui est par sa vie.
35. Estimation briefuete, description de la vie humaine, & ses parties







Cinquieme et derniere consideration de I'homme, par les varietez et differences grandes qui sot
en luy, et leurs comparaisons
41. De la difference et inegalite des hommes en general
42. Premiere distinction & difference des hommes naturelle & essentielle, tiree de la
diuerse assiette du monde
43. Seconde distinction & difference plus subtile des esprits, & suffisances des hommes
44. Troisieme distinction et difference des hommes accidentale, de leurs degrez, estats,
et charges
Des estats et degrez des hommes en particulier, aduertissement
45. Du commander et obeir
46. Du mariage
47. Des parens et enfans
48. Des Seigneurs et esclaues, maistres, et seruiteurs
49. De l'Estat, Souuerainete, Souuerains
50. Des Magistrats
51. Des Legislateurs, Docteurs et instructeurs
52. Du people ou vulgaire
Quatriesme distinction et difference des hommes tiree de leurs diuerses professions, et conditions
de vie
53. Distinction et comparaison des trios sortes de degrez de vie
54. Comparaison de la vie ciuile ou sociale auec la solitaire
55. Comparaison de le vie menee en commun, et menee en propriete
56. Comparaison de la vie rustique et des villes
57. De la proffession militaire
Cinquiesme et derniere distinction et difference des hommes tiree des faueurs et defaueurs de la
Nature et de la fortune
58. De la liberte et du seruage
59. De la Noblesse
60. De l'honneur
61. De la Science
62. Des Richesses et pourete
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LIVRE SECOND, contenant les instructions et regies generales de Sagesse.
1. Exemption et affranchissement des erreurs et vices du monde et des passions, etc.
2. Vniuerselle et plaine liberte de l'esprit, tant en iugement qu'en volonte, seconde
disposition a la Sagesse
3. Vraye et essentielle preud'hommie, premiere et fondamentale partie de Sagesse
4. Auoir vn but et train de vie certain, second fondement de Sagesse
5. Estudier a la vraye piete, premier office de Sagesse
6. Regler ses desirs et plaisirs, second office de Sagesse
7. Se porter moderement et egalement en prosperity et aduersite, Troisiesme office de
Sagesse
8. Obeyr et obseruer les loix, coustumes et ceremonies du pays, comment et en quell
sens, quatriesme office de Sagesse
9. Se bien comporter auec autruy, cinguiesme office de Sagesse
10. Se conduire prudemment aux affaires, Sixsiesme office de Sagesse
11. Se tenir tousiours prest a la mort, fruit de Sagesse
12. Se maintenir en vraye tranquillite d'esprit, le fruit et la couronne de Sagesse et
conclusion de ce liure
LIVRE TROISIESME, a quel sont traittez les aduis particuliers de Sagesse par les quatre
vertus morales
Preface
De la prudence premiere vertu
1. De la prudence en general
De la prudence Politique du Souuerain pour gouuerner estats
2. Premier partie de ceste Prudence Politique, et gouuernement d'Estat, qui est de
la prouision
3. Seconde partie de la Prudence politique, et du gouuernement d'Estat, qui est de
Taction et gouuernement du Prince
4. De la Prudence requise aux affaires difficiles et mauuais accidens publics et priuez.
Preface
(1) Des maux et accidens qui nous menacent
(2) Maux et accidens presens, pressans et extremes
(3) Affaires douteux et ambiguz




(8) Faction et ligue
(9) Sedition
(10) La Tyrannie et Rebellion
(11) Guerres ciuiles
(12) Aduis pour les particuliers en toutes les susdites diuisions publiques
(13) Des troubles et diuisions priuees
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De la iustice seconde vertu
5. De la iustice en general.
6. De la Iustice et deuoir de l'homme a soy-mesme
De la iustice et deuoir de Vhomme enuers I'homme, aduertissement
Premier partie, qui est des deuoirs generaux et communs de tous enuers tous, et premierement.
7. De l'Amour ou amitie
8. De la toy, fidelite, perfidie, secret
9. Verite et admonition libre
10. De la flatterie, menterie, et dissimulation
11. Du bien fait, obligation et recognoissance
Seconde partie qui est des deuoirs speciaux de certains a certains, par certaine et speciale
obligation. Preface
12. Deuoir des mariez
13. Mesnagerie
14. Deuoir des parens et enfans
15. Deuoir des maistres et seruiteurs
16. Deuoir des souuerains, et des suiets
17. Deuoir des magistrats
18. Deuoir des grands et des petits
De la force troisiesme vertu. Preface
19. De la force ou vaillance en general
De la force ou vaillance en particulier
20. Premier partie des maux externes
21. Des maux externes considerez en leurs effets et fruits
Des maux externs en eux mesmes et particulierement. Aduertissement
22. De la maladie et douleur
23. De la captiuite ou prison
24. Du bannissement et exil
25. De la pourete, indigence, perte de biens
26. De l'infamie
27. De la perte d'amis
De la mort
Seconde parties des maux internes etc. Preface
28. Contre la crainte
29. Contre la tristesse
30. Contre la compassion et misericorde
31. Contre la cholere
32. Contre la hayne
33. Contre l'enuie
34. Contre la vengeance
35. Contre la ialousie
De la Temperance quatriesme vertu
36. De la Temperance en general.
37. De la prosperity et aduis sur icelle
38. De la volupte et aduis sur icelle
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39. Du manger et boire, et sobriete
40. Du luxe et debauche en tous conuerts etc.
41. Plaisir Charnel, chastete, continence
42. De la gloire, et de l'ambition
43. De la Temperance au parler, et de l'Eloquence
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Appendix II
Citations from Chapter One
Unless stated otherwise, all the quotations below are taken from Charron's De la
Sagesse, Trois Livres (Paris: David Douceur, 1607). The first number refers to the page,
and the second to the footnote.
50, 53-4: 'Or nous pouvons dire qu'il y a trois sortes et degrez de Sagesse, Divine,
Humaine, Mondaine, qui respondent a Dieu, Nature pure et entiere, Nature vitiee et
corrumpue:... le Theologien de la divine ... Or n'est il point parle d'elle en ce livre, que
pour la condemner'; p. 3.
51, 57: 'De cette sagesse divine n'entendons aussi parler icy, elle est en certain sens &
mesure traittee en ma premiere verite, & en mes discours de la divinite'; p. 4.
51, 61-2: 'Davantage les Philosophes la traittent plus doucement et plaisamment, les
Theologiens plus austerement et sechement... La Philosophie qui est l'ainee, comme la
nature est l'ainee de la grace, et le naturel du surnaturel..p. 6.
52, 63:'.. .mais aussy tous ces grands homes qui faisoient profession singuliere &
exemplaire de vertu & sagesse, comme Phocion, Aristides, Pericles, Alexandre, que
Plutarque appelle Philosophe aussy bien que Roy, Epaminondas, & tant d'autres Grecs:
les Fabrices, Fabies, Camilles, Catons, Torquates, Regules, Lelies, Scipions Romains, qui
pour la plus part ont este generaux d'armees'; p. 7.
52, 64: 'Si i'eusse entreprins d'instruire pour le cloistre, & la vie consiliaire, c'est a dire
professions des conseils Euangeliques, il m'eust faillu suyure, adamussim, les aduis des
Theologiens; mais nostre liure instruit a la vie ciuile, & forme vn homme pour le
monde, c'est a dire a la sagesse humaine & non diuine'-, pp. 7-8.
53, 65:'.. .cette sagesse humaine est une droitture, belle & noble composition de
l'homme entire, en son dedans, son dehors, ses pensees, paroles, actions, & tous ses
mouuements, c'est l'excellence & perfection de l'homme comme home, c'est a dire selon
que porte & requiert la loy premiere fondamentale & naturelle de l'homme'; p. 8.
53, 67: 'Le second moyen est en l'estude de la Philosophie, je n'entende toutes ses
parties, mais de la morale (sans toutefois oublier la naturelle) qui est la lampe, le guide,
et la regie de nostre vie, qui explique et represente tresbien la loy de nature, instruit
l'homme universellement a tout, en public et en prive, seul, et en companie, a tpute
cpnversation domestique et civile, oste et retranche tout le saulvagin qui est en nous,
adoucit et apprivoise le naturel rude, farouche, et sauvage, le duit et fagonne a la
sagesse. Bref c'est la vraye science de 1'homme...'; pp. 10-11.
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54, 69: 'Or a tels esprits foibles de nature, preoccupez, enstez, et empechez de 1'acquis,
comme ennemis formels de Sagesse, ie fay la guerre par exprez en mon livre, et c'est
souvent sous ce mot de pedant, n'en trouvant point d'autres plus propre, et qui est
usurpe en ce sens par plusieurs bons autheurs'; pp. 14-5.
54, 70: 'II n'y a que les sots qui se laissent ainsi mener, et ce livre n'est pas pour eux, s'il
estoit populairement receu et accepte, il se trouveroit bien descheu de ses
pretensions...'; p. 20.
54, 71: 'Nonobstant tout cela plusieurs choses qui pouvoint sembler trop crues et
courtes, rudes et dures pour les simples (car les forts et releves ont l'estomach assez
chauld pour cuire et digerer tout) je les ay pour l'amour d'eux explique, esclaircy,
adoucy en cette seconde edition, reveue, et de beaucoup augmentee'; p. 21.
56, 72: 'Le plus excellent & divin coseil, le meilleur & plus vtile advertissement de tous,
mais le plus mal pratique est de s'estudier et apprendre a se cognoistre: c'est le
fondement de sagesse et acheminement a tout bien: folie non pareille que d'estre
attentive et diligent a cognoistre toutes autres choses plustot que soy mesme: le vraye
science et le vray estude de l'homme, c'est l'homme'; p. 23.
56, 77: 'L'esprit la treshaute et tresheroique partie, parcelled, scintille, image et
defluxion de la divinite en l'homme...'; p. 35.
59, 85: 'Toute cognoissance s'achemine en nous par les sens, c'est dit on en Vescole, mais
c'est ne pas du tout vray, comme se vena apres..p. 69. Interestingly enough, in the first
edition the passage does not include the underlined qualification; Charron's view, thus,
in the 1601 version appear more Aristotelian than in the 1604.
59, 86: 'La plus commune opinion venue d'Aristote est que l'esprit cognoit et entend
par le minister des sens, que de soy il est comme une carte blanche et vuide, qu'il ne luy
arrive rien qui ne soit passe par les sens, nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prills in
sensu: Mais elle est premierement fausse...'; p. 88.
60, 92: 'De la foiblesse et incertitude de nos sens viennent ignorance, erreurs et tout
mesconte...'; p. 73.
61, 94:'.. .mais nous disons pour defendre l'honneur de l'esprit, qu'il est faux qu'il
depende des sens et ne puisse rien sgavoir, entendre, raisonner, discourir sans les sens:
car au reburs toute cognoissance vient de luy, et les sens ne peuvent rien sans luy'; p.
90.
61, 95: 'Son action est la cognoissance et l'intelligence de toutes choses: L'esprit humain
est capable d'entedre toutes choses visibles, invisibles, universelles, sensibles,
insensibles. Intellectns est omnia. Mais soy-mesmes ou point selon aucuns ... on bien
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sombrement, imparfaitment, et indirectement par reflexion de la cognoissance des
choses a soy-mesmes, par laquelle il sent et cognoit qu'il entend, et a puissance et
faculte d'entedre, c'est la maniere que les esprits se cognoissent...'; p. 87.
61, 96: 'car comme tous les sages ont dit, ainsi qu'il a este touchee cy dessus, et renvoye
en ce lieu, les semences de toutes sciences et vertus sont naturellement esparses et
insinuees en nos esprits, dont ils peuvent vivre riches et joyeux de leur propre..p. 88.
62, 99: 'je consens que Ion l'appelle image de Dieu vive, nn degoust de l'immortelle
substance, line fluxion de la divinite, tm esclair celeste, auquel Dieu a donne la raison
comme un timon anime pour le mouvoir avec regie et mesure, et que ce soit un
instrrrment d'une complete harmonie: que par luy y a parentage entre Dieu et l'homme,
et que pour le luy ramentevoir, il luy a tourney les racines vers le ciel, afin qu'il eust
toujours sa veue vers le lieu de sa naissance..p. 92.
62,100: 'Nous essayons tous les moyens que nous pensons y pouvoir servir: mais en fin
tous noz efforts sont courts, car la verite n'est pas un aquest, ni chose qui se laisse
prendre et manier, et encores moins posseder a l'esprit humain. Elle lodge dedans le
sein de Dieu, c'est la son giste et sa retraicte: l'homme ne sgait et n'entend rien a droict,
au pur et au vray comme des apparences, qui se trouvent par tout aussi bien au faux
qu'au vray: nous sommes nais a quester la verite: la posseder appartient a une plus
haute et grande puissance... Les erretus se regoivent en nostre ame, par mesme voye et
conduicte que la verite, l'esprit n'a pas de quoy les distinguer et choisir... Les moyens
qu'il employe pour la descouvrir, sont raison et experience, tous deux tres-foibles,
incertains, divers, ondoyans. Le plus grand argument de la verite, c'est le general
consentement du monde'; pp. 97-8.
62,101: 'C'est pourquoy on a eu bonne raison de luy donner des barrieres estroittes: on
le bride et le garrotte de religion, loix, coustumes, sciences, preceptes, menaces,
promesses mortelles et immortelles'; p. 101.
63,102: 'Le matiere des passions de l'esprit est tresgrande et plantureuse, tient un grand
lieu en cette doctrine de Sagesse: a les sgavoir bien cognoistre et distinguer ce qui se
fera maintenant moderer generaux, c'est pour le second livre:: aux remedes particuliere
d'une chascune au troisieme livre, suyvant la methode de ce livre mise au preface'; p.
111.
63,103: 'Et n'ay point veu qui les despeigne plus naivement et richement que le sieur
du Vair en ces petits livrets moraux, dequels je me suis fort servy en ceste matiere
passionnee'; p. 111.
63,105: 'Passion est rm mouvement violent de l'ame en sa partie sensitive, lequel se fait
ou pour, suyvre ce que l'ams pense luy estre bon, ou pour fuir ce qu'elle pense luy estre
mauvais'; p. 111.
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65,110: 'C'est chose estrange, l'homme desire naturellement sgavoir la verite ...
neantmoins il n'y peut parvenir: Si elle se presente, il ne la peut comprendre, s'il l'a
comprend il s'en offense .. .L'homme est fort a desirer et foible a prendre et tenir. Les
deux principaux moyens qu'il employe, pour parvenir a la cognoissance de la verite
sont, la raison et l'experience. Or tous deux sont si foibles et incertains (bien que
l'experience plus) qu'en ne pouvons rien tirer de certain. La raison a tant de formes, est
tant ployable, ondoyante comme a este dit en son lieu. L'experience encores plus, les
evenemens sont tousjours dissemblables il n'y rien si universel en la nature que la
diversite...'; pp. 187-8.
65,112: 'Les superstitieux, injurieux a Dieu, et ennemis de la vraye religion, se couvrent
de piete, zele, et affection envers Dieu...'; p. 215).
66,116-7: 'La verite et le mesonge ont leurs visages conformes; le port, le goust et les
alleures pareilles; nous les regardons de mesme ceil; ita sunt finitimafalsa veris,ut in
prxcipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere'■, p. 224. Cf. also p. 223: 'Suivant cecy
nous voyons presque tout le monde mene et emporte aux opinions et creances, non par
chois et jugement, voire souvent avant l'aage et discretion, mais par la coustume du
pays, ou instruction receue en jeunesse...'
67,118: 'Toute proposition humaine a autant d'autorite, que 1'autre, si sa raison n'en fait
la difference. La verite ne depend point d'autorite ou temoignage d'homme: il n'y a
point de principes aux homes, si la divinite ne les leur a revele: tout le reste n'est que
songe et fumee.'; p. 226.
67,125: 'C'estoit un prealable que d'appeler l'homme a soy, a se tater, sonder, etudier,
afin de se conoitre et sentir ses defauts et sa miserable condition, et ainsi se render
capable des remedes salutaires et necessaires, et qui sont les advis et enseignemens de
sagesse'; p. 305-6.
68,128: 'lis gouverneront tant qu'ils voudront, ma main, ma langue, mais non pas mon
esprit s'il leur plaist, il a un autre maistre: Empescher la liberte de l'esprit l'on ne
sgauroit, le vouloir faire, c'est la plus grande tyrannie qui puisse ester, le sage s'en
gardera bien activement et passivement, se maintiendra en sa liberte et ne troublera
celle d'autruy'; p. 324.
68,129: 'Or joiiissant ainsi le sage de ce droit sien a juger et examiner toutes choses, il
adviendra souvent que le jugement et la main, l'esprit et le corps se contrediront, et
qu'il fera au dehors d'une fagon, et jugera autrement au dedans, jouera un roole devant
le monde, et rme autre en son esprit, il le doit faire ainsi pour garder Justice par tout. Le
dire general, universus mundus exercet histrioniam, se doit proprement et vrayment
entendre du sage, qui est autre au dedans qu'il ne montre au dehors'; pp.324-5. This
contrast between outward behaviour and inward thinking does not appear in the 1601
version.
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70,133: Cf. 'Cette surceance est fondee premierement sur ces propositions tants
celebrees parmy les sages, qu'il n'y a rien de certain, que nous sgavons rien, qu'il n'y a
rien en nature que le doute, rien de certain que l'incertitude, solum certum nihil esse certi,
hoc unum scio quod, nihil scio: Que de toutes choses l'on peut egalement disputer, que
nous ne faisons de quester, enquerir, tattoner a l'entour des apparences, scimus nihil,
opinamur versimilia, que la verite n'est point de notre acquest, invention, ..., que la verite
et le mensonge entrent ches nous par mesme porte.. .qu'il n'y a opinion aucune tenue
de tous et par tout.. .que toutes choses ont deux anses et deux visages, qu'il y a raison
par tout... Bref c'est la doctrine et la pratique de tous les sages plus grands et plus
nobles Philosophes, qui ont fait expresse profession d'ignorer, douter, enquerir,
cercher'; p. 330.
70,134: '...il y a une sorte d'ignorance et de doute, plus docte et assuree, plus noble et
genereuse que toute leur science et certitude...'; p. 333.
70,135: 'Je dirai icy que j'ai fait graver sur la porte de ma petite maison que j'ai fait
bastir a Condom l'an 1600 ce mot, Je ne sgay.'; p. 333.
71,136-7: 'Que tout le sgavoir du monde n'est que vanite et mensonge... que Dieu a
bien cree l'homme pour cognoitre la verite, mais qu'il ne la peut cognoitre de soy, ny
par aucun moyen humain. Et faut que Dieu mesmes, au sien duquel elle reside, et qui
en a fait venire l'envie a l'homme, la revele, comme il a fait: mais que pour se preparer a
cette revelation, il faut auparavant renoncer et chasser toutes opinions et creances, d'ont
l'esprit est des-ja anticipe et abreve, et le luy presenter blanc, nud, et prest'; p. 336.
72,140: 'L'autre liberte qui est de volonte, doit etre encores en plus grande
recommandation au sage. Nous ne parlons pas icy du liberal arbitre de l'homme a la
fagon des Theologiens; Nous disons que 1'homme sage pour se maintenir en repos et
liberte, doit mesnager sa volonte et ses affections, en ne se dormant et affectionnant qu'a
bien peu de choses, et icelles justes (...) et encores sans violence et asperte'; pp. 343-4.
73,143: 'Je la veux icy descrire, advertissant premierement que suivant le dessein de ce
livre declare au preface, je traitte de la prud'hommie et sagesse humaine comme
humaine, par laquelle l'on est dit homme de bien et sage, et non de la Chrestienne,
combien qu'encores en diray-je en fin un mot'; p. 352.
73,144: 'Le resort de cette preud'hommie est Nature, laquelle oblige tout homme
d'estre et se rendre tel qu'il doit, c'est a dire se conformer et regler selon elle. Nature
nous est ensemble et maistresse qui nous enjoint et commande la preud'hommie, et loy
ou instruction qui nous l'enseigne'; pp. 352-3.
74,145: 'Or le Patron et la regie pour l'estre, c'est cette Nature mesmes qui requiert si
absolument que le soyons, c'est di-je cette equite et raison universelle qui eclaire et luit
en chacun de nous: Qui agit selon elle, agit vrayement selon Dieu, car c'est Dieu, ou
bien sa premiere fondamentale, et universelle loy qui l'a mis au monde, et qui la
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premere est sortie de luy, car Dieu et Nature sont au monde, comme en rm estat, le Roy
son autheur et fondateur, et la loy fondamentale qu'il a bastie poirr la conservation et
regie dudit estat. C'est un esclat de rayon de la divinite, une defluxion et dependance
de la loy eternelle, qui est Dieu mesmes, et sa volonte ... II agit aussi selon soy, car il agit
selon le timon et ressort anime qu'il a dedans soy le mouvant et agitant... car cette loy
et lumiere est essentielle et naturelle en nous, dont aussi est appellee Natiue et loy de
Nature. II est aussi par consequent home de bien tousjours et perpetuellement,
uniformement, et egalement, en tous temps, et tous lieux: Car cette loy d'equite et
raison naturelle est perpetuelle en nous, edictum perpetuum, inviolable qui ne peut
jamais estre eteinte ny efface, quam nec ipsa delet inquitas: vermis eorum non morietur,
universelle et constante par tout, et tousjours mesme, egale, uniforme, que les temps ny
les lieux ne peuvent alterer ny deguyser..p. 355.
74,147: 'La loy de Moyse en son Decalogue en est ime copie externe et publique, la loy de
douze tables, et le droit Romain, les enseignements moraux des Theologiens et
Philosophes, les advis et conseils des Jurisconsultes, les edits et ordonnances des
souverains ne sont que petites et particulieres expressions d'icelle... Bref toutes les loix du
monde ne sont que des copies et des extraits produits en jugement, contre toy qui tiens
cache I'original...'} p. 356. [my italics].
74,148: 'Je veux icy adjouster un mot selon que j'ay promis pour debouscher la pointe
de la medisance, et faire cesser les plaints de ceux qui trouvent mauvais de ce que je fais
tant valoir nature (bien que ce soit Dieu comme a ete dit, et que ce livre ne parle de
naturel et humain) comme si cetoit tout et ne fust plus rien requis'; p. 367.
74,149: 'C'est qu'apres tout ce que j'ay dit il reste encores une chose pour rendre
louvrage complet et parfait, c'est la grace de Dieu par laquelle cette telle prud'homie,
bonte, vertu, est animee, mise a jour, et regoit son dernier trait visuel, est relevee
christianisee couronnee, c'est a dire acceptee verifiee, emologuee de Dieu, rendue
meritoire, et digne de recompense eternelle... Or ce bien ne consiste point en long
discourse, preceptes ou enseignemens, ni ne s'aquiert par nostre fait et labour proper,
c'est un pur don n'enhaut, dont il en porte le Nom, Grace..p. 367-8.
76,157: 'Quand a la reception... la particuliere reception ce fait bien tous les jours par
voye, mains, et moyens humains, la nation, le pays, le lieu donne la religion: l'on est de
celle que le lieu et la comagnie ou l'on est ne tient...'; p. 385.
77,161: 'Seulement ay-je ici a donner un advis necessaire a celuy qui pretend a la
Sagesse, qui est de ne separer la piete de la vraye preud'homie, de laquelle nous avons
parle ci dessus, se contentant de l'une, moins encores les confondre et mesler ensemble:
ce sont deux choses bien distinctes, et qui ont leurs ressors divers, que la piete et la probite, la
religion et la preud'homie, la devotion et la conscience; je les veux toutes deux jointes en
celuy que j'instruis icy, comme aussi l'une sans 1'autre ne peut etre entiere et parfaite,
mais non pas confuses'; p. 396.
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78,164:'.. .sqavoir qui vaut mieux religion ou preud'hommie, je ne veux traicter ceste
question: settlement je diray, pour les comparer hors de la en trois points, que la
premiere est bien plus facile et aysee, de plus grande montre et parade, des esprits
simples et populaires: la seconde est d'exploit beucoup plus difficile et laborieux, qui a
moins de montre, et est des esprits forts et genereux'; pp. 397-8.
78,166: 'La religion est posterieure a la prud'hommie, c'est aussi chose apprise, receue
par Youye,fidex ex auditu et per verbum Dei, par revelation et instruction, et ainsi ne la
peut pas causer. Ce seroit plustot la preud'hommie qui devroit causer et engendrer la
religion, car elle est premiere, plus ancienne et naturelle...'; (Extracts from the 1601
edition) p. 788.
78,167: 'Ceux cy veulent au rebours qu l'on soit religieux avant preud'hom, et que la
Religion qui s'aquiert et s'apprend au dehors ... engender la preud'homie, laquelle
nous avons montre devoir ressortir de nature, Loy et lumiere que Dieu a mis au dedans
de nous des notre origine, c'est une ordre renverse. lis veulent que l'on soit home de
bien, a cause qu'il y a rm Paradis et rm Enfer ... je veux que tu sois home de bien, quand
bien tu ne devrois jamais aller en Paradis, mais pource que nature, la raison, c'est a dire
Dieu le veut, pource que la loy et la police generale du monde, d'ou tu es une piece, le
requiert; ainsi et tu ne peux consentir d'etre autre que tu n'ailles contre toy-mesme, ton
estre, ta fin. Certes telle preud'homie causee par l'esprit de religion, outre qu'elle n'est
vraye et essentielle, n'agissant par le bon resort autheur de nature, mais accidentale,
encores est elle Les-dengereuse, produysaiil quelquefois de tres-vilains et scandaleux
effets (comme l'experience l'a de tout temps fait sentir) sous beaux et specieux pretextes
do piete. Quelles exccrables mcnchancctez n'a produit Ic zcle dc religion? mais sc trouvc il autre
sujet on occasion au monde, qui en aye peu produire de pareilles? ... Et qui a religion sans
preud'homie, je ne le veux pas dire plus mechant, mais bien plus dangercux que ccluy qui n'a ny
I'un ny I'autre ... croyent que toute chose quelle qu'elle soit trahyson, perfidie, sedition,
rebellion, et toute offense a quiconque soit, est non seulement loisible et permise,
coloree de zele et soin de religion...'; pp. 398-9.
80,175: 'Par droit le sage est par dessus les loix, mais par effet externe et public, il est
leur volontaire et libre sujet obeisant'; p. 433.
80,176: 'Finalement c'est l'office de l'esprit genereux et de l'homme sage (...) d'examiner toutes
choses, considerer a part et puis comparer ensemble toutes les loix et coutumes de l'univers ... et
les juger (...) de bonne foy, et sans passion, au niveau de la verite, de la raison et nature
universelle, a qui nous sommes premierement obligez ...; et se contenter de rendre l'observance
et obeisance a celles, ausquelles nous sommes secondement et particulierement obligez ... II
adviendra quelquefois que nous ferons par une seconde particuliere et municipale obligation
(obeyssant aux loix et coutumes du pais) ce qui est contre la premiere et plus ancienne, c'est a
dire la nature et raison universelle: mais nous luy satisfaisons tenant notre jugement et nos
opinions saintes et justes selon elle le monde n'a que fairew de nos pensees mais le dehors
est engage au public, et luy en devons rendre conte..p. 434
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Appendix III
Justus Lipsius's De Constantia Libri Duo (1584)




That De Constantia was written with the aim to serve as consolation in times of
public afflictions is declared by the title of the work: De Constantia Libri Duo, Qui
Alloquium Praecipue Continent in Publicis Malis (Two Books of Constancy, Which
Especially Contain Consolation in Times of Public Adversity).1 Equally, in a much
quoted extract from the Epistle to the Reader of the same work, Lipsius himself tells us
that the text was written as a means of personal solace:
I haue sought out consolations against publick euils ...To conclude, ... I haue written many
other things for others; hut this book primarily for my self; the former for fame, but this for
saluation.2
The text is in the form of a dialogue between the person of Lipsius and Langius
(Charles de Langhe, 71521-73).3 The dialogue is set in 1571-72, during Lipsius's journey
to Vienna, after which he did not return to Louvain, but instead ended up in Lutheran
Jena. The Flemish scholar had in this trip visited Langius, in his home in Liege, where
the latter was a Canon at the Cathedral.4 Twenty-five years older than Lipsius, the
Canon was a man devoted to religion, studies and horticulture; he had also edited some
of Cicero's (106-43 BC) works in 1563, mainly the ones of a Stoic character.5
Langius then is an appropriate figure to have playing a leading role in a Stoic
moral treatise such as the Constantia. The work's focus, however, is not on setting
1 Cf. Seneca, De Constantia
2 Constantia, p. 207.' solatia malis publicis quaesivi... alia pluria aliis mihi scripta: hunc librum
praecipue mihi: illafamae; at haec salutati'; Opera Omnia, TV, p. 371.
3 For Langius see Biographie Nationale de Belgique, 44 vols. (Brussels: 1866-1986).
4 Constantia, p. 71.
5 Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, p. 66.
342
forth the principles of Stoicism; it is concerned rather with the utility of the doctrines
of that ancient trend as a way of strengthening the mind in the face of internal and
external troubles.6 The discussion begins with Lipsius making complaints to the
elderly man about the situation in the Low Countries and admitting to the fact that
this was the cause of his leaving.7 Langius soberly observes that flight is not the
solution, since there was no part of Europe at that time free of turmoil.8 In this vein,
Lipsius uses the opening chapters of the first book (I, 2-3) to explain how misery
comes from inward opinions about outward events. Through Langius he indicates
reason as the instrument to judge and regulate matters and (he) associates it with the
virtue that the whole work is dedicated to, constancy. The young Lipsius of the book
is exhorted to constancy, the virtue that will enable him to survive and endure the
public calamities. The work then goes on to contest the honesty of the feeling of the
young fugitive, accusing him of dissimulation; according to Langius the young
Lipsius is more concerned with his own fate than with that of his coimtry.
After this somewhat long introduction and outline of the basic principles, the
work proposes to demonstrate the triviality of public evils based on four arguments.
The first two, providence and necessity, are dealt with in the first book; they are also
more directly relevant to this chapter as they convey some of the author's
fundamental Stoic views. According to this line of reasoning, civil calamities are part
of God's divine Providence; they are, furthermore, the results of natural necessity,
according to which all things in this world are subject to alteration and decay. Lipsius
creates an opportunity, in this manner, to consider the closely related notions of
providence, necessity and destiny, and to discuss the differences between the Stoic
position on these concepts and the Christian interpretation of them.9 The first book
comes to a conclusion with the account of these crucial issues, and with a final brief
reference to man's role within the divine scheme of things.
6 Cf. A.A. Long, 'Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler' in Brad
Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: CUP, 2003); pp.365-392, esp. p.
381.
7 Constantia, pp. 71-2.
8 Constantia, p. 72.
9 Constantia (1,13-22).
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The second book of De Constantia opens with the serene picture of Langius's
garden. Occupying three chapters, this literary device operates on many levels; in the
first place, it works as a contrast between the raging wars outside and the tranquillity
that is the aim of the Stoic sage, as signified in the image of the garden. It also
represents the Stoic ideal of life according to nature; as a place of reflection,
moreover, it urges to wisdom and constancy. With this transition and the reference to
constancy, Lipsius resumes his reasoning for the exhortation to the same virtue.10 The
two remaining arguments of the work refer to a more practical level than the more
abstract discussion of the first book.11 Thus, the third case for constancy is drawn
from usefulness ('utilitas'): as Lipsius puts it, since public evils derive from God, the
ultimate purpose for their existence must be good, as God through them can exercise
and strengthen virtuous people, and make them an example to the rest, punish the
wicked. Finally, they work within the greater scheme of His Providence for the
conservation of the world.12
The last argument in the author's line of reasoning is the fact that civil
struggles are not as grievous as they appear. The persona of Langius shows that ills
such as the loss of property, banishment and death only seem to be great; their
triviality becomes especially evident when considered alongside the teachings of
Stoicism, and Christianity. The last seven chapters (II, 20-26) compare the situation of
the Low Countries and of Lipsius's age with other civil wars and destructions in
history to prove that the present misery is exaggerated. The examples and accounts,
furthermore, that the author employs are not restricted to this part of the world: as he
10 The description of Langius's garden extends over three chapters (II, 1-3). Lipsius's own love
for gardens and horticulture is well attested; cf. for example Vita, Opera Omnia (I, lxiv); see also
his letter to Willem Breugel (Sept. 29,1575): 'May I remain at peace, far from the stormy sea of
the city, in this tranquil rural haven, and so grow old. Here I may worship God, first, piously,
and purely. Next, may I engage in the study of wisdom and the Muses, and of all else that
promotes the use and education of the mind. Here may I hear no trumpets or bugles, nor see the
crows of the court or market. Rather may I live moderately and peacefully, for myself and with
myself, free from ambition and pale cares'; cited in Mark Morford, 'The Stoic Garden', Journal of
Garden History 7 (1987), pp. 151-175 (p. 164). The article discusses thoroughly the Stoic
connotations of the garden and Lipsius's uses of it.
11 Morford, 'Stoic Garden', p. 160.
12 Cf. Lipsius's powerful metaphor of God as a farmer cultivating his field (the world); Constantia
(II, 11), p. 157.
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explains, Italy, Germany, Britain and France are either experiencing the same menace
or they are about to in the near future.13 The dialogue concludes with a further
exhortation to constancy and the exclamation of the young Lipsius: 'I haue escaped
the euill and foimd the good'.14
ii.
Politico.
Of the most frequently quoted extracts from Lipsius's correspondence is the
part where he mentions how out of all his works, he valued the Constantia and the
Politico most, and that he considered that they would last as long as Latin letters.15
The Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex Qui ad Principatum Maxime Spectant
(Leiden, 1589) matched indeed the success of the Constantia.
It is useful briefly to place side by side the two works. It can be observed from
the outset that the Politico, in contrast to its predecessor's form of a dialogue, is
composed as a treatise in the fashion of 'mirror for princes' literature; the author,
thus, does not use in this case another persona to convey his views. What is most
extraordinary about the composition of this political treatise is that it consists of a
compilation of quotations of ancient texts, a 'learned and laborious tissue' (docte et
laborieux tissue), as Montaigne described it.16 Lipsius is in this manner demonstrating
his exceptional knowledge of classical writers by sewing together their words in
order to create a new text.17 According to a contemporary criticism however, this
13 Constantia (II, 26), p. 199.
14 Constantia (II, 27), p. 201.
15 Ep. misc. iv. 84 (3 November 1603, to Woverius): 'Vide Constantiam meam, dicet: vide Politica,
idem: et hoc utrunque opus est, cui vita fortasse cum Latinis litteris manebit'; cited in Morford,
Stoics and Neostoics, p. 107 note 40. Cf. also Vita, Opera Omnia, I, Ixiii.
16 Montaigne, Essays (1,26), De I'Instruction ('On Educating Children'); The Essays ofMichel de
Montaigne, trans, and edited by M.A. Screech (Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1991), p. 166.
17 In the text itself the quotations by other authors were printed in italics; this is also preserved in
the English edition of 1594, although the quotations here are translated from the original
language. In the two French editions of 1590 and 1594, however, this is obscured: there are no
italics in the citations and these are translated in French. For an interesting interpretation of the
purpose behind Lipsius's construction of his text as a commonplace book and as an example of
the possibility to maintain an equilibrium between unity and multiplicity see Ann Moss, 'Vision
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technique was also a way of utilising other personae, in order to distance himself
from the citations used, and hide behind them.18 In terms of inspiration, as De
Constantia was primarily based on the writings of Seneca - to whom, as already
noted, Lipsius would return later in his life - the Politica draws a great deal from
another Roman scholar, Tacitus: it has been observed that, in fact, a quarter of all the
citations comes from the works of Tacitus.19 Having completed the 'final' and
'definitive' edition of the Histories and the Annals four years earlier (1585), Lipsius
then turned to write a book with political observations founded on the hindsight he
acquired from studying the Roman historian. Tacitus was acknowledged as a
perceptive author who recorded all the ghastly details of political life:
[Tacitus] presents kings and monarchs to you - in a word, the theatre of our life today. I
see in one place a ruler attacking the laws and constitution, and in another subjects
rebelling against the ruler. I find the ways and means of destroying liberty; I find ill-
fated efforts to recover lost liberty. I read in turn of tyrants overthrown and laid low; 1
read of power insecure when wielded to excess. I read too of the evils of liberty restored,
disorder, rivalry between colleagues, greed, looting, wealth acquired from the people,
not for the people. Tacitus, good God!, is a great and useful writer. He should be in the
hands of those in whose hands are the rudder and tiller of the state....20
And this is what Lipsius did in the Politica; he made the lessons from Tacitus
available to the Princes of his age, to whom the work is dedicated. This marks
another distinction from the De Constantia; whereas the latter is intended for subjects,
the former's planned audience, as set out in the Epistle to the reader, is the Emperor,
Fragmentee et Unitaire: les "Politiques" et les Recueils de Lieux Communs' in Mouchel (ed.),
Juste Lipse (1547-1606) en son Temps, pp. 471-478.
18 Cf. Gerrit Voogt, 'Primacy of Individual Conscience or Primacy of the State? The Clash
between Dirk Volckerstz Coornhert and Justus Lipsius's, Sixteenth Century Journal 28 (1997), pp.
1231-49: in his last work, a reply to Lipsius's De Una Religione Coornhert accused the latter of
hiding behind his quotations and disavowing their obvious message; 'If you have a different
opinion [i.e. from the quotations]', Coornhert enquires Lipsius, 'then why don't you write it? or
do you lack the learning, artifice, and words straightforwardly to state your opinion?' (p. 1246).
19 Mark Morford, 'Tacitean Prudentia and the Doctrines of Justus Lipsius's in T.J. Luce & A.J.
Woodman (eds.), Tacitus and the Tacitean tradition. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1993), p. 142. Cf. the dedicatory epistle, where he clearly states his
preference for Tacitus, explaining that this was because of Tacitus' intelligence (prudence)
and because he had more material than all the other authors; Opera Omnia IV, 16.
20 Dedication of the commentary on the Annals (Antwerp: Plantin Press, 1581); trans, by M.
Morford, in Stoics and Neostoics, p. 154.
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Kings and Princes.21 The Politica, therefore, dealt with the 'mysteries of state', or
arcana imperii, which were in a sense, exchanged in confidence between theorists of
politics. The trend in the early modern period to use history as a means ofwriting
commentaries on contemporary political life has long been observed by historians.22
Tacitus's use originally came about as an alternative to Cicero, who had been the
favourite source of reference of the Renaissance authors; since the early 1570's,
however, with the change of the political atmosphere humanists began to be drawn
to the more pragmatic Tacitus.23 This shift to the use of Tacitus, as has been
21 Epistle to the Reader ('Imperator, Reges, Principes'); Opera Omnia, IV, 5-7.1 have primarily
used the English translation of 1594, but cross-referenced it with the edition of the Opera Omnia
(1637) and theFrench of 1590. Significantly, the English translation is based on the original - as
the French is - while the one reprinted in Opera Omnia is the revised edition of 1586. See also p.
54, note 217, below. Unless otherwise stated, all my references are to Sixe Bookes ofPolitickes or
Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London: Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby,
1594); reprinted by Da Capo Press, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam and New York,
1970), henceforth referred to as Politica.
22 For the popularity of Tacitus see Tuck, Philosophy and government, pp. 39-45; Kenneth C.
Schellhasse, Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976);
E. Thuau, Raison d' Etat et Pensee Politique a I'Epoque de Richelieu. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), ch.
2; J.H.M. Salmon, 'Cicero and Tacitus in Sixteenth century France' in idem, Renaissance and
Revolt: Essays in the Intellectual and Social History of Early Modern France. (Cambridge: CUP, 1987),
pp. 27-53; also Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: the Acquisition and Transformation of
the Language ofPolitics, 1250-1600 (Cambridge: CUP, 1992) discusses extensively the new trend in
using Tacitus in political treatises in the sixteenth century. As Peter Burke notes in his essay
'Tacitism, Scepticism and Reason of State', between 1580 and 1700 more than 100 authors wrote
commentaries on Tacitus; in J. H.Burns (ed.), Cambridge History ofPolitical Thought 1450-1700.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1991); pp. 247-53; on p. 484.
23 Cf. Montaigne (III, 8), 'On the art of conversation': 'I have just read through one go Tacitus'
History [...] I know of no author who combines a chronicle of public events with so much
reflection on individual morals and biases. And it appears to me [...] that, as he has the
particular task of following the careers pf contemporary Emperors [...] as well as the
noteworthy deeds which they provoked in their subjects above all by their cruelty, he has a
more striking and interesting topic to relate and discourse upon than if he had to tell of battles
and world revolutions [...] This manner of history is by far the most useful. The unrolling of
public events depends more on the guiding hand of Fortune: that of private ones, on our own.
Tacitus' work is more a judgement on historical events than a narration of them. There are more
precepts than accounts. It is not a book to be read but one to be studied and learnt. It is so full of
aphorisms that, apposite or not, they are everywhere. It is a seed-bed of ethical and political
arguments to supply and adorn those who hold high rank in the governing of this world. He
pleads his case with solid and vigorous reasons, in an epigrammatic and exquisite style
following the affected manner of his century. [...] Tacitus can more properly [than Seneca] serve
a sickly troubled nation like our own is at present: you could often believe that we were the
subject of his narrating and berating'; in Screech, The Essays ofMichel de Montaigne, pp. 1065-6.
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suggested, also denoted a special emphasis on the depravity of politics and the
prominence of reality and experience over theory and ideal.24
Lipsius's purpose in the Politica, thus, is to instruct the reader in civil life.25 As
an introduction, accordingly, the whole of Book One is devoted to the discussion of
the general (moral) principles of politics: prudence and virtue are ascribed by Lipsius
as the guides to civil life. Prudence is the special virtue that Lipsius associates with
civil life and political affairs - and it is, in a sense, equated with virtue a number of
times; at other points, however, Lipsius notes its primacy over virtue.26 The Flemish
scholar differentiates between domestic and civil prudence and traces the sources of
this practical virtue in use and memory. The concept of prudence and its relation
with the other virtues are issues that we will return to anon.
The Second Book of the Politica deals with government in general. Lipsius
demonstrates his preference for the Principality as the ideal form of government and
shows that the purpose of kingdoms is their own preservation and continuation.27
Similarly, the Prince's actions ought to have as their prime objective the benefit of his
subjects. Later in Book Two Lipsius touches upon the princely qualities, such as
justice, clemency, modesty, but pointing especially to the two guides of civil life,
prudence and virtue.28
Books Three and Four are entirely devoted to the analysis of princely
prudence, which is distinguished from that of the ordinary people. Lipsius explains
that prudence is twofold, from ourselves and from others; a Prince, therefore, is in
need of assistance, which would come in the form of counsellors and ministers.29 The
rest of the Third Book, hence, discusses the duties and qualities prerequisite of
counsellors and ministers, features to be avoided, and how the Prince ought to
conduct his advisors. Interestingly, it concludes with some recommendations from
24 This is the central thesis ofViroli, From Politics to Reason of State.
25 Politica (1,1), p. 1.
26 Politica (I, 7), p. 11.
27 Cf. Tuck, Philosophy and Government, where he talks about the Stoically-inspired notion of
preservation and he associates it with the political notion of preservation of the state; pp. 51, 62-3
and 92.
28 Cf. Seneca, De Clementia.
29 Politica (III, 2), p. 43.
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Lipsius himself to counsellors and ministers, on how to survive the evils and
machinations of court life, advising, above all, constancy.30
The Fourth Book is probably the most commented upon part of the Politica,
as it contains Lipsius's views on the role of religion within a state and the rather
controversial account of mixed prudence. The book opens with the bold statement that
'proper' - that is, princely - prudence can 'hardly be tied to precepts', it 'extends very
far' and thus 'no certain rules can be given of it'.31 In his favourite manner, Lipsius
divides princely prudence into civil and military; civil, in turn, is again separated into
human and divine concerns. In relation to the latter, Lipsius puts forth the position
that in order to maintain peace and unity in a state, only one creed should be
observed.32 This view, as indicated above, was to be at the root of the controversy
that arose between the Leiden scholar and Coornhert, and it is also crucial to our
understanding of Lipsius's stance on religious matters. The discussion on human
prudence is centred on the author's view of the nature of people, on how a Prince
should attain the love of his people as a means to authority and stability, and how
this authority and stability ought to be safeguarded against conspiracies and treason.
The book concludes with reference to mixed prudence that is accepted for the Prince to
use. In the account of mixed prudence, Lipsius famously distinguishes three levels of
deception and crucially, he accepts - even recommends - some use of deception on
behalf of the Prince when the benefit of the state requires it; it was statements such as
these that gained him the title of a Machiavellian, as wewill see later.33
Military prudence, the other part of princely prudence is the subject of the
Fifth Book of the Politica. As a recent commentator has pointed out, one could well
imagine Book Five being published as a separate book.34 The author deems military
30 Politica (III, 11), pp. 56-8.
31 Politica (IV, 1) in the title; p. 59.
32 Politica (IV, 2), pp. 61-3. Cf. for example the famous quotation on p. 62: 'One religion is the
author of vnitie; and from a confused religion there always groweth dissention'.
33 The discussion of mixed prudence occupies the chapters (IV, 13-14); pp. 112-123.
34
Jan H. Waszink, 'Virtuous Deception: The Politica and the Wars in the Low Countries and
France, 1559-1589' in Tournoy, G., De Landtsheer, J. and Papy, J. (eds.), lustus Lipsius Europae
Lumen et Columen : Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Leuven 17-19 September 1997
(Leuven/Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1999); pp. 248-267; on p. 250
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prudence necessary for a Prince, as the way to defend and preserve his kingdom. In
this section Lipsius defines the essentials of lawful warfare and war; the book
concludes with a general 'earnest exhortation to peace'.35
The last book of the Politica (Book Six) is especially dedicated to the subject of
the civil wars, as another area under the jurisdiction ofmilitary prudence. This is a
critical concern for the author, as is obvious from the frequent references to the
devastation of his time and the prayer for peace at the end of Book Five.36 Lipsius
treats, thus, the miseries of the civil wars, their causes, as well as, significantly, the
conduct that an honest man should follow in case public calamities do break out: the
author advises him to abstain from taking sides. The Book concludes with an account
of the ending of civil wars and the reiteration that their outbreak ought to be resisted
at all costs.37
35 Politica (V, 20), pp. 183-186.
35 Politica (V, 20), p. 186.
37 Politica (VI, 6), p. 206 (wrongly numbered as 106).
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Appendix IV
Justus Lipsius's Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex:
Changes in IV, 4 (on religious dissent)
A. Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex Old ad Principatum Maxime Spectant (Leiden:
Plantin Press, Franciscus Raphelengius, 1590); pp. 127-29.
CAPVT IV
An puniendi singidi, & quieti? item'que an extrahendi & perquirendi? Neutrum (si intente
quidemfiat) ex vsn videri. Doctore magis his opus, quam tortore.
Secvnda Quaestio est, de his qui in Religione peccant priuatim. Ecce labes errorum in
mea mente, sed neminem maculo: quiesco domi & sileo. Hicne talis etiam puniendus?
Non videtur.
Tacere liceat, nulla libertas minor
A rege petitur.
Fortasse nec nimis inquirendus. nam qui bono? Nemo rex perinde animis imperare potest,
ac Unguis.
Mentium rex, Deus est.
Itaque terrore illo, hoc saltern efficies, vt vultu, qui maxime seruit, assentuatur.
Numquam corde. Quis enim imponat mihi necessitatem vel crededi quod nolim, vel quod
velim non credendi?
Nihil tarn voluntarium, quam Religio: in qua si animus auersus est, iam sublata, iam mdla est.
Fictiones ea res inducit. & Purpuree tux cultures aliquot efficies, non Dei.
Bene olim rex Theodericus: Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur vt credit
inuitus.
Quanto mitior & tutior via altera, Docendi ac Ducendi/ Fides suadenda est, non imperanda.
Ingenia nostra, vt nobiles & generosi equi, melius facili frseno reguntur.
Europam hanc cogitatione peragra. videbis acerbis istis iudiciis vastari magis ciidtates,
quam corrigi.
Ita profecto est. Tolluntur haec talia quae sensibus insident, docendo magis quam iubendo,
monendo quam minando.
In fidibus siquid discrepat, non abrumpis per iracundiam, sed paullatim reducis ad
concentum: in Fide cur non idem fit? & peccata sic compescis, vt sint quos pecasse poeniteat?
Atque hi tales, saepe meliores. Multofirmior est Fides, quam reponit pcenitentia.
Quod o benigne & miserator Deus (nam voto & suspirio locum hunc claudo) da nobis:
& effice vt multitudinus credentium sit cor vnum, & anima vna.
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B. Opera Omnia, 4 vols. (Antwerp: Plantin Press: Balthasar Moretus, 1637); vol. IV, p. 48.
CAPVT IV
An puniendi singuli, & quieti? item'que an extrahendi & perquirendi? Neutrum (si intente
quidemfiat) ex vsu videri. Doctore primum his opus, non tortore.
Secvnda Quaes tio est, de his qui in Religione peccant priuatim. Ecce labes errorum iri
mea mente, sed neminem maculo: quiesco domi & sileo. Hicne talis etiam puniendus?
De quietis temporibus, non disputo: de turbidis, ambigo. & interdum ilia valeant,
Tacere liceat, nulla libertas minor
A rege petitur.
Nemo rex perinde animis imperare potest, ac Unguis.
Mentium rex, Deus est.
Sanenimio aut intempestiuo terrore quid efficitur? vt vultu, qui maxime seruit, assentiatur.
Corde minime. Quis enim imponat mihi necessitatem vel crededi quod nolim, vel quod velim
non credendi?
Fictiones ea res inducit. & fortasse Purpuras tuse cultures aliquot efficies, non Dei.
Vide ne, in statu simili, tutior via altera, docendi ac ducendi. Fides suadenda est, non
imperanda.
Ingenia nostra, vt nobiles & generosi eqid, melius facili fraeno reguntur.
Et errantem per agros ignorantid vice, melius est ad rectum iter admouere, quam expellere.
Ita profecto est. Tolluntur haec talia quae sensibus insident, docendo magis quam iubendo,
monendo quam minando.
In sidibus siquid discrepat, non abrumpis statim, sed paullatim reducis ad concentum:
in Fide cur non idem fit? & peccata sic compescis, vt sint quos pecasse pceniteat?
Atque hi tales, saepe meliores. Midto firmior est Fides, quam reponit pcenitentia.
Etsi Poena etiam saepe rcposuit. & lentis tcpidis'que animis quod cohortatio quicta non suasit,
minax subito terror extorsit.
Sed quid Tempora, quid etiam Pietas poscat, Princeps videto: id'que de piorum
sententia. Tu o benigne & miserator Deus (nam voto & suspirio locum himc claudo)
diuisa haec iunge; & effice, vt multitudinus credentium sit cor vnum, & anima vna.
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Appendix V
Citations from Chapter Two
Unless stated otherwise, the quotations below are taken from Lipsius's Two Bookes of
Constancie, trans. Sir John Stradling (London: Richard Johnes, 1594); eds. Rudolf Kirk
and ClaytonMorris Hall (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1939), and his Sixe
Bookes ofPolitickes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London: Printed by Richard
Field forWilliam Ponsonby, 1594); referred to as Constantia and Politica respectively.
The first number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.
109, 53: Here is how Lipsius opens the scene for the dialogue to follow: 'A fewe yeares
past, as I trauelled towardes Vienna in Austrich, I turned aside (not without Gods
direction) to the towne of Liege, being not far out of my way ... [had some friends].
Among whom was Charles Langius, a man (simplie and without boasting be it spoken)
for vertue and for learning the chiefe of the Flemmings ... he was the man that opened
mine eyes by driuing away the clouds of some vulgare opinions'; Constantia, p. 71.
109, 55:'.. .To whom [Langius] when I had spoken much of the troubles of the Low-
countries, of the insolencie of the gouernours and souldiers, I added lastly that I
pretended other excuses, but this in trueth was the cause ofmy departure. For (said I)
who is of so hard and flinty a heart that he can anie longer endrue these euils? wee are
tossed, as you see, these manie yeares with the tempest of ciuill warres: and like Sea¬
faring men are wee beaten with sundrie blastes of troubles and sedition. If I loue
quietnesse and rest, the Trumpets and ratling of armour interrupt me. If I take solace in
my countrey gardens and farmes, the souldiers and murtheresrs force mee into the
Towne. Therefore (Langius) I am resolued, leauing this infortunate and vnhappie Belgica
(pardon mee my deare Countrie) to change Landfor land, and to flie into some other
part of the world... For, to see and suffer these thinges daylie as heretofore, I cannot,
Langius, neither haue I anie plate of Steele about my heart. ...' Constantia, pp. 71-2.
109, 56: 'O fonde youngling, what childishnesses is this? Or what mindest thou to seeke
safetie by flying away? Thy countrey (I confesse) is tossed and tormoyled grieuously:
What part of Europe is at this day free? [...] Wherefore (Lipsius) thou must not forsake
thy countrey, but thy affections'; Constantia, p. 72.
Ill, 64: 'Beware here, least OPINION beguile thee, presenting vnto thee in steed of
Patience .. .But vertue keepeth the meane, not suffering any excesse or defect in her
actions, because itweigheth all things in the ballance of REASON, making it the rule
and squire of all her trials. Therefore we define RIGHT REASON to be, A true sense and
iudgement of thinges humane and diuine. But OPINION (being the contrarie to it) is
defined to be, A false andfriuolous coniecture of those thinges.'; Constantia (I, 4), pp. 79-80.
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Ill, 65: 'But the true mother of Constancie is PATIENCE, and lowlinesse of mind,
which is A voluntarie sufferance without grudging ofall things whatsoeuer can happen to, or
in a man'; Constantia (I, 4), p. 79.
113, 69: 'Thou sayest thou canst not endure to see these public miseries, that it is a grief,
yea euen a death vnto thee. Speak you that from your heart, or onelie from the teeth
outward? ... I speake in good earnest for that many of your crue doe beguile the
physitians, making them beleeuc that the publike euilles doe grieue them, when their priuate
losses are the true cause. I demaund therefore againe, whether the care which now doth
boile and bubble in thy breast, be for thy countries sake or for thy own? ... You play a
Comedy, and vnder the person of your country, you bewail with tears your priuate
miseries...'; Constantia (I, 8), pp. 88-9 (my italics).
113, 70: Cf. Constantia (I, 9), p. 91: 'Wherefore (Lipsius) take away these stage-hanginges,
draw backe the curtain that is afore thee, and without all counterfeiting or
dissimulation acquaint vs with the true cause of thy sorrow'; and (I, 7), p. 87: [Langius:]
'See how thy country of Belgica [Flanders] is afflicted with sundrie calamities, and
swinged on euery side with the scratching flame of ciuill warres ... Are thou not griued
herewith? Yes, I am sure, and griued diuerslie, for thy self, for thy countrymen, and for
thy countrey. Thy owne losses trouble thee: the miserie and slaughter of thy
neighbours: the calamitie and ouerthrow of thy countrie'...
115, 76: 'It is a strange thing that thou canst not tame, and bring wild beasts into
subiection, without certeine handling and art, and doest thou imagine to get the upper
hand of man?... there is no living creatine more stubborne, nor that requireth to be
handled with greater skill.. .It is more easie to govern all other living creatures, than
man. We ought therefore to use prudence...'; Politica (III, 1), pp. 41-2.
133,129:'But thou yoimg man, if thou be aduised by me, shalt stand to it, and set sine
footing against this thy aduersarie SOROW. Aboue all things it behooueth thee to be
CONSTANT: For by fighting many hath gotten the victory, but none by flying.';
Constantia (I, 3), p. 78.
133,131: 'There bee two thinges that doe assault this Castle of Constancie in vs, FALSE
GOODS, and FALSE EVILS. I define them both to bee, Such thinges as are not in vs, but
about vs: And which properlie doe not helpe nor hurte the inner man, that is, the minde....
From these two rootes doe spring foure principal! affections which doe greatly disquiet
the life of man. DESIRE and IOY: FEARE and SORROW ... A1 of them do hurt and
distemper the mind, and without timely preuention doe bring it out of al order: yet not
each of them in like sort. For whereas the quietnesse and constancie of the minde
restcth, as it were, in an cuon balance, these affections do hinder this vpright poise and
euennesse: Some of them by puffing vp the minde, others by pressing it downe too
much ...'; Constantia (I, 7), p. 85.
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134,137:. .none of all these things trouble my braine. I am guarded and fenced against
all external things, and settled within my selfe, carelesse of all cares saue one, which is,
that I may bring in subiection this broken and distressed mind of mine to RIGHT
REASON [and GOD], and subdue all humaine and earthly things to myMIND';
Constantia (II, 3), p. 137.
135,138: 'Thou therefore in loosing the raynes thus to thy sorrowe, and grudging that
thy countrey is so turned and ouer-turned, considerest not what thou art, and against
whome thou complainest. What art thou? A man, a shadowe, dust: Against whom
doest thou fret? I fear to speak it, euen against GOD'; Constantia (1,14), p. 104.
135,141: 'I come to the Stoickes my friendes (for I professe to hold that sect in
estimation and account) who were the authors of VIOLENT FATE...'; Constantia (1,18),
p. 115. Cf. also p. 117: 'I doe in good earnest giue this commendation to the Stoickes,
that no other sect of Philosophers auowed more the maiesty and prouidence of God,
nor drewe men neerer to heauenlie and eternall thinges'.
136,144: 'How can it be (say they) if God foresawe it that I should sinne, and his fore¬
sight cannot be deceiued, but that I doe sinne necessarily? Foole! Who denieth it? Thou
sinnest necessarily, and yet of thine owne free-will. Forsooth thus much did God
foresee, that thou shouldest sinne in such sort as he foresaw, but he saw that thou
shouldest sinne freelie, therefore thou sinnest freely and necessarily.'; Constantia (I, 20),
p. 122.
140,160: '[internal] is that, which conceaueth in the heart, and vttereth frim the hart;
praiers, praise, and thanksgiuing vnto God: the latter [external] is that, which
expresseth the same things, but by certaine rights and gestures'; Politica (I, 3), p. 4.
140,161:'... least the people fall to superstition, which is an vtter enemy to religion ... Neither
doe great ones hinder this, because they are certainly persuaded, nothing hath more force
to range the multitude in better order then superstition, which we ought to eschew and
auoid, for after it hath once ceased on our hearts, we are neuer at rest, this difference being
betweene religion and superstition, that the religious person doth hue God, the superstitious
dreadeth him'-, Politica (I, 3); p. 5.
142,166:'... and that according to the ancient custome, for it is the part of a wise man,
to maintain the lawes of his Ancestors, by observing their holy ceremonies....'; Politica
(IV, 2), p. 62.
143,169: 'The second question ariseth, concerning those who do offend priuately in
matter of religion. As for example, such a one his mind is corruptwith errors, but he
infecteth no man therewith, he is quiet and silent at home. Whether is he to be
punished, or no? It seemeth he ought not. [... ]No Prince can ride the mindes in like sort as
he may the tongs ofmen. God is the king ofmens minds. [,..]he who doth most ofall seeme to be
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obedient, doth in outward show consent [...] There is nothing more free then religion .
Politica (IV, 4), p. 65.
Appendix VI
Paolo Sarpi's Historio del Concilio Tridentino (1619):
The Subject Matter
It is clear enough from the outset of the work that Sarpi wanted to challenge the
official Roman version of the Council: the Acts of Trent had not been published for
everyone to see what had transpired in that Synod, and various sides had particular
reservations about the way things were conducted in the Council.38 Sarpi, who was
more than anyone else a convinced opponent of Rome, and had faced the real
implications of the outcome of Trent would not let the deceit about the proceedings
continue for any longer. His text was thus an exposition of the 'real' and 'definitive'
version of the story of Trent.
Sarpi's declaration at the beginning of his History is plain enough in maintaining
this: 'My purpose is to write the History of the Council ofTrent'; he justified his
undertaking by asserting there had not appeared so far a study to adequately relate the
causes and the events of the Council.
I wil relate the causes and managings of an Ecclesiasticall Conuocation, by some, for
diuers ends, and by diuers meanes procured and hastened, by some hindered and
deferred for the space of 22. yeeres: and for 18. yeeres more, sometimes assembled,
sometimes dissolued, alwayes celebrated with diuers intentions, and which hath gotten
a forme and conclusion contrary altogether to the deseigne of them that procured it, and
to the feare of those, that with all diligence disturbed it; a cleere instruction for vs to
referre our selues to God, and not to trust in the wisedome of man.39
Sarpi thus dissects the history of the Council for the reader; he narrates the twofold
story of what for him was the 'catastrophe' of the Council; the failure of the reform
movement at Trent was in his view directly linked with the controversy and the conflict
38 Cf. History, p. 136: 'It is a new opinion, and seldom practiced, though established in Trent, that
the Decrees only are called Acts of the Council, and ought only to be published; but in the
ancient Councils all was given unto all. ...'
39 History, p. 1.
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that dominated the whole undertaking, the corruption and the behind-the-scenes
intrigue, all of which he compellingly exposes.
For this Council desired and procured by godly men, to reunite the Church which began
to be diuided, hath so established the Schisme, and made the parties so obstinate, that
the discords are become irreconciliable: and being managed by Princes for reformation
of Ecclesiasticall discipline, hath caused the greatest deformation that euer was since
Christianity did begin... and hoped for by the bishops ....40
The story of the Council in itself, however, does not start but halfway through the
second of the eight books of the work. The first book Sarpi devotes to setting the scene
where the dramawill unfold - the 'Iliad' of his age as he calls it, conscious of the
significance of the subject and the complexity of his narrative. Book One consists of an
overview, thus, of the situation that led to the summons of the Council; beginning with
an account of the Roman Church at the turn of the sixteenth century, Sarpi deals with
Luther's protest and its aftermath, and renders all the political intricacies that
dominated the long wait of almost twenty-eight years to the eventual convocation of
the Council in 1545. To follow the text more closely, the exposition of the author's
intention and the primary questions are followed by an account of the role of the
Councils. Sarpi explains how it had been an 'ancient custome in the Church of Christ to
compose the differences of Religion and to reforme the corrupted discipline, by the
conuocation of Synods'. 41 He points out that the Councils acquired their universal
character with the establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the state under
the Emperor Constantine; he recognises, moreover, the coincidence of Empire and
Christianity as the reason behind the authority of the Roman Emperor to convoke the
Councils, as 'the spread of the religion' tended to cause more extensive divides. He
explains how the meaning of the term 'ecumenical' further lost its significance with the
separation of the Eastern and Western Empires, as the latter ascribed the title to 'vnitie
and communion of those Kingdomes and States' which obeyed the Pope 'in causes
Ecclesiastically According to the Servite, the nature of these summonings had changed
over the years as well:
40 History, p. 2
41 History, p. 2.
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And the assembling of these hath beene continued, not to appease the dissentions about
Religion principally, as before, but either to make warre in the Holy-land, or to compose
Schismes and diuisions of the Church of Rome or else for controuersies betweene the
Bishops and Christian Princes.42
Sarpi then goes on to claim, that around 1600 no reasons deemed urgent enough to call
for a Council, despite the various problems throughout the sixteenth century and
complaints 'against the greatnesse of the Court'; this is an expedient way to refer to
most of the criticisms raised against the Church: he talks thus about the troubles in
Bohemia, about Jan Hus, the contest between Louis XII and Pope Julius II, the French
King's excommunication, and the consequent dangers of a new Schism.43
The imperiousness of the Roman Court was made especially plain with the
corruption of Popes such as Julius II (della Rovere, 1502-13).44 Luther's revolt, Sarpi
attributes precisely to the overall corruption of the Papacy; he associates it specifically,
however, to the issue of Indulgences at the time of Leo X (de'Medici, 1513-21). Of noble
descent and educated in the humanities, Leo would have been a Pope 'absolutely
complete', Sarpi sarcastically comments, had he also had some knowledge on things
related to religion, and some more propensity towards piety. Leo's liberal spending, his
nepotism and patronage of the arts was already a cause of disapproval, when he on top
'thought fit to serue himself of that of Indulgences', as 'other fountaines' from where
the Court of Rome was usually drawing money had 'dried vp'.45 Sarpi argues that the
Curia was also responsible for not handling Luther's protestation effectively - in fact,
according to the Venetian it was the Pope's defenders who tinned the disputation into
an argument on the Pope's authority.46 Luther claimed in response that the Pope was
inferior to a lawfully called general Council and called for one to resolve the
problems.47 On the other hand, Leo was accused by ecclesiastics of negligence and for
42 History, p. 3.
43 History, p. 3.
44 History, p. 3.
45 History, p. 4.
46 History, pp. 6-7.
47 History, pp. 6-8. Skinner points out that the leaders of the Lutheran movement were quick to
associate themselves with the earlier critics of papal authority. It was in this context that Luther
called for a Council; his appeal was published in the form of a tract, The Appeal ofMartin Luther
to a Council (November 1520); Foundations ofModern Political Thought, p. 47.
359
not using 'powerfull remedies' in 'so great dangers'.48 In this manner the idea of the
need of a Council resurfaced as the place where the controversy with Luther might be
decided, together with abuses, 'long since brought into the church'.49 'Godly' and 'well
disposed men', came thus to realise, according to the author, that at the root of the
innovations in the German Lands were the Church abuses and the negligence of the
pastors.50
Sarpi's penetrating narrative identifies at this point the various interest groups
expecting to take advantage of a possible Council for their own ends. As he tells us,
Luther's followers expected that in the Council not only would they be able to defend
their doctrine, but they would also be able to get it approved. Another substantial
group, that of the secular princes, were hoping that the Council would reduce the many
temporal jurisdictions the priests had usurped and ensure their return to the secular
princes. 'The meaner sort' on the other hand, 'though they had not much knowledge of
the affairs of the world' desired the moderation of the ecclesiastical authority that
repressed them in the form of taxes, corrections and sentences. Finally, the Court of
Rome, evidently the most interested party in question, wanted to restore obedience to
the Pope, his authority having been under attack for many years before Luther's
assault.51 A Council, nonetheless, was not an easy enterprise, as Sarpi was very well
aware. The author stresses that the first and foremost obstacle was the unwillingness of
the Papacy and of the Roman Court in general.52 He does not tire repeating, that since a
Council would have the authority to reform the Papacy, it was a prospect that was
abhorred in Rome: a Council would ultimately mean the removal of a great part of the
Curia's income.53 As a result, the problem of convening a Council turned, as Sarpi
points out, into a matter of shrewd diplomacy; it took, as he tells us, a Pontiff
unfamiliar with the Curial affairs to admit the Church's responsibility for the uprising
48 History, p. 9. Cf. also pp. 9, 20.
49 History, p. 13.
50 History, p. 18.
51 History, pp. 18-9.
52 The Pope's difficult position is described in a splendid passage, History, p. 19.
53 Cf. History, pp. 18-9; also pp. 23-4 and p. 29.
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in Germany.54 The rise of his successor to the See of Rome, however, Clement VII (de'
Medici, 1523-34) marked a dramatic change in conciliatory policy. Clement had a
distinct aversion towards councils, chiefly because his claim to the Pontifical throne
might have been challenged through a council, both because of questions of his lineage,
as well as due to allegations of simony during his election.55 Clement, as depicted by
Sarpi was the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the Papacy: a
considerably princely Pope, entangled in family politics and worldly preoccupations,
he displayed very little concern for the spiritual problems of the Church.56 In addition
to these, the author draws attention to the very crucial question of jurisdiction: under
whose authority was it to call for a Council, the Pope, the Emperor or even the
Cardinals. In this fashion, Sarpi shows how the issue of the convocation became the
subject ofmanipulation in the struggles between the Pope and the Emperor. The
Council was a real urgent matter for Charles in his desire to pacify the Empire, so in the
face of Rome's reluctance the Emperor exerted as much pressure as would eventually
secure a General Synod of the Church, even by threatening that he would assemble it
himself or by enlisting the assistance of the College of the Cardinals.57 The remainder
of Book One, thus, is devoted to the endless political manoeuvres of struggles for and
54 Adrian IV (Dedel, 1522-3) was the Pope who finally admitted the Church's responsibility for
the Reformation in Germany. Sarpi explains that he believed that the differences between
Luther's followers and the Catholic Church were not of a doctrinal nature, but rather of a
jurisdictional nature. Sarpi, however, makes only too clear that his sincerity and perhaps
innocence were because of his foreign origin (he was from Utrecht); he describes him, moreover,
as a devout and ascetic prelate, a strike contrast to the Italian Popes. (History, p. 20) Adrian's
admittance was not received well by the Curia (History, p. 29). His successor, Clement VII (de'
Medici) 'being skilfull in the knowledge of negotiations, hee saw clearly that Pope Adrian
contrary to the stile of wise Popes, was too facil, as in confessing the defects of the Court, so in
promising the reformation'; History, p. 30.
55 Cf. History, p. 42.
56 See for example, History, pp. 45-6; Jedin concurs to this view, writing about Clement that he
'became wholly tied up in polities', while his thoughts were almost exclusively determined by
the categories of Italian dynastic policies'. He suggests, moreover, that Clement considered it his
duty to 'extricate the States of the Church from encirclement by the empire of the Habsburgs'
who controlled Naples and Milan, as 'to secure the independence of the Holy See': Jedin, History
of the Council ofTrent I, pp. 220-1; also Michael A. Mullet, The Catholic Reformation (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 32.
57 See Charles' promises in the Diet of Spira (1526) to secure a Council (History, p. 35) and his
letter to the College of Cardinals exhorting to call one themselves (History, pp. 40-1).
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against a Council. Sarpi treats the debate on Imperial Diets as part of this same struggle,
stressing Rome's anxiety that no discussions on religious questions should take place in
them, in contrast to the Emperor's wishes, who laboured for anything that would
provide some solution to the problems in his lands. Last but not least, Sarpi refers to
what seemed to complicate matters even more for Charles (and for a Council), the
Habsburg-Valois war, pronounced by Francis I, to the delight of the Pope.58
The scene for what is going to follow is thus set in the First Book; Sarpi makes
explicit that these inherent problems in the leading up to the Council would not be
properly resolved in the course of the work, prescribing in a somewhat determinist
manner the ultimate failure of the Council. Following the same pattern of paying equal
attention to the religious and political affairs, Book Two narrates two parallel stories, of
the developments both within and outwith the Council. With the opening of the
Council in Book Two, all the aforementioned difficulties become apparent: the location
of the Synod, for instance, and the fact that it was assembled under the auspices of the
Pope ran against the requests of the Protestants, who pleaded for a 'free, Christian
Council' in the German Lands.59 Similarly, that the Papal Legates appeared not to have
specific orders as to the manner in which to proceed in the Council reflects both the
indecisiveness on the sort of Cormcil Trent was intended to be, as well as the fact that
for Paul III the Council was not of primary concern.60 The question, moreover, of
whether the Cormcil represented the 'universal' Church was a matter of debate at the
opening sessions, giving us a pre-taste of debates with strong conciliar resonances that
occurred regularly among the prelates. Similar disagreements in the opening stages as
to what issue would be discussed first, reformation or doctrine, manifested the
contrasting views between the Floly See and Charles as to Trent's purpose.61 Moreover,
after the initial discussions on residence, plurality of benefices and some theological
issues - on which, as the Friar marks clearly, very few delegates had the appropriate
58 History, p. 102.
59 The request runs throughout the work; cf. for example History, pp. 27, 33, 61,149.
60 Cf. History, p. Ill, also p. 133 and p. 146.
61 Cf. for example History, pp. 138-43; 144-5; 166; 188.
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learning in order to resolve62 - the picture of the dissent and disarray in the Council
that Sarpi draws, is particularly lucid.63
Book Two concludes with the dramatic translation of the Council to Bologna,
the author ofwhich, Sarpi was convinced, was the Pope. In the text the Pope comes to
the decision seeing a double situation; on the one hand the potential dangers arising out
of the debates in the Council and on the other, what Sarpi insists that really mattered
for him,64 namely, Charles' successes in Germany, against the Schmalkaldic League. 65
Under a ridiculous pretence then, the Legates presented the reasons for a transfer of the
Council to Bologna, confirming to everyone the complete control of the Council by
Rome.66 The translation was inevitable, evenwith the strong reaction from the
Imperialist party.67
Book Three depicts the stalemate of the situation of the Council and the
intensification of the conflict between Charles and Paul III. Sarpi describes the
Emperor's eager attempts to reassemble the Council, his crushing victory over the
Lutherans and the composition of the Interim of Augsburg. The territorial struggle
between the two heads of Christendom takes on another turnwith the alliance between
the Pope and Henri II, which Paul III instigates as a counterbalance.68
The alliance falls out, however, in Book Four under the new Pope Julius III (del
Monte, 1550-5) with the serious implications for the Council's status, as the French King
declares that he does not recognise it neither as general or free.69 In view of that, the
62 Cf. History, p. 163.
63 See the serious division of the Council with regard to the question of original sin (History, pp.
172-81) and justification - by faith alone or not (History, pp. 194-200). See also the incident on the
publication on 2 separate and different books on the issue of free-will (History, pp. 216 and 229-
30); (History, p. 216). Cf. also the disagreement between Franciscans and Dominicans about grace
in Sacraments, and the efforts of the Legates to settle things; History, pp. 237-8.
64 History, p. 144. See also p. 223.
65 Here is Sarpi's account of how the Pope made the decision for the translation: History, pp. 258-
9.
66 Sarpi's account of the translation is a masterpiece of sarcasm; History, pp. 266-8.
67 History, pp. 267-8.
68 History, p. 272.
69 See Henri II's letter (History, p. 319) where he criticises the Council as being General or free,
and that no safe access had been granted to Protestands in order to attend it.. Henri suggests
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Counsellors of Paris issue a ruling claiming that the decrees of the Council could not be
binding to states that had not been present during the deliberations.70 Sarpi gives
accounts of discussions taking place in Bologna, among what was left of the original
congregation on issues such as the Eucharist, communion and the major issue of
transubstantiation.
Yet the same Book features one of the most significant turning points in the
course of the Council: the arrival - and departure - of the ambassadors of the Protestant
Princes, the Duke ofWittemberg and Saxony. 71 The situating of this event in such a
central Book is, of course, not an accident and bears witness to Sarpi's meticulous
arrangement of the work. The representatives of the Lutherans had been sent to the
Coimcil in accordance with the terms of their defeat to Emperor Charles. Sarpi
illustrates the disappointment of this endeavoru through the direct refusal of the
Legates to let the ambassadors present their doctrine to the Council.72 Lie presents
however some of the Lutherans' points - most of which are the author's as well -
through an oration, in which the Lutherans request a reconsideration of safe-conduct,
on the grormds that the divines of the Protestants were reluctant to appear in a Cormcil
where they were already regarded as 'heretics' and 'schismatics'. The oration also
makes an appeal for the pronouncement of the Council's superiority to the Pope for the
implementation of reform: as the Popes were responsible for the abuses and the
hindering of reform, the assembly ought to be free of its dependence to the Court of
Rome; in this vein, there ought to be a re-examination of Decrees already issued.73 In
this context, the reader is not really surprised with the announcement of the final
suspension of the Coimcil by Julius III, imder another excuse, this time about the
looming Habsburg-Valois war.74 In Sarpi's view, it was in fact the Protestant presence
that it was, instead, convened for the interests of particular parties - namely Charles V and
Julius III.
70 History, p. 320.
71 History, pp. 355-371.
72 History, pp. 359-60. As the Legates make clear to them, the deputies would be required to
accept the Papal Legates as presidents of the Council; this, of course, was in direct contrast to the
assertions and the claims of the Lutherans: see History, p. 368.
73History, p. 368.
74 History, pp. 375-6.
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in the Council that had accelerated the Pope's realisation that nothing beneficial would
come out of it; the suspension 'freed' him 'from many cares'.75
Book Five, accordingly, marks another interval between sessions; the intended
two-year postponement, however, resulted in a ten-year interruption, 'verifying', as
Sarpi sarcastically observes, 'the maxime of the Philosophers that the causes ceasing,
the effects doe cease also'.76 The first cause, according to the author, the hope that a
Council would cure the 'diseases of Christendome' had been plainly disillusioned. The
second cause Sarpi identified as the desire of Emperor Charles to subdue Germany 'by
means of religion' and make the Empire hereditary and his son Philip (later Philip II of
Spain) his heir. But after his plans met the resistance of his own family, Ferdinand and
Maximilian, Charles abandoned all efforts to restore Catholicism in Germany and
consequently any efforts for a Council. Sarpi reverts therefore to a political narrative, as
the ten-year disruption of the Council marked a period of general unrest, both within
the individual states as well as internationally, above all during the pontificate of Paul
IV (Caraffa, 1555-59). The author refers to the conflicts and persecutions in England and
France but also to the long-awaited Peace of Augsburg in Germany, a Peace,
nonetheless, that was severely censured in Rome. Paul IV, a violent anti-Habsburg
Pope,77 had no inclination in (re) convening the Coimcil, and especially not in Trent.78
Things seemed to take a more positive turn after the Peace Treaty of Cambray (Cateau-
Cambresis, 1559) between the Henri II and Philip II, one of which clauses was that the
two monarchs would work together for the solution of the religious differences, the
reformation of the Church and the celebration of the Council.79 And indeed, as Sarpi
75 History, p. 381. Cf. also p. 315.
76 History, p. 381.
77
Significant, in this respect as Richard Bonney's comments about Paul IV: 'He claimed that
Charles V had prompted heresy in order to crush the Papacy and make himselfmaster of Rome,
that is to say, master of Italy and the world'. And he adds later: 'Though 79 at the time of his
accession in May 1555 Paul IV was a man of astonishing energy. He could remember the time
when Italy was free from "those heretics, schismatics, cursed of God, a race of Jews and Moors,
the dregs of the world" - free, that is, from the Spaniards'; Richard Bonney, European Dynastic
States: 1494-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 124 and 127. See also the not-so-
sympathetic article (!) that is devoted to him in the New Catholic Encyclopaedia.
78 History, p. 399.
79 History, pp. 412-3.
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spells out for the reader, it was ultimately the pressure from the temporal princes that
made the next Pope, Pius IV (de' Medici, 1559-65), consider the possibility of a Council.
80 Sarpi puts great emphasis in the explosive situation in France during theminority of
Francis II that dictated an urgent form of religious reconciliation, whether nationally or
'internationally'. He demonstrates, moreover, that it was in the face of the possibility of
a French National Synod, that the Pope convened one himself, for the second time in
Trent.81 Such a beginning, however, as the author makes only too plain, left unresolved
the key question of whether this would be a continuation of the earlier Council:82
contrary to the plans of the Spanish and the Curia, the French Crown and Emperor
Ferdinand were categorically against a continuation, as this would cause the discontent
of their Protestant subjects.
In Book Six we see the impact of that debate dominating the first sessions of the
1562 assembly, together with the ongoing religious unrest in France. As Sarpi
establishes, however, it was in terms of ecclesiological questions that the new
congregation caused the most problems to the Papacy:83 the discussion on the critical
issue of Episcopal residence divided not only the prelates assembled, but the Papal
legates as well.84 Things, in fact, turned even worse during the discussion of order and
hierarchy: whether bishops were superior to priests, and whether this was according to
divine or pontifical law. Sarpi makes the full implications of this matter plain to the
reader: if the superiority of the bishops was de iure divino, it followed that bishops were
80 Sarpi writes that Pius IV initially opposed strongly the possibility of a Council as well. After
deliberations, however, he reached to the conclusions that he could not do otherwise, especially
since he could not openly refuse the convocation of a Council; History, p. 419.
81 History, pp. 425-6.
82 Sarpi shows how the decision to call the Council in Trent was deliberate; the location would
serve as reference to the Council of 1545-1552, but at the same time there was no clear
announcement whether this would be a continuation or not; cf. History, p. 435: This of course
caused the reaction of Princes (History, pp. 428, 441-3). Moreover, the problem appears
repeatedly during the 1562-3 sessions, and it is not resolved even with the closure of the
Council; cf. pp. 468,505-7, 508, 689, 804, 819.
83 Cf. History, p. 502.
84 See for example History, pp. 496-7; 507-8.
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equal to the Pope and that the Pope was nothing more than primus inter pares, severely
damaging the Roman primacy.85
Book Seven traces the escalation of the dispute; Sarpi is ruthless in exposing all
the manipulation the Legates employed in order to avert the situation; he demonstrates
how they assigned the General of the Jesuits Laynez to give a special oration on the
issue,86 and how they resolved, additionally, to postpone any subsequent sessions
rmtil the 'heat was quenched'.87 That the situation would be exacerbated is augured by
Sarpi's frequent references to the impending arrival of the Cardinal of Lorrain.88 A
formidable and astute prelate, of the powerful family of Guise, Lorraine was indeed an
enemy to be reckoned with and was dreaded by both the Legates and the Pope.
Unsurprisingly, with his arrival he assumed the position of the leader of the opposition
party. Sarpi describes graphically the seriousness of the state of affairs in the Council,
the impasse, the extensive uneasiness and the series of informal meetings between
prelates - since formal sessions were not in order. Amidst the unrest and the stalemate
some voices - particularly French - found opportunity to call for the proclamation of
the superiority of the Council to the Pope, citing frequently the Councils of Constance
and Basle. Yet Sarpi does not lose the thread of the conditions in France itself and the
ongoing religious wars: the prelates at Trent were even more aggravated at the news of
any truce there, questioning the authority of the French Crown to draw decrees on
religious issues.89 The Seventh Book of the History comes thus to a strained conclusion
with a double realisation on the part of the French Crown and the Emperor that
nothing good can come out of the Council; Ferdinand's conclusion, nonetheless, as the
author asserts, was 'facilitated' by the secret negotiations between him and Morone,
one of the newer Legates. Despite Sarpi's admission that he could not have ascertained
85 History, p. 609.
86 As Sarpi makes clear, the Legates allowed Laynez, contrary to the principle, to speak for a
whole session: cf. History, p. 609 and p. 610.
87 History, pp. 614-5; the Legates reached to the decision to postpone sessions, after Laynez's
discourse did not have the effect they had expected on the Prelates. Cf. p. 618.
88 Cf. History, pp. 557-9, 600-1, 603, 617; the Cardinal of Lorraine's arrival is on p. 624.
89 Cf. History, p. 697.
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the content of these negotiations, he is convinced that these negotiations amounted to
the beginning of the 'catastrophe', the disastrous conclusion of the Council.90
Thus, having gravely pre-empted the end, Sarpi assigns to Book Eight the place
of a long finale: a matching epilogue to an equally lengthy introduction of the History.
Sarpi allocates, as the protagonist of the Council's last stages, the Cardinal of Lorain,
who fervently worked in bringing to a close in the best - namely, the most moderate
and conciliatory - manner the remaining issues of the institution of the Bishops and
residence, the authority of the Pope and the reformation of the Princes. Ironically, the
conclusion of the Coimcil is finally hastened by a sudden sickness of the Pope and the
dreaded possibility of his death while the Council was still in session. Still, Sarpi points
to a number of issues that the frenzied closure of the Council left unresolved. In this
manner, he refers to the dispute concerning the decrees of the earlier Synod,91 to the
reaction the Council's outcome caused in Germany, the response of the Spanish King
who had been offended by the closure of the Council, and lastly, the censures of the
decrees in France, together with the condemnation of Lorrain's conduct by the
Parlement of Paris. The work closes with a final sarcastic note from Sarpi; he refers to
the promotion of nineteen Cardinals of prelates who supported the Papal positions
during the Coimcil; it paid off to support the Apostolic See. He concludes the story of
the Coimcil, thus, with the 'catastrophe' that he had announced at the very beginning of
the work. Through a carefully structured narrative, with great doses of sarcasm and
detachment, Sarpi manages to bring to life the mesh that Trent had been, while offering,
at the same time, a biting criticism towards the institution of the Papacy.
90 Cf. History, p. 706.
91 The dispute of whether the decrees of earlier session were to be read at the closing of the




Council of Trent: The Reformation of Princes
A. The Proposed Articles of the Reformation, as recorded by Sarpi
That the Synode, besides the things constituted concerning Ecclesiasticall persons, hath
thought fit to correct the abuses of the Seculars, brought in against the immunitie of the
Church, hoping that the Princes will be content, and cause due obedience to be rendred
to the Clergie. And therefore it doth admonish them to cause their magistrates, officers
and temporall Lords, to yeeld that obedience to the Pope and constitutions of the
Councell, which themselues are bound to performe. And, for facilitation heereof, it doth
renew some things decreed by the holy Canons, and Imperial lawes, in fauour of
Ecclesiasticall immunitie, which ought to bee obserued vpon paine of Anathema.
1. That Ecclesiasticall persons may not bee iudged in a secular Court, howsoeuer there
may bee doubt of the title of Clerkeship, or themselues consent, or haue renounced the
things obtained, or for any cause whatsoeuer, though vnder pretence of publike vtilitie,
or seruice of the King, nor shall be proceeded against there, in cause ofmurder, if it bee
not truly and properly a murder, and notoriously knowne, nor in other cases permitted
by the law, without the declaration of the law going before.
2. That in causes spiritual!, ofmatrimonie, heresie, patronage, beneficial!, ciuill,
criminall and mixt, belonging, in what manner soeuer, to the Ecclesiasticall Court, as
well ouer Persons, as ouer goodes, tithes, fourths, and other portions appertaining to
the Church, or ouer beneficiall Patrimonies, Ecclesiasticall Fees, temporall jurisdiction
of Churches, the temporall Iudges shall not meddle, neither in the Petitorie nor in the
Possessorie, taking away all appeale vpon pretence of iustice denied, or as from an
abuse, or because the things obtained are renounced: and those who shall haue
recourse to the Secular magistrate, in the causes aforesaid, shall bee excommunicated,
and depriued of their rights, belonging vnto them in these things. And this shall be
obserued also in causes depending in what instance soeuer.
3. That the Seculars shall not appoint Iudges in causes Ecclesiasticall, though they haue
Apostolike authoritie, or a custome time out ofmind: and the Clerkes who shall receiue
such Offices from the Laikes, though by vertue of any priuiledge whatsoeuer, shall bee
suspended from their orders depriued of their Benefices, and offices, and made
vncapeable of them.
4. That the Secular shall not command the Ecclesiasticall Iudge, not to excommunicate
without licence, or to reuoke or suspend the Excommunication denounced, nor forbid
him to examine, cite and condemne, or to haue Sergeants, or Ministers for execution.
5. That neither the Emperour, Kings, nor any Prince whatsoeuer, shall make Edicts or
Constitutions, in what manner soeuer, concerning Ecclesiasticall causes or persons, nor
meddle with their persons, causes, iurisdictions, or tribunals, no not in the Inquisition,
but shall bee bound to affoord the secular Arme to the Ecclesiasticall Iudges.
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6. That the temporall iurisdiction of the Ecclesiastikes, though with meere and mixt
power, shall not bee disturbed, nor their subiects drawne to the Secular tribunals, in
causes temporall.
7. That no prince or magistrate shall promise by Briefe, or other writing, or giue hope to
any to haue a Benefice within their dominions, nor procure it from the Prelates, or
Chapters of Regulars, and hee that shall obtaine it by that meanes, shall be depriued,
and vncapeable.
8. That they shall not meddle with the fruites of Benefices Vacant, vnder pretence of
custodie or patronage, or protection, or ofwithstanding discords, nor shall place there
either Bayliefes, or Vicars: and the Seculars who shall accept such offices, and custodies,
shall bee excommunicated, and the Clerkes suspended from their Orders, and depriued
of their Benefices.
9. That the Ecclesiastikes shall not bee forced to pay taxes, gabels, tithes, passages,
subsidies, though in the name of gift or loane, either in respect of the Church goods,
and of their Patrimonial, except in Prouinces, where by ancient custome, the
Ecclesiastikes themselues doe assist in publike Parliaments, to impose Subsidies both
vpon the Laitie and the Clergie, to make warre against the Infidels, or for other vrgent
necessities.
10. That they shall not meddle with Ecclesiashcall goods, moouable or immoouable,
vassalages, tenths or other rights, nor in the goods of communities or priuate men, ouer
which the Church hath any right: nor shall rent out the depasturing or herbage which
groweth in the lands and possessions of the Church.
11. That the letters, sentences and citations of Iudges Ecclesiashcall, especially of the
Court of Rome, so soone as they bee exhibited, shall bee intimated, without exception,
published, and executed; neither shall it bee necessarie to require consent or licence,
which is called Exequatur, or Placet, or by any other name either for this, or for taking
possession of Benefices, though vpon pretence ofwithstanding falshoods, and
violences, except in fortresses and those Benefices in which Princes are acknowledged
by reason of the temporalitie; and in case there shall bee doubt of falsitie, or of some
great scandall or tumult, the Bishop, as the Popes delegate shall constitute what hee
thinketh needfull.
12. That Princes and Magistrates shall not lodge their officers, seruants, souldiers,
horses or dogs, in the houses or Monasteries of the Ecclesiastikes, nor take any thing
from them for their foode or passage.
13. And if any Kingdome, Prouince, or place shall pretend not to be bound to any of the
things aforesaid, by vertue of priuiledges of the Apostolike Sea which are in actuall vse,
the priuiledges shall bee exhibited to the Pope, within a yeere after the end of the
Councell, which shall bee confirmed by him, according to the merites of the Kingdomes
or Prouinces, and, in case they be not exhibited before the end of the yeere, they shall be
vnderstood to bee of no force.
[Paolo Sarpi, The History of the Council ofTrent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John
Bill, 1629), pp. 769-71.]
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B. Article of Ecclesiastical Liberty, or Reformation of Princes, as recorded by
Sarpi
(.Decree on General Reformation, article 20)
20. In the end, the Article of Ecclesiasticall libertie, or reformation of Princes, which had
beene so much examined, was read. In it the Synod doeth admonish secular Princes,
hoping they will grant to the Church the restitution of her rights, reduce their Subiects
to reuerence the Cleargie, and not permit their offices and inferiour Magistrates to
violate the immunitie of the Church and Ecclesiasticall persons, but that, together with
themselues, the Princes, they will be obedient to the constitutions of the Pope, and of
Councels, determining that all constitutions of general Councels, & of the Apostolike
Sea, in fauour of Ecclesiasticall persons, and libertie, shall bee obsreued by all:
admonishing the Emperour, Kings, Republiques, Princes, and all, to reuerence the
things that belong to Ecclesiasticall right, and not to suffer them to be violated by
inferiour Lords, their Magistrates, or Ministers; that the Clerkes may reside and
performe their dutie, without impediment, and with edification of the people.
[Paolo Sarpi, The History of the Council ofTrent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John
Bill, 1629), pp. 811-2.]
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C. The Council of Trent: Decree on General Reform, Chapter 20 (Session 25)
The holy council desires church discipline not only to be restored among the
Christian people but also to be perpetually protected and preserved safe from
all obstructions. Hence, over and above its rulings about ecclesiastical persons, it
has thought it right to warn secular princes too of their responsibility, trusting
that they, as Catholics whom God has wished to be protectors of the holy faith
and of the church, will not merely allow a restoration of the church's law, but
will also recall their subjects to due reverence towards the clergy, both parish
priests and those in higher ranks; and will not allow officials and magistrats of
lesser degree to violate the immunity of the church and of ecclesiastical persons,
which has been established by the ordinance of God and canonical rulings, for
any motive of greed or by any act of contempt; but will see that together with
the princes themselves they give due observance to the sacred constitutions of
popes and councils. It therefore decrees and commands that the sacred canons
and all general councils together with other apostolic rulings, that have been
published in favour of ecclesiastical persons and the freedom of the church and
against their violaters, all of which it renews by this present decree, be
rigorously observed by all. Wherefore it also charges the emperor, kings,
republics, princes and each and all of whatever rank and dignity they may be,
that the more amply they are endowed with temporal goods and with power
over others, the more devoutly they should revere what is of ecclesiastical right,
as the special care of God and protected by his patronage; and not allow them to
be damaged by any barons, squires, stewards, rulers or other temporal lords or
magistrates, and particularly by servants of these princes themselves; but
severely punish any who obstruct the church's freedom, immunity and
jurisdiction; and to all of these may themselves be a model of devotion, religious
practice and protection of the churches, in imitation of the best and most
religious of their predecessors as princes, who were the first to advance the
good estate of the church by their authority and generosity, as indeed to avenge
it of the injury caused by others. May each do his duty in this matter with
exactness, so that divine worship is devoutly conducted, and prelates and other
clergy are allowed to continue at peace and without obstacles in their residences
and at their tasks, to the great profit and edification of the people.
From Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Norman P. Tanner, 2 vols.
(London and Washington DC: Sheed & Ward and Georgetown University Press,
1990); vol. I, pp. 795-6.
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Appendix VIII
Citations from Chapter Three
Unless stated otherwise, all the quotations below are taken from Paolo Sarpi's The
History of the Council of Trent, trans. Nathaniel Brent (London: John Bill, 1629). The first
number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.
161,17: Micanzio, Life ofFather Paul, p. 49: 'being growne very numerous, and frequent
because there came thither a great part of such as profest learning, and not onely of the
nobility whereof some subjects are since risen to be great Senators, and like stares in the
firmament of the most serene Common-wealth for goodnesse, Religion, learning and
civill prudence; but there were likewise admitted into that meeting all sorts of virtuosi,
as well as seculars as religious, beside the most eminent persons of learning that were
then met at Venice, or in Italy or of any other nation that did not faile to be present at
that place, as in one of the most celebrated conventions that had ever beene consecrate
to the Muses../.
'At this time the civil warrs in France flam'd out, and the father was pleased to heare
such as could discourse of them. And that pleasure continued with him to his lives end,
to heare and understand any thing of the state of the world and how things were
carried'; Micanzio, Life ofFather Paul, p. 50.
161, 20: 'But concerning his communication with heretiques, although nothing was
proved, yet it tooke a very great impression in Clement the eight, who remembered it
against him a good while after'; Micanzio, Life ofFather Paul, p. 59.
162, 23: 'Because the matter being partly Theologicall and partly legal, the most
excellent Senate came to a resolution, to chose next after their consultors injure, a man
that was both divine and a Canonist'; Micanzio, Life of Father Paul, p. 57.
162, 24: 'By this time (wee may say) that the fathers quiet studies and his private life
were come to their period, and that from hence till the end of his life, he entred upon
another world; or rather came into the world, wherein it pleased God to call him into
employments, which he had never thought he should applied himselfe to. But man is
not borne alone for himselfe, but principally for his Countrey and for a common good';
Micanzio, Life ofFather Paul, pp. 85-6.
171, 51: Cf. Bovio: 'It is appropriate for the church to have ecclesiastical liberty, because
its power is supreme and exempt from any other; but to the secular power, which
according to all the doctors ... is subject to the ecclesiastical, secular liberty in this sense
does not belong ... laymen being mortal [but churches perpetual, the cause of religion
being more favoured even among the barbarians than that of the world, and finally
373
(which is most important) the two powers by which these laws are made not being
equal but the ecclesiastical superior' Bovio, Giovanni Antonio, Risposta alle considerationi
del P. Maestro Paolo de Venetia (Rome, 1606); cited in Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of
Republican Liberty, p. 424.
173, 59: See how Sarpi records Papalist arguments in the History: [Nuncio's reply to
German request for a General Council]. .For it was not conuenient to tolerate an euill,
that good may come thereby, and that they ought to esteeme more the saluation of
soules, then worldly tranquillitie.' (p. 27); see also the reactions of the Prelates at Trent
at the news of an agreement between the French King and the Huguenots (pp. 696-7):
'This was blamed by the greater part of the Fathers in Councell, who said it was to
prefer the things of the world, before the things of God, yea to ruine both the one and
the other. For the foimdation of a State, which is religion, being remooued, it is
necessary that the temporall should come to desolation; whereof the Edict before was
an example, which did not cause peace and tranquillitie, as was hoped, but a greater
War than before'.
174, 60: Cf. Leonardo Dona's account for his decision to allow for some room for
compromise with the Roman Curia: 'Let us not deem it the duty of a prudent man
always to have the same opinion, but that which the accidents and rather variable
conjunctures of human affairs counsel. And certainly, since the principles and accidents
of things vary, it is essential for the deliberations based on them also to vary. Thus he
who otherwise might pretend to the title of consistency and constancy in his opinions
should rather deserve a reputation for imprudent pertinacity and unconsidered
obstinacy, since everyone, even of superficial intelligence in things of state, knows that
civil matters are variable and subject like the sea to the diversity of the winds, to the
violence and diversity of accidents. For this reason man should regulate his opinions
exactly as on a sea voyage, according to the quality of the winds. Nor is he obliged
always to have the same opinion, but rather the same end: the good and safety of the
Republic'; cited by Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense ofRepublican Liberty, pp. 410-11.
174, 63: 'Yet Iwill not speake of those happie times when the name of the Church was
common to all the congregation of the faithfull, vnto which did belong the vse &
propriety of the goods which are called Ecclesiasticall... But I will begin from the time
when the Name of the Church was appropriated to the Clergie onely, all other
Christians being excluded Hisotry, p. 250.
177, 72: 'In departing from Italy to place myself under the August mantle of your
Clemency, I attempted to secure a copy, in so far as it was possible for me, of various
compositions by the most elevated spirits ... which might be pleasing to your Majesty
as True Defender of the True Catholic Faith. ... I have known the Author, a person truly
ofmuch Learning, of great judgement and integrity, and ofmost upright intention. ...
This Work of his, known to me and to a very few of his intimates, I adjudged worthy to
be guided into the light of day, wherefore I labored not a little to get a copy out of his
hands; and this precious jewel obtained (by him little regarded), I have not judged that
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it should any longer remain hidden, even though I knew not what the Author might
think nor how he might have to construe this resolution ofmine to publish it'; cited in
Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, pp. 40-1.
178, 76: 'These contests [between the Papacy and Venice] were the occasion of Padre
Paolo's knowledge and interestwith King James; for whose sake principally, Padre
Paolo compiled that eminent History of the remarkable Council of Trent; which history
was, as fast as it was written, sent in several sheets in letters by Sir HenryWotton, Mr.
Bedel and others, imto King James, and the then Bishop of Canterbury, into England,
and there first made public both in English and the universal language.'; cited in
Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 45.
178, 77: 'What I can say of Father Paul is but little material; however, to satisfie your
desire, I send you this Account, viz. That my Father (having been once before at Venice)
was sent by George Abbott Arch-bishop of Canterbury, a second time, on purpose to
procure the History of the Council of Trent... and my father sent it over weekly, as
[they] compos'd it, to the Arch-bishop in Italian; to whose hands it came after five or six
Superscriptions to other persons for the greater Security' (extract from a letter of Basil
Brent, son of Nathaniel.
There is also a series of letters between Abbott and Brent, while the latter was in Venice,
that refer to a number of 'Canzoni' that Brent was sending over to the Archbishop,
'canzoni', obviously being a code word for the installements. Finally, the letter of 24
Sept. 1618 (from Croydon) indicates the completion of the operation: 'I have received all
the Packets which you have sent unto me, so that there is in my hands the full Story';
both citations in Lievsay, Venetian Phoenix, p. 47
181, 85: 'It is a new opinion, and seldom practiced, though established in Trent, that the
Decrees only are called Acts of the Council, and ought only to be published; but in the
ancient Councils all was given unto all. ...'; History, p. 136
186, 96: 'Here I must make a greatmutation of stile. For whereas in the former narration
I have vsed that which is proper to describe varietie ofminds ... hereafter I must make
relation of one aime only, and vniforme operations, which seeme rather to flie than run
to one only end, whereof I can giue but one cause, not to repeate it in all places, that is,
the ioynt resolution to precipitate the Councell'; History, p. 782
186, 98: 'The custome of those who write Histories is, to propose, in the beginning, a
modell of what they meane to handle. Which I haue thought fit to deferre vntill this
place, making it an abstract of the which is related already, and a desseigne of that
which is to follow. Hauing resolued to give to the memorials which I had collected,
some forme, which might not exceed my power, and yet best befit the matter, I
considered, that, of all the negotiation considered, that, of all the negotiations which
haue hapned among Christians in this world, or perhaps will happen hereafter, this is
the most principall, and that most men are desirous to know whatsoeuer doth belong to
that which they doe esteeme, euen the last things of all. Therefore, I thought first that
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the forme of a Diarie would best agree to this subiect. But two oppositions did crosse
mine opinion: One, that that forme could not befit the occurrences of twenty nine
yeeres, spent in making preparation for the birth of this Councell, nor of the fourteene
yeeres which passed while it slept, it not being known whether it were aliue or dead.
Another, that all the matter which continuate Diarie doth require, could not possibly be
found. Therefore, fitting the form to the matter, as nature doth, not the matter to the
forme, as the Schooles, I thought it not absurd to write the preparatory and
interconciliary times by way of Annals, and in those of the celebration to make a Diarie
of the occurrences of those dayes, the knowledge whereof I was able to attain; hoping
that whosoeuer shall read this Treatise, will excuse the omission of those which could
not be knowen... For these causes this Treatise ofmine is subiect to some disequalitie
of Narration; and howbeit Imight say, that as much might bee foimd in some famous
Writer, yet this shall not bee my defence; but this, that if others have auoyded it, they
have not written the History of the Councell of Trent, nor any other like vnto it.';
History, pp. 583-4.
Cf. also History, pp. 90-1: 'When I set myself to write this Story, considering the number
of Colloquies, some onely intimated, and some held, to compose the differences in
Religion, I doubted whether it was fit to make mention of all, hauing concluding
reasons for the one part and the other. In the end, considering that I haue proposed to
myselfe to relate all the causes of the Councell of Trent, and obseruing that none hath
been intimated or held, but to hinder or diuert, or delay, or to hasten and accelerate the
Coimcil, I resolued to make mention of every one, especially for the fruit which may be
gathered from the knowledge of the notable particulars which happened in them...';
p. 226: 'When I had made this short narration of the Decree, I began to thinke it
superfluous, seeing all the decrees of that Councell are printed in one volume, and in
euery mans hands, and that in the Composition of the Actes that follow, I might referre
my selfe to that booke: and I was about to teare this leafe. But considering that some
might desire to reade the whole continuation in one booke only ... I resolued not to
change ... and the rather, because I am grieued, when, in Zenophon and Tacitus, I see the
narration of things, most knowen to their times, omitted, which remaineth vnknowen
to mee, because there is no meanes to know it againe: and I hold it for a maxime, that
one ought neuer to referrre himself to another.';
p. 633: 'I haue often rehearsed, and continue still, many particulars, which I am sure
many will thinke not worthy ofmention, as I haue thought myselfe; but finding them
preserued, and noted in the memorials of those who were present in the actions, I
perswade my selfe that for some respect, vnknowen to me, they haue deemed them
worthy of commemoration, and therefore, according to their iudgement rather then
mine owne, I haue thought fit to relate them. Perhaps some sharpe witte may discouer
in them some thing which is not penetrated by mee, and those who doe not esteeme
themwill lose but a little labour in reading them.'
187,100: History p. 114: 'All which particularities, with many more that shall bee spoken
of, hauing taken out of the Register of the letters of the Cardinall ofMonte, I haue not
beene willing to conceale them, because they serue to penetrate the depth of the
treaties';
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Cf. also p. 42: 'But I haue not been able to learne what was the negotiation of the
Councell of Spira, hauing not found any mention thereof, but in the foresaid Manifest,
and in Paulus Iulius in the name of the forenamed Cardinall.';
with regard to the Decree for the translation of the Council, p. 268: 'Yet, following the
notes which I haue seene, as I haue said before, I assure my selfe, that it was made two
yeeres, and sent 18 moneths before this time.';
p. 517: 'And the register of the letters written by him [Bishop of Vintimiglia], with much
acutenesse, and iudgement, hath been shewed me, out ofwhich a great port of those
things which follow hath beene drawen.';
p. 706: 'The trueth of this particular I put in the number of those things, the knowledge
thereof I cannot attaine vnto. But it is certaine that the Catastrophe of the Councell,
which it was thought could not possiblie haue a quiet conclusion, had beginning in this
time.';
p. 757: 'I haue not found in the memorials who was Author of this great aduantage; as
many other particulars of importance are hid from mee also, whereof I would willingly
make mention
p. 815: 'Cardinal Annulius, in whose memorials I haue seene this negotiation, said..
189, 106: 'And hence the reformation of Princes began, which, in the relation of the
things that follow, will afford vs much matter'; History, p. 617;
p. 761 'To this effect, the Reformation of Princes was made, whereof wee haue spoken
already, and will hereafter, more at large'.
Cf. also p. 218 where the author refers to the issue residence (1546):'.. .which because it
produced a small controuersie in the beginning, a greater in the progresse, and in the
end (which was in the yeeres 1562 and 1563.) greatest of all, itwill not be vnseasonable
to make some recapitulation...'
191, 111: Sarpi's general/historical assessment: 'Which things hee that shall observe
plainly, shall see which were the ancient incorrupt institutions, and how corruptions
began for worldly respects and interests. For when men began to place Heaven below
the earth, good institutions were published to be corruptions, only tolerated by
antiquity, and abuses, brought in afterwards, were canonized for perfect corrections';
History, p. 578.
196,120: The papal standpoint is perhaps most eloquently expressed by Paul IV during
the Council's long intermission, and while considering whether it should be re¬
assembled, and under what conditions; the following, according to Sarpi took place in
1556:'... Some told him that it was necessary to handle such a thing in a generall
Councell; which he heard with great indignation, and said hee had no neede of a
Councell, himselfe being aboue all. ... hee (Paul IV) concluded that, if a Councell were
necessary, it should bee held in Rome, and that it was not needful to goe elsewhere; that
he neuer consented that the Councell should be held in Trent; as was knowen to them
all, because it was in the middest of the Lutheranes, that the Councell is to consist of
Bishops onely; that other persons might be admitted for counsel, yet onely Catholikes,
otherwise the Turke also ought to be admitted; that it was a great vanitie to send into
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the mountaines threescore Bishops, of the least able, and fourtie Doctours of the most
vnsufficient, as was twice done already, and to beleeue that, by those, the world conld
be better regulated, then by the Vicar of CHRIST, with the College of all the Cardinals,
who are the pillars of the Christendome, elected for the most excellent of all Christian
Nations, and by the councell of the Prelates and Doctours which are in Rome, who are
the most learned persons in the world, and more in number then, by any diligence, can
be brought to Trent.'; History, p. 339.
197,124: Sarpi's account of the translation is a masterpiece of sarcasm: 'And it hapned
fitly that many in the families of the Prelats were sicke, either by the disorders of the
Carnoval, or because the aire had been moist many daies before ... And after the session
a Bishop dying opportunely, interred with the obsequies of the whole Councel, made
the matter more conspicuous. Whereupon all Trent was full, that the disease was
contagious, and the fame was spread in all the bordering places.... Monte proposed the
Translation of the Councel, saying he had Apostolike authority to doe it from the
beginning .. .to translate it into some other City, more commodious, opportune and
secure ... In Rome the Court was glad they were delivered from danger.. .But none was
so simple as not to beleeue that all was done by his [the Pope's] commandment, it being
certaine that nothing, how little soeuer, was handled in the Councel, without order first
had from Rome ... But that which could not be concealed, and which did scandalize
euery one, was, that, by that Bull it appeared that the Councel was in seruitude. For if
the two Legats could command all the Prelates, at once to part from Trent, and compell
them by punishments, and censures, let any man say that can, what liberty they had?';
History, pp. 266-8.
197,127: 'Therefore perceiuing that euery place, Germanie especially, is on fire with
discords, and that the Dutch Bishops, especially the Electors, were departed to make
prouision for their Chinches, it hath determined not to content with necessitie, but to be
silent vntill better times. And therefore they doe suspend the Progresse for two yeeres,
with condition, that if all be quiet before that time bee ended, the Councell shall bee
vnderstood to bee restored; but if the impediments shall not cease at the end of two
yeeres, it shall be vnderstood that the suspension is taken away so soone as the
impediments are remooued, without a new Conuocation of the Councell, his Holinesse,
and the holy Apostolique See, hauing giuen consent and authoritie to this Decree.';
History, p. 376.
199,133: And the divisions at this day, that are among Christians so irrevocable by any
other means than the omnipotent and miraculous hand ofGod, he held it for certain
that they were bred not so much by obstinacy in diversity of opinions, and contrariety
of Doctrine, as from the strife about jurisdiction, which after by degeneration, and
growing into Factions hath taken up the Mask of Religion; Micanzio, Life ofFather Paul,
p. 136.
200,134: Cf. the Pope's letter to Charles V: '...that hee should not violate the rules
obserued by Christians, which command that, in the cause of religion, all should be
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referred to the Church of Rome: and yet hee, not esteeming the Pope, who onely, by the
law ofGod and man, hath power to call Councels. And to decree in spirituall matters,
was willing to thinke of assembling a General or National Councell ... that the Scripture
is full of examples of the wrath of God, against the vsurpers of the office of the High
Priest... That God hath alwayes exhalted those Princes, that haue beene deuoted to the
See of Rome, Head of all Churches, Constantine, the Theodosii, and Charles the Great: and
contrality hath punished those that haue not giuen respect unto it. ... And not Princes
only, but whole Nations haue been punished for it... That he commendeth him for
desiring the amendment of the Church, but withal doth aduise him to leaue the charge
thereof to him, to whom God hath giuen it. That the Emperour is a Minister, but not a
Gouernour, nor an Head. ... That it belonged to the Emperour himselfe, to giue way
that it [the Council] may be celebrated, by making peace, or deferring the warre, while
matters of religion are handled in the Councel. That he should obey the fatherly
commandes, exclude from Imperial Diets all disputes about religion, and referre them
to the Pope .... otherwise to performe his owne duety, that he shall be forced to vse
greater seuerity against him then hee would'; History, p. 107.
201,137: 'Hee (the Pope) sent the Bishop of Viterbo, with institution, to shew him (the
Spanish King) that a Nationall Councell of that Kingdome, would bee a kinde of
Schisme from the vniuersall Church, giue a bad example to other nations, and make his
Prelates proud, assuming greater authoritie, which diminution of his owne; that is
generally knowen how earnestly they desire the restitution of the Pragmatique.
History, p. 423.
201,139: 'the Pope required that the Emperor would make the Lutherans return to the
Church of Rome by the force of arms and the Emperor that the Pope would convene a
General Council: 'it was resolued to stand in this article in generall tearmes, and
concluded, that, to reduce the Lutherans to the vnion of the Church, the Pope should
vse spiritual meanes, and Charles and Ferdinand temporall; who also should make warre
against them if they remained obstinate'; History, pp. 46-7.
202,141: 'This generall and sudden combination made the gouernours of the Kingdome
resolue, that there was neede of an Ecclesiasticall remedie, and that very quickly; and a
Nationall Synod was proposed by the whole Councell. The Cardinal of Armignac said
that nothing was to be done without the Pope... But the Bishop of Valence said, that a
sudden remedy could not be expected from the Pope, because he was farre distant, nor
a fit one, because hee was not informed of the particular necessity of the Kingdome, nor
a charitable one, because he was so busied in making his Nephewes great; that GOD
had giuen to all kingdomes, all things necessary to gouerne them; that France had
Prelats of its owne to regulate the causes of Religion, who better know the wants of the
kingdome; that it would be a great absurditie to see Paris burne, hauing the riuers of
Some and Marne full of water, and to beleeue that water must be brought from Tiber, to
quench the fire'; History, p. 422.
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203,143:. imploy themselues to diuert the Pope from so pernicious a deliberation, in
which if he shall remaine vnmoueable, they may exhort him to call a Councell;
whereunto in case he will not condescend according to order of law, hee beseecheth
their most reuerend Paternities, and the sacred College, that, the Pope denying or
deferring the conuocation, they would call it themselues, obseruing the due order.
Wherefore if they shall refuse to grant him this iust demand, or shall deferre longer
then is conuenient, he will make prouision for it himselfe by the Imperial authority,
vsing the meanes that are iust and fitting.'; History, p. 41;
also p. 57: The Pope hauing receiued aduice from his Legat, of what was done in the
Diet [Diet of Augsburg, 1530], was touched with an inward griefe of minde,
discouering that... [Charles] had not proceeded as aduocate of the Church of Rome,
vnto whom it belongeth not to take knowledge of the cause, but to bee a meer executor
of the Popes Decrees: whereunto was quite contrary to haue receiued the confessions,
and caused them to bee read, and to haue instituted a conference to accord the
differences. ... But the promising of a Councell, which hee so much abhorred, pressed
him aboue all: in which, though honourable mention were made to his authoritie, yet to
subscribe six moneths, to call it, and a yeere to beginne it, was to meddle with that
which was proper to the Pope, and to make the Emperour the principall, and the Pope
his minister'.
203,145: Cf. also Charles' own autobiography: 'For it must be known that since the year
1529, when, as already stated, he visited Italy for the first time, and had an interview
with Pope Clement, he never ceased whenever he saw either Pope Clement or Pope
Paul, and in every journey, and at every Diet in Germany, and at every time and
opportunity, continually to sollicit, either personally or through his ministers, the
convocation of a general council to provide a remedy for the evils which had arisen in
Germany, and for the errors which were being propagated in Christendom'; cited by
Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, p. 186.
204,146:'... howsoeuer, the most vnderstanding men did beleeue that the Synod was
assured that no Protestant would come to Trent, with any safe conduct whatsoeuer,
except it be by force, as it happened in the yeere 1552. because of the resolution of
Charles; a thing which could no more bee put in practice'; History, p. 481.
204,148: 'He [the French King] intimated also, that they ought not to make a
continuation of the things begim in Trent, but to abandon them quite, and make a
whole new Councell.' Ferdinand had a similar reaction: 'no mention ought to be made
of a continuation of the things begun in Trent. For the Futherancs would neuer consent
otherwise, yea, the very name of Trent would make them refuse'; History, p. 428.
205,149: '[Loraine boasts that he will cause many important and questionable issues to
be discussed] To crosse this purpose, they determined to propose the abuse of the
Kingdome of France, and to let the Ambassadours vnderstand that they would make
prouision for them; because all Princes, who desire a reformation in the Church, would
not willingly endure any at all of thcmselues, so that they thought, that if any matter of
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importance were handled to their preiudice, they would not forbeare, and make their
Prelats forbeare also to speake of things preiudiciall to the Apostolique Sea. Therefore
after some packets had passed between Rome and Trent, it being iudged a good course,
the abuses were collected, which were said to be principall in France, and partly in other
Dominions. And hence the reformation of Princes began, which, in the relation of the
things that follow, will afford vs much matter'; History, p. 617.
205,150: Cf. Pierre Pithou's comments: 'For a long time all the science of Europe ... had
been cloistered among those who are called clergy: who, being for the most part by
profession entirely removed from the conduct ofworldly things, discussed the affairs of
state not merely as a clerk would speak of weapons, but even worse as one blind from
birth would discuss colours'; cited in Parsons, Church in the Republic, p. 91.
206,151: History, p. 189: 'But the Emperour made shew he vndertook the warre, not for
Religion, but for matters of State, for that some denied him obedience, plotted with
strangers against him, and refused to obey the Lawes, vsurped the possessions of
others, especially the Churches, going about to make Bishoprikes and Abbacies
hereditarie: and that hauing prooued diuers gentle meanes to reduce them, they euer
became more insolent.
.. .But many of the Protestants kept themselues on his side, because they could not
beleeue, that hee had any other respects, then of State.
Cf. also p. 201: 'The Emperour, in conformity to his purpose of concealing the cause of
Religion, ... published a Bando against the Saxon and Landgraue, laying to their charge
that they had alwayes hiridred his designes, and had neuer obeyed him ... and couered
all these things with the glorious and sweet name of Religion, peace and liberty, but
hauing indeede rather any other end. Therefore hee doeth prescribe them, as
perfidious, rebels, seditious, guilty of high treason, and enemies of the publike peace'.
206, 152:'.. .the Pope published a Iubile in Rome, the fifteenth of Iuly: by which he eased
the Princes of Germany of the paines to find out, or perswade others, the true cause of
the warre. ... Hee therefore wished them all to haue recourse vnto GOD by prayers,
fastings, confessions, and communions, that GOD of his Diuine Majestie, would giue a
good issue to this warre, vndertaken for his glory, exaltation of the Church, and
extirpation of heresies'; History, pp. 200-1.
206,153: 'The Elector of Saxonie, and the Landgrave seeing this [that the Archbishop of
Collen followed the Emperor], they published a Manifest the eleuenth of Iuly, declaring
that the warre was vndertaken for Religion, and that the Emperour couered his
meaning with a cloake of taking reuenge against some few for rebellion, to disioyne the
confederates'; History, p. 190.
206,154: 'the Pope [Leo X], whose thoughts were wholly bent to make an Italian Lord
of that State, and therefore proposed the warre of Germanie, not so much to suppresse
the Lutherans (as hee said openly) as to diuert Caesar from possessingMilan, which was
his principall end, though secret ...'; History, p 78;
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see also p. 222, where Pope Paul III recalled his forces after seeing the Emperor's
successes; his reaction to the news of Charles' victory at Miihlberg (pp. 270-1): These
things did much afflict the Pope, who considered that Italy was without helpe, and
remained at the Emperor's discretion. Yet he was comforted, that hauing gotten the
conquest by force, hee would bee compelled to maintaine it by the same meanes, and
could not remoue his army from thence very soon. In the mean space, he had time to
treat and agree with the new French King, and the Italians, and to secure himselfe';
similarly in the case of France: 'There was an opinion that he [the Pope] secretly wished
some good success to the Hugonots in France, and some advantage to the Protestants in
the Diet of Germany, that the Coimcil might be dissolved, and not by his means.';
History, p. 628.
207,156: The Emperour, whom the Councel did more concerne, holding it to be the
onely meanes, to make himselfe absolute Master of Germanie, sent a safe conduct in an
ample forme, to all the Protestant Orders of that Empire, for themeselues, their
Ambassadours, and Diuines'; History, p. 311.
207,157: Sarpi even ascribes the death of Paul III to 'perturbation of mind':'... the
seventh of November, the Pope, seeing a letter of Duke Octavius, his nephew, that he
would make an agreement with Ferdinand Gonzaga, to enter into Parma, which City the
Pope caused to be held in the name of the Apostolick See, he was so assaulted with
perturbation of mind and anger, that he swooned, and, after some few hours, coming to
himself, he fell into a Feaver, whereof he died within three daies'; p. 298.
208, 159: The Pope, beside that he is the head of Religion, is also a Prince, and one that
from above 500 years to this day hath aspired to the Monarchy of Italy ... And what
wonder can be made of it, if he practice all the means he can to enlarge his jurisdiction.
He hath three great charges upon him; that of Religion; that of Ecclesiastical affaires;
and the temporality of his Estate. And the Fountain from which all ill is derived, is in
this, that his right is not well distinguisht from that of Princes.'; Life ofFather Paid, p. 183
(wrongly numbered as p. 163).
210,162: The passage concludes like this: 'I will omit to speake how the paines of so
many, besides the obtaining of the wished end, to make themselues independent of the
publike, haue, before they were aware, raysed an Empire, there being a more difficult
opinion sprung vp, taking root with admirable progresse, which giueth to the Pope of
Rome, as much at once, as hath, in 1300 yeeres, been gained by so many Bishops, by
such extraordinarie means, not making the power to binde and loose the foimdation of
iurisdiction, but the power of feeding and so affirming, that all iurisdiction was giuen
to the Pope by CHRIST, in the person of Peter, when he sayd to him, Feede my sheepe.'; p.
333.
210,163: Cf. the distinction made by Micanzio: 'There are also three kinds of Canons, of
spiritual things, of temporal things, and those that are mixt of both; Of the first, the care
ought to be in Ecclesiasticks, of the second none can carry the exercise beyond their
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own temporal estates, and for the third, it is as much the duty of Princes to take care, as
of the Ecclesiasticks themselves, if not more'. Having neglected their duties, the
Ecclesiastics have effectively relinquished their right of control over the third category,
of mixed authority'; Life ofFather Paul, p. 183 (wrongly numbered as p. 163).
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Appendix IX
Contents of James VI and l's Workes 0616 and 1620)
A paraphrase vpon the revelation of the Apostle S. Iohn.
A frvitfvll meditation, containing a plaine and easie exposition, or laying open of the
VII. VIII. IX and X. Verses of the 20. Chapter of the Revelation, in forme and manner
of a Sermon.
Daemonologie, in forme of a Dialogve, Diuided into Three Bookes.
BAZIAIKON AQPON. or his Maiesties Instvctions to his dearest Sonne, Henry, the
Prince.
The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, or the Reciprock and Mvtvall Dvetie betwixt a Free
King and his naturall Subiects.
A covnterblaste to Tobacco.
A Discovrse of the Maner of the Discoverie of the Powder-Treason, joyned with the
examination of some of the prisoners.
Triplici Nodo, triplex cuneus. Or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. Against the two
Breves of Pope Pavlvs Qvintvs, and the late Letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to G.
Blackwell the Arch-priest.
A Premontion to all most Migtie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes, and States of
Christendome.
A Declaration concerning the Proceedings with the States Generall, of the Vnited
Provinces of the Low Cormtreys, In the cause of D. Conradvs Vorstivs.
A Remonstrance for the Rights of Kings, and the Independance of their Crownes,
against an Oration of the most Illvstriovs Card, of Perron, Pronovnced in the
Chamber of the third Estate. Ian 15. 1615.
A Speach, as it was delivered in the vpper Hovse of the Parliament to the Lords
Spiritvall and Temporall, and to the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses there
assembled, on Mvnday the XIX. day of March 1603. being the First Day of the first
Parliament.
A Spcach in the Parliament Hovse, as nccrc the very words as covld be gathered at the
instant.
A Speach to both the Hovses of Parliament, delivered in the Great Chamber atWhite-
Hall, the last day of March 1607.
A Speach to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament atWhite-Hall, on Wednesday
the XXL ofMarch . Anno 1609.
A Speach in the Starre-Chamber, the XX. of Ivne. Anno 1616.
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Contents of Modern Editions of James's 'Political' Works
A. The Political Works of James I, ed. Charles H. Mcllwain (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard UP, 1918).
Basilikon Doron
The Trew Law of Free Monarchies
An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance
A Premonition to all Christian Monarches, Free Princes and States





Speech in the Star Chamber, 1616
B. King James VI and 1, Political Writings, ed. Tohann P. Sommerville (Cambridge:
CUP, 1994).
Basilicon Doron
Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cnneus. Or an Apologie for the Oath ofAllegiance
Speech to parliament of 19 March 1604
Speech to parliament of 9 November 1605
Speech to parliament of 31 March 1607
Speech to parliament of 21 March 1610
Speech in Star Chamber of 20 June 1616
A Meditation upon the 27th, 28th and 29th Verses of the 27th Chapter of Saint Matthew (1619)




Citations from Chapter Four
The quotations below are taken from James I. The Workes (1616), facsimile edition
(Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971) and from Craigie, James (ed.), The
Basilicon Doron ofKing James VI. 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Text Society,
1944-50); and idem, Minor Prose Works ofKing James VI and I. (Edinburgh: STS, 1982).
The first number refers to the page, and the second to the footnote.
234, 27: Thus James in his preface to the reader in Basilikon Doron: 'And amongst the rest
ofmy secret actions, whiche hanc (vnlookedfor ofme) come to publick knowledge, it hath so fares
with my BaoiAiKov Soopov directed to my eldest sonne: whiche I wrotefor exercise ofmy own
ingyne and instruction ofhim, who is appointed by God (I hope) to sit on my Throne after me...
I onely permitted seuen of them [copies] to be printed, the printer beingfirst swornefor secrecie:
and these seuen I dispersed amongst some ofmy trustiest seruants, to be keeped closelie by
them... But since contrarie to my intention and exspectation,..., this booke is noiu vented, and
setfoorth to the publike viewe of the worlde, and consequently, subiect to euery mans censure ...
I am nowe forced.. .both to publishe and spread the true copies thereof for defacing of thefalse
copies that are alreadie spred, as I am enformed; as likewayes, by this preface, to cleare suche
parts thereof as in respect of the concised shortnesse ofmy style, may be mis-interpreted
therein.'; Basilikon Doron, p. 13.
234, 28: 'I onely write this a ground, whereupon I meane (if God shall spear mee dayes
and leisure) to set down at large (as in the descant) the whole principal points
belonging to the office of a king'; Workes, p. 606.
236, 33: Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 292: This Oath now grounded vpon so great and iust
an occasion, set forth in so reasonable terms, and ordained onely for making of a trew
distinction betweene Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good subiects,
and such other Papists as in their heart maintained the like violent bloody Maximes, that
the Powder -Traitours did'.
237, 37: 'As likewise you cannot, without most euident and grieuous wronging of Gods
Honour, bind your selues by the Oath, which in like manner we haue heard with great
griefe of our heart is administered vnto you... it must euidently appeare vnto you by
the words themselues, That such an Oath cannot be taken without hurting of the
Catholike Faith and the saluation of your soules; seeing it containes many things which
are flat contrary to Faith and saluation.'; Apologie; Workes, pp. 250-1.
237, 39: Apologie; Workes, p. 258: 'That our Apostolike Letters were written not only
upon our proper motion, and of our certaine knowledge, but also after long and
weightie deliberation vsed concerning all those things, which are contained in them;
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and that for that cause ye are bound fully to obserue them [the letters] reiecting all
interpretation perswading to the contrary..
239, 47: Premonition; Workes, p. 288: 'To the Most Sacred and Invincible Prince,
Rodolphe the II.(Emperour), ... and to all other Right High and Mightie Kings, And
Right Excellent free Princes and States of Christendome Our louing Brethern, Cosins,
Allies, Confederates and Friends'.
240, 49: Cf. James: 'And thus may ye now clearly see, how deepe the claime of the
Babylonian Monarch toucheth vs in all our common interest..Premonition; Workes, p.
333.
241, 52: Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 289: 'To you, I say, as of right belongeth, doe I
consecrate and direct thisWarning of mine, or rather Preamble to my reprinted Apologia
for the Oath ofAllegiance. For the cause is generall, and concerneth the Authoritie and
priuiledge of Kings in generall, and all supereminent Temporall powers.... The
consideration hereof hath now mooued mee to expone a Case vnto you, which doeth
not so neerely touch mee in particular, as it doeth breach against our Authoritie, (I
speake in the plural of all Kings) and priuiledge in generall.'
243, 58: 'For how the profession of the naturall Allegiance of Subiects to their Prince
can be directly opposite to the faith and saluation of soules, is so farre beyond my
simple reading in Diuinitie, as I must thinke it a strange and new Assertion, to
proceede out of the mouth of that pretended generall Pastor of all Christian soules.',
Apologie; Workes, p. 254. Cf. also p. 256: 'Temporal obedience to a temporal magistrate
did nothing repugne to matters of faith or salvation of soules...'.
245, 66: Cf. Basilikon Doron, pp. 47-9: 'And fore keeping your conscience sound from
that siknes of superstition, ye must neither lay the safetie of your conscience vpon the
credite of your own conceits, nor yet of other mens humors, howe great doctors of
divinitie that euer they be; but ye must onely ground it vpon the expresse
Scripture.. .Beware therefore in this case with two extremities: the one, to beleeue with
the Papists, the Chinches authority, better then your owne knowledge; th' other to
leane with the Anabaptistes, to your owne conceits and dreamed reuelations. But learne
wisely to discerne betwixt points of saluation and indifferent things, betwixt substance
and ceremonies; and betwixt the express commandement and will of God in his word,
and the invention or ordinance of man: since all that is necessarie for saluation is
contained in the Scripture.'
245, 67: Premonition; Workes, p. 296: 'he [Bellarmine] is so bolde as to affirme, that
Church-men are exempted from the power of earthly Kings; and that they ought them
no subiection euen in temporall matters, but onely vi rationis and in their owne
discretion, for the presentation of peace and good order.'
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246, 68: Cf. also Apologie; Workes, p. 282: 'Wee doe constantly affirme, that all Christian
Kings are so farre vnder Bishops and Priests in all matters appertaining to faith, that if
they shall continue in a fault against Christian Religion ... for that cause they may and
ought to be deposed by the Bishops from their temporal! authoritie they holde ouer
Christians. Bishops are set ouer temporall kingdomes, if those kingdomes doe submit
themselues to the faith of Christ. We doe iustly affirme, that all Secular power, whether
Regall, or any other, is of men. The anoynting which is powred vpon the head of the
King by the Priest, doeth declare that hee is inferiour to the Priest.'
246, 69: 'And as for the setting vp of the People aboue their owne naturall King, he
bringeth in that principle of Sedition, that he may thereby proue, that Kings haue not
their power and authoritie immediately from God, as the Pope hath his: For euery King
(saith he) is made and chosen by his people; nay, they doe but so transferre their power
in the Kings person, as they doe notwithstanding retaine their habituall power in their
owne hands, which vpon certaine occasions they may actually take to themselues
againe. This, I am sure, is an excellent groimd in Diuinitie for all Rebels and rebellious
people, who are hereby allowed to rebell against their Princes; and assume libertie vnto
themselues, when in their discretions they shall thinke it conuenient.'; Premonition;
Workes, p. 331.
246, 70: 'yet do not preferre a temporall liberty to the liberty of the glory of the Sonnes
of God: neither for escaping a light & momentarie tribulation, lose an eternal weight of
glory...' Apologie, Workes, p. 262.
247, 72: [Augustine discussing Iulian] They distinguished their eternall Lord from their
temporall, and yet were they subiect euen vnto their temporall Lord, for his sake that
was their eternall Lord and Master. Apologie-, Workes, p. 255.
248, 75: See pp. Premonition; Workes, pp. 306-7. Cf. also ibid., p. 296: 'Thus hath he set
such a new goodly interpretation vpon the wordes of CHRIST, Pasce ones meas, as if it
were as much to say, as, depose Christian Kings; and that Quodcunque solueris gaue the
Pope power to dispense with all sorts of Oathes, Vowes, Penalties, Censures and
Lawes, euen with the Naturall obedience of Subiects to their Souereigne Lords; much
like to that new coyned glosse that his brother Baronius made vpon the wordes in Saint
Peters vision, Surge Petre, occide & manduca; That is (said he to the Pope) Goe kill and
conformd the Venetians.'
250, 78: 'And when it [title of Universal Bishop] was offered to himselfe the wordes of S.
Gregory be these, refusing that Title: None ofmy predecessours [Bishops of Rome,] eiier
consented to vse this profane name [of vniversall Bishop]. None ofmy predecessours euer
tooke vpon him this name ofsingularitie, neither consented to vse it, Wee the Bishops ofRome
doe not seeke, nor yet accept this glorious title offered vnto vs. And now, I pray you, would
he that refused to be called Vniversall Bishop, be stiled Caput fidei, vnlesse it were in
that sense, as I haue expressed?'; Apologie; Workes, p. 279.
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250, 80: Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 402-3: 'It is to be obserued withall, that when the
Emperours were not of sufficient strength, and Popes had power to beard and to braue
Emperours, then these Papall practices were first set on foot'.
250, 81: 'The Popes in that aage writing to the Emperours, vsed none but submissiue
tearmes, by way ofmost humble supplications; made profession of bowing the knee
before their sacred Maiesties, and of executing their commaunds with entire obedience;
payed to the Emperours twenty pound weight of gold for their Inuestiture... ';
Premonition; Workes,pp. 297-8. Also: 'Yee shall first see how farre other Godly and
Christian Emperours and Kings were from acknowledging the Popes temporal!
Supremacie ouer them; nay, haue created, controlled and deposed Popes: and next, what
a number ofmy Predecessorshx this Kingdome haue at all occasions, euen in the times of
the greates Greatnesse of Popes, resisted and plainely withstood them in this
point... .That all Archbishops and Bishops should receiue their Inuestiture from the
Emperour..Premonition; Workes, p. 297.
250, 82: 'But that the King of France and Church thereof haue euer stoken to their
Gallican immunitie, in denying the Pope any Temporall power ouer them, and in
resisting the Popes as oft as euer they prest to meddle with their Temporall power,
euen in the donation of Benefices, the Histories are so full of them, as the onely
examples thereof would make vp a bigge Volume by it selfe. And so farre were the
Sorbonnistes for the Kings and French Chinches priuiledge in this point, as they were
wont to maintaine; That if the Pope fell a quarrelling the King for that cause, the
Gallican Churchmight elect a Patriarch of their owne, renouncing any obedience to the
Pope. And Gerson was so farre from giuing the Pope that temporall authority ouer
kings (who otherwise was a deuout Roman Catholike) as hee wrote a Booke de
Auferibilitate Papse; not onely from the power ouer Kings, but euen ouer the Chinch';
Premonition; Workes, pp. 298-9.
251, 84: 'To conclude then, The trewth is that Peter was both in aage, and in the time of
CHRISTS calling him, one of the first of the Apostles; In order the principall of the first
twelue, and one of the three whom CHRIST for order sake preferred to all the rest. And
no further did the Bishop of Rome claime for three himdred yeeres after CHRIST:
Subiect they were to the generall Counsels, and euen but of late did the Councell of
Constance depose three Popes, and set vp the fourth'; Premonition; Workes, p. 307.
255, 94: Cf. Premonition; Workes, p. 332:'.. .so it is well enough knowen to some of you
(my louing Brethern) by what holy Spirit or casting of Lots the Popes vse to be elected;
the Colledge of Cardinals, his electors, hauing beene diuided in two mightie factions
cucr since long before my time; and in place ofcasting of Lotto, greatfat pensions being cast
into some of their greedy mouthes for the election of the Pope, according to the partiall
humours of Princes.'
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257, 97: 'And yet he that gaue so much to Peter, took nothing from Caesar; but gaue
him both his Titles and due, giuing the power of calling a Council to the Emperor';
Apologie; Workes, p. 280.
258,102: 'When yee go about to disturbe, diminish, or take away the authoritie or
supremacie of the Church, which resteth on the head of the King, within his dominions,
ye cut off the head and chiefe gouernour thereof, and disturbe the state and members of
the whole body.'; Apologie; Workes, p. 279.
259,104: The text included: 'that since he [the king] is known to be the sovereign in his
state, holding his Crown from God alone, that there is no power on earth whatever,
spiritual or temporal, which has any authority over his kingdom, to take away the
sacred nature of our kings, to dispense [or absolve] their subjects of the fidelity and
obedience which they owe them for any cause or pretext whatsoever', quoted in
Patterson, James VI and I and the Reunion ofChristendom, p. 183.
261,110: Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 396-7: 'They [the Popes] depose Princes for
infringing, or in any sort diminishing the Priuiledges of Monasteries... They depose for
naturall dullnesse and lacke of capacitie.. .They depose for collating of Benefices and
Prebends.. .They depose for adulteries and Matrimoniall suites.. .Finally, faine would I
learne into what Heresie or degree of Apostasie, either Henry IV. or Frederic Barbarossa,
or Frederic II. Emperours were fallen, when they were smittenwith Papall fulminations,
euen to the depriuation of their Imperiall Thrones.'
261,112: Cf. Remonstrance; Workes, pp. 402-3: 'It is to be obserued withall, that when the
Emperours were not of sufficient strength, and Popes had power to beard and to braue
Emperours, then these Papall practices were first set on foot'.
262,116: 'And whereas nowdays a General Council cannot be held, except it be called
and assembled by the Popes authority ... and how the pope can be president in a
council, where himself is the party impleeded?'; Remonstrance; Workes, p. 423.
262,117: 'It is willingly granted, that Emperours neuer challenged, neuer arrogated, to
bee Soueraigne Iudges in controuersies of doctrine and faith; neuerthelesse it is clearer
then the Sunnes light at high noone, that for moderation at Synods, for determinations
and orders established in Councils, and for the discipline of the Church, they haue
made a good and a full vse of their Imperiall authoritie. The first Council at
Constantinople, beares this title or inscription; The dedication of the holy Synode to the most
religious Emperour Theodosius the Great, to tuhose zvill and pleasure they haue submitted
these Canons by them addressed and established in Councill. And there they also beseech the
Emperour, to confirme and appoue the said Canons. ... This was not done, because
Emperours tooke vpon them to bee infallible Iudges of doctrine; but onely that
Emperourc might sec and iudge, whether Bishops (who fcclc the prickc of ambition as
other men doe) did propound nothing in their Conuocations and Consultations, but
most of all in their Determinations, to vnderminc the Emperourc authoritie, to disturbc
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the tranquilitie of the Common-wealth, and to crosse the determinations of precedent
Councils'; Remonstrance; Workes, p. 427.
268,133:'... wher-through I was ofttimes calumniated in their populare sermons, not
for any euill or vice in me, but because I was a King; whiche they thought the highest
euill. and yet for all their cunning, whereby they pretended to distinguishe the
lawfulness of the office, from the vice of the person, some of them would some-times
snapper out well grosselie with the trueth of their intentions: informing the people, that
all Kings and Princes were naturally enemies to the libertie of the Churche, and could
neuer patiently beare the yoke of Christ: with suche sound doctrine fed they their
flocks/; Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9.
269,134: Basilikon Doron, pp. 77-9: 'For if by example thereof, once established in the
Ecclesiasitcall gouernment, the Politicke and ciuill estate should be drawne to the like,
the greate confusion that there-upon would arise, may easily be discerned. Take heede
therefore (my Sonne) to such Puritanes, verie pestes in the Churche & common-weale:
whom no deserts can oblishe, neither oathes or promises binde; breathing nothing but
sedition and calumnies, aspyringwithout measure, rayling without reason, and making
their owne imaginations (without any warrant of the worde) the square of their
conscience'
270,135: 'If then Idolatrie and defection from God, tyrannie ouer their people, and
persecution of the Saints, for their profession sake, hindred not the sprit of God to
command his people vnder all hiest paine to giue them al due and hartie obedience for
conscience sake, giuing to CESAR that which was CAESARS, and to God that which
was Gods, as Christ saieth; [...] the duety, and allegeance of the people to their lawful
King, their obedience, I say, ought to be to him, as to Gods Lieutenant in earth, obeying
his commands in all thinges, except directly against God, as the commands of Gods
Minister, acknowledging him as a Iudge set by God ouer them, hauing power to judge
them, but to be judged onely by God, whome to onelie he must giue count of his
judgement...'; True Lawe, p. 69.
270,137: True Lawe, pp. 61-2: 'Kings are called Gods by the propheticall King DAVID,
because they sit vpon God his throne in the earth, and have the count of their
administration to give vnto him. Their office is, To minister Iustice and Iudgement to
their people .... To advance the good, and punishe the evill ... To establishe good lawes
to his people, and procure obedience to the same ... To procure the peace of the people
... To decide al controversies that can arise among them ... To be the minister of God
for the weale of him that doth well, and, as the minister of God, to take vengeance vpon
them that do euil.. .As a good Pastour... And therefore in the Coronation of our owne
Kings, as well as of euery Christian Monarche, they giue their Oath, first to maintaine
the Religion, presently professed within their countrie, according to their lawes, wherey
it is established, and to punish all those that should presse to alter, or disturbe the
profession thereof.
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270,138: 'Bvt as ye are clothed with two callings, so must ye be alike carefull for the
discharge of them both: that as ye are a good Christian, so ye may be a good King,
discharging your office (as I shewed before) in the points of justice and aequity: whiche
in two sundry waies ye must doe: the one, in establishing and executing, (which is the
life of the lawe) good lawes among your people: the other, by your behauiour in your
person, and with your seruantes, to teach your people by example Basilikon Doron,
p. 53.
271,140: Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3: 'And to end my aduice anent the Church estate,
cherishe no man more then a good Pastor, hate no man more then a proude Puritane:
thinking it one of your fairest styles, to be called a louing nourish-father to the Churche;
seeing all the Churches within your dominions planted with good Pastors ... as the
flourishing of your churche in pietie, peace, & learning, may be one of the cheefe
pointes of your earthly glory'.
272,144: 'The naturall sicknesse that haue euer troubled, and beene / the decay of all
the Churches, since the beginning of the world, changing the candle-sticke from one to
another, as Iohn saith, haue bene Pride, Ambition, and Auarice: and now last, these
same infirmities wrought the ouer-throwe of the Popishe Churche, in this covmtry and
diuers others'; Basilikon Doron, pp. 73-5.
273,146: Cf. True Lawe, pp. 80-1: 'And so to refuse him, or intrude an other, is not to
hold out vncomming in; but to expel, & put out the righteous King. And I trust at this
time whole France acknowledgeth the superstitious rebellion of the Liguers, who, vpon
pretence of heresie, by force of armes held so long out, to the great desolation of their
whole covmtrie, their natiue and righteous King from possessing of his owne crowne
and naturall kingdome'
273,147: 'being euer alike ware with both the extremities; as well as ye represse the
vaine Puritane, so suffer not proude Papall Bishops... '; Basilikon Doron, pp. 81-3.
278,161: 'But learne wisely to discerne betwixt points of saluation and indifferent
things, betwixt substance and ceremonies; and betwixt the express commandement and
will of God in his word, and the invention or ordinance of man: since all that is
necessarie for saluation is contained in the Scripture.'; Basilikon Doron, p. 49.
281,167: Cf. Basilikon Doro?t, pp. 16-7: 'that are persuaded, that their Bishops smells of a
Papall supremacie, that the Surplice, the cornered cap, and suche like, are the outward
badges of Popish errours'.
281,170: 'Thus hath the Cardinals shamelesse wresting of those two places of Scripture,
Pasce ones meas, and Tibi dabo clause, for proouing of the Popes supreame Temporall
authoreitie ouer Princes; animated mee to prooue the Pope to bee THE ANTICHRIST,
out of his foresaid booke of Scripture; so to pay him in his owne money againe. And
this opinion no Pope can euer make me to recant; except they first renounce any further
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medling with Princes, in any thing belonging to their Temporall Iurisdiction.';
Premonition; Workes, pp. 328-9.
284,175: 'Kings therefore, as Gods Deputie-iudges vpon earth, sit in thrones, clad with
long robes, not as laikes and simply togati (as inferior secular Iudges are) but as mixtae
personae (as I said in my BAZIAIKON AQPON) being bound to make a reckoning to
Godfor their subiects soules as well as their bodies. Not that they ought to vsurpe any
point of the Priestly office, no more then the Prist should the Kings, for these two offices
were deuided in Aarons Priesthood; but it is the Kings office to ouersee and compell the
Church to do her office, to purge all abuses in her, and by his sword (as vindex vtriusquae
tabidae) to procure her due reuerence and obedience of all his temporall subiects.';
Meditation upon the Verses ofSt. Matthew; Workes, p. 611.
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